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Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to interpret Michael Oakeshott as a critic of Enlightenment 
positions. In so doing, the author’s ambition is to go some way to fulfilling the lacuna in 
Oakeshott studies by concentrating on his notion of philosophy. Having introduced my 
project of study in the opening chapter, I begin chapter two with an examination of 
philosophical modernism in order to allude to the Enlightenment positions concerned: 
foundationalism in philosophy, formalism in ethics and naturalism in history. In the 
following chapters I turn to cope with Oakeshott’s reflection upon philosophical 
modernity, liberal ethics and positivist historiography respectively. It is my view that 
Oakeshott’s critique of philosophisme and Rationalism expresses a sense of the crisis of 
philosophical modernity and throughout his intellectual career he has never altered his 
analysis of these two themes: philosophy as the persistent re-establishment of 
completeness by transcending abstractness, and the modes of experience as self- 
consistent worlds of discourse. To apply this philosophy, in his moral and political 
writings Oakeshott has re-established a balance against the Enlightenment ethical 
position: “the sovereignty of technique”, “demonstrative moral truth”, “the politics of 
faith”, or “enterprise association”, by revitalising the importance of “traditional 
knowledge”, “conversationally traditional intimation”, “the politics of scepticism” or 
“civil association”. Oakeshott is not a doctrinal liberal any more than a dogmatic 
conservative, but a sceptical philosopher who is the victim o f thought. Moreover, 
Oakeshott’s contribution to history not only lies in his effort to transcend the 
Enlightenment historiographical position by separating the historical from the naturalised 
conception of History on which the so-called “scientific history” rests, but also in his 
idealist^ solution for the “temporal dilemma in history” and the “epistemic tension in 
history” that have long bothered philosophers.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: A UNIQUE VOICE
The purpose of this thesis is to interpret the works of Michael J. Oakeshott (1901-1990, 
the Professor of Political Science at the LSE, 1951-1969) as a substantial critic of the 
Enlightenment project by concentrating on his philosophy of politics and history. In this 
context, my ambition is to clarify some debated issues in Oakeshott studies by a fresh 
approach to understanding the philosopher’s unique voice in the “conversation of 
mankind”.
Oakeshott is, of course, best known today for his political philosophy for which 
he has been acclaimed “the greatest political philosopher in the Anglo-Saxon tradition 
since John Stuart Mill - or even Burke”, and “the most original academic political 
philosopher of this century”.1 Oakeshott’s philosophical position of understanding 
politics and morality, however, continues to be disputable. Whilst the initial reception of 
Rationalism in Politics (1962) has been coloured by some scholars with a progressive 
attitude and labelled loosely as “pessimistic”, “traditionalist” or “conservative” in a 
somewhat negative sense,2 more recent scholarship, by contrast, has tried to show that 
with On Human Conduct (1975) Oakeshott’s political philosophy can be treated as a 
comprehensive restatement of liberalism.3
It is my view that Oakeshott is not a doctrinal liberal any more than a dogmatic 
conservative,4 but a sceptical philosopher who is the “victim o f thoughf’5. Political 
philosophy, as Oakeshott understands it, is nothing if not philosophy, inasmuch as it is 
the application of a doctrine about the nature of philosophy to the study of the nature of
1 Daily Telegraph, December 21, 1990, The Guardian, December 22, 1990; quoted by J. L. Auspitz, 
1993: 1. See also, Casey, 1993: 58; J. Hart, 1993: 82; R. Grant, 1990: 9.
2 Cf. T. Fuller, 1991: xiv-xv. For the detailed charge of Oakeshott being a conservative, see, for 
example, N. Wood, 1959: 645-62; B. Crick, 1963: 65-74; H. Pitkin, 1973: 496-525.
3 For the interpretation of Oakeshott as a liberal, see P. Franco, 1990; J. Gray, 1989: 199-217, and 1993: 
40-7; W. J. Coats, Jr., 1985: 773-87. Cf. D. Thomas, 1977: 454; N. O’Sullivan, 1993: 106.
4 For the differences between the conservative disposition in Oakeshott’s thought and conservatism as a 
political ideology, see, for example, J. Ryaner, 1985: 313, 316, 334-8. Cf. B. Barber, 1976: 446-50.
5 EM: 321; RP: 150.
politics.6 Philosophical thinking, as established in Experience and It Modes (1933), is the 
persistent re-establishment of completeness, which aims to transcend the abstractness of 
modes of understanding such as history, science, poetry and practice (mainly including 
morality and politics) for its own sake, but does not take the place of the modes. Hence, 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy is self-limited in the sense that it aims to explain rather 
than suggest, and it is self-critical in the sense that the explanation on which it embarks is 
a tireless consideration about the conditionality of the conditions of political practice.
In the course of this philosophical adventure, liberal ethics has been unveiled as 
an incomplete form of understanding politics that Oakeshott’s traditionalist, conservative 
or sceptical politics intends to transcend; and a notable concern of this thesis is to 
provide a platform for looking at Oakeshott’s criticisms of liberalism. For the moment, 
however, it is only significant to note that in addition to self-limitation and self-criticism, 
Oakeshott’s notion of philosophy also entails a Montaignean scepticism which contends 
that human understanding is “an engagement to abate mystery rather than to achieve 
definitive understanding”7, because it always involves a world of ideas, a tradition of 
behaviour which is too comprehensive to be totally grasped. It is without doubt that 
Oakeshott’s traditionalist politics, maintaining that politics is a way of living in which the 
participants are learning how to recognise plausible statements for given contingent 
circumstances through the “pursuit of the intimations” of a political tradition, is likewise 
a consequence of this philosophical scepticism. Moreover, as I hope to show, this non- 
foundationalist practical reasoning deeply embedded in Oakeshott’s thought is actually a 
re-establishment (which is somewhat uncritical, though) of Aristotelian rhetoric in 
association with phronesis. Thus, in any event, it is intellectually arbitrary to depreciate 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy simply because of his conservative identification, nor is 
it practically sound to regard his theory of civitas as one which “came down earth” in the 
practice of Thatcherism.8
In addition to politics, Oakeshott has also “done as much as anyone in the 
modem world to establish [history] as an independent manner of thinking.”9 “For anyone
6 See esp. RP: 236.
7 HC: 2ff.
8 J. Hart, 1993: 83. As T. Fuller puts it, Oakeshott “never really became the guru of Thatcherism as 
some who lack subtlety have alleged.” (1993a: 68.)
9 W. H. Greenleaf, 1966: 29.
interested in the contribution of English idealism to the philosophy of history, 
Oakeshott’s writings are an indispensable source.”10 Even though one may not agree that 
Oakeshott’s theory of history “ranks with Vico’s in its originality and scope”,11 it has 
been widely accepted that it “represents the high-water mark of English thought upon 
history.”12 It is more than clear that the current of historical thought against which 
Oakeshott argues constantly is positivist historiography. But I believe it would be a 
misconception to decipher Oakeshott as an historicist.
To transcend the positivist-historicist debate in favour of Oakeshott’s 
historiography, it is advantageous if where appropriate we distinguish a number of 
different references related to the ambiguous term “history”. To put it briefly, they are: 
(1) history as a mode of understanding, i.e. an enquiry; (2) History as “what really 
happened” in the Past, i.e. the Past in itself as a whole; (3) history as a habit of the 
human mind, i.e. the historicity or historical consciousness of human understanding, 
meaning that human knowledge involves a hermeneutic-self, a tradition of ideas, rather 
than a Cartesian-self, a set of principles; and (4) the history of a certain subject-matter 
which refers to the recorded evidence, res gestae, about such subject-matter that is 
surviving in the present and available to the interpreters.
Before examining these references in more detail, there are accordingly three 
types of historiography that can be concisely expressed in this way: First, positivist 
historiography is the view that history as an enquiry is the causal representation of the 
course of “what really happened” in History. Secondly, historicist historiography is the 
doctrine that since the human mind must be historically conditioned, only through the 
lens of the historical mode may we comprehend the genuine meaning of things; insofar as 
all knowledge proper is historical. Thirdly, compared to positivism, Oakeshottian 
historiography is the belief that the Past in itself is out of our reach in the present, instead 
there are several forms of reading past in terms of res gestae, corresponding to several 
modes of experience in the present (e.g. the historical past, the practical past, the 
scientific past etc.); on this view, not everything concerning past is historical,13 but
10 W. Dray, 1968: 19.
11 A. Sullivan, The New Republic', quoted by T. W. Smith, 1996: 598.
12 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: pp. 158-9. Cf. J. L. Auspitz, 1993: 22. where he writes that “if R. G. 
Collingwood was correct in calling that earlier ‘the high water mark of English thought upon history’, 
the essays published fifty years later [i.e. On History and Other Essays] must be the flood tide.”
13 Cf. D. Boucher, 1991: 721.
rather, history as an enquiry is a specific way of narrating res gestae, in short, history 
exists only in the work of the historian. And, although Oakeshott would not deny that 
human understanding must be historically or traditionally conditioned, as we shall see, 
unlike the historicists such as Collingwood, he does not intend to identify our historicity 
or traditional knowledge with historical knowledge without modifications.
That is to say, regarding the map of human knowledge, it is Oakeshott’s major 
point that reason appropriate to a mode of understanding or a tradition of activity (which 
may contain a certain historicity of human knowing) cannot be applied to any others 
without being self-deconstructed.14 As a result of this, we are approaching Oakeshott’s 
objection to philosophical modernity, i.e. the conception of philosophy par excellence, 
which suggests that philosophy should be a master discipline that lays foundations for the 
natural sciences and authorises the validity of any other knowledge in terms of an 
objective scientific-criterion. In other words, philosophical modernity expresses the view 
that human reasons can be united in the form of Universal Philosophical Reason 
elucidated by science.
At this point, nonetheless, Oakeshott’s anti-foundationalist position likewise calls 
for a debate. For, inspired by the work of Rorty and other post-modern writers, many 
believe that the only way out of philosophical foundationalism is to put an end to the 
enterprise of philosophy in terms of epistemology. Oakeshott’s idealistic connection, 
however, has led him to believe in the possibility of a self-independent epistemological 
discourse.
Be that as it may, I believe that because Oakeshott’s sceptical idealism leaves his 
reflection upon the despotism of philosophical modernism at a philosophical level, it 
actually offers us an alternative answer to the self-image of philosophy without claiming 
“the end to philosophy”. And so, I think, the clearer we become about Oakeshott’s 
philosophical rejection of foundationalism, the less we should worry about Rorty’s 
insistence on the necessary connection between epistemology and foundationalism. 
Consequently, if my interpretation of Oakeshott’s philosophical thought is plausible, we 
may reach the understanding that Oakeshott may have successfully resolved Rorty’s
14 Indeed, a significant aspect of Oakeshott’s enterprise is to reconcile the sharp contrast between Reason 
and Tradition (rationality and historicity) led by the Enlightenment thinkers, (see esp. [IV.3.2.] & 
[IV.3.3.].)
problematic proposal in a way which is safe from the charge of “total scepticism”, a 
charge that scholars often make against Rorty’s case.
Now, it is of little wonder to say that philosophical modernity, liberal ethics and positivist 
historiography, the three main targets to which Oakeshott’s critique of Western 
intellectual fashion points, are exactly the elements that underlie the so-called 
Enlightenment project. By re-placing Oakeshott into this very context, it would then 
become possible for us to arrive at a new level of assessing Oakeshott’s thought as a 
whole where his profound philosophical reflection upon politics and history could be 
better understood. And this, as already indicated, is presumably the major contribution to 
Oakeshott studies that this thesis wishes to make.
To achieve this goal, I therefore begin Chapter II with an examination of 
philosophical modernism, by means of which I shall unveil the Enlightenment project in 
terms of three positions: (1) foundationalism in philosophy, (2) formalism in ethics and 
(3) naturalism in historiography. The crisis of the Enlightenment project has indeed 
achieved serious attention from contemporary thinkers such as Foucault, Habermas, 
Derrida, Rorty and MacIntyre, to name only a few. Among these major figures, however, 
it is MacIntyre’s position that I take to be closest to Oakeshott’s, even though there are 
still significant differences between them. Put briefly, in Oakeshott’s very case the 
Enlightenment ethical position in terms of formalism results in an empty concept of 
rationality, and the scientific attempt to generalise history has exactly obscured the 
possible route of returning us to traditions to which the concrete moral and political 
exemplifications belong. And further, since the Enlightenment positions constitute a 
whole package in favour of philosophy par excellence, to untie the bond that is required 
in the first place is therefore a non-foundationalist conception of philosophy itself.15
Here we thus come to Chapter III which takes Oakeshott’s notion of philosophy 
into full consideration. The approach I am adopting to re-interpret Experience and Its 
Modes, the key text of Oakeshott’s philosophy, is basically to see it as a response to the 
crisis of philosophisme, inasmuch as it contains a very clear sense of renouncing ideas
15 Whilst in VP Oakeshott concedes that “to rescue the conversation from the bog into which it has fallen 
and to restore to it some of its lost freedom of movement would require a philosophy more profound than 
anything I have to offer” (VP: 15), it seems to me that earlier in EM Oakeshott has attempted to seek this 
philosophy.
from philosophical modernity that scholars used to follow. Although, with regard to his 
idealistic background, Oakeshott retains Hegel’s understanding of philosophy as the 
perpetual re-establishment of coherence, yet at the same time he subscribes to Bradley’s 
revised idealism which argues that “hence no total truth, only more or less of validity”,16 
i.e. human thought (which can have a number of spheres or worlds) must be conditional: 
every idea refers to reality from a limited standpoint and has its own degree of truth. 
That is, Oakeshott has actually merged Hegel’s notion of completeness and Bradley’s 
idea of “degrees of truth and reality” into a form of “sceptical idealism”, which purports 
to maintain the following: Even though philosophy is the self-critical thought which is 
concerned with the conditionality of human understanding for its own sake, i.e. to be 
complete, this pure thinking is so self-limited and sceptical that it contributes nothing to 
the fact that ordinarily we live in an abstract world, and that we have at our disposal a 
number of self-consistent but incomplete ways of understanding. In short, Oakeshott 
creates two themes in Experience and Its Modes which he has ever since retained 
throughout his whole academic career: a non-foundationalist philosophy characterised in 
terms of self-independence (or self-criticism), self-limitation and scepticism, and the self- 
consistency of modes of experience.
Having examined Oakeshott’s philosophical idea per se, Chapter IV comes to 
terms with his philosophical understanding of morality and politics. In summing up, the 
central problem which concerns this chapter is this: Oakeshott’s attack on Rationalism 
can be well understood as an extension of his criticism of the Enlightenment project, not 
merely because the quality Oakeshott gives to Rationalism fits perfectly with the 
assumptions of formalism in ethics that we shall disclose, but also because the 
philosophical foundations Oakeshott traces to Rationalism are nothing but the 
assumptions of foundationalism in philosophy that we shall unveil. It is on the 
interpretation of Rationalism in Politics that Oakeshott’s endeavour to ponder the crisis 
of Enlightenment positions becomes most evident.
Moreover, given Oakeshott’s position on formalism in ethics, a contradiction 
would at once become evident if Oakeshott is interpreted as a liberal.17 For, formalism in
16 Bradley, 1969: chap. xxiv.
17 Here I am not denying that Oakeshott’s rationalism in politics mainly embraces both socialism and 
liberalism. A qualified consideration about this matter will be provided when I come to examine 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy in more detail.
ethics or rationalism in politics, as we shall see, is that which portrays Lockean natural 
law theory, the Kantian categorical imperative and Millian utilitarianism, the three main 
traditions of justifying liberalism. And yet, in contrast to the characteristics of liberalism 
in terms of (1) a set of principles, (2) radical individualism and (3) formalistic 
argumentation, Oakeshott basically follows Aristotle in comprehending conservatism in 
politics as (1) a “way of living” in which (2) the traditionalist-individual is engaged, (3) a 
“rhetorical form of reasoning” which deals with plausible statements in given 
circumstances through the “pursuit of intimations” of a political tradition. And if 
questioned thus: isn’t it true that Oakeshott has “a love of freedom”18? my reply is that 
his love of freedom does not have the same quality as the liberal’s.
But further, all this does not simply suggest that Oakeshott has tried to purge 
liberalism of whatever defects it may contain, in order to restate it in terms of a theory of 
civil association in On Human Conduct. In the first place, civil association is a more 
sophisticated reconstruction of conservatism in politics, by bringing a Hobbesian 
legalistic character of civil authority into consideration. More crucially, although in On 
Human Conduct Oakeshott keeps liberalism out of the most remarkable fountain of 
enterprise association or universitas19, he does not embrace it in civil association or 
societas, either.20 The absence of liberalism in the work is because part of Oakeshott’s 
interests there is to show a societas cum universitate as the “unsolved tension” limiting 
the identification of modem European political character and consciousness.21
The aim of Chapter V is to give a detailed analysis of Oakeshottian 
historiography. There are basically three main issues concerning contemporary 
historiographical debate that will be put forward here: first, the epistemological problem 
of historical knowledge; second, the autonomous problem of history; and third the 
problem of historicism. Oakeshott indeed battles with positivist historiography over the 
first two issues; but here, once again, Oakeshott’s contribution to this field can be more 
profitably perceived while understanding him as a critic of the Enlightenment 
historiographical position.
18 N. O’Sullivan, 1993: 101. CF. M. Cranston, 1967: 82.
19 See HC: 136-313.
20 See esp. HC: 245, n2.
21 See esp. HC: 200-1, 320. Cf. PFPS.
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Epistemologically, it is my understanding that there are two intricate impasses 
inherent in scientific historical thought from the philosophes to neo-positivism. In the 
first place, it produces a “temporal dilemma in history”. That is, to say that the historical 
study is the causal representation of “what really happened” in the Past, i.e. the course of 
successive events, is to identify history with a naturalised conception of History which 
shows the historical to be unrepeatable and past; and yet this identification must at the 
same time conflict with the modem epistemological conditions that neo-positivism 
adopts, namely the view that genuine knowledge should be repeatable and present. In the 
second place, positivist historiography is unable to deal with the “epistemic tension in 
history” that bothered the philosophers such as Descartes and Locke: the nature of 
history is particular and concrete whereas that of science is general and abstract. By way 
of contrast, in Oakeshott’s historical theory, as we shall see, there is a theory of time and 
a hermeneutic-like view on historical narration, both of which are capable of removing 
the naturalistic traps in historiography under consideration.
Again, if one of the main arguments that Oakeshott takes to impugn 
foundationalism is that the monopoly of scientific voice will make our conversation 
“boring and insidious”,22 it would appear that the meaning of rescuing the autonomous 
voice of history (and that of poetry) in the conversation of mankind is no less than to 
dissolve the Enlightenment Universal Rationality. That is, the significance of history in 
Oakeshott’s thought lies in the important role of the historian in bringing out concrete 
knowledge to nourish our ability to converse. But, the theme of the autonomy of history 
is frequently related to the theoretical context of historicism, a school of historical 
thought to which Oakeshott objects. Consequently, to interpret the uniqueness of 
Oakeshott as a non-historicist critic of positivist historiography, part of my concern in 
this chapter will be directed to making a comparison between Oakeshott’s and 
Collingwood’s philosophies of history.
22 See esp. VP: 12-4.
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CHAPTER II 
THE ENLIGHTENMENT POSITIONS
II.l. Introduction: Philosophy Par Excellence
The purpose of this chapter is to unveil the Enlightenment positions: (1) foundationalism 
in philosophy, (2) rationalism in ethics and (3) formalism in historiography, by way of an 
enquiry into philosophical modernism. It aims to deal with a most powerful modem 
paradigm of understanding the function of philosophy in relation to “science”1 and its 
influences upon ethical and historical thought, ranging from Descartes through Kant, and 
stretching into liberalism and positivism. Time and again in the course of examining 
Oakeshott’s work I must return to this establishing context, as it is my plan to interpret 
Oakeshott as one of the most substantial critics of the Enlightenment project in the 
century.
Although historians of ideas used to restrict the age of the Enlightenment to the 
eighteenth century, in this study I am basically tracing the emergence of Enlightenment 
positions back to Descartes and Locke, amongst other thinkers. This is because the 
intellectual landmark of the eighteenth century was the search for “one king, one law, 
one faith” over all spheres of human life. The eighteenth century, to quote D’Alembert, 
was “the century of philosophy par excellence”2, and this version of philosophisme was 
of course largely rooted in the seventeenth century.
Following Oakeshott and some other scholars3, I do not take the Enlightenment 
to be a “closed historic episode” either; rather, I believe the Enlightenment positions
1 The term “science”, as it was understood within a much older tradition of Western thought, was taken 
to mean episteme, scientia or Wissen, i.e. ways to knowledge or forms of knowing. Such knowledge 
could be of God and Nature, of the good and the cosmos, of the polis and the psyche etc. With this 
meaning, “science” was certainly not merely referring to our modem natural science alone. Be that as it 
may, in this study I take it to mean the natural sciences all the time.
2 Quoted by E. Cassirer, 1979: 3.
3 See, for example, M. Foucault, 1984; J. Habermas, 1989.
have surely become a part of Western tradition in the present day. That is to say, whether 
or not one likes or dislikes the notion of rationality it carries, the fact is that a true 
understanding of the conditions of Western cultural milieux must demand a diagnosis of 
Enlightenment positions. And if this is the case, according to Oakeshott, what we really 
need in order to transcend the intellectual crisis of our times is to revitalise those which 
have been destroyed by the Enlightenment project: the importance of traditional 
knowledge in human activity (Chapter IV) and the multiplicity of non-scientific voices 
(such as history or poetry) in the conversation of mankind (Chapter V). But in each case, 
we must appeal to a non-foundationalist conception of philosophy in the first place 
(Chapter III).
Moreover, my understanding is that an overall look at modem philosophy reveals 
a certain tradition about the self-identification of philosophy. And this tendency in 
principle is that philosophy is a master discipline that lays foundations to science and 
authorises the validity of any other knowledge in terms of an objective scientific-criterion 
rooted in a specific kind of rationality. It is a tendency which at once implies the notion 
of an “integral philosophical system”, in that the proper subject of a philosophical study 
is no less and no more than the entire universe - Nature, Man and History. In short, 
within that tradition philosophy is understood as the yardstick against which everything 
can be measured, and the role of the philosophe, is identified as nothing but a “cultural 
arbitrator”.4
To illuminate: the key to the Enlightenment project is the notion of rationality, 
understood as objective thinking, indifferent to traditions and institutions, and elucidated 
by science. On the one hand modem philosophy is indeed inspired by modem science and 
the property of rationality it wears; on the other the philosopher at the same time intends 
to objectify scientific knowledge and to spread that very rationality over entire human 
engagements. That is, modem natural philosophy is not only concerned with the basis of 
science itself, i.e. the possibility of knowing the external world with certainty; it also 
works as the link between the diverse areas of human understanding. It is accordingly 
with this meaning that I come to the term “foundationalism in philosophy” below.
4 Cf. R. Rorty, 1980: esp. 139.
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Among the diverse areas of human intelligence, two are central to this thesis: 
ethics and historiography. First of all, Nature, the very subject matter of science, has 
been described by many Enlightenment thinkers as an “ethical norm” on the basis that 
what is “natural” must be “good”.5 It follows that the Enlightenment ethical position is 
nothing but the hope for “human affairs to be guided by rationality rather than by faith, 
superstition, or revelation; a belief in the power of human reason to change society and 
liberate the individual from the restraints of custom or arbitrary authority; all backed up 
by a world view increasingly validated by science rather than by religion or tradition.”6 
This points to the belief that for them morality can be objectified in the same way as the 
scientist deals with Nature, that the business of moral philosophy must consist in “a 
systematic attempt to discover a rational justification for morality.”7 In what follows I 
take this position to be “formalism in ethics”; and it is not unlikely that the representative 
of such a moral position is liberal ethics, appearing in the moral and political thought of 
Locke, Kant, Mill and so forth.
Additionally, a brief description of what I mean by “naturalism in historiography” 
is this. Although seventeenth-century thinkers such as Descartes and Locke demonstrate 
a lack of interest in history, many of the philosophes in the next century unite in the 
belief that “an analogy of Newtonian science, a reduction of facts to laws, should also be 
possible in history”8, and that the development of Human History should be seen as 
man’s capacity for “progress”. As a result of this, there emerges the conception of 
Universal History, which is actually based on an identification of the historical (a mode 
of understanding) with a naturalised conception of History (the occurrence of events, 
“what really happened” in the Past), in accordance with the modem philosophical 
discussions of the structure of Natural Time as successiveness. Despite the fact that the 
notion of Universal History later animates the reaction of German classic historicism, by 
posing a Romantic reflection upon the inadequacy of the Enlightenment idea of universal 
rationality, the assumption of a naturalised conception of History penetrates into 
traditional positivist historiography where it is claimed that the purpose of the historical 
study is to represent “what really happened” in the Past in terms of causal explanation,
5 D. Outram, 1997: 48.
6 Ibid.: 3.
7 A. MacIntyre, 1985: 39
8 E. Cassirer, 1979: 216.
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and as such, as J. B. Bury says, “history is a science; no less, and no more.”9 At this 
point, I presume, neo-positivism should be brought into consideration on two counts. In 
one, it reconstructs the project of philosophy par excellence in the name of the “fusion of 
sciences”; in another, as I hope to show, it is exactly the Enlightenment historiographical 
position, i.e. an identification of the historical with a naturalised conception of History, 
that neo-positivists such as K. Popper and C. Hempel take for granted in establishing 
their “covering law model”10 in historiography.
In short, the ideal form of Enlightenment civilisation is that of “argumentation” as 
exemplified in the natural sciences; what we are directed to live by in terms of the 
philosophes is a goal-orientated life aiming to “solve problems” by discovering the most 
advanced scientific answers. “At bottom, the mistake of the Enlightenment project is the 
failure to see that rationality is as such an abstract capacity.”11 But more critically, it 
produces an intricate paradox. That is, while its incapability of recognising the emptiness 
of the concept of rationality is partly due to its neglecting the importance of history in 
constructing some more concrete knowledge to be received in the conversation of 
mankind, the historiography that is in compliance with it requires the historian to abide 
by abstract scientific methods and thus gives over the autonomy of history to the natural 
sciences.
In the main body of this chapter, I shall strive to examine further the metaphysical and 
epistemological grounds on which the notion of philosophy par excellence rests ([II.2.]), 
and the character and crisis of modem ethics and historiography it has brought out 
([H.3.] & [II.4.]). And, in giving a brief and necessarily inadequate sketch of the 
development of modem philosophy this way, I think, it will be sufficient to draw 
attention only to the basic doctrines of great philosophers.
9 J. B. Bury, 1956.
10 The name “covering law model” was first coined in W. Dray, 1957.
11 C. Larmore, 1996: 49.
II.2. Philosophical Modernity
Let me now begin with the proposal of foundationalism in philosophy which, to use 
Locke’s language, is eager “to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human 
knowledge.”12
II.2.1. Science and Knowledge Proper 
Modem Western philosophy, it has been said, arose out of the reflection on the progress 
made by mathematics and physics in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 
Being stimulated by Renaissance science and the work of Galileo, many modem 
philosophers were apt to draw a determinable structure of the natural world and its 
process in quantitative and geometrical terms. This inclination to understand the universe 
was summed up in Galileo’s proclamation, in 1623, that “the great book of the universe 
cannot be understood unless one can read the language in which it is written -- the 
language of mathematics.”13
It was under the influence of the new science of mathematical physics that 
Descartes came to systematise our knowledge, though he did not completely exclude the 
spiritual substance from his philosophy. “The whole philosophy”, Descartes once argued, 
“is a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches are 
the other sciences.”14 This clearly implies that all truths (of practical sciences, natural 
philosophy and metaphysics) should be proved in an orderly way by proceeding from an 
indubitable metaphysical basis, namely, cogito ergo sum (that I think therefore I am), to 
derived propositions. In other words, the logic Descartes took to formulate his ultimate 
context of thoughts was mathematical deduction in the conviction that by inspecting the 
one absolute objective truth, a criterion can be discovered about all other truths.
Those who followed Descartes in principle and are called rationalists today are 
Spinoza and Leibniz. There are two reasons for the basis of this assertion. First, that 
which Descartes supposed philosophy to be, namely the formulation of an orderly system
12 Locke, 1975: 1.
13 Quoted by J. Cottingham, 1988: 5.
14 Quoted by A. Flew ed. 1983: 92.
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of objective knowledge by means of mathematical deduction, and this can also be said of 
Spinoza and Leibniz. That which constituted the central part of Spinoza’s philosophy 
was the idea that all genuine explanation is deduction in nature and everything is 
explicable from an absolutely infinite being which he called “God”. In Spinoza’s own 
words, “everything is determined by the necessity of the divine nature.”15 In his Ethics, 
the subject that concerned him most, Spinoza presented his views on what “good” 
should be in the form of geometry, and he derived it from the more fundamental truths 
about the nature of God and its relation to matter. Leibniz also conceived the notion of a 
universal logical method, by means of which we can not only systematise all existing 
knowledge but also deduce hitherto unknown truths. And, like Spinoza, Leibniz regarded 
everything as explicable in a mathematical sense. “There cannot”, he wrote, “be any true 
or existent fact, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason why it 
should be so and not otherwise.”16 This is his famous Principle of Sufficient of Reason 
which was originally found in mathematics.
Second, none of the three thinkers would deny that, in our knowing, reason is the 
only genuine source from which our true knowledge can be gained. They assumed that 
true knowledge is already with us, it is self-evident. Truths do not depend on experience; 
rather, there are a priori truths which are true in themselves. Descartes, for example, saw 
reason as an inborn “natural light” that would enable us to understand things clearly and 
distinctly. For Spinoza, likewise, reason alone can perceive things “truly, as they are in 
themselves.” Leibniz, too, believed that we have “innate principles” of reasoning, such as 
the Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Principle of Contradiction, which are self- 
evident and through which we can attain “the universal and necessary truths of the 
sciences.” For all of them, as a result, all my knowledge of the world, if it is true, is not 
just knowledge of my own point of view but of all human kind’s shared points of view. 
In other words, objective knowledge is and only can be derived from the operation of 
reason, and it purports to draw an objective description of the world, indifferent to the 
particular experience of any observer. Truth, in short, is knowable only to, or through, 
reason.
15 Spinoza, 1989: part 1, prop, 29.
16 Leibniz, 1991: par. 32.
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If scientific progress provided continental rationalists with the notion of mathematical 
certainty and method of deduction for their philosophical systems, there was considered 
to be another aspect of the new science besides its use in mathematics. That is, “scientific 
progress was also felt to depend very largely on the attention to empirical data and on 
the use of controlled experiment.”17 Here we come to the central doctrine of empiricism, 
rationalism’s traditional opposite, that the source through which our knowledge comes 
to us is sense experience. As Locke put it,
Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word,
from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives
itself.18
For Locke as for other empiricists, we then have no “innate ideas” in knowing. Although 
mathematical deduction at its best will give us the certain logical relation of things, yet it 
can not give us the factual information about the natural world. If we wish for the latter, 
empiricists would argue, we must content ourselves with probabilities, which is all that 
induction-based generalisation can give us.
Like the mathematical method for rationalists, empiricists believed that the 
experimental and inductive methods which have been applied with such success in 
accounting for the coherence of astronomy, physics and biology should also be applied in 
the study of man, which is entitled to be called a “science of man”. In other words, as 
empiricists assigned to philosophy the task of studying the nature of knowledge which is 
to be given in the form of experience of the mind (ideas or perceptions), in their 
investigations of the human mind, they were, in fact, using the same experimental 
methods that natural scientists applied in their study of Nature. In the case of Locke, 
such a “science of man” was developed from the belief that “an analogue of Newton’s 
particle mechanics for ‘inner space’ would somehow be ‘of great advantage in directing 
our Thoughts in the search of other Things.’”19 That is, Locke’s discussion of the causal 
theory of perception can be seen as working out the philosophical implications of
17 F. Copleston, 1958: 24
18 Locke, 1975: II. 1. 2.
19 Quoted by R. Rorty, 1980: 137.
Newtonian mechanics. Hume, to take another example, believed that he was dealing with 
human nature by using scientific method in his Treatises and other works. “The science 
of man”, he wrote, “which is the only solid foundation we can give to this science itself 
must be laid on experience and observation.”20 “In pretending, therefore, to explain the 
principles of human nature,” he continued, “we in effect propose a complete system of 
the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they 
can stand with any security.”21
Accordingly, it seems from this that neither Descartes nor Locke nor Hume 
identified their task qua philosophers to be fundamentally different from that of those 
involved in the pursuit of science which we today refer to as the natural sciences. In fact, 
an identification of knowledge proper with knowledge acquired by scientific methods has 
been made by almost every important modem philosopher.
II. 2.2. The Invention o f  the M ind22 
So far we have seen that modem philosophy arose from the reflection on scientific 
development. However, it does not necessarily follow that modem philosophy has since 
become “the charwoman of the natural sciences”. On the contrary, although it received 
its input from the natural, sciences, it proclaimed its own autonomy in the sense that it 
took up an independent task to understand the meaning of the entire universe and thus 
laid foundations to the natural sciences. Descartes was obviously inspired by the work of 
Galileo, but the Cartesian mechanism and its supporters, in denying the purposeful 
tendency in the physical world, at the same time provided a metaphysical basis for 
Galileo’s physical theory which soon became the orthodox approach in scientific 
research. It “allowed scientists to pursue their enquiries without paying more than 
passing attention to theology and metaphysics,” and therefore “provided the conceptual 
framework for a spectacular advance in the sciences.”23
In order to understand the whole universe with scientific certainty or reliability, a 
rigorous access to all truths or a firm basis of knowledge is required for modem
20 Hume, 1978: Introduction, p. xx.
21 Ibid.: xx.
22 R. Rorty, 1980: chap. 1.
23 F. L. Baumer, 1977: 51.
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philosophers. Aristotle had already told us that “all men by nature desire to know”. But 
in the search for the scientific criteria of knowledge modem philosophy is likely to know 
the world as a whole especially in terms of the mind-body relation, the notion of 
objective knowledge and the condition of subjectivity. Like many others, I believe it was 
Descartes whose motivating mind was behind this philosophical fashion and ever since 
compelled a lot of philosophers to investigate the so-called problem of “the foundation 
of knowledge”.
It has been indicated that for Descartes all knowledge should be derived from an 
absolute objective truth, which must be so “certain” that “all the most extravagant 
suppositions brought forward by sceptics would be incapable of shaking it.”24 And, those 
being interested in philosophy must know that it is through his famous “method of 
doubt” that Descartes reached such “a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences”.25 
Through a striking excursion of casting some possible doubts about our sense 
experience, mathematical knowledge and Deity, Descartes took the proposition cogito 
ergo sum to be indubitable: For, no matter how deceivable my understanding of the 
world could be, Descartes insisted, there must exist an “I” who is deceived; any doubts 
after all only confirm the existence of a subject, an “I” who is doubting. If I am in error, 
it must be an “I” who is in error; if I am mistaken, it must be an “I” who is mistaken. I 
must be, I exist, then, I can be positive whether I am deceived or not. “So that it must, in 
fine, be maintained, all things being maturely and carefully considered, that this 
proposition (pronunciatum) I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time it is expressed by 
me, or conceived in my mind.”26
Furthermore, according to Descartes, the reason why I am so certain that “I think 
therefore I am” is true is that I see or understand “clearly and distinctly” what is being 
said. Many of my ideas about the world, coming from my sense experience or 
imagination, are either unclear or indistinct; only “innate ideas” from my inborn “natural 
light of reason” would enable me to grasp clarity and distinctness, which are certainly the 
mark of truth. Descartes thus reaches the conclusion that we can have objective 
knowledge about the fact that “I exist” and this fact is a universal “innate idea” about the
24 Descartes, 1990: 119.
25 Ibid.: 112.
26 Ibid.: 119.
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world not just about someone’s perception. For everyone by the use of his own “natural 
light of reason” will see cogito ergo sum as “clearly and distinctly” as Descartes himself 
saw in Meditations.
But, what precisely do I affirm as existing? This interrogative brings us to the 
Cartesian problem of sum res cogitans. As Descartes puts it, “I am a being whose whole 
essence or nature is to think, and whose being requires no place and depends on no 
material thing.”27 That is, for Descartes, when I am certain that “I think therefore I am”, 
I am affirming the existence of myself as something which “thinks”. Given that we not 
only exist as a thinking thing but we are able to apprehend “things” clearly and distinctly 
which can be created by God, Descartes now proceeds to prove the existence of the 
body, of the material world, though he deals rather briefly with it. His general argument 
is that in understanding the world we must receive impressions and “ideas” and that as 
God, who is no deceiver, has implanted in us “a very great inclination to believe that they 
(impressions and “ideas”) are conveyed to me by corporeal objects, I do not see that He 
could be defended from the accusation of deceit if these ideas were produced by causes 
other than corporeal objects. Hence we must allow that corporeal objects exist.”28 In 
short, Descartes affirmed two incompatible kinds of substances: the unextended and 
indivisible mind (res cogitans) and the extended and divisible matter (res extensa), which 
in some ways depend on God, who is what creates the unity between the two substances, 
and what makes knowledge possible.
It follows that Descartes made the task of understanding the whole world 
possible by affirming cogito ergo sum as our rigorous access, which contains two main 
elements: the assertion of an ontological category of subjectivity which can think and the 
validity of “innate ideas” as objectivity. But Descartes himself failed to answer 
sufficiently the problem of how knowledge is possible. There are consequently some 
answers to this question Descartes left by concentrating on the tension between the 
Cartesian notion of objective knowledge and “innate ideas” developed in rationalism and 
the Cartesian condition of subjectivity developed in empiricism.
That is to say, in formulating an entire structure of knowledge about the world in 
terms of scientific method, post-Cartesian modern philosophers basically accepted that to
27 Ibid.: 119.
28 F. Copleston, 1958: 117.
know is to “realise” or “represent” what is there in the natural world in terms of our 
natural faculties, namely, experiencing or reasoning. And here, the term “to realise” 
denotes to become self-conscious about the created objective world by the use of reason 
or “innate ideas” in the context of rationalism (“how the world itself appears to we”), 
while the term “to represent” refers to experiencing things in the world in one’s mind 
(subjectivity) in the context of empiricism (“how can I  come to represent the world?”). 
Instead of elucidating the doctrines of modem rationalism and empiricism in more detail, 
however, my purpose here allows me only to take on a review of Kant’s philosophy, 
attempting to reconstruct the two streams of philosophical thought at stake by virtue of a 
synthesis of subjectivity and objectivity.
II.2.3. A  Synthesis o f  Subjectivity and Objectivity 
In some respects the cardinal problem with which Kant was concerned was not so 
different from that of Descartes: Man and the physical world. Kant himself declared that 
what he wondered most about were two main things, “the starry heavens above me and 
the moral law within me.”29 This expression re-emphasises two of the most important 
aspects of the thought of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries: One is the 
scientific conception of the world which modem physics - more especially, Newton - has 
given us; the other is the rational creature who can understand the physical world, as 
mind to body or as subject to object, and who is at the same time conscious of moral 
sense and freedom.
Both the main groups of modem philosophy, rationalism and empiricism, were 
accused by Kant of underestimating either the subjectivity of human agents or the 
objectivity of the physical world. Rationalism’s general presupposition that there is a 
given world created by God would be inclined to determinism. Although rationalists tried 
to make metaphysics as firm as the natural sciences, the stmggle amongst competing 
rationalist theories raises the question /^ of the validilty of their plan to extend our knowl­
edge to one that transcends our sense experience. One of the main tasks of Kant’s 
Critique o f Pure Reason was thus to pose a critique “of the faculty of reason in general,
29 Kant, 1993c: 169.
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in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience.”30 
That is, he wanted to decide the extent of pure reason so that he might make sure 
whether metaphysics is possible and, if so, in what sense it is possible. On the other hand, 
by asserting that thought must be constrained by sense experience, empiricism is 
incapable of justifying Newtonian physics. For Newtonian physics does not completely 
rely on observation. In Kant’s view, Newtonian physical science presupposed the 
“uniformity of Nature” to which empiricists can not reply sufficiently. Furthermore, 
empiricism can not account for what Kant calls “a priori synthetic judgements”31 which, 
he claims, are the basis for Newtonian physics. Moreover, according to Hume’s analysis 
of ideas and perceptions, we can be certain of very little. It is not surprising then that, 
Kant was, as he says, aroused by Hume from his “dogmatic slumbers”.32
In epistemological terms, the difficulties in rationalism and empiricism can be 
expressed in two ways. According to rationalism, knowledge is knowledge of things, and 
its objectivity transcends me. Whilst, according to empiricist theory, knowledge is 
knowledge of my ideas and impressions which are in me but there is no absolute 
guarantor of objectivity. As a result, the modem pre-Kantian philosophical debate can be 
restated as follows: Knowledge can be either a priori or a posteriori. The former is 
knowledge whose objectivity is based on forms or concepts (logic), and this is all that 
rationalism believes knowledge to be. The latter approach encompasses knowledge 
whose reliability depends on the contents of experience and reflects the empiricist belief 
about knowledge. All this encouraged Kant to propose a synthesis of forms and contents 
for human understanding.
Kant believes that every knowledge must at the same time bear the marks of 
reason (forms or objectivity) and of experience (contents or subjectivity) together. 
“Without sensibility”, to quote Kant himself, “no object would be given to us, without
30 Kant, 1993a: 9.
31 Kant believed that a science is a systematic complex of judgements; knowledge occurs in judgements. 
Judgement is either analytic or synthetic. The former is one whose predicate is contained in the notion of 
the subject. For example, “All bachelors are unmarried”. The latter is one whose predicate is not 
included in the notion of the subject. For example, “All bachelors are unhappy”. At first glance it seems 
that analytic judgements are a priori judgements and synthetic judgements are a posteriori judgements. 
But, there are some a priori synthetic judgements which are of value to science, because whatever a 
priori is universal and necessary and whatever synthetic will augment our knowledge. We find a priori 
synthetic judgements in mathematics: “2+2=4”; and in metaphysics: “man is free”, “God exists”. Thus, 
the question of how Newtonian physics is possible is reduced to the question: How are a priori synthetic 
judgements possible in it?
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understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind.”33 For Kant, then, our experience contains two 
elements: what is given (content) and what is posited by the thinking subject who carries 
the “objective reference” (concepts). This is not to say that we have innate ideas, nor that 
objective reference, such as space, time and causality, are antecedent to experience. But 
it implies that the thinking subject has a natural ability to synthesis or constitute the given 
data in a certain way. It may be said that, by claiming such constituting activity of “the 
transcendent ego”, Kant raises “the science of man” from a Lockean empirical level to an 
a priori one.34 But, in contrast to Locke, Kant asserts that such knowledge is genuine 
and objective. Although knowledge must be constituted by man, none the less it 
transcends one’s particular point of view, and it is therefore possible for him to make 
legitimate claims about an independent world. Objects do not depend for their existence 
on being perceived as the empiricist claims; rather their nature is only determined by the 
fact that they can be perceived. And, objectivity is not knowable to reason alone as 
rationalists claim, because objective reference is within experience itself. Hence all that 
Kant is suggesting is that in describing my experience I am in the act of referring to an 
ordered perspective on an independent world. The world of experience is not simply my 
construction; it is also the result of an application of a priori forms and categories 
(objective reference) to what is given. A priori knowledge provides the physical world 
with necessary support, but it also derives its content from the physical world. The 
principle question of Kant’s philosophy, as a result, becomes how a priori knowledge is 
possible.
Kant accepts that there are three basic kinds of a priori knowledge: mathematics, 
physics and metaphysics, and he thus tries to formulate a complete philosophical system 
in terms of three major questions: How is mathematics possible? How is pure physics 
possible? Is metaphysics possible? Real knowledge, it may seem from the above, is 
possible only when my experience is added to a priori objective reference; man sorts out 
the manifold of sensations, first in “time and space”, and then according to categories. By 
the analysis of the a priori elements in human experience, Kant proves the first two 
questions and the uniformity of Nature. However, traditional metaphysics is an attempt
32 Kant, 1997: 9.
33 Kant, 1993a: 91.
34 Cf. R. Rorty, 1980: 137-9.
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to acquire knowledge of God, the soul and the world, which are beyond our sense 
experience. It is therefore a vain attempt, because all the things known with the aid of a 
priori formal principles are phenomena that manifest themselves via time and space. 
God, the soul and the world are neither spatial nor temporal, but no one can conceive 
anything that is outside of time and space. They are thus merely “things-in-themselves ” 
which are inaccessible to my subjectivity. Put another way, traditional metaphysics is 
exactly the case of “thoughts without content” which therefore must be empty. It is thus 
useless to employ a subjective category of the understanding to transcend experience, 
e.g. employ causality to prove the existence of God. This is the reason why Kant tries to 
show that traditional metaphysics leads to insoluble “antinomies” which makes no 
progress comparable to that of physical science.
Although the themes of traditional metaphysics have nothing to do with real 
science, for Kant they remain as matters of faith: “I had therefore to remove knowledge 
in order to make way for belief.”35 That is, Kant endeavoured to set up a different basis 
from that of the realm of theoretical and scientific knowledge for the study of man and 
God. This is not the place to look at Kant’s moral philosophy. The point to be made here 
is merely that by claiming this Kant leaves us with a bifurcated world: the physical world 
and the world of freedom (or in later versions, Nature and History). On the one hand, 
there is the world of Newtonian physics: an objective world governed by causal laws and 
which contains a priori formal principles which make “understanding” possible. On the 
other hand, there is the world of freedom and of God. We can not ascertain the world of 
freedom by Scientific Reason, but at the same time our Scientific Reason does not, as 
rationalism and empiricism suppose, prove that the physical world is the only possible 
world. And if the understanding of the physical world depends on Scientific Reason, i.e. 
depends on the operation of objective reference to experience, the moral life, the 
consciousness of obligation, depends on Practical Reason and opens to a sphere of 
reality which man affirms by faith as a demand of the moral law. The division of Nature 
and History, as we know, plays a central part in the historical ideas of new-Kantism.
35 Kant, 1993a: Preface.
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II .2.4. The Superiority o f Universal Reason 
Closely connected with what we have said so far is the idea of the superiority of 
Universal Reason recognised in philosophy. Although some empiricist thinkers may 
maintain that there are aspects of reality outside of human experience and therefore 
unknowable, this opinion does not alter the basic belief that for the most part the human 
natural faculty of Reason is effective for the accomplishment of a complete philosophical 
system in which all human problems can be considered. In this respect, it should be noted 
that even empiricists like Locke, Berkeley and Hume would claim that they relied on 
Universal Reason in their philosophical reflection. The distinction between rationalism 
and empiricism, as we have seen, can only be fundamentally drawn by their differing 
views on the sources of knowledge.
The notion of an integral philosophical system must depend on the superiority of 
Philosophical Reason. And, given the belief that all knowledge proper is knowledge 
acquired by scientific methods, pre-Kantian philosophers tended to identify Philosophical 
Reason with Scientific Reason, by means of which the most genuine form of knowledge 
(i.e. a scientific criterion of knowledge) can be established. In other words, the united 
Reason in the form of the natural sciences makes it possible for the notion of the unity 
and interconnectedness of all knowledge. Thus, Descartes proclaimed that “all the items 
of knowledge that lie within the reach of human mind are linked together with a 
marvellous bond.”36 Whilst Spinoza studied Ethics following a method incorporating a 
geometrical pattern, Hume argued that all the sciences, such as logic, aesthetics, politics, 
mathematics and natural philosophy, have some relation to human nature which is “the 
capital of the sciences”. That is, the “science of man” aims to consider all the fields of 
human life in terms of scientific observation.
At first sight, the unification of Human Reason seems to undergo modification in 
Kant’s philosophy. For Kant, we not only have Scientific Reason which refers to “the 
starry heavens above”, a pure knowledge of things; but also Practical Reason which 
refers to “the moral law within”, a rational conduct of life. However, I think in Kant’s 
system Scientific Reason acquired by philosophy is still superior to any other areas of 
human life. The reasons are twofold, each of which will be re-emphasised in the 
discussions that follow.
36 J. Cottmgham, 1988: 7.
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First of all, even though Kant distinguishes Scientific Reason from Practical 
Reason, it must be remembered that Kant claims a theory of morality must come after an 
a priori theory of knowledge. In philosophical terms, the existence of the physical world 
must be confirmed in the first place, then we may come to consider the possibility of 
moral consciousness. As Rorty argues, Kant’s epistemology steps into a traditional 
metaphysics’ role of “guarantor of the presupposition of morality.”37 Secondly, what 
Kant refers to as Practical Reason is not simply our actual practical reasoning, but, more 
crucially, it is a different kind of Theoretical Reason, in accordance with the laws of 
Nature, which governs our moral activity.
77.2.5. Foundationalism in Philosophy 
To sum up, for the development of modem natural philosophy the influential relation 
between philosophy and science is in actuality reciprocal. On the one hand, philosophy 
received its input from science by assuming the belief that there is only one genuine form 
of knowledge which is knowledge acquired by means of scientific methods, i.e. the 
notion of identifying knowledge proper with scientifically certain and objective 
knowledge alone. On the other hand, however, philosophy proclaimed its own superior 
function by taking up the fundamental task to understand the meaning of the entire world 
and thus laid external foundations to science. That is to say, with scientific methods 
philosophy is not anxious about particular things but about the nature of the world as a 
whole, thus “to know is to realise or represent the natural world as it is” in terms of our 
natural faculties, namely, reasoning and experiencing. In other words, men, at least 
philosophers among them, are capable of making a complete description of public reality; 
and for this reason, any incomplete description of reality must fall short of being real. 
This, therefore, resulted in the modem mainstream philosophers’ zealous attempt to 
justify the existence of an objective external world independently of us. Accordingly, 
with such an attitude to reality, there thus came up the belief that the aim of philosophy is 
to establish an universal ab extra criterion of truth, which corresponds to the order of 
Nature, and by which everything claimed to be true should abide. In summary,
37 R  Rorty, 1980: 138.
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(1) foundationalism in philosophy is the philosophical project searching for
(1.1) scientific certainty as the criterion of all knowledge claims by 
establishing
(1.2) a foundationalist theory of knowing which is concerned with the 
relationship between subjectivity (a concept of mind) and objectivity (a 
complete description of public reality); and this project is supported by
(1.3) the superiority of Universal Reason which demands that 
Philosophical Reason identified as Scientific Reason is superior or prior to 
the non-scientific reasonings of art, politics, morality and of history in the 
sense that it is the guarantor of their validity and the guidance to their 
practices.
These are what I take to be the assumptions underlying modem natural 
philosophy as an integral philosophical system. What remains to be considered, as a 
result, are their applications to the spheres of ethics and historiography. And here, let me 
first turn to consider the Enlightenment ethical position by taking liberalism as the moral 
and political theory of modernity.38
II.3. Liberal Ethics
In discussing liberalism, it is not my intention to provide the reader with an analysis of its 
“conceptual system”39 or “conceptual constellation”40 in terms of equality, freedom, 
authority, rights, citizenship, property, the market economy and laissez-faire etc., but 
rather to deal with its philosophical commitment in a brief outline.
38 See, for example, J. Gray, 1995b; A. MacIntyre, 1935; J. Appleby eds. 1996; J. S. McClelland, 1996: 
427-49.
39 Cf. W. Connolly, 1993: 13-5.
40 Cf. R  E. Flathman, 1972: xiv.
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II. 3.1. Liberal Elements 
That the term “liberalism” is an “essentially contested concept”41 lacking an exclusive 
definition seems plain to me and to many other scholars. Historically, some say that 
liberalism is a notoriously ambiguous concept which more than anything else “has led to 
persistent historical contests for the idea”42; whereas theoretically others say that 
“liberalism has never been a closely integrated or firmly fixed doctrine.”43
However, according to J. Gray, liberalism is “no older than the seventeenth 
century” and it can be characterised as a recognisable identity by reference to four 
features44: individualism in that it alleges the moral primacy of the person against the 
demands of any social collectivity; egalitarianism inasmuch as it confers on all men the 
same moral status and denies the relevance of legal or political order to differences in 
moral worth among human beings; universalism on the account that it asserts the moral 
unity of the human species and accords a secondary importance to specific historic 
associations and cultural forms; and finally, meliorism because of its affirmation of the 
corrigibility and improvability of all social institutions and political arrangements.
Of the four liberal elements, the last two are of most importance to Gray, because 
they seem to be definitive of liberalism as a political philosophy.45 But anyhow, for my 
concern, it is equally significant to note that according to Gray’s understanding of the 
first two liberal features, egalitarian individualism can be seen as a different expression of 
the so-called “radical individualism”; that is the view that “the individual is ontologically 
and morally independent of the social groups and institutions to which they belong, and 
the cognate idea that social institutions are ontological fictions.”46 By way of contrast, 
there is also another form of “individualism” which I shall refer to as “traditionalist 
individualism” in the discussions that follow, and it argues that the value of the individual 
is not unimportant but it is meaningful only if the individual acts on a tradition of 
meanings, that morality is to pursue the ethical exemplification embodied in tradition 
rather than to follow the universalistic, formalistic or abstract moral rules alone.
41 W. B. Gallie, 1964: chap. 8. See also W. Connolly, 1993: chap. 1.
42 K. Haakonssen, ed. 1988: xi.
43 R. E. Flathman, 1989: 2.
44 J. Gray, 1995b: Introduction. For a history of the appearance of liberalism, see H. J. Laski, 1997. in 
which the view that “liberalism is no older than the seventeenth century” is affirmed.
45 Cf. J. Gray, 1995b: 86-7.
46 This is a dense examination of what A. MacIntyre takes radical individualism to be, provided by D. 
MacNiven, 1996: 352.
At this point, Gray’s interpretation of Oakeshott as a liberal thinker47 seems to 
have been at odds with Oakeshott’s own theoretical system. For an understanding of 
liberalism as the heir of the Enlightenment as such, it appears to me, is equal to 
Oakeshott’s apprehension of rationalist politics. Oakeshott could not be regarded as a 
liberal philosopher, if one accepts Gray’s attributing universalism and meliorism as 
“centrally constitutive of a liberal outlook.”48 Also, Oakeshott was never an advocate of 
radical individualism but only of traditionalist individualism.
Indeed, in my discussion of Oakeshottian Rationalism, we shall have a chance to 
examine the problems of liberalism as those of rationalist politics and Oakeshott’s 
rehabilitation of sceptical politics as a balance against it. Leaving Oakeshott for now, 
however, my business here is, first, to show liberal ethics as an Enlightenment plan to 
discover a rational justification for morality, by choosing Locke’s natural right theory, 
Kant’s categorical imperative and Mill’s utilitarian principle as test cases, each of which, 
as we shall see, has been impugned by Oakeshott; and second, to demonstrate the moral 
crisis it produces.
77.5.2. Locke: The Natural Right Theory
Let me begin with Locke’s natural right theory which appears in the Second Treatise o f 
Government. I am aware that an interest in the study of past political theory has for the 
last few decades been associated with the “historical approach”, casting doubt upon 
Locke’s “intention” in writing the Second Treatise as a defence of the revolution of 
1688.49 My concern, nonetheless, permits me not to take sides in the debate, but simply 
to accept that the central problem of Locke’s political philosophy was that of political 
obligation,50 a problem that is most urgent when the state is sick. And, by political 
obligation, following J. Dunn, I take it to be “the duty incumbent on any person or set of 
persons legitimately subject to a legitimate political authority to obey the legitimate 
commands of that authority.”51
47 For Gray’s interpretation of Oakeshott as a liberal, see 1989: 199-217; 1993: 40-7.
48 J. Gray, 1995b: 86.
49 See esp. P. Laslett, 1997: 3-133; J. Dunn, 1969; R. Ashcraft, 1986.
50 See, for example, J. P. Plamenatz, 1968: 164-65, 1992: 336-7; S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, 1958: 299- 
300.
51 J. Dunn, 1991:23.
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That the problem of political obligation played a central part in modem history of 
political thought has been granted by many scholars.52 Moreover, on the account that 
obligation means to be “voluntarily incurred or created”, i.e. to make “a moral 
commitment that is freely entered into by individuals, and freely taken upon themselves 
through their own actions,”53 some have argued further that the appearance of political 
obligation has replaced the ground of pre-modem moral and political philosophy with a 
new basis of its own. For example, J. Chapman says that:
If we apply the plain historical method to Western experience, there has been one big 
shift in the moral foundations of political obligation, and that may be described as a
movement from moral functionalism to moral individualism Moral functionalism
transforms into moral individualism as the concept of natural law inverts into that of 
natural rights, conceived initially as metaphysical attributes of men who recognise, in 
Locke’s word, a “law of reason” as their moral and political guide. With this 
fundamental change in orientation the modem theory of political obligation begins to 
develop and to elaborate as Western thinkers have had to cope with a succession of 
intellectual and situational concerns.54
What Chapman says here represents the character of radical individualism we have 
mentioned above. And it is no wonder that to justify political obligation on such an 
individualistic ground, the approach Locke adopted was contractarian.
According to Locke, there existed a “state of nature” in which men were 
supposed to possess certain natural rights which are inalienable and independent of 
“political society”, as there was no political society existing in the primitive situation.55 
Locke wrote that:
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: And 
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind who will but consult it that, being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or 
Possession.56
52 See, for example, J. Dunn, 1991: 24; J. R. Pennock and J. W. Chapman, eds. 1970: xiv, P. Harris, ed. 
1990: 151.
53 H. L. A. Hart, 1973:187-201; C. Pateman, 1979: 2. See also, A. Gewirth, 1970: 55-89, esp. 88.
54 J. W. Chapman, 1970: 149.
55 For the characteristics of natural rights used here, see J. P. Plamenatz, 1968: 84-9.
56 Locke, 1997: II. 6.
It follows from this that “men are naturally free”57 by virtue of the natural laws 
which govern them in their relations with each other. But the natural right that Locke 
had drawn most attention to was “property.” Locke’s usage of the term, however, seems 
ambiguous.58 On the one hand, Locke seemed to believe that man cannot be free unless 
he is possessive of his property in the usual sense of lands and goods.59 On the other 
hand, by contrast, he also took it to embrace all natural rights: “man ... hath by Nature a 
Power ... to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate”; “...for the mutual 
Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general name, 
Property.”60 Here, we need only notice that for Locke the natural rights are universal, 
because the natural law, i.e. the law of “reason” is applied to every man.
Although men, considered in the state of nature, are independent of one another, 
they find it inconvenient to coerce every member to obey the law of nature and reason. 
For in the state of nature men are bound only in conscience to obey this law, which does 
not mean that they actually obey this law or respect the rights of others. So it is in men’s 
own interest to bind themselves together by contract in order to establish an authority for 
the better security of the majority. “The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting 
into commonwealths and putting themselves under Government”, Locke insisted, “is the 
Preservation o f their Property.”61
To sign a contract is to consent explicitly to the setting-up of political authority; 
and in so doing men thus show their promise to fulfil the obligation to obey that 
authority and the laws it issues.62 But if we are already living in a certain arranged 
political society, Locke believed that:
every Man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of any 
Government, doth hereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to Obedience 
to the Laws of that Government, during such Enjoyment, as any one under it, whether his 
Possession be of Land, to him and his Heirs forever, or a lodging for only a Week; or 
whether it be barely travelling freely on the Highway; and in Effect, it reaches as far as
63the very being of anyone within the Territories of that Government.
57 Cf. ibid.: II. 5.
58 See, for example, C. B. Macpherson, 1962: 198, 220, 247ff.
59 For a Marxist attack on this assumption, see ibid.
60 Locke, 1997: VII. 87, IX. 123.
61 Ibid.: IX. 124.
62 For a linguistic approach to show the connection between consent-promise and obligation, see R. B. 
Brandt, 1964: 374-93.
63 Locke, 1997: VUI. 119.
The debates arising around the consent theory are beyond my concern here. It is 
only important to stress once again some crucial points. First, the contract theory is 
generally understood to be a political theory which is nothing if not based on moral 
individualism: consent is “voluntarily incurred”. And if the hallmark of authority is 
unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey, what is required in political 
philosophy is neither coercion nor persuasion but “individual judgement” to prove the 
legitimacy of authority. And second, for writers like Locke, we should maintain a number 
of natural rights in political participation because this is why we entered into political 
community in the first place. “According to this theory”, thus,
it is a fundamental moral truth that human beings may make valid and weighty claims in 
justice against each other, society and government. Human beings possess the moral 
rights in virtue o f  which they may make these claims o f  justice not as members o f  any 
specific moral community or as subjects o f any positive legal order, but simply in virtue 
o f  their nature as the sort o f creatures they are. The natural rights ascribed to human 
beings in this theory are natural, accordingly, in the sense that they are pre-conventional, 
morally prior to any social institution or contractual arrangement, and they are natural in 
the related sense, also, o f  being grounded in the natures o f  the creatures that possess 
them.64
Consequently, the natural rights that we have in our political practice are simply a set of 
abstract moral claims.
Indeed, one might conjecture here whether the principle of natural rights 
validated by a law of “reason” would contradict Locke’s empiricist position: that all 
knowledge comes from sense-experience. Within the system of An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding itself, however, it seems that Locke himself would not have 
thought of this as a problem. For even though all simple moral ideas are from experience, 
once they are obtained, Locke argues, we have the ability to examine, relate or abstract 
them in order to gain some complex moral ideas. And if, in so doing, they express 
necessary relations of agreement or disagreement, we may then claim certain moral rules 
subsist in their relations. That is, in Locke’s system of ethics, the ideas of a moral law
64 J. Gray, 1995b: 45-6.
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must come from experience, but the truth of a moral rule is independent of its 
observance.65
Locke identifies three kinds of moral law: the divine law, the civil law and the law 
of opinion or reputation, of which the first is ultimate and exactly understood as “that 
law which God has set to the actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light 
of nature, or the voice of revelation.”66 According to F. Copleston, “Locke’s distinction 
between the light of nature and revelation recalls Aquinas’s distinction between the 
natural law, known by reason, and the divine positive law; and this distinction was 
doubtless inspired largely by Hooker, who had taken over a good deal from mediaeval 
philosophy.” “The influence of Hooker”, Copleston continues, “and of mediaeval 
philosophy through Hooker, on Locke’s thought can be seen in the latter’s notion of 
natural rights.”67 It is thus reaffirmed here that the distinction between empiricism and 
rationalism is only a matter regarding the source of knowledge; and that Locke has been 
promoting the Enlightenment ethical position in terms of a rational justification of
i
morality.
11.3,3. Kant: The Categorical Imperative
We may now turn to Kant’s moral philosophy by concentrating on Grounding fo r the 
Metaphysics o f Morals, the philosopher’s ethical propaedeutic.
The major objective in our moral life, for Kant as for many ethical thinkers, is to 
be “good”. But Kant’s key point is that “there is no possibility of thinking of anything at 
all in the world, or even out of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification, 
except a good w/7/.”68 Intelligence or courage may be good only if they are not put to ill 
use; happiness or pleasure cannot be good unless a will thinks it to be so. A “good will”, 
then, points to the fact that we, fully rational beings, are in essence free agents who can 
autonomously judge our own moral status by the use of reason. The theme of Kant’s 
ethics thus exists in the following form: “Morality makes sense only if men are free; 
freedom is just the ability to act from reason; thus morality will make sense only if it is
65 SeeF. Copleston, 1959: 123.
66 Locke, 1975: n. 28. 8.
67 F. Copleston, 1959: 127.
68 Kant, 1993b: 7.
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grounded on rationality.”69 For this reason, Kant simply regarded his whole ethical 
theory as an attempt to discover “a supreme law of freedom”70, that is, rational principles 
for the intelligent direction of the activities of free agents. In other words, for Kant, 
morality is a system of laws of freedom, indicating what ends the fully rational beings 
ought to choose for themselves and how they ought to act with regard to these ends. 
And as already mentioned, this transcendental freedom in Kant’s system of critical 
philosophy is beyond the realm of cognitive knowledge; it is a rational guide for action in 
the light of which a person can be sure that he is free?1
It follows from this that Kant’s methodology in ethics, as in epistemology, is 
transcendental. As J. G. Murphy comments,
A transcendental argument or deduction, it will be recalled, proceeds from experience to 
a discovery of those conditions making this experience possible. It discovers
presuppositions or necessary conditions for intelligibility Similarly in morality. We
do not discover that freedom is a value by inductive argument. We do not note that 
people say things like “Freedom is a good thing” with great frequency. Rather, we see 
that unless freedom is presupposed as a basic value, much of our ordinary moral talk - 
that which it is the business of the moral philosopher to analyse - would not make sense,
72would not be intelligible.
This means that the aim of Kant’s moral philosophy is not to discover a new morality, 
nor to deny our moral discourse, but to ascertain the possibility of moral certainty by 
discovering a priori principles underlying the whole body of discourse and rendering this 
discourse intelligible, and hence to put our moral life on a purely rational basis.73
All this re-affirms that although Kant distinguishes Practical Reason from 
Scientific Reason, each for him has a reality of its own: the world of the Will and the 
world of Nature. By the former he does not simply mean our actual moral judgement but 
a kind of Universal Practical Philosophy74 aiming to provide it with a rational criterion, 
an end-in-itself.75 Hence, Kant would not deny that theoretical reasoning (i.e. the
69 J. G. Murphy, 1994: 26-7.
70 Kant, 1993b: 62.
71 Cf. ibid. : 62-3.
72 J. G. Murphy, 1994: 32.
73 Cf. J. W. Ellington, 1993: vi.
74 Cf. Kant, 1993b: 3-4.
75 To apply the categorical imperative, mainly the Formula of the End in Itself, to test maxims in 
concrete moral cases is a task that Kant later came to take up in Metaphysics o f  Morals.
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philosopher’s Practical Reason) must be prior to practical reasoning (i.e. our actual 
moral activity)76; indeed Kant is a writer of a normative ethical theory.77
In Kant’s ethics the laws of freedom or morality set forth by reason, as we know, 
are identified in favour of various formulations of “categorical imperative” which 
culminate in the “kingdom of ends”. In Grounding, before moving to an examination of 
the categorical imperative, Kant first set out to clarify the nature of morality, i.e. 
goodness in terms of three propositions:
Firstly, Kant believed that moral conduct is to act “from duty” by the guidance of 
“reason” irrespective of any desire or inclination,78 that is, to act by understanding the 
action as our own duty. As D. Ross points out, for Kant to maintain that “it is my duty to 
do act A” is to maintain that “it is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to 
do act A ”79 That is to say, neither desire nor self-interest bestows moral implication; 
they are just non-moral.80 Moral worth is always accomplished on the condition that we 
behave ourselves without reference to any reward.
As a result, “the second proposition is this: An action done from duty has its 
moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to 
which the action is determined. The moral worth depends, therefore, not on the 
realisation of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition according to 
which, without regard to any objects of desire, the action has been done.”81 This means 
that moral activity is to act not only from duty but also on the principle of the moral law. 
On this basis, Kant is surely a rigorist in that the claims of duty are always against 
inclinations and there can be no expectations from any basic moral rules.82 It is thus not
76 G. Schrader, 1975: 65-90.
77 Note that many interpreters would refer to Grounding for the Metaphysics o f  Morals and Critique o f  
Practical Reason as Kant’s “meta-ethical” work which deals with the formations and methods of moral 
philosophy, whereas Metaphysics o f Morals as his “normative ethics” which copes with concrete moral 
cases in the light of the categorical imperative. But, here as elsewhere in this study, what I mean by a 
normative ethics is the attempt to seek a universal theoretical principle as a guide in our practical 
reasoning. Kant’s whole ethical project, which is contained in the three works mentioned, is perhaps the 
most outstanding case which concerns me here, i.e. it is the biggest target of Oakeshott’s critique of 
morality as abstract moral laws.
78 Kant, 1993b: 9-12.
79 D. Ross, 1930: 5.
80 Cf. W. K. Frankena, 1973: 4.
81 Kant, 1993b: 12-3.
82 H. B. Acton, 1970: 64.
difficult for the reader to realise that the moral self in Kant’s moral thought is a 
“principled self’ and morality consists in a set of abstract rules. They are abstract because 
it is the form  of the principle not the content of the principle that instructs moral action: 
moral life, for Kant, is governed by the categorical imperative rather than by concrete 
moral exemplification by which it is driven.
“The third proposition, which follows from the other two, can be expressed thus: 
Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law.”83 What concerned 
Kant regarding the principle of morality, it says, was its character as a command. When 
we act from duty and on principle we must be acting because the law demands it; and as 
such we are paying our respect to the law. “Therefore, the pre-eminent good which is 
called moral can consist in nothing but the representation of the law in itself, and such a 
representation can admittedly be found only in a rational being insofar as this 
representation, and not some expected effect, is the determining ground of the will.”84
It is no surprise, then, that for Kant when we act from duty, on maxim and out of 
the respect for the law we are acting according to the moral law, namely, the categorical 
imperative. Kant grants that conceptually all imperatives, which must contain an “ought”, 
can be in two forms: the hypothetical or the categorical. Morality can never be truly 
conducted by the former, because it represents “the practical necessity of a possible 
action as a means for attaining something else that one wants (or may possibly want).”85 
That is, the hypothetical imperative indicates that: “If you want x, you ought to do 
and so it must be associated with a certain utilitarian principle. By way of contrast, “the 
categorical imperative would be one which represented an action as objectively necessary 
in itself, without reference to another.”86 It is thus by definition the only criterion in 
accordance with the nature of goodness to be revealed.
There are a number of versions of the categorical imperative which, in fact, all 
amount to the same thing. The best-known is the Formula of Universal Law: “Act only 
according to the maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law.”87 Or alternatively, since the universality of law according to which effects
83 Kant, 1993b: 13.
84 Ibid.: 13-4.
85 Ibid.: 25
86 Ibid.: 25.
87 Ibid.: 30. The formula of universal law first appeared as “I should never act except in such a way that 
I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law”. (Ibid.: 14.)
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constitute what is properly called “nature”, the categorical imperative also can be 
rephrased thus: “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a 
universal law of nature.”88 This is often called the Formula of the Law of Nature. 
However, each of these directives means equally that “an action has moral worth only if 
it is done from duty, in a sense there is only one categorical imperative, the one that 
demands of us that we act on maxims or principles we can universalise and that we act 
on them because they can be universalised, i.e., that we act from respect for law.”89 For 
example, one who believes in the maxim of promising falsely could not “will it as a 
universal law”. “For the universality of a law which says that anyone believing himself to 
be in difficulty could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it 
would make promising itself and the end to be attained thereby quite impossible, 
inasmuch as no one would believe what was promised him but would merely laugh at all 
such utterances as being vain pretenses.”90 In short, to will a maxim as a universal law is 
to will it as a ubiquitous moral institution, a general system of values.
There are three other closely intertwined principles that can be derived from the 
above. The first of these is the Formula of the End in Itself: “Act in such in way that you 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the 
same time as an end and never simply as a means.”91 That the result of the test of this 
formula is equivalent to that of the previous ones should not be questioned. To use the 
same example again, if one is to make a false promise one is using others as a means to 
achieve one’s own ends and thus one breaks the principle of the end in itself. Conversely, 
when someone is treated as a means, his humanity is defaced; when the principle of such 
treatment is universalised, the agent of such treatment must in turn be willing to be 
similarly treated. But every one wants to be treated as a human and not as a thing. Thus, 
any violation of the Formula of the End in Itself must be morally wrong according the 
Formula of Universal Law.92
What is more, there is also the Formula of Autonomy which commands that 
“everything be done from the maxim of such a will could at the same time have as its
88 Ibid.: 30.
89 R. L. Arrington, 1998: 275.
90 Kant, 1993b: 31.
91 Ibid.: 36.
92 J. W. Ellington, 1993: 12.
object only itself regarded as legislating universal law.”93 This suggests that the notion of 
autonomy is the very idea running through all of those formulations of the categorical 
imperative, because it ensures once again that we, fully rational beings, are not merely 
the subject of the moral law, but its legislators; that we must be free agents conceived as 
an end in itself and able to make universal law. “Hence autonomy is the ground of the 
dignity of human nature and of every rational nature”; “freedom must be presupposed as 
a property of the will of all rational beings.” 94
And finally, all that has been said gives rise to the concluding Formula of the 
Kingdom of Ends, to which a rational being belongs as a member “when he legislates in 
it universal laws while also being himself subject to these laws.”95 Thus where the 
Kingdom of Ends is an ideal moral community in which every rational member is freely 
and equally co-operating with each other according the same universal laws, what is 
eventually confirmed is a bifurcated reality that Kant has already set forth in Critique o f 
Pure Reason:
Therefore he [a rational being] has two standpoints from which he can regard him self and 
know laws o f  the use o f  his powers and hence o f  all his actions: first, insofar as he 
belongs to the world o f  sense subject to laws o f  nature (heteronomy); secondly, insofar as 
he belongs to the intelligible world subject to laws which, independent o f  nature, are not 
empirical but are founded only on reason. As a rational being and hence belonging to the 
intelligible world, man can never think o f  the causality o f  his own will except under the 
idea o f  freedom; for independence from the determining causes o f  the world o f  sense (an 
independence which reason must always attribute to itself) is freedom.96
This, of course, does not mean that for Kant human beings can be indifferent to nature 
and live in the Kingdom of Ends alone. In fairness to him, as already indicated, it only 
says that although Scientific Reason cannot penetrate into Practical Reason, logically the 
existence of the physical world must be established in the first place, then we may come 
to consider the possibility of moral consciousness. As Kant puts it,
The former view o f  a countless multitude o f  worlds annihilates, as it were, my 
importance as an animal creature, which must give back to the planet (a mere speck in 
the universe) the matter from which it came, the matter which is for a little time provided
93 Kant, 1993b: 39.
94 Ibid.: 41, 50.
95 Ibid.: 40
96 Ibid.: 53-4.
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with vital force, we know not how. The latter, on the contrary, infinitely raises my worth 
as that o f  an intelligence by my personality, in which the moral law reveals a life 
independent o f all animality and even o f the whole world o f  sense.97
To conclude, it has been shown that for Kant morality derives neither from 
traditions and communities, nor from the natural law, nor from the inclination of the 
nature of men, but from “pure reason” alone. “Kant’s ethics”, as O. O’Neill comments, 
thus “remains the paradigmatic and most influential attempt to vindicate universal moral 
principles without reference to preferences or to a theoretical framework.”98 And it is 
true that the possibility of these principles is based on a form of radical individualism: 
“Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has the power to 
act according to his conception of laws, i.e., according to principles, and thereby has he a 
will.”99 According to Kant’s renowned claim in “What Is Enlightenment?”, the motto of 
enlightenment is: “Have courage to use your own reason”, and for this enlightenment, 
“nothing is required but freedom”.100 As a result, the nature of Kant’s ethics is both 
formalist and abstract.
n.3.4. Mill: The Utilitarian Principle
The third and last module of liberal ethics on which I shall comment here is utilitarianism. 
In its standard form, utilitarianism presents the ethical thought teaching that “happiness is 
desirable, and the only thing desirable, as an end”101 in human actions i.e. a sum of 
pleasures, and that moral activity is the promotion of “the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number”: “the rightness of an action is determined by its contribution to the 
happiness of everyone affected by it.”102 Thus, the two features which are of particular 
significance in classic utilitarianism are hedonism and consequentialism,103 and both of 
these can be found in Mill’s Utilitarianism subsumed under his definition of the 
utilitarian principle:
97 Ibid.: 169.
98 O. O’Neill, 1994: 184.
99 Kant, 1993b: 23.
100 Kant, 1996: 106,107.
101 Mill, 1991a: 168.
102 A. Quinton, 1989: 1.
103 For the general characteristics of utilitarianism, see A. Quinton, 1989: 1-10; G. Scarre, 1996: 1-26; J. 
P. Plamenatz, 1949: 1-10.
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility or the Greatest Happiness 
Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.104
First, utilitarianism involves a form of hedonism because neither Bentham nor 
Mill would deny that “end”, “utility”, “happiness”, “interest”, “good”, “benefit” etc., are 
all different expressions of the same thing, that is, the enjoyment of “pleasures” or the 
relief of “pains”. But, in many cases, the utilitarian is also an egoist in the sense that the 
individual is believed to desire pleasures or interests in actual fact by ways of which his 
actions are motivated. A most obvious implication of egoism, indeed, is expressed in the 
first three sentences of Bentham’s Principle o f Morals and Legislation:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine 
what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain 
of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne.105
Whether or not Mill was an egoist is debatable, as he did have a subtler position 
about the “development of person excellence”106 and he put much more stress on the 
importance of the consensus and stability of common good than either Bentham or James 
Mill.107 But in each case, it still seems that egoism plays a major role in the premise of 
Mill’s “proof’ of the Greatest Happiness Principle mentioned:
The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see
it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people here it: and so of the other
sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to
produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which
the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice,
108acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so.
That is to say, Mill’s proof of the utilitarian principle somehow rests on “a 
psychological theory according to which the only promoting which moves a man to
104 Mill, 1991a: 137.
105 Quoted by A. Quinton, 1989: 6.
106 G. Scarre, 1996: 5. Cf. A. Ryan, 1974: 105, 125, 131-3.
107 Cf. A  Ryan, 1974: 127.
108 Mill, 1991a: 168.
action is the pleasure of so acting or the pain of acting otherwise.”109 If it is so, it 
demands that the ground of the Greatest Happiness Principle should be originally based 
on an account of human nature: all men often seek pleasure and avoid pain; all men are 
utilitarian in practice; it is common human experience to increase the best and decrease 
the worst. And thus, it may not be going too far to say that the egoistic hedonism of 
utilitarianism, even in Millian terms, contains a psychological transformation of radical 
individualism. The individual is dependent on the determination of human nature in order 
to make his responses to situations. Besides, the fact that men’s endless capacity to 
aggregate and maximise happiness implied in any form of utilitarianism must have 
reinforced the strength of radical individualism in its theoretical context.110
Secondly, as indicated, that which is closely related to Mill’s Greatest Happiness 
Principle is its consequentialist implication, in that it maintains that the rightness of an 
action is judged by the goodness of its outcome.111 In its later version, consequentialism 
has been developed into “act consequentialism” and “rule consequentialism”,112 but, what 
is important here is that any form of consequentialism is appropriate in a universal theory 
of moral justification.113 For, to judge the rightness of an action in favour of the 
goodness of its result must have logically implied that a criterion of moral judgement is 
prior to the performance of human activity. At this point, it means that consequentialism 
or teleology and deontology are fundamentally different only if the moral worth of 
actions should be determined according to their consequences for the promotion of a set 
of moral values, or on the basis of their agreement with a priori moral laws. Both of 
these, to be sure, make an attempt to establish some one ultimate principle of morality.114 
It is thus no wonder that the two major approaches in modem ethics generally lead to 
similar moral conclusions in practice. For example, breaking promises is morally wrong 
because it is breaking the moral law from a deontologist point of view, or because it 
produces negative impact on common human interest from a utilitarian point of view.115
109 A. Ryan, 1974: 118.
110 Cf. G. Scarre, 1996: 14-25.
111 Some writers, indeed, thus intend to make no difference between utilitarianism and consequentialism. 
See, for example, P. Kelly, 1994: 127-45.
112 For act utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism, see G. Scarre, 1996: 122-32.
113 For this foundationalist or Rationalist character of utilitarianism in terms of Bentham’s ethical 
thought, see also RP: 132-50.
114 Cf. Mill, 1991a: 134-5.
115 G. Scarre, 1996: 11-3.
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The view that a rational system of ethics must contain the first principle of utility 
is certainly relevant to Mill’s case. Mill’s Utilitarianism not only revises his 
predecessors’ teachings, for example, by putting emphasis upon the qualities of 
happiness,116 but it also addresses those of his enemies, especially, in criticism of W. 
Whewill’s intuitionism which tried to replace the criterion of morality with our common 
“moral sense”.117 In A System o f Logic, Mill had tried to surmount intuitionism by 
establishing a philosophia prima of “the Art of Life” which would allow us to justify and 
rank the ends of life:
I shall content myself with saying that the doctrine of intuitive moral principles, if true,
would only provide for that portion of the field of conduct which is properly called moral.
For the remainder of the practice of life, some general principle, or standard, must still be
sought; and if that principle be rightly chosen, it will be found, I apprehend, to serve
118quite as well for the ultimate principle of Morality, as for that of Policy or Taste.
And by the same token, in Utilitarianism Mill attempts to define the first principle of 
utility as follows:
The truths which are ultimately accepted as the first principles of a science, are really the 
last results of metaphysical analysis, practised on the elementary notions with which the 
science is conversant; and their relation to the science is not that of foundations to an 
edifice, but of roots of a tree, which may perform their office equally well though they be 
never dug down to and exposed to light.119
Utilitarianism understood in terms of consequentialism, then, is a rational 
programme whose ambition is to order our moral life into a whole system. The first 
principle of utilitarianism, the Greatest Happiness Principle, is regarded as the rational 
guide in practice - “the test of right and wrong” 120, as Mill used to call it - but, like any 
moral principle, it must suffer from being abstract and formalistic.
Aside from the combination of egoistic hedonism and consequentialism, however, 
classic utilitarianism produces a self-contradiction. In the case of Bentham or James Mill, 
the difficulty is this: If egoistic hedonism means that the individual is always motivated by
116 See Mill, 1991a: 139-43
117 Cf. A. Ryan, 1974: 99-101; J. Skorupski, 1993: 51-4.
118 Quoted by A. Ryan, 1974: 104.
119 Mill, 1991a: 132.
120 Ibid.: 132ff.
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his own pleasure, there can be no sense in saying that the “greatest happiness of the 
greatest number” is desirable to him at the same time.121 But this perhaps was more 
important to the critics of utilitarianism than Bentham or James Mill had actually thought 
it to be. Because the resolution for reconciling the two factors was to maintain the 
harmony of self-interests. That is, as long as a society makes every effort to create a 
harmony of the interests of individuals, the Greatest Happiness Principle can be desirable 
to its numbers. And here, we can not see any reason for John S. Mill to deny this in 
principle.
But, Mill’s whole situation is far more complicated. Because, what he had to 
conciliate was not merely self-interest and common good, but, more importantly, liberty 
and the utilitarian principle; the two matters that now give him a distinguishable place in 
the history of political thought. And in which case, the principle paradox of Millian 
utilitarian liberalism is: “the Principle of Liberty actually disqualifies utility-promotion as 
a reason for the restraint of liberty.”122
Although, in the first chapter of On Liberty, Mill told us that his object was to 
defend the principle that:
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering 
with the liberty o f  action o f any o f  their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose 
for which power can be rightly exercised over any member o f  a civilised community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
123not a sufficient warrant.
And he seemed to believe that it is not a theory of natural rights but the very principle of 
utility on which the justification of liberty rests: “It is proper to state that I forego any 
advantage which could be derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a 
thing independent of utility.”124 However, it does seem that it is not quite this direct 
position that Mill really took to defend liberty for the remainder of his prestigious essay. 
As J. Plamenatz states, “what he [Mill] is himself concerned to do is not to show that 
there are good utilitarian grounds for the non-interference he advocates, but to determine 
the limits of the interference which he regards as permissible”; that is, “he leaves undone
121 J. Plamenatz, 1949: 9-10; A. Quinton, 1989: 6.
122 J. Gaiy, 1991: xix.
123 Mill, 1991b: 14.
124 i  «
all those things that a utilitarian ought to do, but what he does is as well worth doing as 
anything he ever attempted.”125 Some contemporary liberals, thus, would like to interpret 
Mill more as a liberal than as an utilitarian.126
Recent revisionist scholarship, however, has tried to connect Mill’s utilitarianism 
with his liberalism by linking Utilitarianism with On Liberty121 And two major pieces of 
evidence have been provided in support. Firstly, the two works were almost written 
contemporaneously. And second, perhaps more importantly, the liberal principle can best 
be seen as a “secondary principle”, which can be driven by the first principle of utility and 
allowed in the whole system of Utilitarianism, to govern society’s political and moral 
treatment of the individual. Thus, as R. Crisp argues, the principles Mill recommends in 
On Liberty, “even though they make no explicit reference to the utility principle, derive 
their plausibility from that principle”:
The liberty principle states that such interference [with the lives o f  individuals] is
justified only to prevent harm to others, and this principle not only rules out paternalistic
justifications for interference, but provides the underpinning for a protected self-
regarding sphere. The liberty principle rests upon individuality, which has welfare value
in itself when instantiated in people’s lives, as well as being o f  great instrumental value
as humanity progresses. The same sorts o f  justification underlie M ill’s defence o f
freedom o f  speech: the value o f understanding, and the importance o f  vivid belief, both o f
128which can be productive o f  welfare fo r  society as a whole [emphasis mine].
And yet, if it is so, the universal and formalist features of utilitarianism must be reflecting 
an ultimate utilitarian principle of liberty.
77.5.5. Formalism in E thics 
By formalism in ethics, then, I mean the attempt to produce a normative moral and 
political theory, maintaining that the task of moral philosophy is to establish a set of self- 
evident and universal principles which can govern our practical life as a whole. And thus,
125 J. Plamenatz, 1947: 126.
126 See, for example, I. Berlin, 1991; C. L. Ten, 1980.
127 See, for example, J. Gray, 1983 and 1991: vii-xxx; R  Crisp, 1997: viii.
128 R  Crisp, 1997: 199.
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there are three points of “family resemblance”129 being of particular importance to this 
ethical position, which can be restated as follows:
(2) formalism in ethics means the hope to establish
(2.1.) a set of moral principles which would ensure our moral certainty; 
and this hope is based upon a form of
(2.2) radical individualism, which contains an anti-traditional or anti- 
institutional attitude towards our moral life; and thus this treatment of 
morality has the character of 
(2.3.) formalism in order to be applied universally.
Now, it would not be surprising to say that foundationalism in philosophy and 
rationalism in ethics are theoretically allied. Locke, Kant and Mill basically accept the 
premise that the rationality discovered by science and applied to objectify the external 
world can be likewise used to order our moral life in terms of a set of rules. And just as 
the ideal form of Enlightenment civilisation is a mode of “argumentation” in which the 
philosopher is engaged in the pursuit of some ultimate values rather than in “an 
unrehearsed intellectual adventure” recognised as “conversation”130, the liberal thinkers 
have tried to establish, so to speak, the “technique or rule of morality”, the “morality of 
faith” or a set of “demonstrative moral truths”131.
More precisely, as we shall see in greater detail in terms of Oakeshott’s 
understanding of Rationalism, a set of moral and political (liberal) principles are made for 
the sake of Cartesian certainty. Furthermore, radical individualism is closely related to 
the notion of the instrumental mind, or, to use C. Taylor’s terminology, the 
“unencumbered self’ or the “disengaged self’132 which hovers over modem philosophy in 
order to establish an absolute system of things and values. And finally, the inclination to 
formalism indicates that the rational authority of moral principles is possible only if the 
superiority of Human Reason is presupposed. In short, formalism in ethics or rationalism
129 Wittgenstein, 1968.
130 RP: 490.
131 These, as we shall see, are the Oakeshottian terms.
132 C. Taylor, 1989.
in politics is the belief that our abstract theoretical reasoning can be and must be used as 
a guide in our complicated practical reasoning.
We may thus reach the point that liberalism and foundationalism mutually entail 
one another;133 they constitute the whole package of Enlightenment positions. This, of 
course, does not mean that every important antecedent of modem natural philosophy we 
have mentioned must be a liberal thinker: Descartes, for example, made no claim to the 
concept of liberal thought. But it does say of liberalism and foundationalism that if one is 
repudiated the other must also be repudiated. And thus, if “the moral crisis of our day is 
a ‘crisis of Enlightenment thought,’”134 it predicts a crisis for liberal ethics, viz. rationalist 
politics, too.
77.5.6. The Crisis of the Enlightenment Ethical Position 
The mistake of the Enlightenment project, as indicated, largely lies in the abstract 
concept of rationality it carries. And recently, for those who are concerned with the crisis 
of Enlightenment ethics in terms of this view the name Alasdair MacIntyre has become 
something of an institution. A short review of this thinker’s scholarship will help to shed 
light on my concern here.
It is MacIntyre’s observation that contemporary moral and political culture is in a 
state of disarray in the sense that we are no longer able to resolve the actual moral 
debates concerning nuclear war, abortion, freedom, justice and so forth. He begins in 
After Virtue by noting that:
The most striking feature o f contemporary moral utterance is that so much o f  it is used to 
express disagreements; and the most striking feature o f  the debate in which those 
disagreements are expressed is their interminable character. I do not mean by this just 
that such debates go on and on - although they do - but also that they can find no 
terminus. There seems to be no rational way o f  securing moral agreement in our 
culture.135
133 Rorty seems to have held a different view. For his attempt to free liberal theory from Enlightenment 
foundationalism, see J. Gray, 1995a: chap. 10. See also D. MacNiven, 1996: 353. in which he argues 
that “it may be possible to reject foundationalism, radical individualism, and the fact/value dichotomy, 
yet retain the principle of individual liberty, equality and defended democracy.”
134 D. Harvey, 1989: 4.
135 A. MacIntyre, 1985: 6.
And he concludes that book with the claim that:
on the one hand we still, in spite o f  the efforts o f  three centuries o f  moral philosophy and 
one o f  sociology, lack any coherent rationally defensible statement o f  a liberal 
individualist point o f  view; [and] on the other hand, the Aristotelian tradition can be 
restated in a way that restores intelligibility and rationality to our moral and social
136attitudes and commitments.
The main reason why the present moral position has become so bewildered, 
according to MacIntyre, has the most to do with the Enlightenment project of providing 
a vindication of morality, in terms of which Western people have now become 
accustomed, by classifying judgements, arguments and deeds in everyday moral 
discourse.137 On the one hand, that which is closely related to the ideal of a rational 
justification of morality is the Enlightenment’s premise of radical individualism teaching 
that morality is really about the individual’s capacity to act which is independent of 
historic and social context. On the other hand, ironically, those moral arguments, which 
are put forth by the individuals as the best solutions derived from the universal principles 
fortified by the rational ethical theories, are so diverse that they actually conflict with one 
another in a way which is logically “incommensurate”:138
Every one o f  the arguments is logically valid or can be easily expanded so as to be made 
so; the conclusions do indeed follow from the premise. But the rival premises are such 
that we possess no rational way o f weighing the claims o f  one as against another. For 
each premise employs some quite different normative or evaluative concept from the 
others, so that the claims made upon us are o f quite different kinds.139
The appearance of emotivism in the century, MacIntyre declares, precisely 
symbolises this chaos of moral reasoning and the breakdown of the very tradition of 
ethics. For, by claiming that moral judgements embrace an emotional aspect which is 
allowed by different moral theories and can hardly be reasonably denied,140 emotivism 
stands for an extreme form of moral relativism giving up the possibility of any rational 
reflection upon morality and politics.141 Moreover, in view of the fact that “a moral
136 Ibid.: 259. See also, 1988: ix.
137 A. MacIntyre, 1985: chap. 4.
Ibid.: 6-10138
139 Ibid.: 8.
140 T. Honderich ed. 1995: 225.
141 A. MacIntyre, 1985: 11-22.
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philosophy ... characteristically presupposes a sociology”,142 it can be noted that 
emotivism is actually in accordance with the character of the modem world. That is, the 
social content of emotivism “entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between 
manipulative and non-manipulative social relationships”143 which characterises our time; 
emotivist ethical thought simply regards all moral discourse as an expression of a 
“manipulative interpersonal relationship.”144
In an emotivist society, then, morality is treated as the selfish desire for power in 
terms of the bureaucratic rationality of “matching means to ends economically and 
efficiently”.145 And consequently, the “emotivist self’ thus conceived, “utterly distinct on 
the one hand from its social embodiments and lacking on the other any rational history of 
its own, may seem to have a certain abstract and ghostly character:”
The appearance o f an abstract and ghostly quality arises not from any lingering Cartesian 
dualism, but from the degree o f contrast, indeed the degree o f  loss, that comes into view  
i f  we compare the emotivist self with its historical predecessors. ... The self is now 
thought o f as lacking any necessary social identity, because the kind o f  social identity 
that it once enjoyed is no longer available; the self is now thought o f  as criterionless, 
because the kind o f telos in terms o f which it once judged and acted is no longer thought 
to be credible.146
In short, the crisis of modem ethics does not simply lie in its substituting one morality for 
another but lies in its substituting morality for “power politics”.147
In order to rescue the malaise of ethical modernity that the Enlightenment project 
has brought about, as mentioned, MacIntyre suggests that we should revert to an 
Aristotelian tradition. The three elements that MacIntyre learns from Aristotle and takes 
as opposed to the Enlightenment ethical assumptions are: practice, the narrative self and 
tradition148 (in contrast to a set of moral rules, radical individualism or the emotivist self, 
and formalism respectively). It is in his discussion of the implications of these 
conceptions, especially that of Aristotelian phronesis, as we shall see, that MacIntyre 
expresses his affinity with Oakeshott’s critique of Rationalism.
42 Ibid.: 22.
43 Ibid.: 23.
44 S. Mulhall and A. Swift, 1997: 75.
45 A. MacIntyre, 1985: 25.
46 Ibid.: 33.
47 D. MacNiven, 1996: 351.
48 J. Horton and S. Mendus, 1994: 8-14; S. Mulhall and A. Swift, 1997: 82-92.
II.4. Positivist Historiography
The next topic that I am going to explore here is the Enlightenment historiographical 
position, i.e. the notion of scientific history backed up by an identification of the 
historical with a naturalised conception of History, which I believe empowers the 
philosophical commitment of pro-positivist historiography. Before we go any further, 
however, I intend to clarify the meanings of history, History or the Past and 
historiography used in the thesis from the outset.
11.4,1. History, the Past and Historiography
In English the locution of “history” is ambiguous; and I have tried to gather together 
some of its distinguishable meanings in the previous chapter. Yet, two of these concepts, 
to which the word “history” most frequently refers, must be particularly discriminated 
here, namely history as an enquiry and History as the Past.149
History, as we commonly conceive it, may stand for all the events or occurrences 
that have ever happened in the lives of human beings, especially where the events are 
seen as a long process which leads up to the present. In other words, the word “History” 
may be taken to mean the Past, the Human Past, which precisely signifies all the other 
events that have really happened “in” it before any now-points that can be arbitrarily 
determined by men. To cite one simple example, it is possible in standard English to say 
either “Parliamentary government is a product of the Past” or “Parliamentary 
government is a product of History”. Furthermore, in academic writings, one finds 
reference to the concept “historical context” or “historical situation” which is commonly 
used in the social sciences to mean “the social, political, economic and cultural 
circumstances prevailing in the particular society being studied.”150 The adjective
149 OH: 1-2. For the discussions of this two-fold meaning of the word “history”, see also F. H. Bradley, 
1993: 3-4; W. H. Walsh, 1967: 16-7; K. Jenkins, 1991:3-26; P. Kelly, forthcoming.
150 Cf. A. Marwick, 1989: 10.
“historical” used here, without doubt, does not refer to the historian’s understanding of 
past ideas at all; but rather, refers to people, situations, etc. that used to exist there and 
then, in respect of this identity, whether or not we know anything whatever about them. 
In what follows, to avoid confusion, I shall substitute the adjective “historic” for 
“historical” in this context of usage.
In another meaning, however, history stands for a certain sort of enquiry into 
some such passage of events in a particular subject; the engagement and the conclusions 
of an historian. That is to say, in respect of this sense, the word “history”, just as the 
Greek word from which the English word “history” is derived, indicates a kind of human 
enquiry; it is used to mean an individual manner of interpreting, understanding past ideas, 
or an organised body of knowledge about something past, which is produced by no one 
but the historian alone. Here, the adjective “historical” denotes an enquiry that, whatever 
we may think about the truth of its conclusions, is recognised in terms of certain 
characteristics to be an historical enquiry; and it denotes the kind of understanding 
reached in the course of such enquiry.
It has now become clear that the locution of “history” as such refers to two 
different levels of human activity. In one it reflects our activity of “making history”. It 
was in this sense that, for example, Karl Marx made his famous comment: “Men make 
their own history, but not of their own free will.”151 In another, however, it reflects the 
historian’s activity of “writing history”: “it is made by nobody save the historian, to write 
history is the only way of making it.”152 It is undoubted that all of us all the time are 
participants in “Human History”, but only few of us at the same time have ever engaged 
in writing “a history”, one among many other “histories”, about that “History”.
These two meanings of the word “history” are certainly different but they are not 
unrelated. For, history as interpretation is a human way of understanding the Past 
recognised in terms of certain characteristics to be the historical (and this is what I mean 
by historiography). Nevertheless, here and everywhere else, we need to get clear in our 
minds this very distinction, because the word “history” used by many unreflective 
historians and in pro-positivist theories of history where it is thought that “it refers both 
to what actually happened in the past and to the representation of that past in the work
151 Marx, 1973: 146.
152 EM: 99.
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of historians,”153 has unquestionably given rise to the belief that the Past existed 
objectively in itself and is now understandable, and that the historian’s principle business 
is to discover those “objective facts”, to represent the occurrence of “what really 
happened” in The Past in terms of causal explanation. It is mainly this premise of an 
identification of history with History that I shall call into question in this study.
By the term “historiography”, on the other hand, I mean the theory of the writing of 
history. However, following M. Stanford, there are three basic aspects of writing history 
that must be distinguished here154: Firstly, there is “the descriptive theory of history” that 
simply describes the historian’s practices and points to their methods and procedures. 
Secondly, we also have what is often called “a history of history” that looks at the 
different ways in which people have written history from the time of the ancient Greek, 
Herodotus. And finally, there is “the philosophy of history” which, as we know it today, 
embraces the so-called “analytical philosophy of history” (in relation to logical 
positivism) as well as the “critical philosophy of history” (in relation to writers such as 
Dilthey, Collingwood and so forth), both of which attempt to discuss some of the 
concepts and philosophical problems that arise from the writing of history.
Also, it should be observed that, like the word “history” itself, the term 
“philosophy of history” has been used in two basic senses.155 In addition to analytical and 
critical historiography, this term has long been indiscriminately applied to all speculative 
schemes of the Human Past. This is what may be called the “speculative philosophy of 
history”, (or the capitalised term Philosophy of History), which has been undertaken with 
the aim of providing us with some general laws or patterns that underlie the whole 
process of the Human Past, a general review of the whole course of human life, or the 
plan of History considered as a whole.156 We may find the idea of a Philosophy of 
History in the work of the nineteenth-century thinkers such as Hegel, Ranke157, Comte, 
Marx, Tolstoy or Spengler, for example.
153 J. Tosh, 1991: vi.
154 See M. Standford, 1994: 5-7.
155 Cf. W. H. Walsh, 1967: 19.
156 EM: 154-5.
157 Note that there seems to have been two different faces of Ranke in terms of philosophy in Germany 
and in terms of historiography in Anglo-America. In German philosophical circles, Ranke is often taken 
to be a theological-historicist who believed that Universal History was organised according to 
providential design. In historiography, however, he was seen by Anglo-American scholars as a historical
In this thesis, by the Enlightenment historiographical position I am referring to a 
certain tradition of philosophy of history that adopts a naturalistic view of historical 
knowledge, but I am leaving aside the case of the Philosophy of History. For the latter is 
actually concerned with a metaphysical reading of History rather than with the 
characteristics of the writing of history. To make an obvious distinction: it is one thing to 
suppose that the Human Past has a meaning in the sense that all that has happened has 
been dominated by some “hidden hand”: for example, the hand of Hegel’s “cunning of 
reason”; whilst it is quite another to think about the human way of understanding and 
enquiring about that Past.158 That is, to Hegel, the historian’s understanding of History 
must be “in his own spirit which is different from the spirit of the object itself’; only the 
philosopher who aims to discover “absolute knowledge” is eligible to realise how God’s 
wisdom has expressed itself in World History159.
More precisely, I take the Enlightenment historiographical position to be a 
scientific attempt to study history by identifying the historical with a naturalised 
conception of History; it is a position, although having been encouraged by the 
eighteenth-century philosophes, which becomes most unambiguous when represented in 
pro-positivist historiography. I said most unambigious because Western people, without 
doubt, have had experience in writing history as far back in time as the ancient Greeks. 
Yet, if by now in Western culture “history” means “academic history”, it is less than two 
centuries old.160 And given the view that to write history is separable from thinking about 
the nature of historical writing, it is not until the nineteenth century that the largest 
number of discussions about historiography have been made by pro-positivism and its 
theoretical competitors.
Moreover, it is true that “the first stage in the development of modem historical 
thought came when the historians of the Enlightenment, inspired by seventeenth-century 
science, launched a large-scale exploration of the past.”161 But, it is also those 
philosophes who, by applying the notions of universal human nature, totality and 
progress to surmount the Past, created the idea of Universal History and developed
objectivist who claimed it was possible to uncover the past and speak about it - “wie es eigentlich 
gewessen”. (See G. Iggers, 1973.)
158 Cf. P. Gardiner, 1959: 7.
159 Hegel, 1993: 16, 25.
160 See, for example, A. MacIntyre, 1985: 4.
161 T. R. Tholfsen, 1967: 14.
insights that pointed in the direction of the Philosophy of History in the following 
century.
To adopt the rational standard in understanding History, Voltaire, for example, 
wrote that:
it is clear that everything which belongs intimately to human nature is the same from one 
end of the universe to the other; that everything depends on custom is different, and it is 
accidental if it remains the same. The empire of custom is much more vast than that of 
nature; it extends over manners and all usages, it sheds variety on the scene of the 
universe; nature sheds unity there, she establishes everywhere a small number of 
invariable principles. Thus the basis is everywhere the same, and culture produces 
diverse fruits.162
And, from the notion of totality one learnt that: If one reads “history” from a particular 
point of view, Human History breaks apart into “fragments” (historical particulars); it 
was therefore urgent to insist on its wholeness by means of “a kind of secularised 
theology of cause and effect which presumed the coherence of all events”.163 In addition, 
as Lord Acton pointed out, the view of Universal History relied on the Enlightenment 
notion of human progress, too:
By Universal History I understand that which is distinct from the combined history of all 
countries, which is not a rope of sand, but a continuous development, and is not a burden 
on the memory, but an illumination of the soul. It moves in a succession to which the 
nations are subsidiary. Their story will be told, not for their own sake, but in reference 
and subordination to a higher series, according to the time and the degree in which they 
contribute to the common fortunes of mankind.164
In sum, the philosophes played a paradoxical role in the development of historical 
thought: In respect of Universal History they were unhistorical in the sense of distorting 
the concrete and particular characteristics of historical knowledge, whilst in respect of 
providing a new conceptual instrument for scientific history they contrived a modem 
mode of treating history.165 And here, it is the latter that will be further discussed.
On the whole, then, it is my view that the philosophical commitment of positivist 
historiography, both traditional and contemporary, is predicated on an Enlightenment
162 Quoted by E. Cassirer, 1979: 219.
163 Cf. C. R. Bambach, 1990: 6.
164 Quoted by E. Breisach, 1994: 321.
165 Cf. T. R. Tholfsen, 1967: 93-4.
position which makes no distinction between history as a mode of understanding and 
History as a naturalised entity. For the rest of this section, as a result, I intend to examine 
first, the characteristics of that naturalised conception of History; second, and most 
importantly, the grounds of neo-positivist historiography; and finally, some philosophical 
problems arising from the notion of scientific history in general. In the course of 
discussing neo-positivist historiography, nonetheless, I shall pay some attention to its 
foundationalist character. In so doing, my argument is that neo-positivism is incapable of 
solving the pitfalls embodied in Enlightenment historical thought, as it remains within the 
Cartesian-Kantian tradition of philosophy in terms of scientism, dualism- 
representationism and universalism upon which the notion of scientific history is based. 
And thus, bringing neo-positivism into consideration will enable a more complete 
examination of the development of modem foundationalist philosophy to be extended on 
the one hand, and provide an opportunity for further study of the contemporary debate 
over historiography with regard to a certain Enlightenment position on the other.
II.4.2. The Naturalised Conception of History 
To begin with, by a naturalised conception of History, I mean the attempt to impose a 
law of Nature upon History. Since History is literally related to the Past, the law of 
Nature at stake can be understood as a “temporal rhythm given in Nature”166, namely, 
successiveness. In this sense the naturalised conception of History is a “Historical 
Perspective” in association with a certain notion of Time; its typical definition can hereby
• 167be understood as a series of “what happened”, the course of successive events. It 
follows that this notion of History does not necessarily amount to a Philosophy of 
History, (although it may be regarded as the presupposition: It seems harder to believe in 
the progressive process of Human History if past events are not believed to be successive 
in the first instance.) And thus, even though one of the main features which characterises 
logical positivism is its striving to reject the traditional metaphysical system and the 
Philosophy of History, in claiming history as the representation of what really happened
166 R. Koselleck, 1985: 95.
167 Bosanquet, for example, has negatively used the phrases: a “tissue of mere conjunction” or the 
“doubtful story of successive events”. (Quoted by P. Franco, 1990: 33.)
in the occurrence of events in terms of general laws, its historiography must be 
dependent on this naturalised conception of History, which clearly assumes: (1) the 
existence of History as the only legitimate object of historical study, (2) the conception 
of Time as successiveness and a definition of History as a series of successive events, and
(3) the application of scientific methods to the study of history. Let me now illuminate 
these characteristics in relation to the Enlightenment philosophical and historical 
thoughts of the moment.168
First of all, we have seen that, for Descartes, to understand things credibly one 
has to seek for a rigorous access to the absolute certain truth; and this implies that there 
are always objective answers about the natural world waiting to be disclosed by the self- 
conscious cogito. This belief was so influential in the modem world that, when “history” 
was taken into account, many scholars were concerned to assume that there is only one 
genuine answer corresponding to any historical question we may ask. That is, they 
maintained history to be an account of “what really happened” by postulating the 
existence of History in a singular form (note that the plural expression of “histories” is a 
more recent phenomenon).
For example, E. Chambers in his famous and seminal Cyclopaedia, the English 
forerunner of the French Encyclopedic, offered a standard definition of history as “a 
recital or description of things as they are, or have been; in a continued, orderly narration 
of the principle facts, and circumstances thereof.”169 Voltaire, in his prestigious article 
“Histoire” which appeared in the French Encyclopedic, defined history as “the account of 
things represented as true, as contrasted with fable, which is the account of things 
represented as false.”170 And Gibbon once claimed that history is “the knowledge of the 
events that have happened on the soil which we inhabit.”171 The notion of the singularity 
of History indeed would make it possible for the philosophes to order History in a way 
that corresponds to the “uniformity of Nature” as Newton had postulated in physics. It 
thus requires that History, “what really happened” in the Past, must be governed by the
168 Indeed, I am not suggesting that the great philosophers, especially those of the seventeenth century, 
anticipated the basic issues of modem and contemporary historiography; on the contrary, most of them 
demonstrated a lack of historical interest. Rather, I only suggest that there are some deep philosophical 
difficulties in our historical thinking whose roots should be traced back to the Cartesian-Kantian 
philosophical tradition.
169 E. Chambers, 1991: 440.
170 Voltaire, 1991: 442.
171 E. Gibbon, 1991: 461.
law of Nature, especially the law of Natural Time, so that a linear temporal sequence of 
the cause and effect of historical events can be regarded as objectively as Nature. In 
other words, when History is seen to be the temporal development of past events, its 
objectivity demands a notion of Time as a constituent of reality on a par with absolute 
Space. The indispensable element of such a naturalised conception of History, i.e. the 
notion of Natural Time, I think, had eventually been recognised in Kant’s philosophical 
system, when he came to justify the existence of a common-sense world of science in 
order to correspond exactly to Newtonian natural science.172 Although, in physics, 
Newton’s paradigm of Time might have been revised by Einstein’s paradigm of relative 
time, it remains as an orthodox human understanding of time and change 
(successiveness), even up to the present day, not to mention the time of positivism.
On this interpretation, however, one might argue that Kant seemed to have 
claimed that the world of Will should be separated from the world of Nature. But, it 
should be recalled that for Kant, Scientific Reason must be prior to Historical Reason. 
Furthermore, when “history” came into discussion, in his “Idea of a Universal History 
from a Cosmopolitan Point of View”, Kant in fact accepted the view that Nature has 
implanted certain capacities in human beings in order that they may develop and be 
progressive, and that Human History exhibits the mechanisms by which Nature ensures 
the development and progress of these.173 Thus, Kant’s conception of History can not be 
said to be non-naturalistic.
In Western philosophical theories, the concept of “time” has always occupied an 
important place; we are usually told that “[o]ne cannot read metaphysics, either of this 
age or of any other, without finding frequent reference to the problem of time.”174 And, 
many thinkers have remarked that time in itself is nothing; it is man himself who makes 
time measurable and meaningful. That time is in itself meaningless and indescribable is 
actually a traditional notion that can also be found in Greek philosophy. In Timaeus, for 
example, Plato says that “time” is a process of becoming and perishing and never really 
is. In Physics, again, Aristotle claims that since time itself is not movement, it must 
somehow have to do with movement. Following this viewpoint of time, Kant in his
172 R  Scruton, 1982: 31.
173 Cf. P. Gardiner, 1959: 22.
174 M. F. Cleugh, 1937: 1.
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Critique o f Pure Reason, takes time to be “the form of inner sense”, the “objective 
reference” within experience, but does not exist of itself:
Time is not something which exists of itself, or which inheres in things as an 
objective determination, and it does not, therefore, remain when abstraction is 
made of all subjective conditions of its intuition.
(I)f we abstract from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, time is 
nothing, and cannot be ascribed to the objects in themselves (apart from their
175relation to our intuition) in the way either of subsistence or of inherence.
Even though time is in itself nothing, it seems undeniable that change is in time. 
We usually speak of what has changed, what happens and what will occur “in time”, to 
realise changes around us. And, because time itself cannot be “removed”, all we can do is 
to ascribe the change of things in it. Kant thus says that “the concept of alteration, and 
with it the concept of motion, as alteration of place, is possible only through and in the 
representation of time;” “(o)nly in time can two contradictorily opposed predicates meet 
in one and the same object, namely, one after the other”116 That is to say, time as “the 
context of changing” does not exist of itself, but by the human way of understanding 
things in it, then, the temporal notions of coexistence or succession, before or after, 
continuity or discontinuity,... and so on, would be able to come into our perception.
So far I agree with Kant’s viewpoint which is acknowledged by many other 
contemporary philosophers as well. Heidegger, for example, indicates that “time is 
initially encountered with regard to those entities which are changeable; change is in 
time;” and that time is “the context of the fundamental kind of Being pertaining to 
natural beings: change, change of place, locomotion.”177 However, given the view that 
time is a thing of our own creation, it seems to me that we can possibly have several 
ways of speaking of time and change which exactly correspond to our different modes of 
experience (see [V.2.2.]). But this is not the case for Kant. He argues that “time has only 
one dimensionality; different times are not simultaneous but successive.” “We represent 
the time-sequence”, he continues, “by a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold 
constitutes a series of one dimensionality only; and we reason from the properties of this
175 Kant, 1993a: 76, 78.
176 Ibid.: 74.
177 Heidegger, 1992: 3E.
line to all the properties of time, with this one exception, that while the parts of the line 
are simultaneous the parts of time are always successive.”178 In short, for Kant, there is 
one dimensionality of time, i.e. the “temporal rhythm given in Nature”, and the only 
principle of time and change is successiveness.
That time has only one dimentionality and must be successive is an opinion that 
can be found in the work of almost every modem mainstream natural philosopher that 
has been discussed above. Leibniz, for example, remarked that “time is nothing but the 
order of succession of creatures.”179 For Locke, time can be understood through the 
conception of duration which like extension is derived from “the fleeting and perpetually 
perishing parts of succession”.180 And, this reading of time remains acceptable to many 
contemporary thinkers. For example, “with regard to time”, Russell seems to believe that 
“our feeling of duration or of the lapse of time is ... [according] to the time that has 
elapsed by the clock,” “... time is constituted by duration,” it “consists in an order of 
before and after.”181
Yet, if an appeal to the formulation of Natural Time is made in this way, Kant’s 
view would be that:
These principles cannot be derived from experience, for experience would give
neither strict universality nor apodeictic certainty. W e should only be able to say
that common experience teaches us that it is so; not that it must be so. These
principles are valid as rules under which alone experiences are possible; and they
182instruct us in regard to the experiences, not by means o f  them.
That is, just as the aim of Kant’s philosophy is to justify the existence of a common-sense 
world of science corresponding to Newtonian natural science, for him Natural Time has 
only one dimensionality and the course of that time must be successive because our 
“natural experience” teaches and instructs us so.
How and in what ways, does our natural common experience teach us about 
Time? This, I presume, can be understood as the way in which we learn from a clock. It
178 Kant, 1993a: 75, 77.
179 Quoted by Newton-Smith, 1980: 6.
180 Quoted by S. Priest, 1990: 91.
181 Russell, 1991: 16.
182 Kant, 1993a: 75.
is true that, at first and for the most part, as Heidegger indicates, we are really concerned 
with “time” from a physicist's viewpoint: Our “grasping and determining of time have the 
character of measuring ” “Measuring indicates the how-long and the when, the from- 
when-till-when,” between two different temporal points.183 The possibility of Natural 
Time that our natural experience has taught us is, thus, only the Astronomical Time by 
which we standardise our calendars and clocks. There are, consequently, three relative 
characteristics about Natural Time which a clock teaches us that correspond to Kant’s 
notion of Time:
Firstly, successiveness. It is without doubt that to measure time different peoples 
have used different methods to standardise their calendars and clocks. But, clearly, in 
doing so, they must have accepted a common proposition prior to all calendars and 
clocks, that is, the proposition of the existence of a temporal sequence, a conception of 
successiveness. Through our common sense (that is to say, natural experience), we do 
commonly believe that 1998 must be successive to 1997; 4:01 must be successive to 
4:00. Secondly, irreversibility. Simply learning from a calendar and a clock, we also often 
believe that a past hour will never return. We cannot reverse Human History. Thirdly, 
absoluteness. It follows from above that any span between any two different temporal 
points must be absolute in the sense that, with the same clock and calendar, the 
quantitative measure of that span can be attained by men with certainty. It is on this point 
that S. W. Hawking simply calls the traditional paradigm of reading Time as that of 
“Absolute Time”.184
What follows from the existence of unique History and the notion of successiveness is 
the definition of History as the course of successive events. But what is more, the 
Enlightenment thinkers were also likely to apply scientific methods to the study of 
history. “Perhaps”, Voltaire wrote, “the same change which has lately happened in 
physics may soon take place in the manner of writing history.” Later, he reiterated that 
“history is in the same situation as mathematics and physics: its scope has increased 
tremendously.”185
183 Heidegger, 1992: 4E.
184 S. W. Hawking, 1988: chap. 2.
185 Quoted by T. R. Tholfsen, 1967: 106.
With scientific belief and the notions of universal human nature and progress, as 
already mentioned, the eighteenth-century Rationalists tried to write history en 
philosophe, the result of which was an unhistorical study of Universal History. 
Irrespective of its metaphysical approach to reading History, however, the ambition to 
assimilate history into the scientific category of genuine knowledge was later to be 
rehabilitated in pro-positivist historiography by keeping the identification of the historical 
with a discovery of the course of successive events. To this I must now turn.
11,4,3, Positivism and The Turning Point of Modern Philosophy 
In considering positivist historiography, I think it is proper to focus mainly on the notion 
of scientific history refined by neo-positivism appearing at the beginning of the century. 
And here, I would like to start with the character of neo-positivism in general in relation 
to the turning point of modem philosophy. As we shall see, it was exactly within this 
context that Oakeshott’s Experience and Its Modes worked as well.
The whole of Western thinking, Heidegger once argued, is metaphysical thinking. 
Modem philosophy, as we have reviewed it, is linked to a general theory of reality and a 
universal system of knowledge. From Descartes to Kant philosophical thought as a 
whole was pursued under the name of metaphysics; and in the early nineteenth century 
there finally developed “the most remarkable flowerings of metaphysical speculation” 
with the subjective Idealism of Fichte and Schelling, the absolute Idealism of Hegel, 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy of the world as presentation and will, Nietzsche’s philosophy 
of the Will to power and so forth.186 Therefore, it is arguable that since the turn of the 
century modem metaphysics has disintegrated. Kant once regarded the battles between 
earlier metaphysical systems as a “scandal” and tried to overcome this. His own 
“universal solution”, however, has failed to win “universal acceptance”. For post-Kantian 
German philosophers, Kant’s metaphysical judgement was closely related to his own 
system. But no one escaped Kant’s dilemma. When Fichte declared that philosophy is the 
fundamental science, he was referring to his own theory, to his Wissenschaftslehre, as 
did Schelling, Hegel and Nietzsche. In short, they all claimed their metaphysical systems 
to be universal, but it is questionable that their philosophies are mutually compatible.
186 F. Copleston, 1960:1.
Moreover, the demise of metaphysics was also due to the growth of separate 
disciplines in the human and natural sciences which posed a serious challenge to the unity 
of Reason. In the nineteenth century the Hegelian notion of philosophy as the only 
genuine “scientific knowledge of truth” in realising the Absolute was fundamentally 
resisted not only by scientists trained in laboratory methods of every specific scientific 
field but by professional historians attempting to write a history rather than to seize on 
the whole meaning of History. All this implies historical and scientific provocation for 
traditional metaphysics. One German scholar thus argues, “(n)ineteenth-century 
consciousness as a whole achieved its emancipation from idealism [Hegelian 
metaphysics] in the name of science and history.”187 Consequently, philosophers were 
confronted by “the crisis of philosophical-identity”; they had to rethink the nature and 
purpose of their own task. And in so doing, the question of “What is the real task of 
philosophy” was identified and linked to that of “What is the principle relationship of 
philosophy to science and history as a model and to the human and natural sciences as 
specific forms of research?”; and most of them went further by asking “What is the 
relationship of science to history ?”.
The dispute, like its origins, took place primarily within a specific philosophical 
context: that of German philosophy in the late nineteenth century; but by the beginning 
of the twentieth century it had spread to the whole of the Western world. In so far as we 
have, for example, logical positivism trying to re-construct a philosophical synthesis of 
different sciences, and neo-Kantians trying to reduce philosophy to the scientia 
scientiarum (i.e. the science of all sciences). And, it is their shared belief that even 
though philosophy might no longer serve a metaphysical system, it could, under the name 
of epistemology, still function as the “methodological foundation of all scientific 
knowledge”. The notions such as “the synthesis of the sciences” (positivism), and 
scientia scientiarum (neo-Kantianism) are thus no more than an attempt to re-formulate 
an integral philosophical system which is associated with an “extraneous” interest of the 
natural sciences. Here, for the purpose of this study, we need to talk about the case of 
positivism in more detail.
187 Quoted by C. R. Bambach, 1990: 42.
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Neo-positivism or logical positivism was originally launched by an intellectual group 
known as the “Vienna Circle” whose participants included M. Schlick, R  Carnap and O. 
Neurath, among other thinkers. Broadly speaking, however, it may also include those 
non-Circle philosophers such as A. J. Ayer, Karl Popper and C. Hempel. In many 
respects, logical positivism fell within the movement of “analytical philosophy” as a 
whole, one of the most substantial contemporary philosophical movements of which was 
initiated by G. E. More and B. Russell; more particularly, the “Vienna Circle” also used 
to be regarded as having been “influenced” by the early Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus.m  In this study I merely intend to highlight three central doctrines of 
logical positivism by comparing each of them with the foundationalist assumptions in 
philosophy referred to above.
First of all, scientism. Just as modem natural philosophy was influenced by the 
work of Galileo and Newton, logical positivism adopted the benefits of the recent 
developments in logic and mathematics to enhance its analysis of language. In other 
words, for logical positivists all knowledge proper comprises logical and mathematical 
truths, i.e. scientific knowledge, and the common belief is that logic and the principles of 
mathematics can be taken as a new instrument for solving many meaningless traditional 
philosophical problems. One might even remark that logical positivists were “science- 
intoxicated” in the sense that “it was almost as if philosophy were synonymous with the 
philosophy of science, which in turn was synonymous with the study of logic (language) 
of science.”189
Secondly, a foundationalist analysis of knowledge. It is suggested above that with 
the tool of logical analysis, positivism aimed to provide new and more reliable 
foundations for science.190 Before the Vienna Circle, Russell in his Principia 
Mathematica had already envisaged the so-called mathematical logic or symbolic logic 
which, unlike traditional logic dealing with the categories of things, makes an 
investigation into propositions or sentences presenting the linguistic structure of the 
world. According to Russell, any native language has a basic structure corresponding to
188 Note that the influential relation between logical positivism and early Wittgenstein has sometimes 
been called into question. See, for example, A. C. Grayling, 1988: 55-62.
189 N. Fotion, 1995: 508.
190 This tendency, indeed, can be found in the title of Vienna Circle’s Manifesto itself: “The Scientific 
Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle”.
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that of the world and by putting the sentences of language into their proper symbolic 
logical forms all information about the world may be acquired. On the other hand, 
following the Russellian method of symbolism, Wittgenstein in his Tractatus also tried to 
set out a new theory of representation, i.e. “the picture theory of representation” in 
which a perfect language is thought to be a map capable of mirroring the world.
In a like manner, logical positivism takes a realist position towards the world and 
uses language to be a method for analysis. And it was to round off their ideal of 
constructing the world within a framework of language: sentences, statements or 
propositions, that Schlick, Carnap and their fellow positivists arrived at what is today 
believed to be the most central issue in logical positivism, i.e. verificationism, or the 
motto that “the sense of a proposition is the method of its verification”191. In other 
words, for them, the meaning of a proposition relies on some sort of actual step we take 
to decide on its truth or falsity: “The principle of verification”, as Ayer puts it, “is 
supposed to furnish a criterion by which it can be determined whether or not a sentence 
is literally meaningful.”192 Although many discussions have arisen around the principle of 
verifiability or the theory of meaning in the work of logical positivists, in one way or 
another they all contain an attempt to clarify the truth-value of scientific statements as 
the only genuine description of the world.
In the case of Ayer, for example, meaningful statements are divided into two 
categories: analytical propositions which are true by definition or by an appeal to the 
grammatical structure that constitutes them, and part of synthetic propositions which can 
be verified by sense-experience. For Ayer, as for many logical positivists, the former 
category is a tautology which has no factual implications and thus tells us nothing 
important about the world itself. While it is the latter category that contains the 
possibility for us to determine the truth-value of all sciences and to exclude those 
meaningless statements as pseudo-questions. That is, since the language of the sciences 
such as natural sciences (except mathematics), metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, history 
and so forth, can all be transformed into synthetic statements: “water is composed of 
H2O”, “God exists”, “rape is wrong”, “this picture is beautiful” or “Ayer was bom in 
1910”, their meaningfiilness may be established by putting them to a verifiability test.
191 J. Skorupski, 1993: 201.
192 A. J. Ayer, 1987: 7.
And it is not surprising that for Ayer metaphysics, aesthetics and ethics are the three 
subjects which would fail to meet the criterion of verifiability. For the sentences like 
“water is composed of H2O” may be verified as true or false by empirical experiment, 
and so it is scientific. The other three things at issue, however, are said to be neither true 
nor false as they are beyond the realm of our sense-experience; and as such they are 
synthetically meaningless. Here we arrive at one of the most distinguished features of the 
positivist movement, i.e. anti-metaphysics.
Thirdly, universalism. The notion of superiority, reunification and universality of 
Scientific Reason was also fully re-located in the neo-positivist project of the synthesis of 
sciences. As one scholar comments, for logical positivists “only those statements about 
the world whose content can be controlled by means accessible to all are entitled to the 
name of knowledge”, and that “there are no legitimate ways of attaining knowledge of 
the world other than those used by natural science and mathematics.”193
II.4.4 . Popper and Hempel: Scientific H istory 
The claim that all meaningful statements are scientific statements in the sense of being 
observable and verifiable would have given logical positivism the ability to fuse the 
sciences by maintaining that the language of any other sciences should be transformed 
into scientific statements in order to be true. And this foundationalist proposal was 
eventually confirmed in the Popperian-Hempelian covering law model.
Popper conceded that “history is characterised by its interest in actual, singular, 
or specific events, rather than in laws or generalisation”194; and those whose interests are 
in laws, Popper argued, should concentrate on the generalising sciences such as 
sociology195. However, historical particularity does not alter the fact that the study is a 
genuine science because historical explanation still conforms in its essential structure to 
scientific explanation, based on the premise that “while the theoretical sciences are 
mainly interested in finding and testing universal laws, the historical sciences take all
193 L. Kolakowski, 1972: 207
194 K. Popper, 1957: 143.
195 Cf. K. Popper, 1962: 264.
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kinds of universal laws for granted and are mainly interested in finding and testing 
singular statements.”196 This is to say that
a singular event is the cause o f another singular event - which is its effect - only relative 
to some universal laws. But these laws may be so trivial, so much part o f our common 
knowledge, that we need not mention them and rarely notice them.197
In other words, Popper claims that while the historian is describing a particular event he 
is involved in a “disentanglement of causal threads”198 which are interwoven and 
supplement each other. Therefore, from the standpoint of its causality, explanations of 
historical events are always typical and scientific; although from the standpoint of the 
historian’s mentality, they are peculiar and unique.
Hempel, on the other hand, provides us with a similar but more comprehensive 
consideration on the subject at issue. In his classical work, “The Function of General 
Laws in History”, he attempts to emphasise three premises: first, general laws or 
universal hypotheses have quite “analogous functions” in history and in the natural 
sciences; second, they offer an “indispensable instrument” for historical study; and third, 
they even constitute the “common basis of various procedures” which have often been 
taken to separate the social and historical from the scientific.199
On the first topic, Hempel first asks us to look at the logical structure of a 
physical explanation. Suppose that a set of events Cl, C2, ... Cn have occurred within 
which the situation E  is to be explained. According to Hempel, the explanation of the 
occurrence of E  must consist of:
(1) a set o f  statements asserting the occurrence o f  certain events C l, C 2 , ... Cn at certain 
times and places, [i.e. the “determining conditions” for the event to be explained]
(2) a set o f  universal hypotheses, such that
(a) the statements o f  both groups are reasonably well confirmed by empirical 
evidence,
(b) from the two groups o f  statements the sentence asserting the occurrence o f  
event E can be logically deduced.200
196 K. Popper, 1957: 143-4.
197 Ibid.: 145
198 Ibid.: 147
199 C. Hempel, 1965: 231.
200 Ibid.: 232.
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The second point that Hempel reminds us of is that even when the logical 
structure of a scientific “prediction” parallels the structure of a scientific explanation, the 
difference is a pragmatic one: while in a scientific explanation the event to be explained is 
known to have happened and its determining conditions have to be sought, in a scientific 
prediction the initial conditions are given and their “effect” has to be determined. Ideally, 
a complete scientific explanation may well exhibit predictive character at the same time, 
but this rarely happens as the determining conditions are frequently incomplete.
Based on these views, Hempel moved to prove that historical explanation in 
^  nature makes no d iffe ren t scientific explanation:
Historical explanation, too, aims at showing that the event in question was not “a matter 
o f chance”, but was to be expected in view o f  certain antecedent or simultaneous 
conditions. The expectation referred to is not prophecy or divination, but rational 
scientific anticipation which rests on the assumption o f  general laws.
And like Popper, Hempel upholds two possible replies to the rejection of resorting to 
general laws in history: First, in history general laws are often “tacitly taken for granted” 
as they are familiar to everybody through everyday experience; and secondly, frequently 
hidden behind the terms such as “hence”, “therefore”, “consequently, “because”, 
“naturally”, “obviously” etc., is “the tacit presupposition of some general law.”202
Hempel does not deny that in most cases historical explanations are based on the 
assumption of probability hypotheses rather than on general “deterministic” laws in the 
form of universal conditions. But since this situation also exists in many empirical 
sciences it remains true that the logical form of historical explanation corresponds to that 
of the empirical sciences. Similarly, the contention that the content of the Human Past is 
too infinite to be generalised also seems irrelevant to Hempel. Even though this may be 
the case, Hempel argues, historical explanation may be understood as something like an 
“explanation sketch” which “consists of a more or less vague indication of the laws and 
initial conditions considered as relevant, and it needs ‘filling out’ in order to turn into a 
full-fledged explanation.”203 In this case, history no less than science is in a progressive 
process in which hypotheses could gain empirical import while evidence could well be
201 Ibid.: 235.
202 Ibid.: 236.
203 Ibid.: 238.
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confirmed. And consequently, although the function of historical prediction may be very 
limited, it is not impossible. In short, what really excludes historical explanation from 
being scientific is not its probability and sketchy explanation but the attempt to mistake 
any metaphysical theory of History as an explanation plan, for Hempel’s fellow 
positivists have already ruled out the testability of such a plan.
For Hempel, then, general laws are indispensable to historical study. In 
developing this idea, Hempel takes the historicist method of “empathic understanding” as 
his target further and refers to it as nothing more than a “heuristic device” whose 
function is to provide “psychological hypotheses” which serve as the explanatory 
principles we are considering. Also, Hempel argues, these explanatory principles stand 
behind the other research procedures that scholars take to distinguish the social and 
historical from the scientific, the procedures such as the “interpretation of historical 
phenomena”, the “meaning of given historical events”, the “analysis of the development 
of the institution”, and the “notions of determination and of dependence” and the like. In 
the case of the “meaning of given historical events”, for example, Hempel argues that its 
scientific import lies in it aiming to determine the causal and effective relation of other 
events to the event concerned; and as such the statement of the relevant connections 
must involve the form of explanations or explanation sketches which contain universal 
hypotheses.
By claiming this, Hempel’s point is not really about the plausibility of “empathic 
understanding” or the workability of the procedures in question; but rather it is to 
reaffirm the positivist general belief that our logical reasoning is so penetrating that it 
could help us discover a universal logical structure about the entire world, a structure 
which, no matter how willing we are to recognise it or not, we can never set our 
language free from it. The consequences for historiography arising from Hempel’s 
viewpoints are two: First, the historian cannot confine his research to a description of the 
Past without applying “hypothetical generalisation and theory-construction” to his 
research; and second, it is groundless to claim the autonomy of history from the united 
scientific world.204
204 Cf. ibid.: 243.
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II. 4.5. Naturalism in Historiography
Although A. J. Ayer once doubted “whether we have sufficient ground for accepting any 
statement at all about the past, whether we are even justified in our belief that there has 
been a past”,205 the Popperian-Hempelian covering law model has clearly assumed 
otherwise. For them, the events in History are in no fundamental way different from 
those in Nature. They are “what really happened” in the Past existing objectively and 
independently of the historian and waiting to be discovered by him.
That is to say, when Popper remarked that “a singular [historical] event is the 
cause of another singular event”, and Hempel maintained that historical statements like 
the scientific statements which assert “the occurrence of certain events Cl, C2, ... Cn at 
certain times and places”, they are saying History is a temporal series of successive 
events in accordance with the notion of Time as successiveness. Put differently, that the 
historian always takes general laws for granted can be true only if the temporal structure 
that underlies causal explanation has been identified as successive such that the causality 
of events may be pre-determined as an existing fact without recognition by the historian.
At this point, it may be inferred that the roots of this conception of explanation 
lie in Hume’s theory of causation,206 according to which all we can ever observe is the 
“constant conjunction” of events, but which does not deny the existence of the natural 
world (see also [III.4.3.]). That is, the covering law model is based on the belief that 
History exists in the same way as Nature does, and thus the temporal rhythm given in 
Nature must be likewise given to History: they are both the occurrence of successive 
events.
It follows that the theory of history in question presupposes at the same time the 
view, shared by traditional positivism, that the task of the historian is simply to discover 
the course of events as it really was. In other words, according to pro-positivism, in view 
of the fact that History exists as objectively as Nature, the business of an historian is only 
to make a “historical picture” which exactly corresponds with that objective Past World. 
As Ranke remarked in the 1830s, it is “simply to show how it really was (wie es 
eigentlich geweseri)”201 but not to think, judge or criticise historical evidence in his
205 A. J. Ayer, 1954: 168.
206 Cf. W. Outhwaite, 1987: 7-9.
207 Quoted by E. H. Carr, 1961: 9.
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mind. What Popper and Hempel tried to do, as a result, was to make the most sense of 
Bury’s motto: “history is a science; no less, and no more.”
Thus far, then, we have reviewed modem naturalised historical thought from the 
philosophes to neo-positivists. To conclude, we may revise the Enlightenment 
historiographical position with the following propositions:
(3) naturalism in historiography stands for the ideal of scientific history by 
identifying the historical with a naturalised conception of History which suggests
(3.1) the existence of History as the only legitimate object of 
historical study, that is, the Cartesian belief that there exists only one 
genuine answer corresponding to any historical question that may be 
asked, and defines
(3.2) History as the course of successive events, governed by Time in 
Nature, i.e. the notion of Absolute Time as successiveness; as a result, 
(following Lockean representation in the case of pro-positivism), 
historical study is understood as the representation of what really 
happened by
(3.3) applying scientific methods (such as general laws) to historical 
explanation and analysis, insofar as the scientific objectivity of historical 
knowledge can be secured as it abides by the epistemological conditions 
which have been successfully used to explain the relation of mind to 
Nature.
Like rationalism in ethics, the above discussions show that naturalism in 
historiography is a theoretical extension of modem foundationalism. Before leaving this 
section, let us revisit some philosophical problems which have emerged from the 
Enlightenment historical position as such.
II.4.6. The Problems of the Enlightenment Historical Position
In the first place, it appears to me that naturalism in historiography produces a self- 
contradiction about the temporal character of history. For while the first and second 
statements above hold the historical to be unrepeatable, particular and past, ironically, 
the third statement must come to discard history as genuine knowledge since modem 
epistemological conditions suggest that knowledge must be repeatable, general and 
present. Or alternatively, in the specific case of pro-positivist historiography, the pastness 
of history must be in conflict with its own motto that “the real is the observable in the 
present”.208 Hence, the three assumptions together within the jurisdiction of the 
Cartesian-Kantian tradition of philosophy demonstrate an intricate “temporal dilemma in 
history.”
Secondly, the application of scientific method (such as general laws) to history is 
doubtful; it provides too easy an escape from the tension between scientific 
generalisation and historical particularity. As a matter of fact, it is exactly due to this 
“epistemic tension in history” that seventeenth-century thought basically “concentrated 
itself on the problems of natural science and left those of history on one side”;209 that “it 
has always tended to look to the natural sciences for material for its studies, and has 
formed its criteria of what to accept as known by reference to scientific models.”210 
Descartes, for example, expelled history from the body of genuine knowledge at the 
beginning of his Discourse 2U For, it is evident that scientific method aims to formulate 
generalisations; but history in essence is something particular. Hence, in The Idea o f 
History, Collingwood refers to Schopenhauer to demonstrate this anti-historical 
epistemological situation:
[History] lacks the fundamental characteristic o f science, namely the subordination o f  the
objects o f consciousness; all it can do is to present a simple co-ordination o f the facts it
has registered. Hence there is no system in history as there is in the other sciences. ... The
sciences, being systems o f  cognition, speak always o f  kinds; history always o f  the
212individual, which implies a self-contradiction.
208 Cf. H. Kragh, 1987: 41-2.
209 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 59.
210 W. H. Walsh, 1967: 12.
211 It may be argued that Leibniz was once an historian, and Hume wrote his History o f England, for 
instance. Be that as it may, it seems to me that they basically treated history as a way of moral education, 
a discipline of morality rather than as a genuine way to understand the world, a legitimate mode of 
knowledge.
212 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 167.
Indeed, the eighteenth-century philosophies, as we have seen, had expressed an 
ambition to undergo “the conquest of the historical world.”213 But, the obstacle 
presented to them was thus: If history remains defined in terms of its essence of 
particularity and pastness, agreement would lie with the thinkers such as Descartes and 
Locke to place history in a secondary position beneath philosophy and science; however, 
if the legitimacy of history is claimed in terms of the epistemological condition of 
generalisation and presentness, it could only be done at the price of destroying the 
essence of historical thinking. With the notions of universal reason and progress, the 
philosophes seem to have taken the second alternative, by assimilating history into 
science.
Given the growth of historical interest since the nineteenth century, positivism 
has thus tried to establish the nature of the historical by rejecting any metaphysical 
reading of Human History. However, the notion of scientific history still calls for the 
application of general laws to historical study. Both Popper and Hempel aim to adjust the 
tension between the scientific general and the historical particular by assuming that the 
scientific structure of the world (including History) is a necessary premise of existence 
that the historian cannot escape and that it does not conflict with the historian’s interest 
in particularity. However, their philosophy eventually penetrates into their historiography 
to recommend that history can be a progressive scientific-like discipline if the historian is 
conscious of the general laws embodied in explanation and establishes a framework for 
their inquiry. But, as Oakeshott puts it, “the moment historical facts are regarded as 
instances of general laws, history is dismissed.”214
It appears to me that these pitfalls remain unsolved within the theoretical 
framework of neo-positivism. For the foundation of positivism, as it has been shown, is 
established within modem natural philosophy in terms of scientism, dualism- 
representationism and universalism upon which its claim of historical study as a 
representation of “what really happened” in the Past is based. Instead, neo-positivists are 
new philosophes with a more confident belief in harnessing the Enlightenment 
technocratic premises by overcoming its main adversary, i.e. “history”. The 
characteristica universalis Leibniz favours predicts exactly the project of the fusion of
213 E. Cassirer, 1979: chap. v.
214 EM: 154; also quoted by W. Dray, 1957: 49-50.
sciences. Like the philosophes, then, neo-positivists maintain the scientific objectivity of 
historical knowledge at the price of dismissing genuine historicity in what today may be 
termed the debate over “the autonomy of history”.
But possibly, the lesson that the assimilationists (as opposed to autonomists215) 
have to learn is that if all human utterance is in one mode, our civilisation will be tedious 
and humdrum. And, if the interest of history as a narrative of traditional and historical 
teachings is to be replaced by that of a set of rules, it would deepen the moral and 
political crisis that the Enlightenment project carries. For, as already indicated, what is 
required to fill in the “emptiness” of the Enlightenment’s conception of rationality may be 
a kind of historical study which aims to offer us the concrete moral and political 
exemplifications that have been placed in a vacuum by a scientific attempt to discover the 
abstract justification for ethics.
In short, scholars have for a long time been incapable of setting history free from 
the naturalistic traps. And, this inability to act is not simply because a philosopher may 
not also be a good historian; but, more importantly, it is because the naturalistic forms of 
pseudo-historical ideas arise from a great tradition within which many philosophers still 
work, i.e. the Cartesian-Kantian tradition of natural philosophy. Consequently, it is my 
view, a view which penetrates throughout my examination of Oakeshott’s 
historiography, that a search for genuine historicity not only needs a historiography 
reflecting the conditions of historical thinking; but it needs a non-Cartesian-Kantian, i.e. a 
non-naturalistic or non-scientific meaning of philosophy itself.
215 E. Breisach, 1994: 327.
CHAPTER III 
PHILOSOPHY AND MODES OF EXPERIENCE
III.l. Introduction: Some Interpretative Problems
Having investigated the Enlightenment positions in the last chapter, we now turn to 
examine Oakeshott’s reflection upon philosophical modernity, liberal ethics and positivist 
historiography respectively. Here, let us first start with an analysis of Oakeshott’s non- 
foundationalist notion of philosophy, on which his sceptical politics and his idealistic 
historiography rest.
This chapter, more specifically, is a study of Experience and Its Modes (1933; 
hereafter EM), which is Oakeshott’s major philosophical work. However, it appears to 
me that there are some difficulties in attempting to interpret Oakeshott’s philosophical 
work in general and EM  in particular. First of all, as Oakeshott believes that “there are 
no ‘authorities’ in philosophy”, that “there is no book which is indispensable for the 
study of philosophy,” he has often omitted to acknowledge the authors against whom his 
theory of experience argues, and he has merely remarked in passing that he is conscious 
of having learnt most from Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit and Bradley’s Appearance 
and Reality} Being an interpreter whose concern is to make the writer more 
understandable, in this study I not only intend to decipher EM  by reference to 
rationalism, empiricism and the Kantian “thing-in-itself’, i.e. the aspects of philosophical 
thought to which Oakeshott mainly objects, but I also wish to clarify especially the extent 
to which his writings are influenced by Bradley’s work.
Another interpretative problem in the study of Oakeshott is that one of the main 
tasks which Oakeshott has constantly taken on during his academic life is to categorise 
the modes of human activity for the interest of philosophy itself. His undertaking
1 EM: 8, 6. For the influence on Oakeshott of idealism in general and of British idealism in particular, 
seeD. Boucher, 1984: 194-202.
however is too unique to be fitted neatly into any of the main categories. As M. 
Cranston, Oakeshott’s former colleague at the LSE, put it:
[Oakeshott] is a traditionalist with few traditional beliefs, an “idealist” who is more 
sceptical than many positivists, a lover of liberty who repudiates liberalism, an 
individualist who prefers Hegel to Locke, a philosopher who disapproves of 
philosophisme, a romantic perhaps (if Hume could also be called one), and a marvellous 
stylist. Oakeshott’s voice is unique.
Here, with EM  alone we cannot yet gain a complete understanding of Oakeshott’s 
political ideas, although it is where the thinker’s conception of a “philosophy of practical 
experience”3 is envisaged. But, to make Oakeshott’s philosophical position clearer, in 
what follows I shall pay careful attention to his qualified statements on idealism, 
scepticism and non-foundationalism (non-philosophisme), and to his rejections of 
historicism, logical positivism and pragmatism.
From the standpoint I have been taking, the non-foundationalist character of 
Oakeshott’s philosophical idea in EM  is the most crucial point to which this chapter 
points. All through the examination below there will appear several perspectives leading 
to the idiosyncrasies of EM, and a comprehensive synthesis will be set out in [III.4.]. 
Also, it is my view that Oakeshott’s unique philosophical voice has in fact provided an 
exception to Rorty’s concern about the necessary connection between epistemology and 
foundationalism; what he offers us is a non-post-modernist critique of philosophical 
modernity.
Perhaps, not wishing to assimilate Oakeshott’s metaphysical feature in EM to his 
“conversational” feature in Rationalism in Politics (1962; hereafter R P \ previous 
research has sometimes interpreted Oakeshott as having changed his mind on the 
conception of philosophy from EM  to RP.A My view, however, is that EM  can be 
basically taken as “propaedeutic” or as a “research programme” which sets out the initial 
steps leading to the consequent development of Oakeshott’s ideas of history, politics, 
education, aesthetics and indeed philosophy in his later work.5 In other words, I believe
2 M. Cranston, 1967: 82.
3 EM: 249.
4 See, for example, T. Modood, 1980: 315-22; B. Parekh, 1979: 487-8; J. Gray, 1989: 202
5 See, for example, R. Grant, 1990: 37; K. Minogue, 1993a: 44; T. Fuller, 1991: xiii; P. Franco, 1990: 
66 .
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that Oakeshott’s “general philosophical position has remained constant throughout”6, 
and what seems to have changed from one stage to another is just a matter of 
terminology. From one standpoint, I shall argue that Oakeshott’s “sceptical idealism” in 
EM  (a combination which, for me, differs from the way in which Cranston observes it) 
may have embraced the attempt to revive Montaignean traditionalist elements to balance 
against the emptiness of Rationalism in RP. And, from another standpoint, that which 
may be considered as linking together all of Oakeshott’s philosophical texts is his 
repeated insistence on (1) the non-foundationalist notion of philosophy in terms of three 
characteristics: self-independence, self-limitation and scepticism, and (2) the self- 
consistency of modes of experience.
In interpreting EM, my approach will be arranged as follows: First and foremost, I shall 
account for Oakeshott’s theory of experience and modality ([III.3.]), such that we may 
be in the best position to grasp his concept of philosophy in terms of the three non- 
foundationalist characteristics at stake ([III.4.]). And then, I shall turn to take the mode 
of practice as a test case to show further the categorical distinction amongst philosophy 
and modes of experience illustrated by Oakeshott ([III.5.]). Before we move on to the 
main body of EM  itself, nonetheless, it would be advantageous to make some preliminary 
remarks on the setting of the work from the outset ([III.2.]).
III.2. The Aim and Background of the Work
Regarding the context of EM, there are a number of issues that must be initially marked 
out in this section, and each will be developed in the discussions that follow. For the sake 
of clarity, I shall put these issues into two categories: the aim of EM, and the idealistic 
background of Oakeshott’s thought.
6 W. H. Greenleaf, 1966: 5.
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111.2,1. The Aim of the Work
It seems unquestionable that the intellectual environment within which EM  establishes 
itself concerns the debate over the nature of philosophy in terms of the question “What is 
the relation of philosophy to science and to history?”, launched by neo-positivism, neo- 
Kantism and historicism at the turn of the century.7 Oakeshott’s persistent rejection of 
any form of scientism is well-known today. The scientific voices embroiled in the dispute, 
as mentioned in the previous chapter, include logical positivism trying to re-construct a 
philosophical synthesis of different sciences, and neo-Kantians trying to reduce 
philosophy to the scientia scientiarum (i.e. the science of all sciences). In the 
introduction to EM, Oakeshott exactly cites the names “the fusion of sciences” and 
scientia scientiarum by questioning them thus:
Yet, what are the sciences that they must be accepted as datum, and as a datum not to be 
changed, o f  valid knowledge? And i f  we begin with sciences, can our conclusion be other 
or more than merely scientific? These and other questions like them are what anyone 
must consider who, in search o f  a complete and satisfactory world o f  experience, is 
tempted by science.8
For Oakeshott, the only complete and satisfactory world of experience is 
philosophy itself; and “when philosophy is sought, it must be sought for its own sake.”9 
That is, according to Oakeshott, what appears to be fundamentally wrong with the 
logical positivist’s attempt to appeal to the authority of science in philosophy, among 
other things, is the commitment to a categorical mistake of identifying philosophy with 
the scientific, which would at once destroy both the self-independence of philosophy and 
the self-consistency of science.10
Thus, in the positivist-historicist debate Oakeshott is equally against positivism 
and historicism. The latter claims that since human understanding must be “a ‘captive’ of 
the historical condition,”11 all knowledge proper is historical; as a result, a similar sort of 
categorical confusion is made over philosophy and history. On this reading, it may be 
indicated here that Oakeshott’s scepticism is never absorbed into an extreme form of
7 See [II.4.3.]. Cf. P. Franco, 1990: 3-4, 13-5.
* EM: 2.
9 EM: 3.
10 Cf. RPML: 142.
11 R. D ’Amico, 1989: x.
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relativism which dissolves the value of philosophy, but rather the point pervading 
throughout his thought is that philosophy is a self-independent universe of discourse 
having interests of its own, and it is self-limited and sceptical only in the sense that, in the 
process of philosophising, it does not interfere with the autonomous logic of modes of 
experience such as history and science. What Oakeshott rejects, in other words, is the 
despotism of positivism (which has earlier been disclosed as a form of foundationalism) 
and the pessimism of historicism rather than the importance of our scientific and 
historical knowledge or the legitimacy of philosophical thinking itself.
Oakeshott’s bid to transcend both scientism and historicism is, of course, 
important to this thesis. But there is a third type of thought which constitutes 
Oakeshott’s life-long target and thus needs to be emphasised where appropriate, that is, 
pragmatism. Generally speaking, as W. James puts it, pragmatism suggests that “the 
whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make 
to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula 
be the true one.”12 In other words, pragmatism maintains that the value of knowledge is 
determined by its contribution to the practical world, and so it comes under attack in EM  
for its lack of a categorical distinction between theory (philosophy) and practice.
In short, EM  can be regarded as Oakeshott’s response to the turning point of 
modem philosophy and he tries to find an alternative answer to the problem of the nature 
of philosophy rather than pursuing those solutions which have been offered by 
positivism, historicism and pragmatism. This is, accordingly, the main reason why in this 
pure philosophical work Oakeshott attests history, science and practice to be three 
abstract modes of experience in his act of clarifying the meaning of philosophy. For, if 
philosophy is to be self-independent, according to Oakeshott it must be self-critical 
thought which does not rely for its authority on science, history or practice as positivism, 
historicism and pragmatism have respectively argued.
The attempt to categorise the diversified reasons for philosophy and modes of experience 
has given us a hint about Oakeshott’s aversion to an integral philosophical system, i.e. 
philosophisme. At the beginning of EM  Oakeshott thus writes that “there is little or
12 W. James, 1995: 20. For a general discussion about the development of pragmatism in the States, see 
J. P. Murphy, 1990.
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nothing in common between the philosopher and the p h ilosopher  And throughout the 
work, Oakeshott’s intention is to offer his readers a possible view of philosophy rather 
than an institution of philosophic. To elaborate on this anti-philosophisme aim of EM, I 
think, we may further refer to “The New Bentham”, an article published one year before
E M U
In understanding Bentham as a typical philosophe, Oakeshott singles out the 
three prime elements in this type of mind. Firstly, according to Oakeshott, “an age of 
philosophisme implies a peculiar confidence in knowledge, indiscriminate knowledge; it 
implies an hydropic thirst for information about the present world, its composition and its 
laws, and about human nature, its needs and desires.”15 That is, philosophisme is the 
belief in the pursuit of encyclopaedic knowledge; indeed, philosophisme is 
foundationalism. “At all events in these days when we are more conscious of the futility 
of knowledge than its blessing,” Oakeshott thus restates in EM, “it is not to be expected 
that an encyclopaedia will attract him who is looking for a philosophy.”16
Secondly, “for the philosophe the world is divided between those who agree with 
him and ‘fools’; ‘science’ is contrasted with superstition, and superstition is identified 
with whatever is established, generally believed or merely felt.”17 In saying this, 
Oakeshott is saying that for the philosophe if there were only one indiscriminate voice to 
be heard in human conversation, it would be that of science. Indeed, the most central 
grounding ofphilosophisme is scientism to which Oakeshott objects.
And finally, for Oakeshott, philosophisme or foundationalism is, without doubt, 
apt to Rationalism. “The genius of the philosophe is a genius for rationalisation, for 
making life and the business of life rational rather than for seeing the reason for it, for 
inculcating precise order, no matter at what expense, rather than for apprehending the 
existence of a subtle order in what appears to be chaotic.”18 In other words, it is the 
intention of the philosophe to establish a rational programme for conducting human 
practice, and to deny the traditions of the past. As a result, the ambitions of the 
philosophe such as Bentham are “to create a science of politics, to apply the scientific
13 EM: 1.
14 “The New Bentham” has now been collected in the new and expanded edition of RP: 132-50.
15 RP: 138.
16 EM: 2.
17 RP: 139.
18 RP: 139.
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method to the field of law, to unite law and science, to discover some means for 
measuring accurately political satisfactions.”19 And yet, as Oakeshott points out, “it is 
not the philosopher, the victim of thought, who influences our practical conduct of life, 
but the philosophaster, the philosophe.”20 Even later in On Human Conduct (1975, 
hereafter HC), Oakeshott retains the distinction between the philosopher and the 
pejorative view of the philosophe as the theoretician 21
Oakeshott’s serious attack on Rationalism in RP must be individually dealt with 
in the next chapter. But now, it has become clear that there does exist a strong 
connection between the purpose of EM  and that of RP; they are both concerned with the 
defects of philosophisme, foundationalism and Rationalism, i.e. the Enlightenment 
positions.
III.2.2. Bradleyfl): Appearance and Reality 
What has been said so far highlights the aim of EM. But it should be remembered that 
there are two influences behind the thought of Oakeshott in EM, namely, Hegel and 
Bradley. Oakeshott’s connection with Bradley, at least so far as EM  is concerned, is 
much more direct than with Hegel. I shall merely introduce Bradley’s philosophy to a 
point where those of his ideas, with only minor modifications and changes of emphasis, 
are revealed in EM: first, the notion of the concrete universal as the given in 
understanding; second, the features of truth in the light of coherence, colligibility and 
degrees; and third, the assumptions of reality in the light of monism, idealism and 
degrees.
Bradley’s philosophical system was first established in his Principles o f Logic , 
aiming to reject the empiricist theory of the mind and its working. According to 
empiricism, all knowledge comes from the Lockean ideas or the Humean impressions 
which represent discrete facts or events making up the external world. Since each one of 
those facts is independent of all others, for the empiricists, the world is a pluralist world 
and reality is the sum of particular objects. And thus, human knowledge is made up of
19 RP: 140-1.
20 RP: 150. See also EM: 2.
21 HC: 26, 30.
22 For the brief discussions on this work provided below, see, R  Wollheim, 1969: chaps. 1, 2 & 3.
knowledge of separate facts, and the criterion of truth is the correspondence between 
experience and reality, thought and object, i.e. the mind and the external world.
For Bradley, however, empiricist representationism simply neglects the 
importance of “artificiality” and “generality” inherent in all “symbolism” upon which any 
meaningful expression of thoughts must rely. In the first place, the meaning of an idea is 
not dependent on the observable property that it bears, but on the use to which it is 
artificially put by the knower. In the second place, no meaning is in isolation, because 
every meaning is possessed by the general unity to which the idea being understood 
belongs. Or alternatively, it may be said that for Bradley the meaning of an idea does not 
lie in its external relation to the object it represents, but in its “internal relations” to some 
other idea than itself. That which is given in every understanding is not the external 
world outside the mind but the “concrete universal” indicating a system of meanings 
within the mind. That is, Bradley would not deny Hegel’s proverb that “the true is the 
whole”.23 And consequently, all facts are not separate but united in one, and truth 
demands the conception of coherence rather than that of correspondence. Later in 
Appearance and Reality, Bradley restates this “doctrine of internal relations” conceived 
in his study of logic as such:
(a) A  merely external relation has no meaning or existence, for a relation must (at least to 
some extent) qualify its terms, (b) Relations imply a unity in which they subsist, and 
apart from which they have no meaning or existence, (c) Every kind o f  diversity, both 
terms and relations alike are adjectives o f  one reality, which exists in them and without 
which they are nothing.24
To comprehend Bradley’s notions of truth and reality in more exact terms, interpreters 
turn to Appearance and Reality and Essays On Truth and Reality. Here, let me begin 
with Bradley’s theory of knowledge and truth in the first instance.
Bradley believes that the development of the mind involves the elaboration of 
knowledge which contains three levels: (1) feeling, (2) internal relational thinking, i.e. 
thought, and (3) the Absolute. To start with, feeling is the undivided non-relational unity
23 Hegel, 1977: 11.
24 Bradley, 1969: 559.
of immediate experience, that provides the foundations on which all higher forms of 
knowledge are constructed. Feeling has a finite content. However,
this content is not consistent within itself, and such a discrepancy tends to destroy and to 
break up the stage of feeling. The matter may be briefly put thus - the finite content is 
irreconcilable with the immediacy of its existence. For the finite content is necessarily 
determined from the outside; its external relations (however negative they may desire to
25remain) penetrate its essence, and so carry that beyond its own being.
As a result, there appears a higher form of intellectual consciousness in which an attempt 
is made to rectify this grossest error, that is the thought of “internal relations”.
At the second stage of relational thinking, Bradley believes, the mind is 
concerned with negation, contradiction, identity, inference and judgement regarding 
ideas; as such it is about what thought is for, namely, truth. However, as already 
indicated, for Bradley truth is not the copy of Nature or the representation of objects; 
rather he insists that all judgements are ideal and relational. In other words, Bradley’s 
theory of truth is necessarily in conflict with the correspondence theory of truth precisely 
on the account that for him thought is ideal but Nature, natural; relations are general but 
objects particular.26
Thirdly, it follows that Bradley’s concept of truth is an attribute that a judgement 
enjoys by being the member of a unity of judgements, i.e. a system of ideas; it is not a 
fixed  category outside thoughts, but a corrigible quality within judgements. Ideally, then, 
there must exist the Absolute Truth - reality as a concrete and coherent whole in which 
all relations are internalised - by means of which the truth worth of every judgement can 
be tested. However, thought, i.e. internal relational thinking, by its very nature is 
inadequate in being able to reach such a total truth, the final stage in knowledge. On this 
limitation of thought, Bradley writes that:
It [thought] aims at an all inclusive whole, not in conflict with its elements, and at
elements subordinate to a self-dependent whole  [But such a completion], would
prove destructive; such an end would emphatically make an end of mere thought. It 
would bring the ideal content into a form which would be reality itself, and where mere
truth and mere thought would certainly perish Thought can form the idea of an
apprehension, something like feeling in directness, which contains all the character 
sought by its relational efforts. Thought can understand that, to reach its goal, it must get
25 Ibid.: 407.
26 Cf. R. Wollheim, 1969: 168.
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beyond relations. Yet in its nature it can find no other working means of progress. Hence 
it perceives that somehow this relational side of its nature must be merged and must 
include some other side. Such a fusion would compel thought to lose and to transcend its 
proper self. And the nature of this fusion thought can apprehend in vague generality, but 
not in detail; and it can see the reason why a detailed apprehension is impossible. Such 
anticipated self-transcendence is an Other; but to assert Other is not a self- 
contradiction.27
Put simply, there is a paradox inherent to all thought, that is, it “is relational and 
discursive, and if it ceases to be this, it commits suicide”,28 therefore what is absolutely 
true requires more than itself: It is only at the stage of supra-relational thought, the 
fusion of thoughts, that the Absolute Truth may be arrived at, and thus the apprehension 
of the Absolute becomes reality. On each occasion, it is beyond the ability of our mind, 
even at its most acute level of perception, to know the detail of the Absolute, and all that 
can be apprehended is nothing more than its generality, namely, the fact that the 
Absolute exists:
Our complete inability to understand this concrete unity in detail is no good ground for 
our declining to entertain it. Such a ground would be irrational, and its principle could 
hardly everywhere be adhered to. But if we can realise at all the general features of the 
Absolute, if we can see that somehow they come together in a way known vaguely and in 
the abstract, our result is certain.29
Closely related to this aspect of Bradley’s coherence theory of truth is, therefore, 
the notion of the degrees of truth. That is to say, since it is the case that our common 
thinking and judgement “must in the end be called conditional,” we are obliged to 
concede that human understanding in general “can never reach as far as perfect truth, and 
must be content merely to enjoy more or less of Validity ”30 Or put another way, 
although logically the Absolute Truth is necessary and possible, it cannot be denied “that 
truth has to satisfy the intellect”31 whereas “Absolute Truth is corrected only by passing 
outside the intellect.”32 And consequently, “it must be admitted that”:
27 Bradley, 1969: 160.
28 Ibid.: 150.
29 Ibid.: 140-1.
30 Ibid.: 320, 321.
31 Ibid.: 509.
32 Quoted by R. Wollheim, 1969: 179.
in the end, no possible truth is quite true. It is a partial and inadequate translation o f  that 
which it professes to give bodily. And this internal discrepancy belongs irremovably to 
truth’s proper character. Still the difference drawn between absolute and finite truth must 
none the less be upheld. For the former, in a word, is not intellectually corrigible. There 
is no intellectual alternation which could possibly, as general truth, bring it nearer to 
ultimate Reality.33
In a nutshell, then, Bradley’s notion of the degrees of truth can be understood in 
terms of this motto: “Hence no total truth or error, only more or less of Validity.”34 R. 
Wollheim has given this view in four propositions which are so instructive that they can 
be cited as follows35: (1) no judgement is wholly true; (2) no judgement is entirely false;
(3) no judgement is neither true nor false; (4) all judgements are partly true, partly false.
Having examined Bradley’s idea of truth and knowledge, we may now turn to the 
issue of reality. For Bradley, whatever is self-contradicted, in the sense of being 
irreconcilable with its contents and existence, is phenomenal, that is, “appearance”36; by 
way of contrast, “ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an 
absolute criterion.”37 On this account, Bradley believes, not only that feelings and 
thoughts, but also things, space, time, causation, activity, the self and even things-in- 
themselves are all phenomena.38 In the above discussions we have already seen in brief 
how feelings and thoughts must be committed to self-contradiction. Here let me take just 
one example from those other spheres of phenomena, i.e. things. According to Bradley, 
the self-contradiction of a thing lies in this fact: on the one side, a thing must have an 
identity which persists as itself throughout time, change and motion; on the other side, 
however, to introduce an identified character into a thing is to enter the sphere of ideality 
which does not belong to existence but to relational thinking. As a result, a thing is not 
real in the ultimate sense, as “a thing may be identical or different according as you look 
at it.”39
To Bradley, however, no matter how incomplete phenomena may appear to be, it 
does not follow that reality is absent in them. Far from it, Bradley states that:
33 Bradley, 1969: 482-3.
34 Ibid.: chap. xxiv.
35 R  Wollheim, 1969: 177.
36 As Wollheim points out, “for to him (Bradley), denying that something is real is equivalent not to 
saying that it is unreal but to saying that it is appearance.” (Ibid.: 208.)
37 Bradley, 1969: 120.
38 Ibid.: Book I.
39 Ibid.: 69.
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Reality is one in this sense that it has a positive nature exclusive o f  discord, a nature 
which holds throughout everything that is to be real. Its diversity can be diverse only so 
far as not to clash, and what seems otherwise anywhere cannot be real. And, from the 
other side, everything which appears must be real. Appearance must belong to reality, 
and it must therefore be concordant and other than it seems. The bewildering mass o f  
phenomenal diversity must hence somehow be at unity and self-consistent; for it cannot 
be elsewhere than in reality, and reality excludes discord. Or again we may put it so: the 
real is the individual. It is one in the sense that its positive character embraces all 
differences in an inclusive harmony. And this knowledge, poor as it may be, is certainly 
more than bare negation or simple ignorance. So far as it goes, it gives us positive news 
about absolute reality.40
There are accordingly some crucial insights concerning Bradley’s idea of reality 
that may be derived from this quotation. First of all, it implies that reality is One not 
Many; the world is a concrete universe not a collection of discrete facts. “Plurality and 
separateness without a relation of separation”, says Bradley, “seems really to have no 
meaning.”41 Indeed, Bradley is a monist rather than a pluralist, and “there is nothing 
which, to speak properly, is individual or perfect, except only the Absolute.”42
Furthermore, it follows that to say that an object is phenomenal is not equal to 
saying that it does not exist, but that it exists as parts, aspects, i.e. appearances of the 
Absolute: “everything phenomenal is somehow real”; “reality without appearance would 
be nothing.”43 Thus, what Bradley’s phenomenalist account of the Absolute really 
intends to show us is that the phenomena do exist but not all exist to the same extent, 
that is, corresponding to there being the degrees of truth, there are also degrees of 
reality. And yet, instead of deciding the exact degree of truth and reality that an idea may 
enjoy, it is only in fairness to the philosopher to compromise that the Absolute is so 
comprehensive that within it everything has a relative home for itself: “to hold a thought 
is, more or less vaguely, to refer it to reality.”44 Consequently, whilst Bradley’s famous 
quote says that “the world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a 
necessary evil”45, he is making room for Oakeshott, surely one of his best descendants, to 
develop the notion of degrees of truth and reality into a more sophisticated form of 
scepticism by adding traditionalist elements to it.
40 Ibid.: 123-4.
41 Ibid.: 101.
42 Ibid.: 217.
43 Ibid.: 127, 432.
44 Ibid.: 350.
45 Ibid.: Preface. Also quoted in RP: 66.
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And finally, in rejecting empiricist-realism, Bradley is of course expressing a 
preference for idealism. For Bradley the possibility of considering further the concrete 
nature of the Absolute exists in the very conception of experience:
When we ask as to the matter which fills up the empty outline, we can reply in one word, 
that this matter is experience. And experience means something much the same as given 
and present fact. We perceive, on reflection, that to be real, or even barely to exist, must 
be to fall within sentience. Sentient experience, in short, is reality, and what is not this is 
not real.46
That is, for Bradley as for other idealists, because no thinking can be possible outside the 
mind, everything understandable must be found combined with ideas, i.e. experience. 
And because reality is indivisible from experience, it must be nothing but experience 
itself.
Turning now to EM, one sees that its Bradleyian influence is evident and significant. First 
of all, Oakeshott keeps Bradley’s notion of concrete universal as the given in 
understanding, by virtue of which he defines experience as a “single concrete whole”.47 
Again, Oakeshott believes in the Bradleyian sense that truth is “what is finally 
satisfactory and coherent in experience”48 (coherence), “even if truth is difficult to come 
at, nothing can be dismissed as mere error”49 (degrees), and “where error is impossible, 
truth is inconceivable”50 (corrigibility). What is more, Oakeshott also follows Bradley to 
accept that “reality is one, a single system, and it is real only as a whole”51 (monism), that 
“reality is experience”52 (idealism), and that “experience is a single whole within which 
modifications may be distinguished”53 (degrees).
Many of those ideas that Oakeshott shares with Bradley are, of course, indebted 
to Hegel. But, due to the revised notion of the degrees of reality and truth, there are two 
related points that I think both Bradley and Oakeshott do not accredit to Hegel: the 
“absolute” and the “hierarchy of knowledge”. In Oakeshott’s case, this revision has
46 Ibid.: 127.
47 EM: 9ff.
48 EM: esp. 27-48.
49 EM: 2.
50 EM: 112.
51 EM: 58.
52 EM: 49ff.
53 EM: lOff.
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occurred in his philosophy with the consequences of self-limitation and scepticism which 
concede the self-consistency of modes of experience. Let me now try to expand on this 
matter.
III.2.3. The Absolute and the Hierarchy
The major purpose of Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit, as we know, is to describe the 
“coming-to-be of Science as such or of Knowledge”54, by way of an analysis of how the 
Spirit will undergo a series of phases, stages or moments in order to achieve its final 
position, i.e. the Absolute, where “it is Spirit that knows itself in the shape of Spirit, or a 
comprehensive knowing [in terms of the Notion].”55 According to Hegel, “the necessary 
progression and interconnection of the forms of the unreal consciousness will by itself 
bring to pass the completion of the series.”56 For the process in question is a negative 
one.57 This means, as J. N. Findlay points out, that “its successive phases bring out what 
is logically implicit in its earlier phrase, in the Hegelian sense of representing throughout 
an insightful, higher-order comment on (emphasis mine) previous contents.”58 In other 
words, the Hegelian Spirit, in the search for its own goal, must involve a procedure of 
self-refusal until it comes to the end of the spiritual adventure. Although Hegel did not 
think that the sequence of thought-phases described in Phenomenology is the only 
possible sequence that may be taken59, he surely assumed that this process must have a 
final state “where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds 
itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion.”60
It follows that for Hegel the development of human mind results in a hierarchy of 
knowledge in which the existence of a certain form of thought is dependent on the 
realisation of that which logically supersedes it; and philosophy, the Absolute, is at the 
apex of the hierarchy as it is the sole self-autonomous thinking which “has won the pure 
element of its existence, Notion.”61 And thus, it is only in philosophy that the Spirit
54 Hegel, 1977: 15; cf. 486.
55 Ibid.: 485.
56 Ibid.: 50.
57 Ibid.: 50 ff.
58 J. N. Findley, 1977: vii.
59 Cf. ibid.: v-vi.
60 Hegel, 1977: 51.
61 Ibid.: 490.
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realises that it is “the phases of content in which it externalises itself and the process of 
leading these phases back to a full consciousness of self.”62
Here, it may also be significant to note that the attempt to consider the successive 
moments of the Spirit, with specific regard to “provinces” of experience, has been 
rephrased in Collingwood’s Speculum Mentis, and Outlines o f A Philosophy o f Art. 
According to Collingwood, there are five stages developing through the life of the Spirit 
in a way that the higher form of experience “presupposes and includes within itself those 
that logically precede it”63: Art is the pure act of imagination whose indifference to the 
distinction between real and unreal is to be superseded by religion as a quest after truth, 
whose errors of superstition and idolatry are to be destroyed by science as the 
apprehension of a self-sufficient intelligent world, whose inclination to abstract facts is to 
be abolished by history as a concrete study, whose shortcoming of reaching a unity of the 
mind is only to be overcome in philosophy by the Absolute.64
By way of contrast, it may be surmised from our earlier discussions that, the first 
and foremost concept running through Bradley’s philosophical work is the Hegelian 
Absolute which is identified with “ultimate reality” in ontological terms, and with “total 
truth” in the epistemological sense. Unlike Hegel, nevertheless, Bradley believes that the 
Absolute might be beyond the grasp of thought which has its own degrees of truth and 
refers to reality from a limited point of view. And although Bradley understands the 
development of human mind in the order of feeling-thought-the Absolute, he does not 
really concur with Hegel’s notion of the “hierarchy of knowledge”. Instead, Bradley 
seems to accept that “hence no total truth or error, only more or less of validity”, such 
that there exist “self-independent” spheres of thought making their own contribution to 
reality and truth. And in the context of Appearance and Reality, these spheres of thought 
actually include “the worlds of duty and religious truth”, “hope, desire and dream”, “the 
various worlds of politics, commerce, invention, trade and manufacture”, “the intellectual 
province of truth and science, and more or less apart from this, the whole realm of the 
higher imagination” and so forth.65
62 Ibid.: 591.
63 R. G. Collingwood, 1994: 94.
64 Ibid.: 88-94.
65 Cf. W. H. Greenleaf, 1966: 9-11; R. Grant, 1990: 29.
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Here again, it appears to me that Oakeshott’s particular position on the relation of 
philosophy to modes of understanding is in spirit closer to Bradley than to Hegel or 
Collingwood,66 At first glance, it seems true that Oakeshott does not follow Bradley to 
take the Absolute as what is beyond our thinking. According to Oakeshott:
what is absolute means here that which is absolved or emancipated from the necessity o f  
finding its significance in relations with what is outside itself. It means that which is self- 
complete, whole, individual, and removed from change. What is absolute, in this sense, is 
no inscrutable Absolute (emphasis mine), beyond conception and outside the world o f
67experience, it is the world o f  experience as a coherent unity, for that alone is absolute.
Consequently, as Greenleaf points out, Oakeshott takes philosophy to be the “perpetual 
re-establishment of coherence”, which “is suspicious of any stopping-place or any 
attempt to limit the inquiry”;68 or alternatively, it may be said that for Oakeshott 
“philosophy is the engagement of continuous re-examining”69 whatever is conditional and 
partial. And this understanding of philosophy, indeed, is where Oakeshott stands closest 
to Hegel.70 Later in HC, Oakeshott continues to interpret Hegel as a philosopher who 
“engaged in a tireless exploration of the conditions of conditions”,71 an interpretation 
which reflects perfectly his own definition of philosophising.
But, for Oakeshott, philosophy is certainly not a system of knowledge on which 
all other knowledge depends; this, as already indicated, is a form of philosophic not 
philosophy. Rather, it is in Oakeshott’s unique voice that, although philosophy is 
absolute as such, it does not necessarily mean that it should supersede or include modes 
of experience, as the task of philosophy is “not to anticipate or suggest arrests in 
experience, but to consider the character of those which actually exist [emphasis 
mine].”72 In other words, as we shall see, in EM  Oakeshott somehow combines Hegel’s 
notion of philosophy as an endless inquiry and Bradley’s idea of the degrees of reality 
and truth into a sort of “sceptical idealism” which means that: although philosophy is a 
self-critical thought which aims to transcend abstractness in order to achieve
66 Cf. D. Boucher, 1984: 197; 1993: 699-702.
67 EM: 47.
68 W. H. Greenleaf, 1966: 12-3.
69 T. Fuller, 1993b: 24.
70 As Oakeshott puts it elsewhere, this understanding of philosophy, in some sense, is also in favour of 
the Socratic dialogues, with which he sees no specific reason to quarrel. (RPML: 130)
71 HC: 257.
12 EM: 331.
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completeness, it is also a “mood”73, an “escape”74, a “parasitic activity”75, i.e. a self- 
limited pure thinking which does not intend to alter what already exists in experience. 
Thus, whilst Hegel’s phases of knowledge can never be self-independent because only 
the Absolute has such a privilege, and whilst Bradley’s worlds of experience can be self- 
consistent because the Absolute is out of our reach, for Oakeshott they must be so 
because this is the way that they really are in the present situation.
As a result, Oakeshott plainly rejects the notion of the “hierarchy of knowledge”, 
because modes of experience do not constitute “a mere series of what is successive, but a 
world of what is co-existent.”76 And if what he has tried to explain in EM  is plausible, 
Oakeshott thus believes, “experience is no longer seen as an hierarchy of abstract worlds 
of ideas, but as a single concrete whole in which every modification represents an arrest, 
and every arrest a failure.”77
But, if it be the case that modes of experience are abstract and co-existing and 
/ that philosophy has no right to put jhei^failure right, there must at the same time remain 
a sceptical note in Oakeshott’s thought. As Oakeshott states it elsewhere, “the denial of a 
hierarchical order among the voices is not only a departure from one of the most notable 
traditions of European thought (in which all activity was judged in relation to the vita 
contemplativa), but will seem also to reinforce the scepticism.”78 The character of such a 
form of scepticism will be one of the main topics that this study aims to clarify.
To conclude: In EM, on the one hand, Oakeshott intends to maintain the self­
independence of philosophy by rejecting positivism, historicism and pragmatism; on the 
other hand, in receiving inspiration from Bradley, especially in connection with the 
notion of the degrees of truth and reality, he tries to develop a self-limited and sceptical 
notion of philosophy that points in the direction of setting history, science and practice 
free from philosophy. Oakeshott’s suggestion in EM, as in his other works, is the anti- 
foundationalist belief that reason appropriate to a world of discourse cannot be applied 
to any others without committing the mistake of ignoratio elenchi,79 that is
73 EM: 2.
74EM: 3,296-7.
15 RP: 491.
76 EM: 91; cf. 72-3
77 EM: 326.
78 RP: 493.
79 EM: 5ff. In logic, the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi simply means “irrelevant conclusion”, that is, “an 
argument in which one starts out to prove that something is the case, but instead proves something else.
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“categorically absurd”.80 This “most insidious and crippling of all forms of error - 
irrelevance”81, Oakeshott has never tired of reminding us, should be prevented from 
relating philosophy to modes of experience and from that of one mode to another.
III.3. Experience and Modality
So much, then, for a contextual background to EM. Let us now proceed to the main 
argument of the work under consideration. Since Oakeshott’s philosophy is ultimately 
connected with a certain view on the nature of experience, in this section I shall first 
attempt to discuss four related topics in his theory of experience: the general character of 
experience, truth, reality and modality.
777.3.2. Experience: A  Single Whole 
We have indicated that for Oakeshott “experience is a single whole, within which 
modification may be distinguished, but which admits of no final or absolute division.”82 
This, as I understand it, signifies the core meaning of experience which Oakeshott aims 
to discover throughout the whole book. In the first place, it suggests that the 
distinguishable modes of experience such as history, science and practice are not separate 
kinds of experience corresponding to the separate parts of experience which the 
empiricist might think of, but rather they are the single whole of experience modified by 
the conditions that characterise each of them. That is to say, in the spirit of Oakeshott 
there is only one reality, a single system of experience; the modes of experience are not 
the “sum-totals” of our knowledge, but different ways for us to approach the world as a 
whole through certain standpoints.
 What happens in an ignoratio elenchi is that the disputant thinks he is proving p  when in reality he
is proving r. Thus, he arrives at a conclusion which is irrelevant to the conclusion he was trying to 
prove.” (See, R. H. Popkin & A. Stroll, 1993: 315.)
80 HC: 15.
81 EM: 5.
82 EM: 10, 27.
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Applying the problem of modality to what follows, we only need to notice that, 
by expressing “experience as a single whole knowing no final division”, Oakeshott’s 
major point is to employ an objection to some of the divisions built into experience upon 
which modem natural philosophy depends for its discussions of knowing: first, dualism, 
i.e. the division between experiencing and what is experienced, between experience and 
reality, between subjectivity and objectivity and the like; second, the empiricist division 
as to the different forms of experience - immediate and mediate experience; and third, the 
rationalist division of experience and intuition. Here, for expository purposes, it is 
convenient to look at the non-empiricist and non-rationalist character of Oakeshott’s idea 
of experience by remarking on his objection to the last two divisions, and leave the 
problem of dualism unexplored until we come to understand his attitude to reality.
According to Oakeshott, every experiencing must be a way of thinking; 
everything experienced must be a form of thought. Experience and thought are 
inseparable; experience always and everywhere involves thought or judgement, that is, a 
single homogeneous world of ideas. The view that experience is a self-governing whole 
which needs no outside authority, since no such thing exists, to vindicate it, is indeed a 
view that Oakeshott takes from idealism in general. And, it accordingly follows that 
everything understandable can be neither falling short of nor passing beyond the 
condition of thought, i.e. experience. At this point, Oakeshott, with his fellow idealists, is 
at odds with traditional empiricism and rationalism.
Empiricism holds that since the raw material of knowledge is sensation 
(immediate experience), there is a “pre-thinking stage of experience” distinguishable 
from our reflection (mediate experience). In other words, for empiricists, there exists a 
final division between experience as sensation and experience as thought; and sensation is 
thus an independent form of experience which is less than thinking and reflection. And, 
among those who have made this point, I think, it is particularly Locke that Oakeshott 
takes as his target for attack on the origin of such a form of division in experience.
It is Locke’s view that man at birth is like “white paper, void of all characters, 
without any ideas”, that “all ideas come from sensation and reflection.” 83 Through the 
former our minds are provoked by physical objects to receive passively all the ideas that 
we have of the world. Once the mind has hoarded its sensed ideas, i.e. sense-data, we
83 Locke, 1975: II. 1. 2.
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have a faculty - “the operations of our own minds within us”84 to reflect upon those ideas 
or data. Rather as the ideas of sensation are caused by physical objects, the ideas of 
reflection, which include perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, 
willing and all the different actings of our minds are caused by the ideas of sensation.
According to Oakeshott, what lies behind the Lockean separation of sensation 
from reflection or judgement is nothing but a misconception purporting to presume that 
the given sensation must be isolated, simple and even inexpressible. All we have in 
sensation, it is said, is therefore no more than a bare “this” or “that”, “here” or “there”, 
“now” or “then” without involving thinking. To argue against this, Oakeshott makes two 
points, which I think exactly correspond to Bradley’s notions of “generality” and 
“artificiality” that we have mentioned above: First, Oakeshott argues that nothing in 
experience is ever isolated, unrelated, unmodified by previous experience; that any 
general concept, in terms of being a concept itself, is not inexpressible without a name. 
To take a simple example, “yellow, as it is in actual experience, is characterised by 
connection with previous experience recognised as different or similar either in kind or in 
degree.”85 If I do not recognise the concept of yellow in the first place, then, no matter 
whether other people see it or not, I have no idea of referring yellow to the thing I am 
seeing at all. But if I see something as yellow, I must at the same time see it not as blue 
or red. For without such relevance built into my previous experience, in which the 
concept of yellow can be connected to a more complex unity (i.e. generality), say, of 
colour, to experience something as yellow is not possible. Second, as Oakeshott goes on 
to say, there is no reliable distinction that can be made between the concept of yellow 
and the judgement that “this is yellow”. Experiencing, at least, implies consciousness (i.e. 
artificiality); a bare “this” is nothing but nonentity. Consequently, the statement “this is 
yellow” in fact means that “I recognise that this is yellow”. Since recognition and 
consciousness must involve us at once “in judgement, in inference, in reflection, in 
thought;” 86 experience, Oakeshott concludes, is always and everywhere significant.
It is vital to note that Oakeshott here is clearly aware of the reason why it is so 
important for empiricism to suppose that there is immediate experience outside thought. 
In the first place, this is a consequence of the empiricists’ obsession with dualism, an
84 Ibid.: II. 1. 4.
85 EM: 13.
86 EM: 14.
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issue to which I shall return shortly. But further, the division between immediate and 
mediate experience is made in the service of a certain epistemological premise regarding 
knowledge as a mental process which needs some sort of raw material to begin with. 
Oakeshott characterises this theory of knowledge as follows:
Experience, it is said, must begin somewhere, and if  thought involves mediation, it cannot 
begin with thought. “It is as i f  one should say that in building a wall every brick must be
87laid on the top o f another brick and none directly on the ground.
But does thought require raw material to accomplish itself? Is there anything in thought 
analogous to the builder’s brick? Oakeshott has doubts on this, because he argues that 
there is no “out-there” raw material needed in thinking. Instead, to take an analogy from 
Plato’s Theaetetus, Oakeshott creates his own metaphor in the following way: thinking 
“is a process of catching not wild birds, not what is outside experience (such as objects in 
mere sensation), but tame birds already within the cage of the mind.”88 That is to say, 
thinking begins neither from sense-data, nor from given feelings or perceptions, but 
begins with a world of ideas within our mind. According to Oakeshott,
What is at first given in experience is single and significant, a One not a many. The given 
in thought is the complex situation in which we find ourselves in the first moments o f  
consciousness. There is nothing immediate or “natural” in contrast to what is mediate or
89sophisticated; there are only degrees o f  sophistication.
In short, simply following Bradley, the view Oakeshott wishes to recommend is that the 
given in experience is always a world, not a series nor a collection, of ideas. It is from 
this viewpoint, as we shall see, that Oakeshott’s notion of truth develops.
In contrast to empiricism, on the other hand, rationalism upholds that since the 
only genuine source of knowledge is reason or intuition, there exists a “supra-thinking 
stage” through which our experience can become truer than what it seems to be. 
Intuition, it is claimed, is independent of experience for it is more than thought. In other 
words, truths do not depend on experience; rather, there are a priori truths which are
87 EM: 18.
88 EM: 19.
89 EM: 20.
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true in themselves and which can be realised through reason alone. Accordingly, as 
Oakeshott assumes, it is the rationalists’ general creed that there is “a direct knowledge 
of the whole, freed from the distortion of analysis and the artificial distinctions of 
judgement,” that “intuition is, therefore, a fuller experience; it is a form of experience 
from which the defeats of judgement have been banished.”90
Oakeshott’s comment on rationalism is considerably brief in comparison to his 
views on empiricism and he imputes the impossibility of the division between intuition 
and experience to the fact that, although there are forms of thought that may fall below 
the full character of thought, no thought can be foreign to itself, i.e. to recognise reality 
to a certain extent. That is to say, according to rationalism, the distinction implies a 
“strong” version of dualism or realism91 which alleges that reality exists independently of 
our experience and our apprehension of it is necessarily different from what it really 
appears to our innate reason. “This view implies, among much else, an absolute 
distinction between what is called “knowledge o f  and “knowledge about\ it implies that 
the object in thought is never reality but a mere being-for-thought, it implies that the so- 
called categories of thought stand between the subject and reality, and it implies that a 
direct and immediate experience, because it is direct and immediate, is a complete 
experience.”92 But, rationalism with its “passwords of ‘Either - Or’”93 neglects that 
“understanding is not such that we either enjoy it or lack it altogether”94; truth is not 
such that it is either absolute or nothing. There are, instead, degrees of truth and reality 
to accompany every understanding; and thinking is not the qualification of reality by 
another idea, it is a qualification of reality by itself.
III.3.2. Truth: A Condition of Thought
I have indicated that Oakeshott claims experience begins with ideas, and ideas can never
/
be isolated; the given in experience is always a world of ideas. And, a world means “a
90 EM: 23.
91 Cf. R. Grant, 1990: 25.
92 EM: 23-4.
93 This is a Hegelian phrase, quoted in EM: 25.
94 HC: 1.
complex integral whole or system; whenever there is a world there is unity.”95 On this 
basis, Oakeshott argues that truth is not an external standard outside experience; but it 
is an internal condition within experience, the condition of the world of experience in 
which the world is satisfactory to itself. In other words, truth is not itself an independent 
category outside thinking, but a relative degree of satisfaction that experience enjoys. 
Nothing save the world of experience itself is the arbiter of truth; there are no external 
means by which truth can be established. It is consequently senseless to ask where truth 
can be known - without truth there can be no thinking; without thinking there can be no 
truth.
In order to explain this point, Oakeshott goes on to explore the process of 
understanding by maintaining that in thinking the given, the unity is given in order to be 
transformed. That is to say, thinking must involve itself in a process of self-criticism, or 
using a Hegelian concept, dialectic in which our mind never merely acquiesces in the 
presented condition of what appears to be partial; but rather our mind is so positive and 
critical that it always embarks on an establishment of a concrete whole. That said, in 
thinking, we start with the negation of the presented unity wherever that is seen to be 
false or inadequate in order to recognise a given world of ideas into a closer unity. That 
which is eventually achieved in experience is “first, a world which differs from the given 
world only by being more of a world; the given and the achieved are both worlds, but not 
equally worlds; and second, it is a world of ideas.”96 Hence, following Bradley, 
Oakeshott also argues that the only criterion of truth is “coherence”: “knowledge is 
always a coherent system of ideas, knowledge consists in whatever in experience we are 
obliged to accept, whatever in experience we are led to and find satisfaction in.”97
Furthermore, Bradley’s “doctrine of internal relations” applies to Oakeshott’s 
proposition. Since the given in experience is always a world of ideas, every single 
constituent of the unity has no meaning of its own in isolation from the concrete whole. 
Each single idea’s character rests hot upon a given causal relation as empiricism and 
positivist historiography argue, but upon the whole system to which it belongs. There is 
no fixed meaning for a single idea; its meaning is its place in the whole system. Thus, to 
enhance an idea is to enhance the integral whole; to interpret the meaning of an idea is to
95 EM: 28.
96 EM: 29.
97 EM: 40.
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undertake a “pursuit of implications”98 of its unity. And consequently, the process of 
understanding is never a process of mere “accretion”. To speak of “adding to 
knowledge” is to speak of a misconception. This returns us at once to dualism, to the ab 
extra theory of truth. We can extend nothing to a given series or collection of ideas 
outside ourselves, because no such world exists. Instead, “each advance affects 
retrospectively the entire whole, and is the creation of a new world.”99 “To modify the 
system as a whole is to cause every constituent to take on a new character; to modify any 
of the constituents is to alter the system as a whole.”100 But in each case, it follows that 
for Oakeshott as for Bradley, every truth is corrigible, that “where error is impossible, 
truth is inconceivable.” And consequently, Oakeshott does not intend to deny that truth 
may not be fully achieved in experience, although, since it is a necessary condition of 
experience, it can never be wholly absent in thinking. Hence, he takes once again 
Bradley’s notion of the degrees of truth by saying that “even if truth is difficult to come 
at, nothing can be dismissed as mere error;” that truth is not a matter of “take-it-or- 
leave-it”, on the contrary, what really concerns the philosopher is a problem of how to 
discover “the half-truth in the error, and the error in the half-truth”.101 This and other 
related points, it seems to me, have prevented Oakeshott from an extreme form of 
scepticism in the sense of eliminating any possibility of truth. But how far and in what 
sense Oakeshott in EM  can be regarded as a sceptic is a question that I do not intend to 
pursue in detail here.
In view of his insistence on the lack of separation of truth from thinking, 
Oakeshott’s premise repudiates the Cartesian belief that truth “is an Absolute not 
inherent in the character of experience but dictated ab extra, a prize, extraneous to the 
race itself, and (when the race is finished) more frequently withheld than awarded.”102 
Since this correspondence theory of truth is associated with dualism, to understand better 
Oakeshott’s repudiation of it, we must turn to examine his attitude to reality.
111.3,3. Reality: The Given in Experience
98 EM: 41.
99 EM: 41
100 EM: 30.
101 EM: 2, 4.
102 EM: 28.
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In connection with the relation of experience to reality, Oakeshott argues that no 
separation is possible between them:
Knowledge, i f  we are to avoid contradiction, must be seen to have its place in the 
universe o f  the real; and reality must lie within the universe o f  knowledge. For, i f  
experience be not, in some sense, real, then, nothing can be real, and consequently 
nothing unreal. And i f  reality be separated from knowledge, it must resign itself to the
• 103condition o f  nonentity, an empty concept, an idea without meaning or significance.
Oakeshott’s observation here is, of course, a re-statement of the central doctrine of 
idealism: mind (experiencing) can never be independent of its objects (what is 
experienced), which implies that: to be real is to be in thinking; to be in thinking is to be 
real; in experience, thinking and reality are elements given in connection.
In order to illuminate this point, Oakeshott identifies and objects to two forms of 
dualism: The first is the form purporting to suppose that reality is independent of 
experience and it is real because it is unknowable. And the second is the form suggesting 
that reality is the object of experiencing, but, due to the limitation of our natural faculty, 
we cannot claim to be able to comprehend reality itself.
With regard to the first observation, it is, I think, the Kantian unknowableness of 
the thing-in-itself that Oakeshott takes to be the case. In his Critique o f Pure Reason, 
Kant set out to consider the demarcation of our reason by asking what it can and what it 
cannot achieve in the way of knowledge. It was Kant’s conclusion that knowledge is 
possible only if our experience is added to a priori objective reference through the 
function of our mind, i.e. we arrange our experience, first in time and space, and then 
according to categories. That is to say, in order to get real knowledge our mind must 
play a dynamic role in organising what we experience, insofar as, space, time and 
categories are merely creations in our mind without which we could not get to 
understand the world. But this does not mean that these realities do not exist; it only 
means that they belong to, as Kant called it, a world of the “thing-in-itself’, which should 
exist and whose nature is completely unknowable to us.
Here Oakeshott makes a twofold objection to this view. First, it contains an 
attempt to define reality “as not something else”. But, “reality, whatever else it is, cannot 
be a thing among things; it must be everything, and has not even the alternative of being
103 EM: 50.
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nothing.” And second, “to assert the impossibility of knowledge is always to assert a 
piece of knowledge, and is therefore self-contradictory.”104 The unknowableness of 
reality, in the end, only contradicts itself as there being nothing to know.
The second form of dualism is perhaps found, again, in Locke’s theory of reality. 
We have shown that for Locke ideas are capable of representing physical objects in the 
external world, yet we are never directly acquainted with physical objects themselves 
(and the mind as substance). For the physical world is only postulated by Locke as the 
cause of our ideas; and, for this reason, it must exist independently. It provides us with 
the objects of thought, but does not give us knowledge in any given form. The Lockean 
representationism is thus not to see the realities of mind and body, but to see “what 
Objects and our Understandings were, or were not fitted to deal with”105.
To this view, Oakeshott’s critique is that if reality (Objects) is independent of 
experience (Understanding), any move to relate one to the other, “to get acquainted with 
it must be stupid rather than presumptuous, and to restrain a man from the undertaking 
would be not less foolish than to prohibit his drinking the sea.”106 Since the view 
Oakeshott is recommending is that reality is knowable because of its lack of separation 
from experience, it seems nonsense for him to speak of reality as beyond the limits of 
human knowledge. Again, as Oakeshott argues, how could we be aware of the limits of 
our thought and where they should lie, if we do not know anything beyond these limits? 
It is thus difficult to hold such a view without being abstract and arbitrary.
Empiricism since Locke has formulated a more and more sceptical view on 
metaphysics raising doubt on any attempt to penetrate reality. Hume and positivism, the 
latest form of empiricism, for example, are significant cases. By questioning such a 
sceptical attitude to metaphysics, it has become clear that Oakeshott’s idealism has led 
him to be positive about the hope for metaphysics, at least so far as EM  is concerned, 
and thus his scepticism seems to have nothing to do with the Humean tradition of 
empiricism. We should therefore be careful about Cranston’s remark that “(Oakeshott) is 
an idealist who is more sceptical than many positivists.”
104 EM: 50-1.
105 Quoted by R. Rorty, 1980: 137.
106 EM: 53-4.
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If reality is, in effect, a world of ideas, it follows that reality is nothing but that which is 
given in every experience. At this point, Oakeshott continues, reality is what is achieved 
and satisfactory in experience. And, in view of the fact that what is satisfactory in 
experience is always a coherent world of ideas; reality is thus a coherent world of ideas, 
i.e. of things. It is one, a single system, and it is real only as a whole. Reality “is what we 
are obliged to think; and since to think is to experience, and to experience is to 
experience meaning, the real is always what has meaning, or is rational.”107 Accordingly, 
as with the nature of reality, Oakeshott makes his own motto as follows: “we have, and 
all we have, is a world of ‘meanings’” - “Whatever has a meaning, if we give it its lull 
meaning, is real; and whatever is real has a meaning,”108 a motto which at once reminds 
us of that of Hegel: the rational is the real and the real the rational. In short, for 
Oakeshott, what is real is what is “objective”.
While seeing the real world as an objective world in this way, however, there 
appears a need to distinguish the notion of objectivity from what dualism, or so-called 
realism presumes. For, on this issue, it has been said that objectivity must signify 
independence: whatever is objective must be uninterfered with by experience and 
indifferent to our understanding of it. Consequently, related to the correspondence 
theory of truth, it is now suggested that knowing is concerned solely with “subjectivity 
and objectivity”. And following from this, the most fundamental question that should be 
asked in philosophy is: “How can we get outside our purely personal experience to a 
world of objective, real existence?”109
For Oakeshott, an object is always an object of consciousness, and reality which 
is untouched by experiencing is the unknowable and thus a contradiction. Following 
Hegel and Bradley, Oakeshott believes that the Cartesian-Kantian problematic of what 
we can know of the external world, of how objects are related to subjects is not merely 
misleading but nonsensical. If reality is given always and everywhere in experience, the 
real problem concerning objectivity in philosophy should be replaced by “Where is the 
experience in which reality is given fully?”110 And, just as in experience what is
107
108
109
110
EM: 58. 
EM: 61; 58. 
EM: 59. 
EM: 59.
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satisfactory may not be fully achieved yet it can never be absent; Oakeshott accepts 
Bradley’s notion of the degrees of reality that reality may not be given equally but can 
never be denied. In other words, in suggesting that reality is an objective world of 
experience, Oakeshott proposes that reality is obligatory and unavoidable in experience: 
reality is what we are obliged to think, not what we happen to think; without reality there 
is no thinking, without thinking there is no reality. Of the subjectivity-objectivity 
problem, Oakeshott thus concludes that:
Subject and object are not independent elements or portions o f  experience; they are 
aspects o f  experience which, when separated from one another, degenerate into 
abstractions. Every experience ... is the unity o f  these, a unity which may be analysed 
into these two sides but which can never be reduced to a mere relation between them. ... 
[A]n object is not something independent o f  experience, but merely what I am obliged to 
think, and for that reason it is real. And the subject, the I, which belongs to this object, is 
not my body, nor a merely psychological subject, not (that is) an element or portion o f  
my world, but my world as a whole. And my world is a world o f  objects. The subject 
does not belong to my world, it is my world.111
In short, experience, truth and reality are inseparable; the world is a world of ideas in 
which everything experienced enjoys a certain degree of truth and refers to a limited 
viewpoint of reality.
III.3.4. Modality: Three Characters
So far we have seen that for Oakeshott with experience there is a movement directed 
towards the achievement of a coherent world of ideas, but, as Oakeshott proceeds, at a 
certain point this movement may be arrested and an abstract world of ideas, a mode of 
experience constructed. That said, this movement can frequently fall short of the 
completeness of satisfaction, fall short because it reaches something else - a certain 
degree of what is satisfactory. In sum, there will emerge a mode of experience as long as 
there is a lack of an adequacy to realise fully the criterion of satisfaction, the 
completeness.
In experience there is the alternative o f pressing forward towards the perfectly coherent 
world o f  concrete ideas or turning aside from the main current in order to construct and
111 EM: 60.
-103 -
explore a restricted world o f  ideas. The full obligations o f  the character o f  experience are
avoided when (as so often) the attempt to define, the attempt to see clearly and as a
112whole, is surrendered for the abstract satisfaction o f  designation.
As a matter of fact, Oakeshott claims that he has never excluded the possibility of 
such an arrest in experience and this is evident from what we have elicited so far. On the 
contrary, the notion of degrees which we have seen as inseparable from that of 
experience as a coherent world of ideas - the view that in experience truth and reality 
may be conditionally achieved and given - implies the possibility of diversity and admits 
arrest. For this reason, no matter what else the character of a mode of experience can be, 
in the first place, it can never abscond from the world of experience itself.
In other words, it does not mean that a mode when modified relinquishes the 
character of being experience; but it merely means that on occasions it fails to realise 
entirely the criterion of experience in the most complete sense. And thus, modes of 
experience are not kinds  of experience; for there is no final division in experience. All we 
have in experience is “One not Many”. Whatever falls short of the full character of this 
One is merely a defeated mode of experience rather than a specific kind of it. Again, a 
mode of experience is not what corresponds to a separate p a r t  of reality either. “It is not 
an island in the sea of experience, but a limited view of the totality of experience.” “It is 
not partial (in the literal sense), but abstract.” “There are indeed no ‘parts’ in experience, 
no separable ‘tracts’ of experience.”113
There are accordingly three main features of a mode of experience: Firstly, as it is 
suggested, a mode of experience must be “a b s tr a c t’, since it is modified in experience by 
its own conditions and postulates. History is the organisation of the totality of experience 
sub sp ec ie  p ra e terito ru m \ science, sub spec ie  qu an tita tis , practice, sub sp ec ie  
vo lu n ta tis  UA In short, as Oakeshott maintains, the logical structure that ascertains a 
mode of experience as historical, scientific or practical, ascertains it as an abstract world 
of ideas, an arrest in experience as well.115
Secondly, each mode of experience can never transcend its conditions, for it is 
exactly due to the shortcoming of this ability that makes it a modality, a category, an
112 EM: 70-1.
113 EM: 71.
114 EM: 11, 198, 258, 262, 308, 317.
us Cf. EM: 146.
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abstractness. Towards this crucial point, Oakeshott thus argues that each mode contains 
a “self-contradiction” within its own logic. That is, a mode’s explicit character as a 
modality actually and continuously conflicts with its implicit character as experience, and, 
more crucially, this self-contradiction (and thus abstractness) cannot be removed without 
stamping out the mode itself: The explicit form of history as past understanding, wie es 
eigentlich gewesen, contradicts its implicit form as present experience116; the explicit 
character of sciences as a world of proposals and hypotheses contradicts its implicit 
character of referring to and depending upon concrete reality117; and the explicit feature 
of practice as the will to alter or maintain existence, the attempt to throw reality into the 
future, contradicts its implicit feature of being present experience.118 But in each case, it 
is clear that a mode will be self-destructive if its modality is put in question or its self- 
contradiction is to be resolved. Or alternatively, it may be said that a mode of experience 
that adheres to what is explicit in its character must renounce the capacity to achieve 
what would be completely satisfactory in experience at the same time.
Thirdly, it follows that a mode of experience is governed by its own postulates, 
postulates which put it outside the main current of experience and thus enable it to make 
a home for itself. Consequently, a mode of experience must be “self-consistenf\ And, in 
order to clarify this point, Oakeshott has two further arguments: first, the differentia of 
the various modes of experience from one another; and second, the notion of “truth-for- 
itself ’ applied in every mode of experience.
In the first place, according to Oakeshott, “whenever argument or inference 
passes from one world of experience to another, from what is abstracted upon one 
principle [a mode] to what is abstracted upon another [another mode], from what is 
abstract [the modes] to what is concrete [philosophy], and from what is concrete to what 
is abstract”, there will occur ignoratio elenchi. That is to say, for Oakeshott, modes of 
experience must be “wholly and absolutely independent of any other”119; the modes are 
so “tight, exclusive, insular”120 that each mode can never be associated either with the 
principles of other modes or with philosophy.121 As K. Minogue explains:
116 EM: 145-56.
117 EM: 212-9.
119 EM: 304-5.
119 EM: 75
120 EM: 345
121 This does not mean that there are no communications permitted amongst the modes of experience 
under certain conditions. See esp. [V.4.1.].
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Water, to use an obvious example, has little in common with H2O, and neither has much 
relation to the poetic images o f  water in The Ancient M ariner. Each mode plays by its 
own rules, as it were, and to mix them is like playing basketball in the middle o f  a game 
o f football.122
Additionally, as we have seen, a mode of experience, by itself, is an abstract 
world of ideas, and the condition of being a world of ideas is truth. Truth is always “true 
for itself’; truth is what is satisfactory to experience; and consequently, the truth of a 
mode of experience is the limited degree to which it is satisfactory to itself. The principle 
is: Every truth is true in its own place. Oakeshott thus argues that:
Each abstract world o f ideas, in so far as it is coherent, is, then, true so far as it goes, 
true i f  its postulates are accepted, true i f  its reservations are admitted. But, because each 
is an abstract world o f ideas, the product o f  an arrest in experience, when whatever truth 
it may contain is asserted absolutely and unconditionally, its truth turns to error. The 
truth o f  a mode o f  experience is always relative, relative to the degree o f  completeness
123which belongs to its world o f ideas, its organisation o f  reality.
In short, for Oakeshott, the modes of experience are so self-consistent that they 
are governed by nothing save their own conditioned coherence. On the dust jacket of the 
paperback edition of EM  Oakeshott sums up the purpose of his book as follows: “Its 
theme is Modality: human experience recognised as a variety of independent, self- 
consistent worlds of discourse, each the invention of human intelligence, but each also to 
be understood as abstract and an arrest in human experience.”
III.4. The Nature of Philosophy
It can be noted that philosophy itself is not mentioned by Oakeshott among the modes of 
experience. If philosophy is not a specific kind of understanding which approaches the 
world under its own postulates, then what is the nature and main business of it? what is 
its relation to the modes of experience? These are questions to which we now turn. In
122 K. Minogue, 1993a: 46.
123 EM: 77.
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doing so, I intend to expand on the three major characteristics of Oakeshott’s 
philosophical thought upon which we have touched earlier: self-independence or self- 
criticism, self-limitation and scepticism.
III.4.1. Self-Independence 
We have seen that Oakeshott perceives that experience is a single concrete whole within 
which modification may occur, but which admits of no absolute division. I would like to 
add here that this implies that there exists a concrete world of ideas: “Wherever there is a 
modification there must be a totality; wherever there is abstraction there must be a 
concrete whole”.124 Put another way, if there is no other world as a concrete whole, 
which is “neither the sum nor the product of the modes”, which in turn are neither 
alternative nor contributory to this concrete world,125 there can be no modes at all. As a 
matter of fact, the standpoint that we have been taking to consider the nature of 
experience so far is exactly that of taking experience as a concrete whole, and “whatever 
in experience the concrete purpose is pursued without hindrance or distraction” 
Oakeshott now calls “philosophical experience”126. So far, then, all we have been 
undertaking is a philosophical point of view; Oakeshott intends in EM  nothing less than 
to establish such a philosophical world as other, a non-modified world, in order to 
provide the modes and philosophy itself with a criterion. And consequently, the problem 
remaining here is a problem concerning how, and in what sense, philosophy can be seen 
as the criterion of experience?
To ask this question is at once to ask the meaning and function of philosophy 
itself. According to Oakeshott, philosophy, since it must involve itself in the movement 
towards the achievement of a coherent world of ideas, means that it is “experience 
without reservation or preservation, experience which is self-conscious and self-critical 
throughout, in which the determination to remain unsatisfied with anything short of a 
completely coherent world of ideas is absolute and unqualified.”127 In other words, as 
already mentioned, the philosopher is simply “the victim of thought” in the sense that he
124 EM: 77.
125 EM: 77,79.
126 EM: 81-2.
127 EM: 82; see also 3, 347.
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is always critical about whatever is conditional and incomplete; philosophical thinking is 
“self-critical thought” engaged in the pursuit of what is fully and finally satisfactory in 
experience.
If Oakeshott is correct that the basic function of philosophy is to transcend 
abstractness as such, it follows that philosophy cannot disclaim the responsibility of 
accounting for the character of the modes which arrest in experience in order to 
transcend their conditions and postulates. As a result, the main business of philosophy, 
Oakeshott argues, is “to determine its own character, and to extend its content by 
persisting in the concrete purpose implied in its character and by avoiding or overcoming 
every alluring modification which may offer itself as a distraction.”128 And consequently, 
it is in this sense that philosophy can be seen as the criterion of experience.
No matter what this criterion can be, it certainly cannot be a product of what 
categorises the modes of experience. In other words, it cannot be a historical, scientific 
or practical criterion. For, the criterion of experience, according to previous arguments, 
is the persistent re-establishment of a complete and satisfactory world of experience; 
practice, science and history, on the other hand, are modifications or arrests which have 
occurred in experience exactly in the sense of falling short of this completeness. The 
view that Oakeshott wishes to reject here, so far as this perspective is concerned, is the 
view of reducing all experience to historical, scientific or practical experience.129
This, however, can not be simply given as a presupposition (there is nothing 
simply given in philosophy); instead, it needs to be established for the sake of philosophy 
itself. And consequently, this is the reason, I think, why in a work concerning philosophy 
Oakeshott has taken so much space, almost three quarters, to discuss the postulates of 
the modes, to argue whether each of them is an abstract world of ideas arrested in 
experience or a complete and satisfactory world of ideas. It is at this point that the whole 
proceedings of EM  can therefore be seen as a course of elucidating how a philosophy 
starts to establish itself as the criterion of experience, the completeness, by way of 
criticising the abstractness (and the self-contradiction) inherent in modes of experience 
without interfering with their self-consistence.
128 EM: 83.
129 SqqEM: esp. 245.
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That is, to interpret the aim of EM  in this way is to show how a mode of 
experience, on the one hand, by virtue of its character as a world of ideas, can be seen by 
philosophy as a self-consistent world of ideas; but, how it, on the other hand, by virtue of 
its modality, falls short of philosophy itself, a complete coherent world of ideas. Put 
another way, it is Oakeshott’s view that the task of the philosopher is to “discover both 
half-truth in the error and the error in the half truth” - to reject the error-part of a mode 
of experience by showing how it fails to be a concrete whole, and meanwhile to ascertain 
its truth-part by remaining as a self-consistent mode of experience. Otherwise, to speak 
of science, practice and history as the criterion of experience will commit the error of 
ignoratio elenchi. For it will mis-identify modifications with experience itself, mis- 
identify the postulates such as “quantity”, “volition” and “pastness” which distinguish 
respectively the scientific, practical and the historical with the concrete coherence, i.e. 
the philosophical.
Oakeshott claims there are theoretically numberless modes for man to 
comprehend the world130, and the three modes of experience discussed in EM  are not his 
own invention, but ways of thinking that have been “highly developed”.131 And yet, as I 
have pointed out, the more substantial reason for Oakeshott’s selection of history, 
science and practice, among others, as the examples of modality is to make a response to 
the contemporary debate over the nature of philosophy by transcending logical 
positivism, historicism and pragmatism.
We will have other opportunities to resume Oakeshott’s rejections of these 
thoughts in the course of this thesis. Now, instead of appealing to any external and 
extraneous reasons, let me repeat again, for Oakeshott “a philosophy, if it is to stand at 
all, must stand absolutely upon its own feet, and anything which tends to obscure this 
fact must be regarded with suspicion.”132 This clearly suggests that philosophy can only 
depend for its existence on its own interest, i.e. the pursuit of what is completely 
satisfactory in experience; philosophy, whenever it is sought, must be sought “for its own 
sake”. To claim this, it seems to me, is to claim the “self-independence of philosophy”.
130 EM: 75, 331.
131 EM\ 84, 71.
132 EM: 7.
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That is, for Oakeshott, philosophy, interesting as it is, can never be reduced to or mixed 
up with modes of experience.
Yet, if philosophy can not depend for its own existence on the reasons of modes 
of experience, do the modes depend for their own existence on the reason of philosophy? 
Or, more specifically, if the main business of philosophy is to transcend the abstractness 
of modes of experience, does this mean that philosophy, in so doing, determines the 
validity of each mode; if not, what can be seen as their real relationship? These are the 
most crucial issues into which this study wishes to inquire, for it is concerned with the 
interpretative problem of whether Oakeshott in EM  has established a foundationalist 
conception of philosophy on the one hand, or whether he has changed his mind about the 
conceptions of philosophy from EM  to RP on the other. Tariq Modood, for instance, 
holds that in the youthful EM  “it was philosophy which determined the validity of every 
mode of experience;” whereas in RP philosophy bestowed nothing to any other voices. 
Oakeshott’s characterisation of the “conversation of mankind”, according to Modood, 
“means a direct assault on his earlier view of philosophy, he makes no reference himself 
to any such earlier views ”133 And clearly, here Modood simply deciphers Oakeshott in 
EM  as a foundationalist.
III.4.2. Self-Limitation
It seems to me that Modood’s interpretation is a misconception. Following Oakeshott, 
we have, in fact, already seen the self-limited character of philosophy as having no such 
power to interfere with the self-consistence of modes of experience on some points. Let 
me here try to make some sense of those arguments in a clearer way.
First of all, Oakeshott’s philosophy is something like “the actual, operative test 
and criterion” of every experience; its task is to criticise modes of experience “from the 
standpoint of experience as a whole and for its own sake, and it convicts them of 
abstraction and failure; but it has no power to abolish them. It may eclipse, but it cannot 
remove them.”134 Philosophy, therefore, considers each of these modes of experience 
“solely from the standpoint of its capacity to provide what is satisfactory in
133 T. Modood, 1980: 320.
134 EM: 350.
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•  135experience.” Whereas, history, for example, must appear as conditional and incomplete 
to the philosopher, it is the best of all possible worlds that the historian is obliged to 
think, to believe in. Philosophy, no more than science or practice, is not able to take the 
place of historical experience; the philosopher’s task, remember, is only to consider the 
nature of history, from the outside, i.e. from a philosophical point of view136, by way of 
considering the degree of its coherence - how far it succeeds and how far it fails to 
provide what is completely satisfactory in experience. And all this must suggest that 
modes of experience exist independently of philosophising. It is thus not a philosophy but 
the philosophie which would attempt to “give final identity to every mode of 
experience”137, that is, to presuppose the existence of a mode by Universal Reason.
Additionally, Oakeshott declares the main business of philosophy is to discern the 
leading ideas that each mode postulates, although he does sometimes mention philosophy 
as the “logical ground of modes of experience”138. Yet, within the context of EM, by 
“logical ground” Oakeshott signifies no more than two meanings. First, philosophy is the 
logical ground, because it is the totality of experience, the other world, by which the 
modes can be distinguished rather than determined. Second, he takes it as a contrast to 
the historical sense as the end in philosophy, that is, philosophy is the logical end in 
experience rather than the historical end in experience.139 This contrast is very important, 
since, unlike his fellow Idealists, especially Collingwood in Speculum Mentis, we have 
seen that by so claiming Oakeshott rejects the original Hegelian notion of modes of 
experience as stages or phases in the development of experience, which at once places 
philosophy, the Absolute, on the top of the hierarchy of human knowledge and thus 
makes it superior.
In order to prove further the view that in EM  Oakeshott does not hold 
philosophy to be “the hierarchy and the apex”, i.e. “thinking par excellence”140, let me 
here retell his story: All through Oakeshott’s major works,141 there does seem to be 
contained a scheme of the levels of human thinking, but this is considered in favour of
135 EM: 83.
136 EM: 86-8.
137 Cf. T. Modood, 1980: 318.
138 Cf. ibid.: 318.
139 See, EM: esp. 82.
140 Cf. T. Modood, 1980: 319.
141 In addition to EM, see also, “Political Education”, “The Activity of Being An Historian”, in RP, and 
HC: 1-31.
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the degrees of intelligence it may increase or those of mystery it may debate rather than 
in favour of a hierarchy of knowledge (or a division amongst experience). Occurring in 
our every day life there is the form of practical experience which is “at once the most 
primitive and most general of all forms”142 of experience. In EM  Oakeshott not only 
understands practice to embrace the activity in relation to the ethical institutions such as 
family, civil society and the state, to use Hegel’s classification, or the activity simply in 
relation to a man who, as Rousseau says, makes love “la grande affaire de sa vie”, but he 
also takes it to include our aesthetic and religious activities. In short, practice is the 
conduct of life.
On a “theoretical” level, however, “science, history and philosophy may be 
regarded as attempts to escape from the conduct of life, attempts to throw off the 
responsibility of living.”143 That is, in the practical life, as confused and distracted by 
different purposes as it could be, there is nothing that the scientist, the historian or the 
philosopher could do to correct them. “A scientific idea must be transformed (emphasis 
mine), taken out of the world of scientific experience, before it can establish itself in the 
world of practice; just as a practical idea must be radically transformed before it can 
become relevant in scientific experience”; and here the same must go for the relation of 
history to practice. And further, amongst these “theories”, it seems that philosophy is the 
remotest kind from the conduct of life, for, unlike any other “theoretical” modes of 
understanding, it is not even concerned with an abstract way of understanding but with 
the abstractness of understanding.144 Thus, according to Oakeshott,
to popularise philosophy is at once to debase it: a general demand for philosophy is a 
general demand for its degradation. Few, perhaps, will be found willing to surrender the 
green from the grey, but only those few are on the way to a philosophy. And instead o f  a 
gospel, the most philosophy can offer us (in respect o f  practical life) is an escape, 
perhaps the only complete escape open to us.145
Now, the levels of human thinking recognised in terms of practice-theory- 
philosophy as such certainly do not mean that each “presupposes and includes within 
itself those that logically precede it” in order to establish a “scale of forms”, to use
142 EM: 247; see also, VP: 9, 19.
143 EM: 296-7.
144 “What is farthest from our [practical] needs is that kings should be philosophers.” (EM: 321.)
145 EM: 3.
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Collingwood’s terminology again146. Instead, it clearly re-affirms Oakeshott’s modes of 
experience to be co-existing and with no direct reference to each other.
It follows that, although in RP Oakeshott considers the topic of modality from a 
less-abstract viewpoint of Lebenswelt - “the voices in the conversation of human 
kind”147, it does not seem plausible to believe that in RP a general theory of “civilisation” 
has replaced the theory of knowledge discovered in EM  by Oakeshott himself. For, the 
modes of experience understood as a world of co-existing ideas in EM  actually match 
with the image of human intercourse as conversation in which voices “do not compose a 
hierarchy.”148 And, the point at which philosophy is an “escape” that discloses rather than 
suggests the differentia of modes of experience can be neatly rephrased as follows: 
“Philosophy, the impulse to study the quality and style of each voice, and to reflect upon 
the relationship of one voice to another, must be counted a parasitic activity; it springs 
from the conversation, because this is what the philosopher reflects upon, but it makes 
no specific contribution to it.”149 Why then has Oakeshott changed his terminology? 
Before we discuss RP in more detail, it might be suggested here that the reason is 
probably due to the fact that Oakeshott is a thinker who likes to rethink what he was 
doing from different perspectives.150 The evidence for this can be found in his latest 
work, On Human Conduct (1975) and On History and Other Essays (1983), where 
Oakeshott returned to reconsider a general theory of human understanding.
In contrast to the view that Oakeshott had changed his mind about the 
conceptions of philosophy, it is my contention that the spirit of both EM  and RP is an 
identical problematic. Since history, science, poetry and practice, for example, have de 
facto been developed respectively by the historian, the scientist, the poet and in our 
ordinary life, the philosopher can no longer contribute to those “rules” or “practices” 
(the latter is a view which has been much developed in RP) any more; instead, his task 
lies merely in recognising the leading ideas that postulate each mode and in so doing he 
has found a home for himself. On this view, it will be remembered that the title of the 
book in question is Experience and Its Modes, and one of its main themes is to claim the
146 See R. G, Collingwood, 1995: chap. 3.
147 See esp. VP.
148 VP, p. 10.
149 VP, p. 14.
150 Cf. K. Minogue, 1993b: viii; T. Fuller, 1996: ix; R. Price, 1993: 32.
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self-consistency of the modes in order to dissect philosophisme. To speak of the 
function of philosophy as determining the validity of modes of experience is to speak of 
the modes as dependent on the authority of philosophy and thus to reject them as 
inconsistent. This is too obvious a contradiction that I can find nowhere in EM.
Finally, EM  indeed consists of nothing but pure philosophical language, yet, 
Oakeshott has never said that modes of experience must abide by or give serious 
consideration to philosophical language in order to be self-consistent: “We should listen 
to philosophers only when they talk philosophy.”151 That is to say, just because 
philosophical language is used by nobody save the philosopher, what the philosopher has 
to say about the character of experience, truth, reality and modality belongs to nothing 
except a philosophical world itself.
In sum, the philosopher can never teach an historian, a scientist or a practical 
person to do their jobs any better and vice versa, since, from one standpoint, the 
distinctive modes have their own rules alone; or alternatively, what philosophy has to say 
is for its own interest. Put another way, to think historically, scientifically or practically is 
one thing; but to consider “what is the nature of history?”, “what is the nature of 
science?” and “what is the nature of practice?” is quite another. Consequently, for 
Oakeshott, philosophy could no longer be expected to be a master discipline that 
provides foundations to other forms of knowledge in terms of any “external philosophical 
standards”152, namely, as a tribunal of pure reason that judges others, according to the 
Kantian tradition. But rather, the concept of philosophy in EM, akin in many ways to G. 
Ryle’s attempt to avoid conceptual confusion and category-error153 (which, in 
Oakeshott’s language, amounts to ignoratio elenchi), is concerned with the making of 
discriminations and the self-consistency of the categories of human understanding - the 
modes and philosophy itself. It is thus my understanding that EM  does pose a challenge 
to foundationalism in philosophy.
III.4.3. Scepticism
151 EM: 355.
152 Cf. VP: 18.
153 See G. Ryle, 1949.
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Before we move on, however, I must return to the question that was asked earlier - how 
far and in what sense can Oakeshott in EM be regarded as a sceptic?
Just as foundationalism may be traced back to Plato, people often believe that 
scepticism has its roots in the work of Pyrrho; and after the Greek period, the names of 
Montaigne and Hume, for instance, have often been mentioned among the sceptics. 
However, the fact that the thoughts of Hume and Montaigne have little in common is 
sufficient to suggest that there are at least two forms of scepticism that must be 
distinguished here: Humean naturalism154 and Montaignean traditionalism. As already 
mentioned, I do not think that Oakeshott’s scepticism is comparable to empiricism in 
principle, and so let me first resume with Hume’s case.
According to B. Stroud and other writers, the sceptical position which originally 
confronted modem philosophers is thus: our common experience could be just the way 
that it is, irrespective of it being the case that the external world really exists.155 Instead 
of appealing to an external cause, for example the divine, to maintain the existence of 
objects, Hume makes a radical naturalist move to compromise such a threat. That is, the 
aim of Hume’s philosophy is not to be “sceptical” about the belief in the existence of 
body and causation, but it is to put forward one’s doubt by way of a challenge to show 
that the doubt is unjustified, that the belief put in question is justified.
To claim so, as we know, Hume comes to limit the pretensions of reason to 
decide on the validity of our belief concerning the matters of causation and existence. 
According to Hume, reason does not give us belief about the unobserved, for example, 
we see a fire and infer that it is hot, but our “custom or habit” leads us to the inference. It 
is neither demonstrative reasoning nor probable reasoning, as Hume names them, that 
makes induction possible; it is rather the “constant conjunction”, say, of fire and heat, 
that produces an association of ideas. And if induction is essential to the subsistence of 
human creatures, it is Nature through our common experience that saves us from the 
sceptical position that bothered modem philosophers. In his famous lectures on 
Scepticism and Naturalism, P. F. Strawson writes that:
He [Hume] points out that all arguments in support o f  the sceptical position are totally
inefficacious; and by the same token, all arguments against it are totally idle. His point is
154 For the interpretation of Hume’s response to scepticism as a naturalist, see P. F. Strawson, 1987. See 
also, A. C. Grayling, 1985: 7-8, and chap. 2.
155 B. Stroud, 1979. See also, P. F. Strawson, 1987: 5-10; A. C. Grayling, 1985: 1-2.
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really the very simple one that, whatever arguments may be produced on one side or the 
other o f  the question, we simply cannot help forming beliefs and expectations in general
accordance with the basic canons o f induction He goes on to point out that ...
[e]ven the professed sceptic “must assent to the principle concerning the existence o f  
body, though he cannot pretend by any arguments o f  philosophy to maintain its veracity”; 
for “nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair o f  too 
great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations”.156
Put briefly, then, Humean naturalism doubts the rational ground for holding, but 
does not deny, the belief in the existence of the external world and in the justification of 
induction. As a result of this, Hume seems to accept two levels of thought in his system: 
that of philosophically critical thinking which cannot give us rational arguments against 
scepticism, and that of everyday empirical thinking which is driven by an inescapable 
“natural commitment” to believe that objects exist independently and events are related 
to one another inductively.157 From the first standpoint, Hume leaves empiricism with un- 
refuted scepticism which Kantian transcendentalism tries to overcome;158 from the 
second standpoint, however, Hume finds an answer to ensure the real existence of the 
natural world. And, I presume, it is basically due to these two standpoints of Hume’s 
thought that empiricism after him has developed into scepticism in metaphysics on the 
one hand, and into scientism on the other.
Quite different from Hume’s position, Oakeshott claims reality is what we are 
obliged to think, wherever there is thought there is reality. And precisely because reality 
is experience and experience is our thought, that philosophically reality exists in our 
thinking mind and is therefore, to borrow Wittgenstein’s phrase, “exempt from doubt”.159 
Or put another way, since there is no distinction between experience and what is 
experienced, between mind and object, it is no surprise that the sceptical position under 
discussion has never really troubled Oakeshott.
Moreover, Hume’s scepticism does not prevent him from placing “Logic, Morals, 
Criticism, and Politics” on a new scientific foundation: the science of man and the theory 
of human nature; insofar as Hume is the philosophe. Whereas for Oakeshott the real 
limitation of human reason does not lie in the recognition of its own existence but in its
156 P. F. Strawson, 1987: 11.
157 Ibid.: 12-4; see also, chap. 1. sec. 4.
158 And yet, there appears an attempt to combine Humean (and Wittgensteinian) naturalism with 
Kantian transcendentalism to achieve the final end in the refutation of scepticism. See A. C. Grayling, 
1985.
159 Wittgenstein, 1968: sec. 341.
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partiality and diversity. That is, there are reasons corresponding to different modes of 
thinking which are not united in a single form. And, based on the notion of the degrees of 
reality and truth, Oakeshott believes that each constitutes a self-consistent and abstract 
world o f ideas.
This is to say that Oakeshott’s philosophical interest in considering the modality 
that each mode introduces into experience is not only to disclose its conditionality of 
existence and incompleteness of truth, but also to show how precisely because it is 
governed by its own postulates, it must be self-consistent. However, just because 
philosophy cannot comment on modes of experience and does not aim at an hierarchy of 
knowledge in terms of Universal Reason, in the course of philosophising it must concede 
that we are ordinarily living amid an abstract world in which understanding is hardly 
unconditional and complete. This I take to be of main importance to Oakeshott’s 
scepticism.
At this point, however, some qualifications should be made. Firstly, this form of 
scepticism, although permitting every abstract voice to freely enter into human 
conversation, will not bring us to an extreme anarchical position of human knowledge. 
For the modes have their own rules to play their own game; as such it cannot be 
dismissed that each one of which is true for itself. Put differently, this temptation to 
scepticism is neither frivolous nor unduly serious, because
the excellence o f  this conversation (as o f others) springs from a tension between 
seriousness and playfulness. Each voice represents a serious engagement (though it is 
serious not merely in respect o f  its being pursued for the conclusions it promises); and 
without this seriousness the conversation would lack impetus. But in its participation in 
the conversation each voice leams to be playful, learns to understand itself 
conversationally and to recognise itself as a voice among voices.160
Moreover, it is a sort of philosophical scepticism which has nothing directly to do 
with the “actual disarray” of our practical world. That is to say, although Oakeshott 
declares what we generally understand as “theories” such as science, history and 
philosophy are not always with us in our everyday life which is “fiill of irrationality, 
prejudice and contingency”;161 yet, this is not the property of abstractness that he chiefly 
has in mind in maintaining a form of scepticism. For Oakeshott, whatever general truth
160 VP: 14.
161 EM: 300.
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the view in question may contain, it is irrelevant to his concern in discussing the modality 
of practical experience. For, the philosophical view of abstractness means no more than 
that the practical world is a conditional and incomplete world of understanding and 
practical men “are not ordinarily conscious of its existence”162, and that “ordinarily our 
experience is not clear and unclouded by abstract categories.”163 Thus, it is Oakeshott’s 
point that practical men’s view of the world of practical experience will be categorically 
different from the view that the philosopher is proposing to consider; that “what may be 
called a philosophy of practical experience cannot expect to have anything whatever in 
common with a so-called practical philosophy.”164
It may be inferred from the above discussion that Oakeshott basically argues the case for 
scepticism on two grounds: One is the rejection of Universal Reason and the consequent 
claim for the diversity of human reasons; another is the notion of concrete whole as the 
given in thought which teaches that every abstract mode of understanding must speak 
from a certain point of view about the world but none is complete, and thus knowing is 
“an engagement to abate mystery rather than to achieve definitive understanding.”165
Here, whilst it is not difficult to realise that in principle Oakeshott’s scepticism in 
EM  has much to do with Bradley’s influence, the grounds of this scepticism are not 
unfamiliar to the arguments of Montaigne, one of Oakeshott’s authorities in RP. Firstly, 
the diversity of human reasons can be neatly associated with Montaigne’s well-known 
proverb, “Let every foot have its own shoe.”166 Again, the belief that the given in 
experience is a concrete whole, a system of meanings, contains a request for the 
importance of traditional knowledge in human conduct. And few would deny that in 
modem times it is precisely Montaigne who makes customs and traditions one of the 
most important arguments for scepticism.167 And consequently, so far as politics is 
concerned, Montaigne, in rejecting an external “law of nature” and emphasising the wits
162 EM: 300.
163 EM: 4.
164 EM: 249. It is no surprise that here by “practical philosophy” Oakeshott means something like 
Kantian “Universal Practical Philosophy.” (See, for example, Kant, 1993b: 3-4.)
165 HC: 1.
166 Montaigne, 1991.
167 Cf. P. Burke, 1994: chap. 3.
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on usage,168 seems to have anticipated Oakeshott’s point against liberal ethics. According 
to Montaigne,
In public affairs, there is no course so bad, provided that it is stable and traditional, that 
is not better than change and alternation. ... It is easy enough to criticise a political 
system (une police) ... But to establish a better regime in place o f  the one which has been 
destroyed, there is the problem.169
It thus appears to me that Oakeshott’s scepticism in EM  does not necessarily conflict 
with his traditionalism in RP.
In contrast to Humean scepticism in metaphysics, I believe, it is more likely to be 
Montaignean traditionalism as that which constitutes another thread pulling in the 
opposite direction to modem foundationalism, as it settles the contextual conditions for 
the human ability to obtain absolutely reliable knowledge. And so, it is significant that 
what underlined Descartes’ philosophy was precisely an exertion to overcome the 
scepticism of his time, especially that of Montaigne. In turn, the latest form of scepticism, 
the so-called “post-modernism”, whilst attacking the Cartesian image of philosophy, is 
more or less motivated by scepticism in terms of contextuality. For example, D. Hiley 
argues that the post-modernists such as Derrida, Foucault and Rorty, in the course of 
rejecting the ahistorical foundations of truth and the universality of Scientific Reason, 
have in fact shared the Pyrrhonian aim of opposing philosophy in order to return us to 
the contingencies of our condition and the traditions of our ordinary life.170
By revealing the sceptical traits of Oakeshott’s thought, we are then re­
confirming his anti-foundationalist attitude at the same time. But here, Oakeshott’s 
“transcendental” position needs to be compared to two forms of “total scepticism” that 
he does not subscribe to, namely historicism and post-modernism. In many senses, these 
two categories of thinking can be related to one another.171 For my purpose, however, I
168 “Now laws remain respected not because they are just but because they are laws. That is the mystical 
basis of their authority. They have no other. It serves them well, too. Laws are often made by fools, and 
even more often by men who fail in equality because they hate equality: but always by men, vain 
authorities who can resolve nothing.” (Montaigne, 1991: 1216.)
169 Quoted by P. Burke, 1994: 29.
170 See D. Hiley, 1988.
171 See, for example, A. Cohen, 1989: 112-3, 128-30, 135, footnotes 3 & 6.
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shall take Rorty’s notion of the “end to philosophy”172 into discussion, and postpone the 
problem of historicism to [V.4.] & [V.5.],
III.4.4. Rorty: The E nd to Philosophy 
I am aware that in order to claim Oakeshott as an exponent of a non-foundationalist 
conception of philosophy, the term “foundationalism” needs to be qualified, because it is 
largely used in the context of Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature. At 
first sight, it is of course true that in his bid to reconcile the non-foundationalist trend in 
the twentieth-century philosophical thought, Rorty himself admits to being indebted in 
good measure to Oakeshott’s conception of “conversation”.173 And, by the term 
“foundationalism”, Rorty refers much to his repudiation of the character of modem 
natural philosophy as “a foundational science, an armchair discipline capable of 
discovering the formal ... characteristics of any area of human life.”174 What Rorty says 
on this point, I think, may speak for Oakeshott as well. For, it follows from the above 
that by claiming the differentia of modes of experience, Oakeshott tries to attack the 
tendency of traditional philosophy to be an indiscriminate pursuit of universal 
knowledge.
However, it should be noted that, for Rorty, what makes modem philosophy 
foundationalist is the misconception of treating knowledge as an accurate 
“representation” of reality made possible by some special mental processes. Oakeshott, 
as indicated, has rejected the correspondence theory of knowledge, but he did so merely 
for the sake of defending idealism. Whereas, in a more serious sense, that which Rorty 
really keeps in mind in his attack on foundationalism is the philosophic attempt to 
establish a theory o f knowledge, or epistemology, in terms of treating the concept of 
mind not merely as the mirror of nature but as a meaningful philosophical category.175 As
172 The theme of the “end to philosophy” has, of course, become a landmark of post-modernism. 
Derrida, for example, claims that the death of philosophy “should be the only question today capable of 
founding the community of those who are still called philosophers.” (Derrida, 1978: 79-80) And, 
Lyotard, to take another example, takes philosophy as the most distinguished case of “meta-narrative” 
while he considers the “post-modern condition” as “incredulous towards meta-narrative”. (Lyotard, 
1984).
173 Rorty, 1980: 389.
174 Ibid.: 139.
175 Indeed, in The Consequences o f Pragmatism (1982), Rorty has provided us with a more radical 
theme of the end to philosophy, where the critique of foundationalism in modem epistemology has been
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a result of this, in his attempt to break down traditional epistemology as a delusion, 
Rorty bases his arguments mainly upon Dewey’s reflection on the social uses of 
philosophy, i.e. the view that knowledge is what we are justified in believing in varying 
social contexts rather than in the mind/world relationship; and upon the later 
Wittgenstein’s idea of language as a tool in rejection of his earlier view of a pictorial-like 
representational theory of knowledge; and upon Heidegger’s treatment of the effort to 
make the knowing subject, i.e. the mind, which Rorty sees as a self-deceptive attempt to 
escape from dealing with “strangeness”, that initially led people to commence thinking.176 
And consequently, Rorty himself comes to characterise the function of philosophy as 
“therapeutic”. Philosophy is thus something like an “all-purpose intellectual” or a 
“culture-critic”, whose “edifying role” is to keep inquiry open to new and newer 
possibilities in terms of the changing of historical conditions.
So far as EM  is concerned, however, it was exactly a theory o f experience as a 
reworking of the variety in experience discussed in modem natural philosophy, upon 
which Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy and his notion of modality are based. It has 
also become clear that at the stage of EM, as Oakeshott willingly acknowledges, his view 
on experience owed much to idealism, especially to Hegel’s Phenomenology o f Spirit 
and Bradley’s Appearance and Reality, a philosophical doctrine which would aspire to 
nothing without the conception of mind. And consequently, in the work of EM , 
Oakeshott has considered everything about traditional philosophical debates over the 
mind/body problem, the character of experience, the nature of truth and reality and so 
forth. To get himself involved in these philosophical issues by mainly choosing the side of 
Idealism, he cannot be said to have preserved philosophy from examination as a
extended to the Western tradition of Philosophy as a whole. According to Rorty, the grand ethos of that 
tradition is the notion of philosophia perennis, that is, the view that the business of Philosophy is to deal 
with the Truth, or the Good: “the history of the attempt to do so, and of criticisms of such attempts is, 
roughly, coextensive with the history of that literary genre we call “philosophy” - a genre founded by 
Plato.” (Ibid.: xvi.) In this matter, as A. Cohen points out, “the overall architecture of Rorty’s entire 
critical project can be depicted as encapsulating three distinctive layers of philosophical ‘traditions’: The 
core is the tradition of analytical philosophy (founded by Frege, Russell, Carnap), which belongs to the 
broader tradition of modem philosophy (founded by Descartes, Locke and Kant), which links itself with 
the historically continuous Western tradition called ‘Philosophy’ (founded by Plato).” (A  Cohen, 1989: 
119) Here, it is the second layer of Rorty’s project that interests me the most. But in any case, it is my 
view that foundationalism is not necessarily predicated on a theory o f knowledge any more than on the 
notion of philosophia perennis’, Oakeshott, it seems to me, has rejected foundationalism in terms of an 
epistemological discourse and repudiated philosophisme without giving up the possibility of philosophia 
perennis.
176 Rorty, 1980: 9.
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traditional mode of discourse in which epistemology plays a key role. As a matter of 
fact, unlike Rorty, Oakeshott’s philosophy, by definition, can never set aside the 
problems of truth and reality; and he makes every effort to maintain philosophy as a 
categorically distinct discourse. As he puts it, philosophy, for him as for others, is 
concerned with a “perfectly coherent system” of metaphysics, of epistemology and of a 
theory of logic; and the three cannot be separated from one another because “to sub­
divide philosophy is to destroy it”.177 In addition, Rorty’s inclination to pragmatism is at 
once contradicted by Oakeshott’s protection of a pure philosophy with no reference to, 
say, practice and history.
A debated problem that emerges here, I think, is whether, given that there is a 
crisis in ordering an “integral philosophical system”, philosophy should remain as a self- 
distinct world of human activity pursued under the name of metaphysics, epistemology 
and logic. For Oakeshott, the answer seems positive, but for Rorty it is the contrary. 
Rorty’s announcement of the “end to philosophy”, Oakeshott would argue, is too 
“sceptical” to realise that, although the human mind often falls short of definitive 
understanding, philosophy recognised as an unconditional understanding “may hover in 
the background”178 of human understanding as a whole, such that the conditionality of 
the conditions of human knowledge may be observed. Also, Rorty’s “total scepticism” 
fails to see that “to demystify philosophy itself’179 (a self-limiting character of philosophy 
upon which both Oakeshott and Rorty agree) is itself a form of philosophical thinking. 
Thus, in any event, in our conversation it is valuable and indispensable to have an 
intellectual discourse as “philosophising” for its own sake; to claim “the end to 
philosophy” is to terminate an engagement in the pursuit of “the love of wisdom” that 
has substantiated the Western civilisation for two and a half millennia.
More precisely, then, the crucial controversy between Rorty and Oakeshott is 
this. Does a theory o f knowledge necessarily attempt to foundationalise philosophy as a 
master discipline that underpins the natural sciences and authorises the validity of any 
other knowledge in terms of an objective scientific-criterion? In order to question this 
necessity, I shall here conclude what I have argued for the non-foundationalist character
177 EM: 348-9.
178 HC: 3.
179 J. L. Auspitz, 1993: 8.
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of Oakeshott’s theory of knowledge from another point of view, that is, to compare it to 
the foundationalist assumptions that I have disclosed in the last chapter.
First, the assumption of scientism, in fact, implies science as the ultimate criterion 
of experience, a view which Oakeshott finds “too easy an escape”.180 Science is, of 
course, a legitimate form of knowledge; but it is merely one among many other 
possibilities. If there were only one voice of science in the conversation of human kind, 
our life would be insipid. And, to take science as the ultimate criterion for all knowledge 
is at once to make the error of ignoratio elenchi.
Again, the second assumption, i.e. a foundationalist analysis of knowledge in 
terms of a description of public reality and external truth, also cannot be applied to the 
thought of Oakeshott. It will be recollected that Oakeshott considers that truth is always 
“true for itself’; for this reason, he rejects the ab extra theory of truth in order to make 
room for the self-consistency of modes of experience. Likewise, reality is nothing save 
what we are obliged to think: “Whatever has a meaning, if we give it its full meaning, is 
real; and whatever is real has a meaning.” To be real is not separable from to be in 
thinking, and the ways of thinking are distinguishable and self-governed. The historical, 
the scientific and the practical, as real as they are, do not depend on a full description of 
public reality.
Thirdly, we have seen that one of the main themes of EM  is to suggest that 
reason, appropriate to any one mode of experience, cannot, without irrelevance, be 
applied to any other. And this attack, as we shall see, has been rounded out by 
Oakeshott’s RP. On this meaning, Oakeshott is, of course, against the superiority of 
Universal Reason, i.e. the third assumption of foundationalism. Finally, as I hope to show 
where appropriate, the Oakeshottian image of “conversation” as “an unrehearsed 
intellectual adventure” makes a possible replacement for the “argumentative” premise of 
Enlightenment civilisation.
III.5. The Mode of Practice
180 EM: 2.
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Thus far, then, we have unveiled two main themes of EM\ the self-consistency of modes 
of experience and the non-foundationalist notion of philosophy. What remains to be 
explained are the conditions of history, science and practice exemplified in the work. But 
here, I only intend to bring the mode of practice into consideration such that it may offer 
us a test case to show the idea of philosophy and the autonomy of a mode of experience 
in its fuller sense, in preparation for the study of Oakeshott’s political and moral theory 
in the next chapter.
III. 5.1, Practice as a World o f  Ideas 
One of Oakeshott’s main intentions in EM \s to interrogate whether each of the modes of 
experience is an abstract world of ideas arrested in experience or a concrete world of 
ideas. In the act of reflecting upon the character of practice (and of history), however, 
we have to consider whether practice is a “world of ideas” in the first instance, because it 
is often disclaimed that practice (and history) are not as real as science in the sense of 
being outside the realm of experience or the genera of knowledge. Thus, Oakeshott 
begins his philosophy of practical experience by rejecting a number of views that claim 
practice is less than experience or knowledge.
First of all, it is said that practice is not a unity of experience because it is activity 
not thought, i.e. a world of actions not a world of ideas. The view that human activities 
are products of human thoughts and therefore can be disassociated from them to be the 
observable objects of a “science of man” has constituted one of the philosophical 
grounds which formulates the so-called “behavioural approach” in the States during the 
mid-century.181 Although the tendency to replace, say, political philosophy with a science 
of political behaviour which “aims at being quantitative wherever possible”182 has today 
been approved to be in vain, the scientific and realistic outlook that stand behind the 
project has certainly not yet vanished.
I do not intend to consider here the possibility of “political science” in 
Oakeshott’s thought;183 instead, it seems more urgent to point out that the empiricist-
181 For a condensed discussion on the historical development and theoretical commitment of the 
movement of behaviourism, seeR. Dahl, 1993: 249-67.
182 D. Truman, “The Implications of Political Behaviour Research”, quoted in ibid.: 257.
183 For a brief discussion on this topic, see fV.4.1.].
realistic notion of an “external” or “objective” world of doings and happenings 
independent of the construction of the mind is a mere fiction to Oakeshott. Based on his 
idealistic view, Oakeshott claims that the world is a world of meanings which knows no 
absolute divisions; everything falling outside the meaningful world is a nonentity. That is, 
for Oakeshott action is not separable from thought, it is itself a form of thought, i.e. a 
world of ideas. As Oakeshott later reclaims in HC, it is not possible to find a purely 
objective human action which does not contain our “reflective consciousness” of a 
certain sort; and thus it is freedom that must be regarded as a necessary condition of 
human agency.184
Freedom involves the notions of volition and of the will. As a matter of fact, as 
we shall see, Oakeshott envisages freedom, volition and the will as different expressions 
of the same thing, namely, the cardinal (formal) condition185 that postulates our practical 
life: “practice is the exercise of the [free] will; practical thought is volition; practical 
experience is the world sub specie voluntatis.”186 Before recapitulating Oakeshott’s 
notion of freedom as it appears in EM, however, we only need to recall that he argues 
that action and thought are inseparable, that volition, whatever its defects as experience, 
is a judgement, i.e. a form of experience.
Moreover, a form of experience, according to Oakeshott, must be a world of 
knowledge at the same time. There are accordingly two more weighty contentions that 
have to be rejected at this stage, namely the argument that practical activity may be 
experiential but it is not knowledge proper. In the first place, there is so-called 
intuitionism which argues that: “‘the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason’; 
and it is not reflection, but intuition which tells us what in particular is right and 
wrong.”187 Oakeshott declares, however, that this ethical thought has failed to realise 
that these feelings and intuitions “are not completely isolated and wholly groundless; they 
belong to a world the principle of which is one of coherence; and, so far as it goes, it 
cannot avoid the character of a world of knowledge.”188
184 See esp. HC: 36-41.
185 I shall argue in the next chapter that Oakeshott has considered the problem of freedom from two 
related standpoints in his works: Whereas EM deals with the formal conditions of freedom, RP 
emphasises the problem of its practice in a political tradition.
186 EM: 258.
187 EM: 253.
188 EM: 253.
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On the other hand, there is a more formidable contention which suggests that 
morality is “a mere collection of opinions”. For Oakeshott, however, this extremely 
relative view of ethics is open to a fatal objection: A collection of mere opinions has 
implied the possibility of contradictory different opinions, and yet to recognise two 
different opinions as contradictory we must have at the same time conveyed our 
judgement towards them and thus entered a world of opinions. Hence, nowhere is the 
criterion of judgement absconding from the world of opinions, “everywhere in opinion 
there is implicit assertion, reference to reality”189. Indeed, it perhaps should be suggested 
that in order to avoid denial of the view in question one must not necessarily uphold that 
practical activity is a world of knowledge but only that it is a world of true opinions. 
However, even if it is the case, Oakeshott goes on to say, “opinion is not the negation of 
knowledge, it is merely unorganised, immature knowledge”; that “true opinion differs 
from knowledge, not absolutely, but in degree.”190 That is, a world of true opinions is not 
beyond the genera of knowledge, it is an imperfect world of ideas in which the principle 
of knowledge remains implicit. Thus, the world of practice must be a world of ideas, 
thoughts or knowledge, not in spite of, but precisely because of the fact that it is often 
only a world of true opinions.191
7/7.5.2. The Conditions of the Practical World
Having established the view that practice cannot be other than a form of experience, 
thought or knowledge, we may now return to consider its modality from the totality of 
experience.
We have mentioned that for Oakeshott practice is the exercise of the free will, 
practical experience is the world sub specie voluntatis. It may now be added that this 
view has already suggested that practical life is an attempt to make coherent our practical
189 EM: 255.
190 EM: 255.
191 In some sense, it appears to me, Oakeshott’s point here can be seen as an objection to moral 
relativism in general, including Moorean meta-ethics. Again, meta-ethics, after Moore, has developed 
into emotivism or emotive theory, an ethical movement which became prominent in the late 1930s under 
the influence of A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and reached its fruition with the 
publication of C. L. Stevenson’s Ethics and Language (1944). Oakeshott certainly could not have the 
name emotivism in mind at the time of writing EM (1933). But, given that the core meaning of 
emotivitism lies in the view that moral judgements are merely expressions of our feelings and emotions
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experience as a whole, that is, to understand the world under the category of volition. In 
other words, when we are making a practical performance or utterance, there is always 
an “alteration or continuance of existence” being deliberately undertaken; practical 
activity everywhere depends on a “to be” which is “not yet”. As a result, practical 
activity must involve “a will to change or maintain” which is discrepant from the 
“existence”, it entails an “unrealised idea” or an “unfulfilled desire” which is discrepant 
from “what is”. It is thus presupposed in practice that there are two worlds to be reduced
to one: the world of “to be” and the world of “what is”; and this presupposition is 
absolute.
That there are two worlds presupposed in practice, however, does not suggest 
that there are two forms of reality in search of correspondence. But rather it indicates 
only that the world of “to be” is the “imagined and wished-for outcome”192 of the given 
world of “what is”; it is the coherence of the world that we will. And since in practice the 
notion of coherence is always realised in terms of value, the world of “to be” can be 
identified as the world of “what ought to be”. Consequently, it may be concluded that 
practice is the alternation or maintenance of “what is” so as to agree with an idea of 
“what ought to be”.
So it comes as no surprise that for Oakeshott the principle of the coherence of 
practical knowledge, namely, practical truth, is nothing but the idea of freedom. That is, 
since practice is the exercise of the free will, every attempt to reconcile a “what is” with 
a “what ought to be” must be seen as an accomplishment of human freedom. On this 
meaning, to say that the practical truth is the coherence of practical ideas is to say that 
practice is a self-consistent world of ideas having its own criterion of truth, namely 
freedom. Oakeshott writes that:
Freedom and necessity are conditions o f  the mind which has achieved (or has failed to  
achieve) practical truth. They are conditions o f the practical self. They have neither 
meaning nor relevance for the self in scientific experience or in history, and are certainly
which have little to do with the notion of reality and truth, Oakeshott would not agree with this ethical 
movement in principle.
192 Cf. HC: 36ff.
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meaningless when attributed to the universe as a whole. If a man thinks to set himself 
free, in any save a vague and metaphorical sense, by the study o f  science or o f  history or 
by the pursuit o f  philosophy he is grossly mistaken. The only truth that makes a 
manufacturer free is practical truth, the possession o f  a coherent world o f  practical ideas. 
Indeed, practical truth and freedom seem to me inseparable; wherever the one is, the 
other will be found.193
In short, practice is a self-consistent mode of understanding approaching the world under 
the exclusive category of freedom.
It follows that in Oakeshott’s view practice, by virtue of its conditions, i.e. the 
world sub specie voluntatis, must be distinctive from other modes on the one hand and 
from philosophy on the other. At this point, Oakeshott thus comes to criticise 
utilitarianism as consequentialism, Kantianism and pragmatism in EM. In the first place, 
as already shown, utilitarianism holds the view that “the rightness of an action is 
determined by its contribution to the happiness of everyone affected by it.”194 The view 
that Oakeshott is suggesting, however, maintains that “nothing more is required to 
establish its practical truth than that it should be shown to be followed by consequences 
of a particular kind.”195 That is, to establish the criterion of practical truth, writers like 
Mill often appeal to some sort of external principle, i.e. the utilitarian principle that moral 
activity is the promotion of “the greatest happiness of the greatest number”. And yet, it 
appears to Oakeshott that this notion contradicts the character of experience and that of 
truth. For it assumes that “truth is sought in what is ‘other’ than what is given, and not in 
what is whole. Thinking has become the construction of a chain or series of ideas; and 
[on this view] truth [is] not merely difficult of attainment, but inherently unattained.”196 
Also, the defect of this view lies in the fact that “the future as such is selected as the 
criterion of truth, and that when this criterion is considered it turns out to be no criterion 
at all. The problem has been postponed, not solved.”197
Oakeshott’s criticism of utilitarianism and his stress upon the free will, however, 
does not make him a Kantian. For it is clear from the above quotation that Oakeshott 
believes our practical reasoning is so self-consistent that it should be segregated from any
193 EM: 268, n l.
194 A. Quinton, 1989: 1.
195 EM: 263.
196 EM: 265.
197 EM: 266.
-1 2 8 -
“theoretical” reasonings (philosophical, scientific and even historical). Oakeshott writes 
that:
Kant, for example, found it necessary to subordinate theoretical reason to practical 
because the former, as he conceived it, was limited to “phenomena”; that is, it was not
unlike what I have spoken of as scientific experience  Others have identified
“theory” and “rationalism” or “intellectualism”, and have set their belief in the finality of 
the will over against what they call “mere intellectualism”. A rationalism of this sort, it is 
true, is an abstract mode of experience. Indeed, there is little or nothing to be said in its 
favour. Where it is not a confusion of scientific, historical and practical thought, it will 
be found to be an attempt to replace science, history and practice by an attenuated and 
falsely conceived “philosophy”; and its result is distinguished only by its inconsequence. 
But to think of this as the only alternative to a belief in the finality of practice, and to 
conclude, from the obvious abstractness of the one, the completeness of the other, is a
198form of argument which might be expected to appeal to none but “rationalists.”
I quote this statement from EM  at length, not only because it highlights the 
picture of Oakeshott’s departure from Kantianism, but also because it re-affirms once 
again the non-foundationalist aim of the work and its connection with RP. It has given us 
a hint, which we shall expand on in our discussion of RP, that it is Oakeshott’s 
understanding that the substantial content of our moral life is based on our ethical 
traditions rather than on the empty formulation of moral laws. In other words, although 
both Kant (cf. [II.3.3.]) and Oakeshott take the notion of free will to be the necessary 
condition of human practice, whereas for Kant this freedom is so radical that it only 
allows us to act on a set of categorical imperatives, for Oakeshott the ultimate meaning 
of this freedom lies in our proper ability to deal with contingent, particular moral and 
political problems within a tradition of behaviour.
It is not surprising that the contrast between philosophy and practice also leads 
Oakeshott to reject pragmatism. In a wider aspect, pragmatism can be regarded as a form 
of consequentialism to which Oakeshott objects. But more significantly, by identifying 
the practical with philosophy, it seems to Oakeshott that pragmatism, along with 
utilitarianism and Kantianism, simply commits the error of ignoratio elenchi.; conversely, 
to Oakeshott “it is meaningless alike either to accept or to reject a philosophical 
proposition for a practical reason.”199
198 EM: 317-8.
199 EM\ 320.
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But what makes practice self-consistent must maintain it to be abstract at the 
same time. For a mode’s explicit character as a modality actually and continuously 
conflicts with its implicit character as experience, and more crucially, this self- 
contradiction (and thus abstractness) cannot be removed without stamping out the mode 
itself In practice, remember, it is the case that its explicit feature as the will to alter or 
maintain existence, the attempt to throw reality into the future, contradicts its implicit 
feature of being present experience.200 But further, Oakeshott also claims that the mode 
of practice produces a specific “permanent dissatisfaction”. For, on the one hand, the will 
to change must presuppose two worlds in practice: the world of “what is” and the world 
of “what ought to be” and in practical actions they are somehow to be reduced to one; 
on the other hand, however, the two worlds themselves can never be finally reconciled. 
Because, unlike history and science, every particular practical attempt to reconcile the 
world of “what ought to be” and the world of “what is” through action is at once itself 
an abolition of the discrepancy that makes practice possible in the first place, insofar as 
our practical life, as it were, must be transient and contingent in which the satisfactions 
of countless wants come and go. But there is no final way out of the discrepancy 
between the two worlds presumed in practice as every practical action is an exercise of 
the free will which is the necessary condition of human agency.201
III. 5.3. Ethics as Pseudo-Philosophy 
Before we leave this chapter, let us take a brief look at the characteristic of ethics that 
Oakeshott discloses in EM. We have observed that for Oakeshott the mode of practical 
ideas is seen, together with history and science, as an abstract mode of experience which 
falls short of being complete before a philosophical reflection; by way of contrast, he 
now claims, ethics and political philosophy are “pseudo-philosophy”, meaning an 
“indeterminate arrest in philosophy”: it is indeterminate because, unlike the modes of 
experience under consideration, it is without a determinate homogeneous world of 
experience on its own, and it is an arrest because it is only “to see one particular mode of 
experience - practical experience - from the standpoint of the totality of experience.”202
200 EM: 304-5.
201 EM: 303-4.
202 EM: 345.
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It follows that ethics “is nothing if not philosophical, but in so far as it remains 
‘ethical’ it is a modification of philosophical thought. Its defeat is not that it belongs to 
an abstract world of experience, but that it fails to recognise and to realise its 
membership of the world of concrete experience.”203 And so, it may be said that ethics is 
“parasitic” (remember, this is the characteristic coming from that of philosophy itself) on 
the world of human practice, but can never be identified with the practical. “An ethical 
theory”, he says, “will be morally neutral, will neither be driven from nor dependent upon 
specific practical judgements.” In short, Oakeshott holds a non-normative notion of 
ethics in EM204 in the sense that ethical reflection has no bearing on the specific conduct 
of practice, because it is not a way of living which presupposes the abstract, self­
contradictory, transient and evaluative characteristics of the practical world, but a form 
of thought which takes nothing for granted.205
Oakeshott says that his concern about ethics as pseudo-philosophy in EM  is 
“merely in illustrating a general mode of experience and not in writing an introduction to 
ethics”,206 and yet, given that the business of ethics is to explain the major concepts of 
the mode of practice, in discussing the characteristic of the practical world so far, we 
have been engaging in ethical reflection upon human conduct, i.e. a “philosophy of 
practical experience”. I now turn to consider in greater detail Oakeshott’s ethical 
thought.
203 EM: 335.
204 EM: 335-40.
205 There is a debate which has arisen around Oakeshott’s grounds for separating philosophical reason 
from practical reason in EM. See D. Hall & T. Modood, 1982a: 157-76 and 1982b: 184-9; J. Liddington, 
1982: 177-83.
206 EM: 335.
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CHAPTER IV
A SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS
IV. 1. Introduction: From Truth to Rationality
It is my aim in this chapter to examine Oakeshott’s philosophical understanding of 
morality and politics with regard to the Enlightenment ethical position concerned. I hope 
to provide a fresh approach to comprehending the position of Oakeshott’s political 
philosophy by interpreting him not as a doctrinal liberal nor as a dogmatic conservative, 
but as a philosophical, sceptical critic of the Enlightenment project. And in doing so, I 
shall draw greater attention to Rationalism in Politics (1962, new edition 1991; hereafter 
RP), which is significant among Oakeshott’s other major ethical works.
It is my view that Oakeshott’s long-term critique of Rationalism consists of an 
essential and more direct piece of evidence that shows his sensitive awareness of the 
crisis of the Enlightenment ethical position and its theoretical connection with 
foundationalism in philosophy. If the main objective against which Oakeshott argues in 
EM  is philosophisme - an indiscriminate pursuit of universal knowledge, it is now 
Rationalism - the sovereignty of technique and certainty over human conduct, that 
becomes the thinker’s target. Or, put differently, Rationalism is the manner o f thinking 
that Oakeshott characterises as one of the most distinct aspects of the modem world: its 
philosophical resources can be traced back to modem foundationalism, and its most 
significant influence is in the department of morality and politics. In this sense, it can be 
inferred that foundationalism is “rationalism in philosophy” from which “rationalism 
(formalism) in politics” develops.
To ponder Oakeshott’s criticisms of Rationalism in a complete way, we must 
recall here the main theme of Experience and Its Modes (1933; hereafter EM) because 
that which runs throughout the thinker’s moral and political writings is the non- 
foundationalist notion of philosophy that he has established: Philosophising is self-critical
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in the sense that it is suspicious of any obstacle in the inquiry; it is sceptical in the sense 
that it concedes that the world or tradition in which we live is so comprehensive that our 
understanding is always incomplete and conditional; and it is self-limited in the sense that 
there is nothing which philosophy can do to remove the conditionality of our knowing.
The characteristics of self-criticism and self-limitation imply that Oakeshott’s 
(political) philosophy aims to transcend whatever appears to be partial and incomplete 
for its own sake. Given the frustration caused by Rationalism, Oakeshott’s (political)
* philosophy thus attempts to re-establish an Aristotelian theory of human activity in 
general (as contrasted to rationalism in philosophy, see [IV.3.]), followed by a more 
coherent way of understanding politics in particular, namely conservatism in politics (as 
contrasted to rationalism in politics, see [IV.4.] & [IV.5.]). In interpreting Oakeshott’s 
(political) philosophy this way, we are creating a stage to examine his critique of 
liberalism as a form of rationalism in politics. And, my main arguments leading to the 
non-liberal property of Oakeshott’s political thought will be especially summed up in 
[IV.5.6.].
Moreover, the notion “conservatism” or “traditionalism” presented in RP is 
likewise related to Oakeshott’s scepticism in EM. The consequent emphasis on the 
importance of a tradition of behaviour in morality and politics, however, has sometimes 
led Oakeshott to be mistakenly understood as an historicist on the one hand; and a 
“pessimistic” conservative (or a conservative in whatever negative sense)1 on the other. 
The first misconception is a crucial issue that I shall not deal with until I come to 
examine Oakeshott’s historiography. For the moment, we need only note that this does 
not mean that Oakeshott’s philosophical politics consists of a utopia which does not care 
about the historic context of political ideas. On the contrary, as we shall see, Oakeshott 
thinks that philosophical explanation should not totally leave aside an understanding of 
what has been going on in the Human Past. The Oakeshottian approach to interpreting 
past political theory and practice, however, cannot be the genuinely historical (as a mode 
of understanding) for two main reasons.2 First, it is concerned with the “unmistakable 
emergence”3 or the “abridged conceptual structure”4 of an historic identity rather than
1 See chap. I. n2.
2 Cf. D. Boucher, 1991: 722-3.
3 See, for example, RP: 18, 370; PFPS: 57.
4 See, for example, MPME: 3.
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with a “complete narrative of the unity of historical individuals in terms of change”5. 
Second, Oakeshott first established the ideal characteristics of the identity of “rationalism 
in politics” on the one hand, and “conservatism in politics” on the other, before engaging 
in his study of such a “quasi-philosophical past”, as I shall come to name it.
In this respect, it seems to me that Oakeshott’s philosophical politics is not only 
concerned with the importance of traditional knowledge in political practice, but also it is 
concerned with the tradition of modem Western politics itself. Hence, in understanding 
the Oakeshottian theme of “traditionalist politics versus rationalist politics” below, our 
attention is directed to both their philosophical elements and historic fortunes. Far from 
being a reactionary traditionalist, it is more likely that Oakeshott has given us a profound 
traditionalist understanding of politics; and it is this philosophical traditionalism, based on 
his sceptical idealism established in EM, that underlies his substantive response to the 
crisis of the Enlightenment project.
In what follows, as a result, I propose to link Oakeshott’s Rationalism with the 
philosophical and ethical situations of the Enlightenment project from the outset 
([IV.2.]). And then I shall specify Oakeshott’s philosophical traditionalism by examining 
how it is able to renounce rationalism in philosophy ([IV.3.]), and rationalism in politics 
([IV.4.]). And finally, I would like to provide a brief outline of On Human Conduct 
(1975; hereafter HC, [IV.5.]). Before moving on, however, it must be noted that whilst 
in EM  the crucial term “practice” is taken to denote a mode, the world seen sub specie 
voluntatis all the time, in RP and other works Oakeshott also applies it more widely to 
mean something like the regular exercise that one conveys in order to learn the “skill” of 
an activity such as being an historian, a scientist or a practical man.6 On this usage, to 
speak of a world of ideas or a mode of experience is equal to speaking of a “practice”, a 
tradition or an idiom of activity. And so, it seems to me that the notion “practice”, as a 
substitution for “tradition”, which was particularly represented in HC, is basically in 
accordance with its second usage set forth in RP. And thus, in what follows I shall 
italicise the second usage as practice or practices.
5 See [V.3.3.].
6 Cf. R. Grant, 1990: 45; J. L. Auspitz, 1993: 18.
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IV.2. Rationalism as the Enlightenment Project
The purpose of this section is to interpret Oakeshott’s Rationalism as a concept which 
spells out the Enlightenment project and thus carries its predicament into the Western 
world.
IV2.1. The Character and Pedigree of Rationalism
The Rationalism with which Oakeshott is concerned is modem Rationalism, that he 
claims is the most remarkable intellectual concern of post-Renaissance Europe. 
Oakeshott’s Rationalism holds that human beings share a priori “reason” which can be 
exercised as an “infallible guide” to human conduct by formulating a set of “self- 
contained” and “perfect” rules. This means that the term Rationalism employed by 
Oakeshott embraces more than epistemological rationalism; in fact, it represents a 
general current of thought which has been inspired and sustained by modem mainstream 
philosophy as a whole. I shall return to the philosophical foundations of Rationalism 
later. For now, let me briefly unfold the implications of this definition of Rationalism.
As it implies, the Rationalist belief is that “knowledge is the power” to instruct 
human conduct, and the knowledge concerned is that which is so susceptible to 
formulation into mles, propositions and principles that it can always be “learned by heart, 
repeated by rote, and applied mechanically”.7 Oakeshott contends that such knowledge 
could be considered to be “technical knowledge”, “knowledge of technique” or 
“knowledge of the book”. However, it should be noted that Oakeshott seems to use the 
term “technique” both as the method of inquiry, research or analysis which attempts to 
formulate human activity into mles, and as the result of this formulation.8 Thus, not only 
is a political principle, a moral code or a cookery recipe (a very Oakeshottian example) 
the logic of the syllogism, but the mles of research, observation and verification in
1 RP: 15.
8 For technique as the method of discovery, see, for example, RP: 7,18-21.
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science and in history, and so forth, are all taken as examples of the knowledge to which 
the Rationalist gives sole notice. For the sake of clarity, in what follows it would be 
advantageous to maintain awareness of the different levels of reference with regard to a 
“formulated technique of research” and “technical knowledge” acquired respectively. 
Nevertheless, it is safe to say that for the Rationalist the sovereignty of “reason” is equal 
to the “sovereignty of technique”.
From a “technological will to power”9, it follows that the Rationalist’s ambition 
of being a man is to be a “self-made man”. For, according to Rationalist belief what a 
technique of research could give is a “self-conscious” and a “self-complete” knowledge; 
that is, a technique of research would allow him to isolate his actions from their context 
and to dissolve them into a series of problems to be surmounted by a tour de raison. 
Moreover, it suggests that the Rationalist is apt to take telos as the mark of his “reason”. 
“Rationalist activity”, it is said, “is activity in search of a certain, conclusive answer to a 
question, and consequently the question must be formulated in such a way that it admits 
of such an answer.”10 In other words, irrespective of what technical knowledge appears 
to be, the Rationalist claims the existence of a “rational” answer corresponding to any 
problem, and this answer is, by its nature, the perfect answer. Or, rational conduct is 
regarded as the achievement of a formulated purpose, i.e. an “independently 
premeditated end” which springs from something that has already taken place in advance 
of human activity; and it is governed solely by that faultless purpose or end.
Thirdly, given that the existence of a “rational” solution is waiting to be 
discovered and then applied to our conduct, it becomes difficult for the Rationalist to 
disbelieve that those who think honestly will think contrary to himself, since the 
Rationalist takes the view that the exercise of technological will, or the attempt to 
discover a perfect solution, will lead different people to the same conclusions and issue in 
the same form of activity. In this respect, Rationalism is identical with a form of 
“intellectual equalitarianism”.11 And furthermore, from such a radical individualist 
standpoint springs “the distrust of time”: a view of understanding human conduct as self­
moved by an ubiquitous “reason” alone can indeed have no room for a tradition, a
9 Cf. R  B. Pippin, 1997: 24.
10 RP: 103.
URP: 6; cf. 105.
- 136-
custom or a habit of human behaviour. The Rationalist, Oakeshott claims, has no idea of 
the importance of the accumulation of experience; has none of that “negative capability” 
(which Keats attributed to Shakespeare) of receiving mysteries and uncertainties of a 
tradition. He has nothing but “an impatient hunger for eternity and an irritable 
nervousness in the face of everything topical and transitory.”12
Although, for convenience, the features of Rationalism can be demonstrated as 
“abstractness”, “perfectionism” and “universalism”, they must not be seen as detached 
factors but only as integral qualities. “The essence of Rationalism”, says Oakeshott, “is 
their combination”.13 Besides, Rationalism understood in this way is perhaps the most 
lively, intellectual trend that has influenced almost every area of Western thought. 
However, it is always close to being transformed into political thought. For the gist of 
Rationalism, as noted, is to formulate an “infallible guide” in human practice; its own 
logic contains a bid to set formulated examples to practical life. On this account, it may 
not be inappropriate to characterise Rationalism further in terms of a political 
programme.
Based on what has been said already, then, it can be seen as the Rationalist’s 
common hope that a “rational programme” for political and moral order could, in 
practice, be established and safely relied upon. This means that the character of 
Rationalism, while turning into political thought, shapes the precept that politics is 
concerned with an “ideology” rather than with a concrete political tradition, and by an 
ideology Oakeshott means “the formalised abridgement of the supposed substratum of 
rational truth contained in the tradition”, a “set of related abstract principles which has 
been independently premeditated.”14 That is, in contrast to a tradition of political ideas, 
the charm of a political ideology lies in the external goal and the ideal order it may offer 
to a political society, and this is what the Rationalist seeks in politics: “politics appears as 
a self-motivated manner of activity when empiricism [i.e. politics without policies] is 
preceded and guided by an ideological activity.”15 In this sense, Rationalism as a political
12 RP: 6-7.
13 RP: 10.
14 RP: 9. For Oakeshott, political ideologies include the single ideas such as freedom, equality, 
maximum productivity etc. and a complex scheme of related ideas such as liberalism and Marxism etc. 
(SeePP: 48-9.)
15 RP: 48.
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thought can be portrayed in a number of ways: It is the “politics of engineering” that 
comprehends politics as a matter of solving problems by means of a set of political 
principles. It also implies the “politics of the felt need” in that politics is regarded as the 
feeling of the moment to be interpreted by “‘reason’ and satisfied according to an 
ideology”.16 Moreover, it refers to the “politics of perfection” in combination with the 
“politics of uniformity”; that is, the politics recognised as “the implication of a uniform 
condition of perfection upon human conduct.”17
Now, it becomes evident that Oakeshott’s understanding of rationalism in politics 
matches comfortably with the formalism in ethics that has already been revealed in terms 
of liberal justifications; namely the attempt to establish (1) a set of moral and political 
principles ensuring our practical certainty, which is based upon (2) a form of radical 
individualism (i.e. the notion of “self-made man”) holding an anti-traditional and anti- 
institutional attitude towards our moral and political life, leading to (3) the universal 
application of abstract moral and political rules. And so, Oakeshott would not deny that 
liberalism is a form of rationalism in politics. But before we come to see Oakeshott’s 
particular critique of rationalist politics in [IV.4.], I wish to consider the provenance, i.e. 
the intellectual resource of Rationalism, that is to identify Oakeshott’s Rationalism with 
the rise of modem natural philosophy.
Regarding the contextualisation of Rationalism, Oakeshott first directs our attention to 
some basic historiographical issues, which are worth mentioning here. He says that:
The ambition o f the historian is to escape that gross abridgement o f  the process which
gives the new shape a too early or too late and a too precise definition, and to avoid the
false emphasis which springs from being over-impressed by the moment o f unmistakable
emergence. Yet that moment must have a dominating interest for those whose ambitions
are not pitched so high. And I propose to foreshorten my account o f  the emergence o f
modem Rationalism, ... by beginning it at the moment when it shows itself unmistakably, 
18
It implies that, although at the time of writing this paragraph Oakeshott was a member of 
the faculty of history in Cambridge, he does not intend to take on a genuine historical
16 RP: 27.
17 RP: 10.
18 .RP: 17-8,
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approach to deal with the history of Rationalism19. Apart from the historical approach, he 
seems to accept that there are other ways of reading res gestae; that not everything 
regarding a sense of past has to do with the historical. And, it is a non-historical 
approach that he decides to take, because he only considers the “unmistakable 
appearance” of the ideal identity that is Rationalism.
Yet, there arises another interesting issue which has something to do with 
Oakeshott’s claim about the relation of philosophy to the Past. If the pastness of 
Rationalism Oakeshott tries to construct is not a historical past, what is it? Is it a 
practical past?20 As already mentioned, it is my view that it can only be a quasi- 
philosophical past. For what Oakeshott means by the practical past is the politicisation or 
moralisation of a past, whereas his treatment of the development of Rationalism here is 
to give some historic resources to the Rationalist disposition in our current political and 
moral situation that his philosophy aims to transcend.
We shall have other opportunities to see how this quasi-philosophical past 
functions in Oakeshott’s study of past political ideas. The thing now is that the moment 
in which Rationalism reveals itself “unmistakably” for Oakeshott is the early seventeenth 
century when the state of European knowledge was in need of finding out “a consciously 
formulated technique of research, an art of interpretation, a method whose rules had 
been written.”21 That is, the intellectual appearance of Rationalism is in accordance with 
the rise of modem philosophy; the quality of Rationalism, Oakeshott claims, is the 
intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment positions launched by, among other thinkers, 
Bacon and Descartes.
According to Oakeshott’s interpretation the research projects of Bacon and 
Descartes share in common three characteristics, viz. a technique of enquiry formulated 
as a “set of mles and directions” which is “purely mechanical” and can be “universally 
applied”, but each has put a certain limitation on Rationalism. Bacon, regardless of his 
unbounded belief in the possibility of a perfect technique of research, does not think that 
he has already given it a final formulation. By contrast, while Descartes claims an
19 Some writers, however, believes that Oakeshott traces the emergence of Rationalism as an historical 
genesis. See, for example, P. Franco, 1990: 111; cf. 125, 250, n l2
20 T. W. Smith, for example, argues that it is a practical past which is at the heart of Oakeshott’s 
interpretation of the history of political ideas. (1996: 609-14.)
21RP: 18.
-1 3 9 -
unshakeable foundation for human knowledge, cogito ergo sum has been discovered by 
the method of doubt, the philosopher somehow realises that there may be constraints 
attached to his geometry-based project where it is applied not to propositions but to 
things.
On this argument, Oakeshott’s proposition is not that neither Bacon nor 
Descartes can be called a genuine Rationalist, but that with every step of its development 
Rationalism has been more distant from the true sources of its inspiration and turns out 
to be cruder and more secular. Descartes, as a matter of fact, was never a Cartesian; nor 
was Bacon a Baconian. “The Rationalist character”, Oakeshott thus writes, “may be seen 
springing from the exaggeration of Bacon’s hopes and the neglect of Descartes’ 
scepticism; modem Rationalism is what commonplace minds made out of the inspiration 
of men of discrimination and genius.”22 And yet, from a philosophical point of view, it is 
this philosophical inspiration of Rationalism that we now have to consider further; for, 
remove that, and the whole enterprise of Rationalism will collapse.
IV2.2. The Philosophical Foundations of Rationalism
So far we have mentioned the character of Rationalism and the fact that Rationalism as 
an intellectual model has found support in its affiliation with modem natural philosophy. 
As a result, my next step here is to show how exactly the foundations of Rationalism are 
related to the assumptions of foundationalism in philosophy: (1) the criterion of 
knowledge as “certainty” (for the sovereignty of abstract technique), (2) the notion of 
the mind as an instrument for thinking (for an independently perfect end), and (3) the 
existence of a priori “reason” (for intellectual equalitarianism).
22 RP: 22. On this account, I believe it is unfair to argue that Oakeshott’s Rationalist is merely a 
“fictitious adversary” or something like that. See, for example, D. Kettler, 1964: 488; J. R. Archer, 
1979: 153-4; K. E. Koemer, 1985: chap. 5, esp. 282-98. According to Koemer, for instance, neither 
Locke nor Godwin nor Bentham, Oakeshott’s other instances of the Rationalists, has neglected entirely 
the importance of tradition and the accumulation of human experience. But in the case of Locke, for 
example, Oakeshott concedes that Locke does not deny the worth of a political tradition but only 
formulates it into a set of principles; it is not in his ways of education but in his “works of political 
vulgarisation” that the tradition upon his mind of writing became hidden to the reader. (RP: 30.) In 
short, Oakeshott’s point is that the thinkers under consideration “have done much to encourage ordinary 
people to think in [the Rationalist] manner”, (RP: 107.) and thus it is the theory of Rationalism more 
than the policy of Rationalism that really concerns him in RP.
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We have seen that that which lies at the centre of Rationalism is the sovereignty 
of technique. But, why is the Rationalist so fascinated with technical knowledge? 
Oakeshott believes that this is related to the Rationalist preoccupation with “certainty”. 
That is, for the Rationalist, certain knowledge means self-contained thought “which does 
not require to look beyond itself for its certainty” and “which not only ends with 
certainty but begins with certainty and is certain throughout”;23 with certain knowledge 
at hand he thus feels confident to overcome uncertain traditions or habits. And, technical 
knowledge, by definition, is the result of a technical formulation inasmuch as its 
characteristic shows the appearance of certainty; technical knowledge thus becomes the 
only kind of knowledge which meets “the standard of certainty” that the Rationalist has 
identified. In short, Rationalism, in philosophical terms, represents that all knowledge 
proper is certain and reliable knowledge; that “there is no knowledge which is not 
technical knowledge”.24
Speaking of standardised knowledge, we are at once reminded of the main task 
of modem natural philosophy. The criterion of knowledge which the philosophers have 
made every effort to establish, it will be remembered, was precisely “how to know things 
with certainty”. Neither Descartes nor Locke nor Kant thought of their task of being a 
philosopher as distant from a pursuit of the magic word, certainty. In this matter, we may 
say that what underpins the foundation to the Rationalist belief in the sovereignty of 
technique is a Cartesian certainty.
While we consider the philosophical resource of Rationalism from the standpoint 
of certainty, it can be recognised that it is, first and foremost, an infallible technique of 
discovery, “a key to open all doors, a master science”25 that occupies the minds of 
modem philosophers. For Bacon and Descartes, remember, what was required for the 
turning point of the “modem world”, i.e. the new situation of European knowledge, was 
a “consciously formulated technique of research, an art of interpretation, a method 
whose mles had been written down,” and since “almost everything that distinguishes the 
modem world from earlier centuries is attributable to science, which achieved its most 
spectacular triumphs in the seventeenth century.”26 It will give rise to little wonder to say
23 RP: 16; cf. 113.
24 RP: 15.
25 RP: 20.
26 B. Russell, 1995: 512.
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that for modem philosophers the formulated technique of research which can validate 
certain knowledge is always believed to be equivalent to “scientific method”.
As we have seen previously, since modem philosophy arises from the reflection 
on scientific development in the modem era, an identification of knowledge proper with 
knowledge acquired by scientific method has been accepted by almost every important 
modem philosopher. Within the tradition of philosophy “certainty” will always mean 
“scientific certainty”. Again, generally speaking, it may not be misleading to take 
scientific method as the method of generalising and formulating.27 Oakeshott’s appeal to 
the notion of certainty within Rationalism, it appears to me, can be expounded as a view 
of seeing “scientism” as a part of the intellectual resources of Rationalism. The 
sovereignty of technique, for the Rationalist, is hereby the sovereignty of scientism. And 
consequently, it spells out (1) that all knowledge proper is technical knowledge, i.e. 
scientific knowledge because it involves methods alone inasmuch as it is certain and self- 
complete; and thus (2) that, if any other enquiry is to be a genuine part of human 
knowledge, it must adopt a scientific methodology, i.e. a formulated technique of 
discovery.28
Now that the notion of certainty has been mentioned, it is the consequence of a specific 
theory of mind which plays a key role in modem mainstream epistemology and 
metaphysics. And, it is precisely from this “official doctrine”29 of mind that the other two 
characteristics of Rationalism, namely perfectionism and universalism, become more 
accessible to us.
According to Oakeshott, what needs to be assumed, above all, for the possibility 
of a certain technical knowledge or an independently premeditated end is the Cartesian 
dualism which tends to keep the contents of acting, the objects of thinking, apart from 
the mind:
27 By “scientific method”, indeed, philosophers refer both to the problem of discovery and the problem of 
verification. While, as we know, contemporary philosophy of science, especially logical-positivism has 
paid much attention to the second sense of scientific method, following Oakeshott I am here basically 
considering scientific method as a technique of discovery such as deduction or induction as held by 
modem natural philosophers.
28 For the usage of the term scientism here, see T. Honderich, ed. 1995: 814; N. Beck ed. 1975: 113, 
285.
29 See G. Ryle, 1949: esp. 11-5.
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The mind, according to this hypothesis, is an independent instrument capable of dealing 
with experience. Beliefs, ideas, knowledge, the contents of the mind, and above all the 
activities of men in the world, are not regarded as themselves mind, or as entering into the 
composition of mind, but as adventitious, posterior acquisitions of the mind, the results 
of mental activity which the mind might or might not have possessed or undertaken. The 
mind may require knowledge or cause bodily activity, but it is something that may exist 
destitute of all knowledge, and in the absence of any activity; and where it has acquired 
knowledge or provoked activity, it remains independent of its acquisition or its expression 
in activity. It is steady and permanent, while its filling of knowledge is fluctuating and 
often fortuitous.30
That said, the assumption in question purports to maintain that a man’s mind is like a 
“neutral instrument” or a “piece of apparatus” independent of its thoughts and activities; 
that a man’s mind is able to be trained in the same way as we make the best use of a 
piece of machinery: “it is an engine which must be nursed and kept in trim.”31 And, as 
such it thus encourages the belief that to act “rationally” (in some sense, “scientifically”) 
is simply to set the “mental machinery” to work alongside a certain, a conclusive answer 
that is already given and indifferent to the activity itself.
The result of this, Oakeshott continues, is that for the Rationalist the mind of the 
individual can be most successful in dealing with things, as long as it is least interfered 
with by those dispositions which are already required: “the open, empty or free mind, i.e. 
the mind without disposition, is an instrument which abstracts truth, repels superstition 
and is alone the spring of ‘rational’ judgement and ‘rational’ conduct.”32 In other words, 
understanding is involved not in reforming knowledge which is already there, that is, a 
“process of re-establishing virginal detachment”, but in getting rid of “accumulated 
special knowledge and skill”.33 Thus, it follows that the second assumption of 
Rationalism, the so-called “mental instrumentalism” is the creed which makes up an ab 
extra theory of truth, i.e. representationalism which is central to the Enlightenment 
position. Using the language of EM, this theory of mind restates that experience begins 
with what Locke calls a “white paper” rather than a world of ideas; that understanding is 
a process of catching wild birds rather than taming birds which are already within the 
cage of the mind.
30 RP: 106.
31 RP: 106.
32 RP: 106.
33 RP: 107.
- 143 -
But further, there is a metaphysical assumption that is fixed firmly to this theory of mind. 
That is, for its supporters, men can not only have a premeditated purpose, but, more 
crucially, they must be capable o f formulating any problem in such a way that admits of 
such a purpose and then apply it to instruct their activity. It means that the whole notion 
which stands behind the operation of human mind, as Oakeshott observes, is that men 
first “have a mind, which acquires a filling of ideas and then makes distinctions between 
true and false, right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable, and then, as a third step, 
causes activity.”34 Put another way, that which this “intellectualist legend” ( to use Ryle’s 
phrase ) tells us is that in doing things men are supposed first “to do a bit of theory and 
then to do a bit of practice”35. And, for the last few centuries, Oakeshott believes, 
Western people have been told that to act “rationally” like this is to act “intelligently” 
(or, I would like to say, “scientifically” because there seems nothing more intelligent than 
science in the modem world).
Consequently, the Rationalist argues that “men have a power of reasoning about 
things, of contemplating propositions about activities, and of putting these propositions 
in order and making them coherent.”36 The problem, however, is not whether we do have 
such a power, since, Oakeshott claims that such a power does exist and that it is not to 
be doubted; but rather that the problem is whether:
this is a power independent o f  any other powers a man may have, and something from 
which his activity can begin. And activity is said to be ‘rational’ (or ‘intelligent’) on 
account o f  being preceded by the exercise o f  this power, on account o f a man having 
‘thought’ in a certain manner before he acted. ... In order that a man’s conduct should be 
wholly ‘rational’, he must be supposed to have the power o f  first imagining and choosing
34 RP: 109.
35 Although the philosophical position of Oakeshott is different from that of Ryle in many ways, here it 
seems to me that the two thinkers’ description of the Cartesian notion of mind as “the Ghost in the 
Machine”, to use Ryle’s famous phrase is comparative, (see 1949: 11, 16.) What Ryle says about the 
“intellectualist legend” is so close to Oakeshott’s point that it can be fully cited as follows: “ Champions 
of this legend are apt to tiy to re-assimilate knowing how to knowing that by arguing that intelligent 
(emphasis mine) performance involves the observance of rules, or the application of criteria. It follows 
that the operation which is characterised as intelligent must be preceded by an intellectual acknowledge 
of these rules or criteria; that is, the agent must first go through the internal process of avowing to 
himself certain propositions about what is to be done (‘maxims’, ‘imperatives’ or ‘regulative 
propositions’ as they are sometimes called); only then can he execute his performance in accordance 
with those dictates. He must preach to himself before he can practice. The chef must cite his recipes to
himself before he can cook according to them;  To do something, thinking what one is doing,
according to this legend, is always to do two things; namely, to consider certain appropriate 
propositions, or prescriptions, and to put into practice what these propositions or prescriptions enjoin. It 
is to do a bit of theory and then to do a bit of practice.” (Ibid.: 29.)
36 RP: 105.
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a purpose to pursue, o f defining that purpose clearly and selecting fit means to achieve; 
and this power must be wholly independent, not only o f  tradition and o f  the uncontrolled 
relics o f  his fortuitous experience o f the world, but also o f  the activity itself to which it is 
a preliminary.37
That is to say, to the Rationalist this power is assumed to be a priori, insofar as it is 
universal and impeccable. On this account, the Rationalist thus takes it to be the only 
ground of any argument, the sole criterion for determining the worth of anything, the 
absolute truth of any opinion and the “infallible guide” in any action. And so, it will not 
be surprising that this power has always been given the name “reason” (that is, as I have 
used in the previous chapters, Scientific Reason or Technical Reason) with which the 
Rationalist has expressed his confidence in the universality of human intellect and the 
distrust of the continuous meanings of a tradition. In short, as far as this project of 
perfectionism and its assumptions go, so does the idea of replacing a tradition of 
behaviours with an ideology of premeditated doctrines.
Now, there is little doubt that this a priori power is what Descartes once called 
the “natural light” of human beings in which modem natural philosophers firmly believed 
when they gave us a complete description of public reality to justify the existence of an 
objective physical world independently of us. It is what Kant believed to be the “tribunal 
of reason” by means of which the meaning of everything is judged. To sum up, it is one 
of the most crucial items which made modem foundationalism possible.
IV 2.3. Rationalism and the Predicament of the Enlightenment
It is then Oakeshott’s observation that modem natural philosophy and rationalist politics 
are theoretically allied, so that they constitute the whole package of Enlightenment 
positions. Before we move on to dissect the philosophical assumptions of Rationalism 
and its political doctrines, however, it seems advisable to spend the remainder of this 
section on the problem of the political and moral predicament of the Enlightenment that 
concerned Oakeshott in the first instance.
37 RP: 105. It is observable that in some sense this is actually the old argument between Plato and 
Aristotle - with Oakeshott taking the far more Aristotelian view as to be found in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics.
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Given that “the greatest apparent victories of Rationalism have been in politics”38, 
Oakeshott now claims that the view he is maintaining is where “the ordinary politics of 
European nations have become fixed in a vice of Rationalism, that much of their failure 
(which is often attributed to other and more immediate causes [war, for example]) 
springs in fact from the defeats of the Rationalist character when it is in control of 
affairs.”39 Adhering to his own philosophical position, however, Oakeshott has no 
intention of commending any remedy for Rationalism (and as such he gives us no 
examples of the real damages that it may have incurred, for example, Nazism); nor does 
he expect a speedy release from the circumstances which deliver Rationalism. But rather, 
Oakeshott maintains that his job is only to explain to his reader the disease of 
Rationalism: the conditions of politics and morality in our time.40 That is to say, it is not 
the desirability or undesirability of rationalist politics but the adequateness of Rationalism 
as a political thought to which Oakeshott gives his main attention in RP.41 There are 
accordingly two main symptoms of rationalism in politics that cause Oakeshott the most 
distress: a “corruption of mind”, and a rationalistic “training” of mind over a concrete 
“education” in human life.
First, from a philosophical point of view, Rationalism represents a false theory 
about the nature of human knowledge: where technical knowledge, in fact, is merely 
half-knowledge such that it is only half-right; and the notions of an empty mind and of a 
priori “reason” are utopian illusions. What is involved in rationalist politics, Oakeshott 
thus says, amounts to “a corruption of mind.” And fiirther, for this reason, Rationalism 
will have no capability of amending its own shortcomings: “it has no homeopathic 
quality”; “you cannot escape its errors by becoming more sincerely or more profoundly 
rationalistic.”42 This, according to Oakeshott, is one of the prices that the Rationalist has 
to pay for living by a “book”, because it leads not only to specific mistakes, but to the 
drying up of the mind itself. So, Oakeshott states that the Rationalist is ineducable in the
38 RP: 8. Oakeshott basically attributes the intellectual impetus which has promoted the invasion of 
Rationalism into politics to the “politically inexperienced” and he shows us three examples: the “new 
ruler”, the “new ruling class” and the “new political society”. (See RP: 30-2.)
39 RP: 33-4.
40 See RP: 34.
41 Cf. RP: 48.
42 RP: 37.
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sense that he always begins his action by throwing away the kind of knowledge which 
would save him, that is, “traditional knowledge”.43
Secondly, what makes the situation worse is that a society which is rationalist in 
disposition must be inclined to an exclusive Rationalist form of “training” instead of a 
genuine and more complete “education”. The training of mind in which the Rationalist 
believes
is certainly not an initiation in which moral and intellectual habits and achievements o f  
his society, an entry into partnership between present and past, a sharing o f  concrete 
knowledge; for the Rationalist, all this would be an education in nescience, both valueless 
and mischievous. It is a training in technique, a training, that is, in the half o f  knowledge 
which can be learnt from books when they are used as cribs. ... [Because] he believes that 
a training in ‘public administration’ is the surest defence against the flattery o f  a 
demagogue and the lies o f  a dictator.44
And consequently, in such a society the Rationalist sooner or later will win the battle of 
the whole field of morality and moral education as his ultimate victory.
In morality, as in politics, then, the Rationalist is embarked upon a self-conscious 
pursuit of moral ideals by the presentation of moral principles, by training the mind with 
an ideology rather than a tradition of moral ideas. He composes a moral doctrine out of 
its tradition and then he defends it by argument. For him, the conduct of life is “a jerky, 
discontinuous affair, the solution of a stream of problems, the mastery of a succession of 
crises”;45 and thus the morality that concerns him is that of the “self-made man” and a 
“self-made society”. “The predicament of our time”, Oakeshott thus concludes, “is that 
the Rationalists have been at work so long on their project of drawing off the liquid in 
which our moral ideals are suspended (and pouring it away as worthless) that we are left 
only with the dry and gritty residue which chokes us as we try to take it down.”46 In 
summation, Oakeshott’s point is that the crisis of the Enlightenment ethical position lies 
in the fact that the moral rationality it bears is nothing but an abstract and empty concept.
43 At this point, Oakeshott’s position is somewhat comparable to Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s, which 
argued that the very reason that the Enlightenment used as a weapon against myth, religion, and illusion 
has, in modem technocratic societies, turned against itself and become self-destructive. (See, T. W. 
Adomo and M. Horkheimer, 1972.)
44 RP: 38.
45 Jtf>:41.
46 RP: 41; cf. 487.
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IV.3. Transcending Rationalism in Philosophy
Having related Oakeshott’s Rationalism to the Enlightenment project and shown its 
predicament, we may now turn to examine Oakeshott’s objection to it. Here I first adopt 
Oakeshott’s approach which transcends the partiality of rationalism in philosophy, viz. 
philosophisme in respect of the assumptions of scientism, mental instrumentalism and a 
priori “reason”. And in the course of this examination, the reader of EM  will recognise 
Oakeshott’s constant philosophical position.
IV, 3 A , The Map o f Human Activity: Deconstructing Scientism  
It is my understanding that the first philosophical assumption of rationalism in philosophy 
can be understood as that of scientism: (1) all knowledge proper appears only in the form 
of technical knowledge i.e. scientific knowledge because it involves methods that are 
certain and reliable; and thus (2) for any understanding to be a genuine part of human 
knowledge, it must adopt a scientific methodology, i.e. a formulated technique of 
discovery. According to Oakeshott, this is where the Rationalist starts going astray, and 
the work of RP as a whole has made a sufficient objection to this point of view.
Before we go any further, however, let me remind the reader that by using the 
term “technical knowledge” Oakeshott himself does not refer to it as scientific 
knowledge but Rationalist belief does. Besides, Oakeshott does not deny that technical 
knowledge can be found outside science; he merely thinks that it is in essence incomplete 
and thus it is not a genuine criterion on which to categorise science, let alone to fuse the 
sciences, i.e. to justify that “all human utterance is in one mode.”47 In following 
Oakeshott’s denial of scientism, I shall begin with the partiality of technical knowledge in 
general by arguing that nowhere in complete human activity, including actual scientific 
activity, can technical knowledge appear to be complete and certain, because human 
activity always involves more than just methods, i.e. no technique of research begins as 
well as ends in self-completeness. And then, given that technical knowledge is not an
47 VP: 9.
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actual scientific knowledge nor a genuine philosophical category, I shall introduce 
Oakeshott’s theory of the “map of human activity” in which the characteristics of, for 
example, science, history, and practice, can be truly postulated.
Why, then, is technical knowledge incomplete? To understand this, we have to 
appeal to Oakeshott’s notion of “practical knowledge” or “traditional knowledge” in the 
first instance. In contrast to technical knowledge, Oakeshott points out that there exists 
another type of knowledge, namely, traditional knowledge which is never absent from 
every actual human conduct. Here, by traditional knowledge Oakeshott means the 
knowledge that exists only in practice, i.e. the knowledge “that is expressed in taste or 
connoisseurship, lacking rigidity and ready to impress on the mind of the learner.”48 
Unlike the method of formulating, it follows that the only way of acquiring traditional 
knowledge is by apprenticeship to a master who is perpetually practising it. To illustrate 
further, Oakeshott gives us the examples of the artistry of a pianist, the mastery of a chef, 
the connoisseurship which enables a scientist to decide which direction of research to 
take, the commitment that led an historian to observe that the interrogative “Was the 
French Revolution a mistake?” is not a genuine historical question.
Traditional knowledge, as Oakeshott understands it, is therefore a type of 
knowledge which is reminiscent of that which Michael Polanyi has called “tacit knowing” 
or “tacit dimension” in scientific research.49 Moreover, it bears a resemblance to the 
Aristotelian virtue of phronesis50 So, it appears that Oakeshott’s understanding of 
practical knowledge is remarkably similar to Alasdair MacIntyre’s position in respect of 
their Aristotelian connection.51 And consequently, I think, it is safe to argue further that 
Oakeshott’s reflection upon Rationalism is also comparable to the central theme of 
MacIntyre’s work which tries to show that “the Aristotelian tradition can be restated in a
a*RP: 15.
49 SqqRP: 13, n4.
50 See, for example, P. Franco, 1990: 110; J. Casey, 1993: 60-1; R  Grant, 1990: 77. The Aristotelian 
phronesis is not foreign to Confucianism, either. To use an obvious example, when “Tzu-Kung asked 
about the practice of benevolence, The Master said, ‘A craftsman who wishes to practise his craft well 
must first sharpen his tools. You should, therefore, seek the patronage of the most distinguished 
Counsellors and make friends with the most benevolent Gentlemen in the state when you happen to be 
staying.” (Confucius, 1979: book xv.)
51 See A. MacIntyre, 1988: esp. 124-46.
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way that restores rationality and intelligibility to our own moral and social attitudes and 
commitments.”52
By asserting the epistemic value of traditional or practical knowledge, then, 
Oakeshott does not claim that while technical knowledge will teach us “what to do” 
traditional knowledge will tell us “how to do”; but, following Aristotle’s Ethics, he 
argues that “even in the what, and above all in diagnosis [of a doctor, for example], there 
lies already this dualism of technique and practice: there is no knowledge which is not 
‘know how’ ,”53 In other words, for Oakeshott, “what we do, and moreover what we 
want to do, is the creature of how we are accustomed to conduct our affairs.”54 I shall 
return to and expound upon Oakeshott’s emphasis on the knowledge of “knowing how” 
as a concrete whole later. In the meantime, returning to the topic, it follows that even if 
we accept the image that human conduct everywhere acquires skills, no skill consists of 
technical knowledge alone. For technical and traditional knowledge are distinguishable 
but inseparable; they are “the twin components of the knowledge [i.e. skill] involved in 
every concrete human activity.”55 In cookery, for example, the knowledge that belongs 
to the good cook is not merely, nor less importantly, about what has been written in the 
cook book, but it is also about the need to combine this knowledge with practical 
knowledge to “make skill in cookery wherever it exists.”56
This means that although in certain circumstances technical knowledge may be 
possible, it is merely what is deliberately epitomised from a tradition of behaviour, of 
“how to go about things” and in the course of this formulation there must be something 
missing, something which always coexists with it but which cannot be written down into 
a rule. Acquiring it, Oakeshott says, does not consist in eliminating “pure ignorance”, but 
in reforming knowledge which is already there in a concrete whole. “Nothing, not even 
the most nearly self-contained technique (the rules of a game)”, he claims, “can in fact be 
imparted to an empty mind; and what is imparted is nourished by what is already 
there”.57 In short, technical knowledge is never self-complete; and if its self-completeness 
is illusory, the notion of certainty that the Rationalist appeals to is also an illusion.
52 Ibid.: ix; see also, 1985: 259.
53 RP: 13-4.
54 RP: 53.
55 RP: 12.
56 RP: 12-3; cf. 52, 110, 117-20.
57 RP: 17.
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Among the modes of human activity, it has always been believed that science has 
achieved absolute certainty because it involves nothing more than scientific method; that 
scientific knowledge can be a pure form of technical knowledge. In this respect, 
Oakeshott has no difficulty in arguing further that actual scientific knowledge does not 
involve merely rules of observation, principles of verification and hypotheses of 
experiment. The technique of research constitutes only one of the elements of actual 
scientific knowledge; and thus technical knowledge is a part not the whole of the world 
of science.
Aside from following the rules, Oakeshott thinks that to achieve any advance in 
research a scientist must also acquire (among other things) the sort of judgement which 
tells him when his technique is leading him astray and the connoisseurship which enables 
him to distinguish the profitable from the unprofitable directions to explore. That is, 
according to Oakeshott,
The truth is that only a man who is already a scientist can formulate a scientific 
hypothesis; that is, an hypothesis is not an independent invention capable o f  guiding 
scientific inquiry, but a dependent supposition which arises as an abstraction from within 
already existing scientific activity. Moreover, even when the specific hypothesis has in 
this manner been formulated, it is inoperative as a guide to research without constant 
reference to the traditions o f  scientific inquiry from which it was abstracted. The concrete 
situation does not appear until the specific hypothesis, which is the occasion o f  
empiricism being set to work, is recognised as itself the creature o f  knowing how to 
conduct a scientific inquiry.58
Thus, Oakeshott proposes that “the pursuit of scientific enquiry and the theory of 
scientific enquiry called ‘scientism’ are not the same thing”,59 and it is the latter that is 
here put into question.
Although Oakeshott’s idea of science attracted no real attention from scholars,60 
the view that an actual scientific activity involves more than a set of methods, I think, has 
now become a common argument in the development of the philosophy of science. For 
example, T. Kuhn, in his rejection of pro-positivism, has pointed out that the scientist is 
working under a “paradigm” of scientific research rather than “pure reason”. Here, I do 
not wish to elaborate on Kuhn’s idea of science nor am I able to expound on the debate
ss RP: 51-2; cf. 120, 123.
59 RPML: 99.
60 See, for example, L. S. Stebbing, 1934: 404.
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that has arisen around his usage of the term “paradigm”. For my concern, it is interesting 
only to indicate that by the concept “paradigm” Kuhn basically signifies two meanings. 
“On the one hand, it stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and 
so on shared by the members of a given community. On the other hand, it denotes one 
sort of element in the constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as 
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining 
puzzles of normal science.”61 While with the first of these meanings, Kuhn clearly 
suggests that both beliefs and values are as indispensable as technique in actual scientific 
activity, it is with the second usage, viz. “paradigms-as-shared-examples”, that we may 
find Kuhn expressing beliefs which Oakeshott might equally well have written when he 
explained what he meant by traditional knowledge:
Philosophers of science have not ordinarily discussed the problem encountered by a
student in laboratories or in science texts, for these are thought to supply only practice in
the application of what the student already knows. He cannot, it is said, solve problems
at all unless he has first learned the theory and some rules for applying it. Scientific
knowledge is embedded in theory and rules; problems are supplied to gain facility in their
application. I have tried to argue, however, that this localisation of the cognitive content
of science is wrong. After the student has done many problems, he may gain only added
facility by solving more. But at the start and for some time after, doing problems is
learning consequential things about nature. In the absence of such exemplars, the laws
62and theories he has previously learned would have little empirical content.
To borrow once more Michael Polanyi’s useful phrase, what results from this process is 
‘tacit knowledge’ which is learned by doing science [emphasis mine] rather than by
• 63acquiring rules for doing it.
In short, for Kuhn as for Oakeshott, the pro-positivist attempt to maintain the certainty 
of scientific knowledge in terms of formulated methods is misleading. Furthermore, the 
actual scientific activity is conducted within a tradition or a paradigm of scientific 
inquiry.
Now, let me turn to the second, and more important, meaning of scientism, that is the 
prevailing Enlightenment belief; that scientific method is the most reliable means of
61 T. Kuhn, 1962: 175.
62 Ibid.: 187-8.
63 Ibid.: 191.
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enquiry for men to use in exploring the nature of things so that one should employ it in 
all human activity: “all knowledge proper is scientific knowledge.”
Indeed, if Oakeshott is correct by observing that in actuality science involves 
more than a set of methods, that the notion of scientific certainty is merely a mental 
myth, one can thereby see no reason why a formulated technique of discovery has any 
epistemological priority, that is, to be the criterion of all knowledge-claims. For, in 
science as in other modes, any such formulated technique can only capture a half-part of 
human knowledge; from a philosophical point of view, to understand human action solely 
by means of doing it is thus to understand incompletely. That is, in philosophy the error 
of the sovereignty of technique, of scientism, is nothing but “the error of mistaking a part 
for the whole, of endowing a part with the qualities of the whole”64 and thus results in a 
“corruption of mind”.
But, here as elsewhere, Oakeshott’s dissecting of Rationalism does not stop at 
negative criticism. If the Rationalist understanding of knowledge proper as technical 
knowledge is incomplete, Oakeshott’s identification of being a philosopher must require 
a more concrete understanding instead. In other words, if technical knowledge is not a 
genuine philosophical category to look into the nature of science in particular and into 
human knowledge as a whole in general, the philosophical question that Oakeshott has to 
consider next is: What is the criterion that a philosophy may build up to discern the 
conditions that postulate the mode of science and all other modes of activity?
As one may expect, Oakeshott’s answer is to include the premise that modes of 
activity are not distinguished by pre-assumed methods or premeditated purposes, but by 
a tradition of enquiry to which they belong:
Now, i f  we consider the concrete activity o f  an historian, a cook, a scientist, a politician 
or any man in the ordinary conduct o f  life, we may observe that each is engaged upon 
answering questions o f a certain sort, and that his characteristic [emphasis mine] is that 
he knows (or thinks he knows) the way to go about finding the answer to that sort o f  
question. But the questions which he knows to belong to his sort o f  question are not 
known to be such in advance o f  the activity o f  trying to answer them: in pursuing these 
questions, and not others, he is not obeying a rule or following a principle which comes 
from outside the activity. It is the activity itself which defines the questions as well as the 
manner in which they are answered. It is, o f  course, not impossible to formulate certain 
principles which may seem to give precise definition to the kind o f  question a particular
64 RP: 16.
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sort o f  activity is concerned with; but such principles are derived from the activity and 
not the activity from the principles.65
It follows that for Oakeshott in RP, the modes of experience disclosed in EM  are 
now also seen as a number of distinct practices:; each practice is a tradition of enquiry 
achieved by the practitioner concerned. In participating in a certain practice, one is 
therefore learning the skill of how to go about that sort of thing, the manner of how to 
speak that sort of language. Hence, for example, a scientific hypothesis would be 
meaningless (or incommensurable, as Kuhn reputedly argues) to others when set outside 
the tradition of scientific research within which it is formulated, because its meaning is its 
place in that tradition as a whole. “[A] particular action, in short, never begins in its 
particularity, but always in an idiom or a tradition of activity.”66 And, to give it a concise 
definition here, a tradition of activity is nothing but a concrete knowledge of knowing 
how to go about things appropriately in the circumstances.
Now it can be observed that on this crucial issue Oakeshott has not abandoned 
the theme Of EM, but only altered his terminology. First of all, in RP Oakeshott clearly 
adheres to the view that the purpose of a philosophy is to observe not to determine a 
tradition of activity; there is no external or extrinsic reason which can set about a certain 
practice. If the reader of EM  were somehow unsure about the non-foundationalist role of 
philosophy that Oakeshott delivers with a pure philosophical language there, the image 
of an idiom of activity would now have abolished their concern: the conditions that 
postulate a mode of activity are not determined in advance by a Kantian “pure reason” 
but the mode is characterised by its own practice. The role of a philosophy, Oakeshott 
thus restates, is “to discern the logic of the relation of [a practice] to others and to 
ascertain its place on the map of human activity.”67
Secondly, it follows that modes of activity are self-consistent; each mode is an 
idiom of self-ruled activity. The characteristic of history, for example, lies in the way in 
which the historian comes to deal with his own research in order to describe a “historical 
past” and so forth. Likewise, scientific activity is the exploration of the knowledge the 
scientist has of how to go about asking and answering scientific questions; moral activity
65 RP: 117-8.
66 RP: 120.
67 RP: 152; cf. 65, 127.
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involves a process whereby we get to know how to behave well. The only way of making 
a history, for example, is to write a history:; history is the historian’s experience about a 
certain past. It is thus confirmed that for Oakeshott the conditions that postulate one 
mode cannot be applied to any other without committing a categorical mistake, that is, 
ignoratio elenchi.
I V 3.2. Rationality: Dissecting M ental Instrum entalism
To attack rationalism in philosophy more completely, the next step Oakeshott takes is to 
challenge the use and misuse of “reason” in relation to human conduct, that is, to clarify 
the confusion between Rationalism and genuine rationality. As we have seen, there is a 
theory of mind that lies behind the Rationalist misinterpretation of “rational” conduct. 
Before attempting to present Oakeshott’s conception of rationality, it seems appropriate 
to first review Oakeshott’s idealistic rejection of the theory of mind concerned.
It is Oakeshott’s observation that the theory of mind in question purports to 
maintain that men first “have a mind, which acquires a filling of ideas and then makes 
distinctions between true and false, right and wrong, reasonable and unreasonable, and 
then, as a third step, causes activity.” However, this is not the “intelligent” part of men, 
because no man can think or act in this manner; nor is this a satisfactory notion of 
“rational” conduct, because it is not a satisfactory description of any sort of human 
conduct.
Remaining in the main with his idealistic position, Oakeshott reproduces the 
alternative view that mind is “the offspring of knowledge and activity; it is composed 
entirely of thoughts.”681 say “reproduce”, because we have already seen in EM  that for 
Oakeshott understanding always begins with a world of ideas within the mind, and a 
world is always “a complete integral whole or system; whenever there is a world there is 
unity.”69 Hence, in each instance, mind cannot exist independently of thoughts and 
activities, because they are not the acquisitions but the constitutives of the mind, i.e. a 
world of ideas. For this reason, Oakeshott states that it is not possible to purify a man’s 
mind by extinguishing in it any distinctions such as truth and falsity and the like, because
68 RP: 109.
69 EM: 28.
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“what is extinguished is not merely a man’s ‘knowledge’ (or part of it), but the mind 
itself’, and “what is left is not a neutral, unprejudiced instrument, a pure intelligence, but 
nothing at all.”70 In short, the instrumental mind does not exist.
If mind is not an empty instrument, the view that human conduct springs from an 
a priori act of theorising must be an illusion as well. However, it should be noted that 
Oakeshott does not deny that men may have the power of reasoning, he only argues that 
the essential condition of this power is conduct itself. That is to say, Oakeshott believes 
that our act of theorising is not something prior and superior to conduct but the result of 
a subsequent analysis of conduct. “Doing anything”, Oakeshott says, “both depends 
upon and exhibits knowing how to do it; and though part (but never the whole) of 
knowing how to do it can subsequently be reduced to knowledge in the form of 
propositions (and possibly to ends, rules and principles), these propositions are neither 
the spring of the activity nor are they in any direct sense regulative of the activity.”71 In 
other words, as already noted, our skills of living in the world are not a knowledge of 
certain propositions validated by a priori “reason”, but a knowledge of how to decide 
questions and this is the prerequisite of the ability of reasoning: we are not first given a 
priori “reason” and then instruct our conduct; it is in practising our conduct that we are 
getting to know the rationality it implies.
It follows that rationality is a quality of the conduct itself. And, to elucidate it, Oakeshott 
says that:
the quality concerned is not merely “intelligence”, but faithfulness to the knowledge we 
have of how to conduct the specific activity we are engaged in. “Rational” conduct is 
acting in such a way that the coherence o f  the idiom o f  activity to which the conduct
72belongs is preserved and possibly enhanced.
That is, he believes that rational conduct is the faithfulness to the coherence of a tradition 
of knowing how to act in the circumstances. And thus, instead of claiming a priori 
Reason towering over the map of human conduct as a whole, for Oakeshott as for
70 RP: 109.
71 RP: 110.
72 RP: 122.
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Aristotle, there are different reasons corresponding to the self-distinct practices, namely, 
traditions of activity.
What can be implied from this is that Oakeshott transcends the Enlightenment 
contrast between “Reason and Tradition” by maintaining that reasons always function 
within traditions.731 shall come back to Oakeshott’s notion of “tradition” later. For now, 
it can be observed that his understanding of rationality is simply a restatement of the 
notion of truth he disclosed in EM. First, as in EM, truth is defined as the condition of 
experience which is never absent in thinking; in a like manner rationality is now taken as 
the quality of the conduct itself. Moreover, recall that the criterion of truth established in 
EM  is also the idea of coherence or unity: true understanding is a self-critical movement 
towards the achievement of a more coherent world of ideas. Therefore, it may be said 
that for Oakeshott what is given in our activity is a unity “in which every element is 
indispensable, in which no one is more important than any other and none is immune 
from change”, that the unity of a tradition of behaviour “lies in its coherence, not in its 
conformity to or agreement with a fixed [principle].”74
From this point of view, again, we are explaining Oakeshott’s rejection of 
scientism. For, it becomes observable that rationality (or truth) so defined is at once 
something different from the faithfulness to abstract rules or premeditated purposes. 
Rules or purposes are fixed and finished inasmuch as they are the abridgements of a 
unity. However, for Oakeshott, since knowledge of how to pursue an activity is always 
“in motion”, rationality is always a faithfulness which itself not merely illustrates but 
contributes to the coherence of the activity within which nothing is fixed or absolute. In 
short, it is Oakeshott’s insistence that the rationality of conduct is its relation to the 
idiom of activity to which it belongs; and that “an activity as a whole (science, cooking, 
historical investigation, politics or poetry) cannot be said either to be ‘rational’ or 
‘irrational’ unless we conceive all idioms of activity to be embraced in a single universe 
of activity.”75
Before we leave this point, allow me to reiterate that following Oakeshott “there 
is as much difference between rational enquiry and ‘rationalism’ as there is between
73 Cf. P. Franco, 1990: 138.
74 Cf. EM: 32-3.
75 RP: 122.
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scientific enquiry and ‘scientism’, and it is a difference of the same kind.”76 Rationalism, 
as a view of understanding human conduct, consists of a misconception about human 
“reason”, which is, among other things, supported by a certain concept of mind. And 
thus, it is not “reason” per se but the theory which identifies “reason” with certainty, with 
the view of seeing the mind as an instrument for thinking that constitutes the objective of 
Oakeshott’s critique of Rationalism. Oakeshott’s denouncement of Rationalism, is meant 
to pass beyond the Enlightenment project such that it becomes misleading to attach to 
him any concept of “irrationalism”. Put another way, just as we usually believe that a true 
understanding of human experience can never exclude the notion of “truth”, just as in 
EM where the critique of an ab extra theory of truth does not result in the abandonment 
of the possibility of “truth”, Oakeshott does not exclude the notion “reason” from a 
meaningful philosophical discourse. On the contrary, it is claimed here that what he really 
intends to argue in RP is a more profitable explanation and use of the name “reason” 
itself.
IV.3.3. Tradition: Dissolving a priori Reason 
In earlier discussions we have observed the importance of a “tradition” of activity in 
Oakeshott’s theory. I now want to re-focus my attention on this very concept in order to 
reject more fully the notion of a priori “reason”.
It is true that Oakeshott’s notion of tradition has been so confusingly understood 
by his critics that he later relinquished it.77 There is, however, an important philosophical 
meaning of it assumed in RP that has often been neglected by interpreters, that is, 
tradition as the “concrete universal” given in human activity. And I believe that in 
understanding Oakeshott’s philosophical traditionalism, it would be of great assistance to 
bring that usage of tradition to light, by relating it to Oakeshott’s notion of reality held in 
EM.
It has been demonstrated from EM that Oakeshott perceives the world as a world 
of ideas which can never be independent of us and which is always a homogeneous world 
of thoughts. By the same token, in RP Oakeshott shows no hesitancy in rejecting the
76 RPML: 99.
77 Cf. Oakeshott, “On misunderstanding Human Conduct: A Reply to My Critics” (1976): 364.
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realist’s view that the world is composed merely of “a stock of thingj^such as books, 
pictures, musical instruments and compositions, buildings, cities, landscapes, inventions, 
devices, machines and so on. According to Oakeshott the view that assumes the 
independence of a natural world misunderstands the concept of “second nature” (as 
Oakeshott quotes Hegel) which is the context of our activity; conversely, he writes that:
[t]he world into which we are initiated is composed, rather, o f  a stock o f  emotions, 
beliefs, images, maimers o f speaking, languages, skills, practices and manner o f  activity 
out o f  which these ‘^things” are generated. And consequently it is appropriate to think o f  
it not as a stock but as a capital; that is, something known and enjoyed only in use. For 
none o f  these is fixed and finished; each is at once an achievement and a promise. This 
capital has been accumulated over hundreds o f  years. And in use it earns an interest, part
no
o f which is consumed in a current manner o f  living and part reinvested.
What is cited here implies the general character of the notion of “tradition as a 
concrete whole” that the philosopher has chiefly in mind in RP. And as such it may be 
observed that just as reality is treated as a world of meanings in EM, it is now “tradition 
as a capital of practices” that offers the meanings for human activity. Put differently, if 
the language of EM  spells out that the world in which we live is a world of thoughts and 
knowledge, then that of RP points to the same account that the world consists in a 
concrete tradition of language, skills, and the like. Thus, if reality is what we are “obliged 
to think”, tradition can be regarded as what we are “obliged to act”.
Moreover, it must be recalled that in EM  it is claimed that the world is what I 
understand it to be, and there are a number of limited standpoints which I may take to 
interpret the world as a single whole: reality is apt to be modified. Along these lines, 
Oakeshott seems to agree in RP that tradition as a capital is a “multi-voiced creature”79, 
too; it is composed of traditions of activity in practice. That is to say, for Oakeshott as 
for Wittgenstein, my tradition of language as a whole is the limitation of my knowledge 
of the world; but, unlike the latter, Oakeshott goes further by saying that I have at my 
disposal several distinguishable traditions of language which enable me to describe the 
world differently with regard to the different manners of speaking such as the political 
and moral, the historical, the scientific or the poetic.
n RP: 187.
79 Oakeshott, “Rationalism in Politics: A Reply to Professor Raphael” (1965): 90.
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With the phrase a “tradition of activity”, Oakeshott keeps telling us that it is 
made up of both traditional knowledge and technical knowledge; and for him a tradition 
of activity is a “concrete knowledge of knowing how to go about things appropriately in 
the circumstances”. And yet, because “a tradition of behaviour is not a fixed and 
inflexible manner of doing things; it is a flow of sympathy”;80 because what “we desire to 
impose is already hidden in what exists ”81 In order to understand, say, a tradition of 
political activity in a complete sense, the mode of the mind requires “a conversation, not 
an argument”; it is “the pursuit, not of a dream, or of a general principle, but of an 
intimation.”82 On this reading, Oakeshott thus depicts the (traditionalist) nature of 
politics in terms of the following well-known sentence:
In political activity, then, men sail a boundless and bottomless sea; there is neither 
harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed 
destination. The enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel; the sea is both friend and 
enemy; and the seamanship consists in using the resources o f  a traditional manner o f
83behaviour in order to make a friend o f  every hostile occasion.
We shall have the chance to resume Oakeshott’s understanding of politics in 
relation to the notion of conversation qualified in political activity shortly. The thing to 
note here, however, is that Oakeshott has often been impugned by his critics for his 
traditionalism which could never tell us how to distinguish a good tradition from a bad 
one.84 For example, they asked why people in South Africa should follow the “tradition 
of segregation” as a pattern of their political behaviour? For a South African Rationalist, 
it seems, should have a fundamental moral right not to “keep afloat on an even keel” but 
to “rock the boat” on that particular case.85 And thus, an external criterion of universal 
value is always required in politics.
On the basis of understanding the condition of tradition in activity as that of 
reality in experiencing, it turns out that such a form of criticism consists in a 
misconception about Oakeshott’s philosophical situation. For Oakeshott, tradition as a
80 RP: 59.
81 T. Fuller, 1993b: 24.
82 RP: 58, 57.
83 RP: 60.
84 See, for example, R. H. S. Crossman, 1951: 61; S. I. Benn and R.' S. Peters, 1959: 316-8; N. Wood, 
1959: 660-2; H. V. Jaffa, 1963: 361; H. F. Pitkin, 1973: 508-10; G. Himmelfarb, 1975: 417-8; D. Spitz, 
1976: 340; K. Koemer, 198: 296. Oakeshott himself was aware of this form of criticism, see RP: 67-8.
85 S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, 1959: 318.
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world of what is given in activity, to quote Bradley once again, “is the best of all possible 
worlds, and everything in it is a necessary ev/7.”86 That is, whilst our understanding 
always begins with a world of ideas, our tradition of politics must confront us in such a 
way that we are sailing “a boundless and bottomless sea”, and this confrontation is 
inexorable and absolute. A certain tradition of political activity, of course, may not 
necessarily be favourable any more than there are prejudices, biases or mysterious 
proclivities in a paradigm of scientific or historical research. But, Oakeshott has never 
expressed doubt that a practitioner, a scientist or an historian has his own self-critical 
“reason” in practice (as opposed to Universal Reason in formulation) to conduct their 
intimations of the tradition concerned, by means of which it is possible to tell what is 
good from what is bad. In other words, to converse with tradition is not to be satisfied 
with the status quo, it is to understand ourselves by making more coherent the given 
situation which we inhabit. In the case of politics, we have seen that the coherence of 
practical truth is freedom, insofar as it is the “faithfulness” to our free will that will tell us 
what we ought to do and what we ought not to do in the actual circumstances.
Politics, Oakeshott states, is “the activity of attending to the general arrangemen^/ 
of a set of people w hc0  chance or choice have brought together”; it is “a practical 
activity concerned with making a response to situations of a certain sort: political 
situations.”87 Either “attending to” or “responding to”, indeed, has implied men’s ability 
to choose from a world of values. In other words, Oakeshott’s point is not that every 
tradition must be excellent, but that it is so comprehensive that every political crisis 
“always appears within a tradition of political activity; and ‘salvation’ comes from the 
unimpaired resources of the tradition itself.”88 In claiming this, Oakeshott casts off 
Kantian Universal Philosophical Reason as the foundation of a rational programme, by 
returning our actual practical reasoning to a tradition of moral and political activity. In 
short, for Oakeshott genuine rationality has never been absent in a certain tradition of 
activity; instead, “every tradition has its own reason proper”.
86 RP: 66.
87 RP: 44; cf. 70.
88#P: 59.
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IV.4. Reconciling Rationalism in Politics
My aim in this section is to continue Oakeshott’s attack on rationalism in politics by re­
establishing the philosophical elements and historic fortunes of conservatism in politics in 
order to show it as a more coherent mode of understanding politics. Leaving aside On 
Human Conduct (HC) for now, I shall here deal with Oakeshott’s earlier works on 
morality and politics, mainly including Religion, Politics and the Moral Life (a collection 
of some of Oakeshott’s essays written from 1925-55, published in 1993; hereafter 
RPML), The Harvard Lectures (which was delivered at Harvard in 1958 and published in 
1993; hereafter MPME), The Politics o f Faith and the Politics o f Scepticism 
(Oakeshott’s posthumous work which was probably completed in 1952 although not 
edited and published until 1996; hereafter PFPS) and, of course, Rationalism in Politics
(RP)
IV.4.1. Philosophy and Practice
Throughout the previous discussions it has been shown that liberal ethics as a form of 
rationalism in politics produces a normative political and moral theory in terms of a set of 
self-evident and universal principles that order our practical life as a whole; and that such 
a mode of ethical thinking is predicated on the conception of philosophy par excellence. 
Now that Oakeshott’s main concern in both EM  and RP has been understood as a 
serious challenge to foundationalism in philosophy, I believe that the categorical 
distinction between philosophy and practice implied in Oakeshott’s thought can be 
regarded as a consequence of this challenge, and thus it is a premise of his objection to 
rationalist politics. Before going any further, therefore, it may be appropriate to 
emphasise once again the non-normative character of Oakeshott’s political philosophy.
One of Oakeshott’s main interests in EM, as we have seen, is to categorise the 
mode of practice as the world sub specie voluntatis from the standpoint of the totality of 
experience without advancing the philosophical understanding of practice at the expense 
of the practical pursuit of meaning. That is, he believes that freedom, the criterion of
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practical truth, is meaningful only to the world of practice, whereas philosophy, 
categorically speaking, is not to understand the world under the condition of the free 
will, but it is an escape from the responsibility of living in the world.89
The view that political philosophy cannot be a prescription for political practice, 
as we know, remains throughout Oakeshott’s academic life. In RPML, Oakeshott argues 
that “a philosophy of politics is not itself a political programme; it is not a foundation or 
basis, a body of general principles upon which a political programme might be 
constructed.”90 On the contrary, “where there is genuine philosophy there can be no 
guidance; if we seek guidance, we must ‘hang up philosophy’.”91 And he retains this 
view in RP by remarking that “political philosophy cannot be expected to increase our 
ability to be successful in political activity. It will not help us to distinguish between good 
and bad political projects; it has no power to guide or to direct us in the enterprise of 
pursuing the intimations of our tradition.”92
The error of Rationalism, so far as this view is concerned, lies in a mis­
apprehension of the task of philosophy itself, “which is not to recommend conduct but to 
explain.”93 And consequently, given the crisis of the Enlightenment project that we have 
reviewed, the real problem about the despotism of Rationalism is not that the West has 
failed to see its jeopardy, but that in the meantime its self-analysis has been unaware of 
its own “Rationalisms”.94 Oakeshott singles out Hayke’s Road to Serfdom as one of the 
most significant cases: “a plan to resist all planning may be better than its opposite, but it 
belongs to the same style of politics.”95
In this respect, it seems unfair to me to comment that Oakeshott’s attempt to tell 
philosophical reasoning apart from practical reasoning amounts “only to arbitrary 
stipulations which by distorting the nature of political philosophy unnecessarily restricts 
its scope”,96 that he upholds an “unpolitical theory”.97 For, Oakeshott’s intention is to
89 In RPML: 119-137, Oakeshott reiterates once again what he has largely said about the mode of 
practice in EM by retaining its main terminology.
90 RPML: 137; cf. 135.
91 RPML: 155.
92 RP: 65.
93 RP: 34.
94 Cf. T. Fuller, 1993b: 23; 1996: xiv.
95 RP: 26. Another example mentioned by Oakeshott is W. Lippmann’s Public Philosophy, See RPML: 
111- 8.
96 D. Hall & T. Modood, 1982a: 176.
97 See, H. F. Pitkin, 1976: 301-20.
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limit the function of philosophy in order to transcend the Enlightenment ethical position 
without resulting in another Rationalist effect. And, it will become clearer when 
interpreting HC, that Oakeshott does not actually reject the importance of the “norms of 
conduct” in terms of lex in our political activity; he only argues that it is not the 
philosopher that should set up such authority for the practical man. The philosopher likes 
to observe what is going on rather than to reach a verdict for what should occur next.
The ground on which the liberal-rationalist rests while attempting to comment on 
our political and moral practice, as we well know by now, consists in the general belief 
that the progressive successes that Newtonian science has made in understanding and 
controlling Nature could provide the basis for a “robust optimism about moral and 
political matters”98. Such a connection between liberalism and scientism, for example, 
has been expressed by Russell in his Philosophy and Politics (1947) as follows:
What has theoretical philosophy to say that is relevant to the validity or otherwise of the 
liberal outlook? The essence of the liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held, but 
in how they are held; instead of being held dogmatically, they are held tentatively, and 
with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment. 
This is the way in which opinions are held in science, as opposed to the way in which 
they are held in theology. ... Science is empirical, tentative and undogmatic; all 
immutable dogma is unscientific. The scientific outlook, accordingly, is the intellectual 
counterpart of what is, in the practical sphere, the outlook of Liberalism.99
To say that the liberal outlook and empirical science could be inter-supported on 
account of being tentative, is to say that science involves only a set of methods and rules 
which are applicable to the sphere of politics. In this sense, the possibility of a normative 
ethical theory is possible only if there exist objective moral and political principles backed 
up by scientific reason in terms of scientific methods. This view, however, appears 
inadequate to Oakeshott. For, as we have said, the scientific reason that can be taken out 
of the actual scientific activity and as the normative guidance in practice is, in fact, a 
partial technique which rules out traditional knowledge in use.100 And yet, since every 
actual human activity involves both technical and traditional knowledge, it must be an 
error to substantiate human conduct in terms of a normative ethical theory.
98 R. Flathman, 1989: 19.
99 Quoted in ibid.: 18-9.
100 See, esp. RP: 34-5.
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The assumptions in relation to rationalist politics (esp. in the vision of liberal ethics) as a 
normative ethical theory, as already shown, can be expressed as follows: (1) a set of 
abstract moral and political principles; (2) radical individualism or the self-made man; and 
(3) formalism. According to Oakeshott, “there is no doubt that the liberal democratic 
manner of conducting affairs [in terms of these characteristics] is prone to a certain sort 
of corruption.”101 And to balance against its partiality, Oakeshott thus constructs his 
traditionalist politics by understanding political activity as (1) a “way of living” in which 
(2) the traditionalist-individual is engaged, (3) a “rhetorical form of reasoning” which 
deals with plausible statements in given circumstances through the “pursuit of 
intimations” of a political tradition:
IV.4.2. Abstract Laws vs. a Way of Living 
The character of liberalism recognised in terms of a set of moral and political principles, 
as already shown, is applicable to Lockean natural law theory, the Kantian categorical 
imperative, and Millian utilitarianism. Whilst in EM  Oakeshott has objected to the last 
two schools of thought on account of their mis-identifying philosophy with practice, in 
RP it is especially the theory of natural right to which Oakeshott directs much attention, 
when attacking rationalist politics.
In “Contemporary British Politics” (1947-8), Oakeshott first draws a distinction 
between “liberal conservatism” in favour of a natural law theory and the genuine 
“conservatism” that he wishes to re-construct. According to Oakeshott, the problem of 
contemporary British politics is the tyranny of central planning mainly carried out by the 
British socialist. It is without doubt that the politics of central planning is the politics of 
felt need; and so it is a form of rationalist politics. Although the British conservative 
differs from the socialist in understanding politics as “a limited activity, a necessary but 
second-rate affair”, as “the politics of the diffusion of power” which “are the only 
guarantee of the most valuable and substantial freedom known to human beings”,102 the 
British conservative (together with the liberal) fail to realise that human freedom is not 
“natural” but social. Oakeshott argues that:
101 RPML: 115.
102 Oakeshott, “Contemporary British Politics” (1947-8): 485, 487.
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[The conservative] thinks of [human] rights and duties as ‘limitation’ and of their 
adjustment as ‘interference’. It is an unfortunate way of thinking which is inherent in the 
simpler forms of a natural law conception of society. The truth is, however, that we do 
not begin by being free; the structure of our freedom is the rights and duties which, by 
long and painful effort, have been established in our society. The conditions of 
individuality are not limitations; there is nothing to limit. And the adjustments of those 
conditions are not interference (unless they are over-head adjustments); they are the 
continuation of the achievement.103
To keep the “natural” constituent out of a genuine conservatism, Oakeshott’s 
ultimate purpose is to establish an ideal mode of human relationship which is 
categorically distinctive from rationalist politics. The truly significant opposition “which 
is something of an altogether different nature”104 in contrast to the politics of central 
planning, Oakeshott thus claims, lies not in liberal conservatism but in what he calls the 
“rule of law”. The difference between the two is that whereas the former still understands 
politics in terms of an abstract ideology, the latter is able to recover the sense of politics 
as a “way of living” by considering the solidarity of a society in terms of rights and duties 
in practice.
The main theme that underlies “Contemporary British Politics” is represented in 
“The Political Economy of Freedom” (1949): “We call ourselves free because our pursuit 
of current desires does not deprive us of a sympathy for what went before; like the wise 
man, we remain reconciled with our past.”105 Government by rule of law, Oakeshott goes 
on, “is the greatest single condition of our freedom” because “it involves a partnership 
between past and present and between governors and governed which leaves no room 
for arbitrariness.”106
The more specific concern of the essay under consideration, nonetheless, is to 
recognise a form of “economic organisation” which corresponds to the conception of the 
rule of law and the idea of freedom it bears. And it is not surprising that Oakeshott 
claims “the political economy of freedom rests upon the clear acknowledgement that 
what is being considered is not ‘economics’ (not the maximisation of wealth, not 
productivity or the standard of life), but politics, that is, the custody of a manner of
103 Ibid.: 487-8.
104 Ibid.: 479.
105 RP: 396.
106 RP\ 391, 390.
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living; that these arrangements have to be paid for, are a charge upon our productive 
capacity; and that they are worth paying for so long as the price is not a diminution of 
what we have learned to recognise as liberty.”107
At this point, it is interesting to note that both socialism108 and liberalism are 
mentioned as “the plausible ethics of productivity” which constitute another thread 
pulling in the opposite direction to the political way of dealing with freedom. In the case 
of liberal ethics, this materialistic propensity may be traced back to the thought of Locke, 
and has come as “the most questionable element of Liberal Democracy.”109 And thus, on 
this issue, what is categorically opposed to “the ethics of productivity” is identified as 
“the ethics of custody”.
In “Political Education” (1951), Oakeshott keeps the distinction between 
freedom as a “procedure” and as a “hypothesis”. He writes that:
the ‘freedom’ which can be pursued is not an independently premeditated ‘ideal’ or a
dream; like scientific hypothesis, it is something which is already intimated in a concrete
manner o f  behaving. Freedom, like a recipe for game pie, is not a bright idea; it is not a
‘human right’ to be deduced from some speculative concept o f  human nature. The
freedom which we enjoy is nothing more than arrangements, procedures o f a certain kind 
110
Put briefly, then, Oakeshott in RP has made every effort to disencumber his 
conservatism of any abstract ideology-based foundation. This, however, does not make 
him devalue the importance of freedom in human conduct, but rather his intention is to 
give human freedom a more firm and plausible defence, that is, to treat it as a way of 
living. And by seeing the conservative disposition as a way of living without 
presupposing premeditated ends, Oakeshott is clearly aware that his conservatism is 
closer to the position of Montaigne than to that of Burke.111 As he sums up in “On Being 
Conservative” (1956), “what makes a conservative disposition in politics intelligible is 
nothing to do with a natural law or a providential order, nothing to do with morals or 
religion; it is the observation of our current manner of living.”112 In short, it is
107 RP: 406.
108 For Oakeshott’s discussion on the productivist version of socialism in terms of R. Owen, St Simon 
and Marx, scqMPME: 103-7. Cf. PFPS: 62-4.
109 Oakeshott, “John Locke”, “Introduction” to SPD\ quoted by P. Franco, 1990: 148.
110 RP: 53-4.
111 Cf. RP: 435.
112 RP: 423-3.
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traditionalist politics as a way of living that is seen as exclusively antagonistic to 
“abstract laws” of rationalist politics.
As a counterpart work of “Rationalism in Politics”, nonetheless, there are more insights 
about the Oakeshottian conservatism in politics that we can learn from the famous essay, 
“On Being Conservative”.
Here Oakeshott begins the essay with a disclosure of the general character of 
being conservative. In total contrast to Rationalism, Oakeshott claims that “to be 
conservative is to prefer the familiar to the unfamiliar, to prefer the tried to the untried, 
fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the 
distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present 
laughter to utopian bliss.”113 So, the disposition to be conservative is to enjoy what is 
available in the present rather than to wish for sudden change and innovation in the 
future. In a word, here as elsewhere in the essay, the key concept of being conservative is 
that of “familiarity”.
According to Oakeshott, conservative property as such is not necessarily rooted 
in so-called “human nature”: men naturally prefer safety to danger; but rather it is much 
more apt to obtain it from the observation of human conduct itself. And if this is a 
feasible task, the point Oakeshott intends to make is that “there are few of our activities 
which do not on all occasions call into partnership a disposition to be conservative and 
on some occasions recognise it as senior partner; and there are some activities where it is 
properly master.”114
In the first place, there are some fields of human activity which can be exercised 
only in virtue of a disposition to be conservative, because in these an attendant 
enjoyment rather than an extraneous reward is sought. For example, it is certainly the 
case with friendship. Friends are not concerned with what might be made of one another, 
but merely with the enjoyment of one another; the relationship of friend to friend is not 
utilitarian but dramatic, the tie is not usefulness but familiarity. And what is said about 
friendship here can go for the forms of activity such as patriotism and conversation as 
well. In sum, where there are activities which are engaged in for their own sake and
113 RP: 408.
114 RP: 422.
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enjoyed for what they are, the disposition to be conservative is not merely appropriate 
but a necessary condition.115
Besides, Oakeshott observes that although there are other activities which are not 
engaged in for their own sake, few of them do not, at some point or other, call for the 
disposition to be conservative. For, in these what one may call goal-pursued activities, 
for the sake of argument, a relative distinction may at once appear between the enterprise 
itself and the tools used for its achievements. And while one sees human activity in this 
way, it turns out that since “familiarity is the essence of tool using”116, as long as man is a 
tool using animal he is disposed to be conservative. That is to say, for Oakeshott “tool 
using” must make a call upon “skill in use” which necessarily involves “traditional or 
practical knowledge”, i.e. familiarity: For example, a carpenter can use his own tools 
more skilfully than any other example of the kind of tools commonly used by other 
carpenters, and the solicitor can use his own copy of the textbook on Wills more readily 
than any other. And consequently, “since doing business of one sort or another occupies 
most of our time and little can be done without tools of some kind, the disposition to be 
conservative occupies an unavoidably large place in our character.”117
It follows that to be conservative in politics is to engage in the pursuit of 
intimations in familiarity rather than to wish for novelty. That is to say, for the 
conservative, because government is providing rules of conduct, and because familiarity 
is the most important virtue in a rule, “the intimations of government are to be found in 
ritual, not in religion or philosophy; in the enjoyment of orderly and peaceful behaviour, 
not in the search for truth or perfection.”118 Put differently, Oakeshott considers that 
what is really significant in politics is “the art of the statesman”119 rather than “the 
science of the policy”. Thus, as T. Fuller puts it, to be an Oakeshottian conservative “is 
not to engage in reactionary politics, but in a ‘trimming act’ of statesmanship. [In this 
view] what practising politicians need is not a doctrine, but a view of the limits and 
possibilities of their situation.”120 In short, the contrast between rationalism in politics
115 RP: 415-7.
116 RP: 419.
117 RP: 420.
118 RP: 430, 428.
119 RPML: 107.
120 T. Fuller, 1996: xv.
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and conservatism in politics is the contrast between “the pursuit of innovations” versus 
the “pursuit of intimations”.
IV 4.3. Radical Individualism vs. Traditionalist Individualism
So far we have seen a number of expressions regarding the contrast between rationalist 
politics and traditionalist politics; also it may be contended that rationalist politics may 
embrace the ethos of both liberalism and socialism, the two abstract ideologies which, to 
quote MacIntyre, make up the “ethos of the distinctively modem and modernising 
world”.121 But here, it cannot be denied that, among many other things, there is a 
fundamental difference between the liberal and the socialist; namely, the idea of 
individuality. Generally speaking, it seems that for the liberal the ultimate principle in 
politics is the idea, as J. E. McTaggart claims, that “value is individual”,122 whereas for 
the socialist it is the notion of “common good”, where the individual is normally not 
thought of as the highest value. And so, although the liberal shares in common with the 
socialist the Rationalist characteristics of being abstract, perfect and anti-traditionalist, 
the notion of “perfection” may mean the inspiration of a Cartesian “self-made man” 
which “was recognised as a res cogitans, and in this is found the warrant of his 
independent experience”123 to the liberal, whilst it may stand for a Baconian “co­
operative enterprise” animating the socialist to assume that “the proper object of human 
endeavour was a comprehensive mundane condition of human circumstances 
characterised by ever increasing wealth, abundance and prosperity.”124
It is important to start making the distinction between the two forms of political 
thought, because in “Rationalism in Politics” (1947) and “Rational Conduct” (1950) 
Oakeshott is more likely to link rationalist politics with a certain view of the self, the 
mind or the individual (cf. the last two sections); in other works such as “The Masses in 
Representative Democracy” (1961) and HC, nonetheless, with the idea of “common 
good”. More crucially, since in “The Masses” Oakeshott does turn to construct the two 
categories of politics in terms of “the morality of the individual” and “the morality of the
121 A. MacIntyre, 1985: x.
122 Quoted by W. J. Coats, jr. 1985: 774.
123 MPME: 22.
124 MPME: 102.
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mass”, some writers take this as one of the central factors of Oakeshott’s separation of 
civil association from enterprise association in HCy in order to support their view that 
Oakeshott’s theory of civil association is liberal.125
This interpretation, however, is a misconception. Before coming to elucidate HC 
(and PFPS), it must be pointed out here that the theme disclosed in “The Masses” was 
actually a summary of the lectures on the history of modem European political theory 
that Oakeshott delivered at Harvard in 1958. And yet, because of its specific occasion,126 
in many ways there is very little in common between The Harvard Lectures and, say, the 
lectures Oakeshott gave at the LSE.127 More to the point, unlike what he did in “The 
Masses”,128 in lecturing on the liberal thinkers to Harvard students, Oakeshott actually 
criticised their foundationalist approach, although in a brief outline. As a result, the 
quality of the individual that Oakeshott praises in these lectures is still related to the 
character of traditionalist politics whose political behaviour is understood as a way of 
living, having nothing to do with it being used in the context of liberalism as a form of 
rationalist politics. In other words, although Oakeshott appreciates the morality of 
individualism, he clearly distinguishes “traditionalist individualism” from “liberal 
individualism” within that individualistic paradigm of morality.
It is significant to note at the outset that Oakeshott’s attention to the past in The 
Harvard Lectures is directed to a sophisticated “abridgement” of what has been thought 
in respect of the office and pursuits of government,129 which suggests that it is a quasi- 
philosophical past rather than an historical past with which he is dealing.130 According to 
Oakeshott, the character of post-medieval European politics and government which 
constitutes the context for the reflections of modem political thinkers, generally 
speaking, is predicated on two distinctive and opposed moral dispositions: the morality 
of individualism, and the morality of collectivism, anti-individualism or the mass-man.
125 See, esp. P. Franco, 1990: 152-6; cf. W. J. Coats, jr. 1985.
126 Harvard is surely the bedrock of academic liberalism in the States.
127 Cf. K. Minogue, 1993b: vii-viii.
128 Even with regard to the matter of individuality, Oakeshott’s major purpose in the essay is to provide 
the “clearest evidence of the overwhelming impact of [the] experience of individuality” in modem 
Europe in order to show that human individuality is an historic emergence. (RP: 368, 370.)
129 See esp. MPME: 3,12.
130 On this issue, K. Minogue comments that Oakeshott’s attitude towards the past in The Harvard 
Lectures “was to reject methodological formulae and to rely upon a philosophical self-consciousness 
[emphasis mine] about the precise relevance of questions being asked and answered.” (See K. Minogue, 
1993b: viii.)
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Each of these moralities has appeared as different transformations of an earlier morality 
characterising medieval Europe, namely, the “morality of communal ties”, even though 
the morality of collectivism may be regarded as a reaction against the morality of 
individualism which had first established itself in the early post-medieval period.131
In interpreting how modem political reflection seems to disperse itself in the 
direction of the morality of individualism, Oakeshott describes the elements of 
individualism in the liberal tradition by focusing on the political thought of Locke, Kant, 
Smith, Bentham and Mill. The detail of Oakeshott’s interpretation, interesting as it is, is 
not my major concern here, and an investigation of the three classic liberals: Locke, Kant 
and Mill, has been offered in Chapter II. I only wish to note that Oakeshott classifies 
liberal individualism into three categories (on which my previous discussions on liberal 
ethics rest): first, the Lockean theological or natural law vision, where “individuality is 
the gift of an omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker”;132 second, the Kantian metaphysical 
vision, where a “metaphysical and ethical context” is given to justify the experience of 
the individual;133 and thirdly, the utilitarian vision, where each man is considered as 
having a natural character “to make his own choices for himself about his own 
happiness.”134 Oakeshott finds all of these inadequate:
I believe it to be a virtue in any theory that it avoids calling upon unnecessary 
hypotheses. And if this is so we are likely to conclude that many of the versions of the 
political theory of individualism are capable of improvement in this respect. Writers in 
this idiom, in order to make their position impregnable, have been accustomed to 
construct a foundation [emphasis mine] far in excess of what is required to carry the 
superstructure. They have invoked metaphysical theories of personality [e.g. Kant], they 
have appealed to principles of natural law [e.g. Locke], they have elaborated theories of 
human nature in general [e.g. the utilitarian]. But what they have written in this respect is 
not so much erroneous - indeed, it may all be demonstrably true - as unnecessary. And 
this redundance would, I think, have more clearly appeared if the general character of a
135political theory had been more fully appreciated.
131 For this theme, see also, RP: 295-8.
132 MPME: 58
133 MPME: 64.
134 MPME: 78. For Oakeshott, it is an exaggeration to associate Mill with Bentham in terms of 
utilitarianism, and Mill has substituted an almost entirely different doctrine for the utilitarianism of 
Bentham. (MPME: 78-83) And yet, I interpreted Mill as an utilitarian in [II.3.4.], because what really 
matters for Bentham and Mill is the attempt to justify the value of the individual in terms of “human 
nature”.
]3S MPME: 83-4.
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It is no surprise that Oakeshott believes the “unnecessary hypotheses” appear 
equally in the political theory of collectivism, which for the most part have three main 
versions as well: first, a religious version as in the political theory of Calvinism and in the 
government of the Geneva of Calvin and Bera, where the perfect manner of human 
existence is understood as “righteousness” or “moral virtue”;136 second, a “productivist” 
version in the thought of R. Owen, St. Simon and Marx, where “perfection” is 
understood as a condition of “prosperity, of “abundance” or “wealth”;137 and third, a 
“distributionist” version as in the works of Babeuf, Marechal and Buonarotti, where the 
“perfection” is understood as “security” or “welfare”.138 But in any event, it indicates 
that in The Harvard Lectures Oakeshott does not intend to take either the side of liberal 
individualism or that of socialist collectivism as they are both hypothetical (and are thus 
forms of Rationalist ideologies).
Oakeshott regarded himself to be a philosopher of the morality of individualism, 
or, as we shall see, the Hobbesian paradigm of Will and Artifice. To avoid the 
“unnecessary hypotheses” in the liberal tradition of individualism, Oakeshott thus 
believes that the genuine individualistic manner of governing need not demonstrate any 
eternal validity or fundamental structure; all it needs “is to recognise the appearance of 
such subjects - namely, subjects intent upon the enjoyment of individuality - in sufficient 
numbers to make it appropriate to consider the corresponding office of government.”139 
With reference to Oakeshott’s own conception of philosophy, this means that a genuine 
philosophical theory of individualism is so sceptical and self-limited that it should add 
nothing to the practical enjoyment of individuality but only consider individuality as a 
condition of modem political practice; and in this respect an historic exposition is simply 
sufficient to unveil the “undeniable fact that a large part of the intellectual energy of 
European thinkers over a period of four centuries has been engaged in elucidating a 
theory of government appropriate to subjects of this character.”140 It is therefore re­
confirmed here that it is a philosophical self-awareness rather than a pure historical
136 MPME: 92-9.
137 MPME: 100-7.
138 MPME: 107-10.
139 MPME: 84.
] 40MPME: 85.
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concern that really penetrates Oakeshott’s comprehension of the history of modem 
political theory in The Harvard Lectures.
A philosophical reflection, indeed, attempts to transcend hypothetical 
abstractness; and a philosophical reflection on politics is meant to consider the nature of 
politics, namely the question of what the activity called “governing” really is.141 Given 
the shortcomings of the moralities of socialist collectivism and liberal individualism, 
Oakeshott’s furthest aim is therefore to establish a more sophisticated account of the 
historic achievement of the subject’s enjoyment of individuality. His non-foundationalist 
account for this, to be sure, is related to an understanding of morality as composing a 
vernacular language of colloquial intercourse of agents, and it is ultimately expressed in 
the mode of civil association. Before putting HC under examination, it is my task to 
articulate that the property of individuality that Oakeshott accepts in theorising the mode 
of civil association as such, has been implied in our previous exploration of RP in terms 
of conservatism in politics.
To sum up, the doctrine of radical individualism in the liberal context, which 
maintains that “the individual is ontologically and morally independent of the social 
groups and institutions to which they belong” is, of course, related to an understanding 
of the mind as “an independent instrument capable of dealing with experience”. 
However, Oakeshott would argue that, although freedom is a necessary condition of 
human agency, it is an historic achievement rather than a general principle;142 freedom is 
meaningful only if it is treated as a way of living rather than as a natural right. Hence, the 
political economy of freedom is not about the problem of self-productivity, but about the 
problem of a political procedure. And instead of following a hypothesis, the individual 
consequently must converse with other people, to pursue the moral intimations in 
familiarity, namely, a tradition of concrete moral exemplifications, such that he can be 
said to be in possession of the genuine character of being a free man.
T. Fuller has, therefore, argued that “Oakeshott was an individualist, but not an 
abstract individualist. Individuality is a self-understanding composed in responding to 
others in a certain tradition of behaviour. We understand ourselves to be individuals
141 MPME: 14. Cf. RPML: 138-55; RP: 223-5.
142 See esp. RP: 69, 370.
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because we are self-conscious within a context of innumerable self-conscious agents.”143 
And in other places I have referred to this treatment of individuality as “traditionalist 
individualism”. Thus, Oakeshott’s reaction against liberal ethics is certainly not to 
convert to the morality of collectivism, nor is it to rule out the concept of a free 
individual from a substantial philosophical discourse. On the contrary, Oakeshott’s 
purpose is to return our individuality to the concrete tradition of moral and political 
practice where a true enjoyment may be achieved.
I V 4.4. Formal Argumentation vs. Substantial Conversation 
Liberalism and socialism are then likewise Rationalist in the sense of being abstract, anti­
traditionalist, and in search of a perfect solution to practice, whether the perfection is 
understood as a Kantian ultimate foundation of human freedom or a Baconian 
comprehensive project of “setting the condition of the world.”144 The third characteristic 
of liberal ethics as a form of rationalist politics can accordingly be understood as an 
attempt to establish universally “demonstrative moral truth” in terms of “formal 
argumentation”. And to reveal its incompleteness, we shall be returning to Oakeshott’s 
concept of “substantial conversation”.
To elucidate: In modem times, Oakeshott proposes that political discourse, with 
the desire for certainty in place of conjecture in political affairs, has turned in the 
direction of taking in an “argumentative” logical design, where people are seeking for 
“apodeictic political discourse”, i.e. a kind of argument able to prove or disprove the 
“correctness” of political proposals.145 That is to say, modem political discourse basically 
reflects the Enlightenment situation of treating human affairs as a series of problems to 
be solved by those most scientific and perfect solutions. Thus, the argumentative logical 
design that the Rationalist upholds seeks to establish demonstrative moral and political 
truth which can be applied universally; and so it predicates the character of formalism in 
ethics.
143 T. Fuller, 1996: 10.
UA MPME: 102.
USRP: 81-2.
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This view, however, appears unreasonable to Oakeshott, “because discourse 
which deals in conjectures and possibilities and the weighting of circumstantial pros and 
cons is reasoning, and it is the only sort of reasoning appropriate to practical affairs. In 
this matter Aristotle and Isocrates are better guides than Plato and Marx.”146 This means 
that political discourse is not demonstrable logic, i.e. necessary truth, but the contextual 
plausibility in the circumstances. There are no necessities in political discourse, only 
probabilities and “what is true” for now. Hence, it is basically from the revival of the 
Aristotelian notion of rhetoric that Oakeshott’s understanding of reasoning in practice 
comes. I now want to consider this practical reasoning with regard to the terminology of 
“conversation” used in RP.
It seems to me that Oakeshott uses the term “conversation”, at least, in three 
main distinguishable but related senses. In the first sense, as to be found in the context of 
The Voice o f Poetry in the Conversation o f Mankind (1959), it is used at large to signify 
the “meeting-place” of the diverse idioms of human discourse, i.e. the “greatest and the 
most sustained” of all the accomplishments of mankind.147 The Oakeshottian notion of 
the conversation of mankind, as I have indicated elsewhere, stands for a propensity of 
“civilisation” being carried on between a variety of human activities148, which is in 
conflict with the Enlightenment project. That is to say, whilst the latter predicates a 
world of certainties, truths and resolutions in which the philosophe is expected to 
provide the agents with extrinsic profits and prizes; the former points to a world of 
possibilities, plausibilities and approximations in which “there is no symposiarch or 
arbiter, not even a doorkeeper to examine credentials.” 149 This means that this widest 
comprehension of conversation symbolises an anti-foundationalist attitude which evokes 
the openness, playfulness and flexibility of human engagement as a whole: conversation 
is “an unrehearsed intellectual adventure”150, in that everything is permitted. Thus, as 
Oakeshott concludes, the ideal character of human relationship recognised as a 
conversation is one “where each voice speaks in its own idiom, where from time to time
146 RP: 95.
147 See VP: 12, 14
148 SqqRP: 187.
149 See VP: 10-1.
150 VP: 11.
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one voice may speak louder than others, but where none has natural superiority let alone 
primacy.”151
But further, it follows from this that to be a participant in human discourse one is 
required to learn how to use the language concerned through a corresponding 
conversational manner rather than an argumentative disposition. So in Oakeshott’s 
writings there appears a second usage of the term “conversation” which is taken, not to 
be a metaphor for civilisation, but to delineate a general method of understanding the 
multiplicity of meanings that compose a tradition of activity;152 It is without doubt that 
this derivative sense of conversation is a preferred pedagogical method that plays a 
central role in Oakeshott’s educational thought.153 And with reference to the distinction 
between traditional and technical knowledge that has been unveiled above, it can be 
inferred that for Oakeshott the excellence of the conversational manner of thinking is 
that: whilst the logic of argumentation persuades the agents to pay attention to technical 
knowledge alone, in a conversation they are capable of learning “how to go about 
things” by synthesising both forms of knowledge in question.
In this sense, not only the practical man but also the theorists such as the 
historian or the scientist need to converse with a certain tradition of behaviour in order to 
fulfil his undertaking. But since, as we have seen, every tradition of activity has its own 
reason to deal with its own business, the usage of conversation as a method of 
understanding should be further qualified when applied to different modes of experience. 
That is to say, unlike most of Oakeshott’s interpreters, I believe that to avoid confusion a 
third level of the term “conversation” must be maintained, that is, conversation as a 
specified condition of reasoning appropriate to the mode of experience related. For 
example, what Oakeshott has famously said about the outlook of conversing with a 
political tradition in “Political Education” is so distinct that it has little to do with the 
historical study. For in the practical world the form of conversation is eventually 
exercised to deal with plausible statements in given circumstances. But the historian 
certainly does not engage in judging the plausibility of statements for particular past 
situations, since he has never lived in those contexts.
151 VP: 55.
152 See, for example, J. L. Auspitz, 1993: 7; K. Minogue, 1993a: 49. Cf. P. Franco, 1990: 133.
153 See esp. VL: 39-42, 51, 62, 97-101, 104, 133-4. For the conversational character of Oakeshott’s 
thought of education, see also T. Fuller, 1990.
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In considering the character of conservatism in politics, we are then concerned 
with the modified meaning of conversation as a way of illustrating the traditional 
knowledge embodied in a political tradition, with regard to the circumstantial responses 
to political issues appearing within that tradition. Here, we thus find that Oakeshott is at 
his most Aristotelian in suggesting that our practical reasoning is a form of rhetoric in 
relation to phronesis which is likely to deal with particular political problems in given 
situations by way of appealing to a complete understanding of a tradition of political 
activity.154 That is, for Oakeshott, making a political judgement in favour of plausibility is 
not frivolous nor flimsy, it is to contemplate pros and cons in detail by means of learning 
insights from an informative tradition of political activity. In short, in the Oakeshottian 
“political conversation”, circumstantial considerations and traditional knowledge are 
inseparable. With this in mind, we may now return to examine what Oakeshott means by 
“the pursuit of intimations” in “Political Education”.
We have mentioned that for Oakeshott politics is never anything more than the 
pursuit of intimations; what is required in politics is a conversation, not an argument. 
Now, this means that to consider which statements are plausible for current political 
situations all we have to do is make a cogent contact with what other people have 
understood themselves to be in a political tradition. And since Oakeshott’s scepticism 
articulates that the arrangements of a tradition are so complicated and far reaching that 
they must “intimate a sympathy for what does not fully appear”, the conservative 
disposition in politics in terms of conversation is to engage in the “convincing 
exploration of a sympathy, present but not yet followed up.”155 For example, Oakeshott 
argues that the legal status of women in Britain was in confusion, because the rights and 
duties that composed that status intimated something more than the arguments drawn 
from abstract natural rights, from “justice” or from some general concept of feminine 
personality. And on the view of things that Oakeshott has been suggesting in the 
previous discussions, it is understandable that he reaches the conclusion that the only 
credible explanation to be advanced for the “technical enfranchisement of woman” was 
that in almost every respect they had already been enfranchised.156
154 Cf. P. Riley, 1992: 650.
155 RP: 57.
156 RP: 57.
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It appears that in politics the pursuit of intimations involves a conversational way 
of learning things as they appeared in the wisdom of past agents’ utterances and 
performances so as to come to terms with plausible statements in given circumstances. 
On this meaning, the traditional knowledge, which in the practical world can be 
understood as the actual moral and political exemplifications that have already been 
intimated in past voices, can only be pursued in terms of conversation, not in terms of 
argumentation. And consequently, “since a tradition of behaviour is not susceptible of 
the distinction between essence and accident, knowledge of it [through conversation] is 
unavoidably knowledge of its detail: to know only the gist is to know nothing. What has 
to be learned is not an abstract idea, or a set of tricks, not even a ritual, but a concrete, 
coherent manner of living in all its intricateness.”157
The self involved in a concrete political understanding, Oakeshott would then 
agree, is a hermeneutic-self, not an argumentative-self. It may, therefore, be re-acclaimed 
here that Oakeshott is never an advocate of radical individualism, but a philosopher of 
traditionalist individualism. Far from being associated with the liberal context, 
Oakeshott’s affirmation of the importance of tradition in our understanding of practical 
affairs is a position that is closer to that of the nineteenth-century classical hermeneutics 
when the writers such as Schleiermacher, Droysen and Dilthey claimed that “the 
awareness of one’s own history and of that of mankind as a whole is an indispensable 
condition for a rich and fulfilled life.”158 At this point, it is no surprise that Oakeshott 
believes history as a mode of understanding must be taken seriously in political 
education.159 For history, by definition, is the form of enquiry which works on the 
complexity and comprehensiveness of human actions in terms of contingency and 
particularity; so a history of the manner of political thinking and doing will provide the 
practical man with more concrete knowledge about a political tradition to be conversed 
with, and thus balance against the trans-traditional foundation of rationalist politics.
But, in contrast to classical hermeneutics, I do not think that Oakeshott really 
adopts an historicist position in the sense of making all practice historical. The non- 
historicist communication between history and practice in Oakeshott’s thought,
157 RP: 59-60.
158 J. Bleicher, 1980: 9, and chap. 1 for the theoretical outline of classical hermeneutics.
l59RP: 63-4.
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nonetheless, is a wider question that I must return to in [V.4.1.]. For now, I think it is 
only sufficient to conclude that in RP Oakeshott has made every effort to establish a 
traditionalist mode of understanding politics as a way of living, an effort which should be 
appreciated by anyone who is frustrated by the world which is being governed by a 
vocabulary of scientifically validated moral and political beliefs.
IV.4.5. The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism 
This is not the end of the matter yet. I have mentioned that Oakeshott’s understanding of 
the two contrasting modes of morality and politics does not lack a concern about their 
historic context. To consider this aspect of Oakeshott’s thought expressed at the time of 
his writings published in RP, an essential work is now available to us, namely, The 
Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (PFPS).
The subject of PFPS, as that of The Harvard Lectures, is to consider the manner 
of understanding the activity of governing and being governed in the history of modem 
European politics. And here, once again, it is significant to note that Oakeshott takes the 
work as an investigation into the past which is not historical. He concedes that the 
examination offered in the essay is “a study of change but without revealing (what alone 
interests the historian) the mediation of change.”160 That is, it is not concerned with a 
complete historical account of the office of government in terms of change, but with the 
extremes defining the limits of “a complex, historic alloy, a mixture of heterogeneous and 
not always congmous elements”161 of the office of government.
Through extremes, then, Oakeshott identifies the poles which “protect” the 
identity of the manner of governing; insofar as “these extremes may not only be distant 
from one another, allowing a generous space for manoeuvre; they may even be specially 
opposed to one another, the one forbidding all (or most) of what the other prescribes, or 
at least warrants.”162 It is thus not inappropriate to regard the general character of the 
extreme as an emblem of a profound division within the manner of governing. And so, it 
may be expected that the poles in question are comprised of rationalism in politics and
160 PFPS: 19; cf. 46, 57.
161 PFPS: 10.
162 PFPS: 11.
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conservatism in politics, which Oakeshott here refers to as the politics of faith and the 
politics of scepticism.163
In recognising these two historic styles of politics, we are then looking at their 
ideal characteristics. It is possible to appreciate Oakeshott’s viewpoint that the most 
characteristic assumption of the politics of faith is the view of understanding governing 
as perfection, that is, an “unlimited” activity responding to “an inspired perception of 
what the common good is”.164 The politics of scepticism is rooted in a sceptical view 
about human perfection, and thus sees politics as a “limited” activity whose main 
business is to maintain the “superficial order”.165
But how have these styles of politics emerged? In brief, they are both the 
stepchildren of the “enlargement of power” which marks the beginning of modern times. 
Given the fact that modem government, due to the centralisation of authority to control 
and integrate the activities of its subjects, and the application of more efficient techniques 
in commerce or in industry, had already at its disposal more power than since the 
medieval ages,166 politics of faith and the politics of scepticism can be seen as two 
opposed responses given to this historic phenomenon.
To start with, the optimistic response to the enlargement of power was, of 
course, to be found in the politics of faith, and it was with Bacon that this style of politics 
had “unmistakably emerged”.167 That is to say, as we have seen from The Harvard 
Lectures, Oakeshott interprets Bacon as “the mirror of his age and the chief architect of 
the politics of faith”,168 when he was inspired by the capacity he saw in mankind to 
achieve its “well-being” and to regard government as the chief agent in a pursuit of 
perfection.169 And in a similar manner, Oakeshott claims the politics of faith has exploited 
two main idioms since Bacon: a religious version and a productivist version (in The 
Harvard Lectures a distributivist version has been added, though).
163 It must be noted here that “the ‘faith’ in question is virtually the opposite of traditional religious 
faith. It is the faith in the capacity of human beings to perfect themselves through their own effort, made 
possible by the discovery of ways continually to increase the power of government as essential 
instramentally to control, design and perfect individuals and groups.” (T. Fuller, 1996: xi.)
164 PFPS: 23-30, esp. 27.
165 PFPS: 30-8, esp. 34.
166 PFPS: 46-50.
167 PFPS: 57.
leg p F p s . 52
169 PFPS: 53-7.
-181 -
The politics of scepticism, on the other hand, was a pessimistic response to the 
“enlargement of power”. This means that in the modem context political scepticism 
sprang up not merely as a reaction against the politics of faith, but also as a self- 
conscious response to the circumstances that made possible the politics of faith, namely, 
the appearance of government as a “public office” with a special status commonly 
recognised as “sovereignty”.170 Moreover, the emergence of the politics of scepticism 
also has to do with the current of doubt and despondency appearing in the early 
seventeenth-century literature as a relic of medieval pessimism not yet dismissed by the 
optimism of Baconian thought. In Montaignean traditionalism, for example, custom is 
seen as an indispensable condition of human understanding on the account that man is so 
composed of contrarieties that, if he is to enjoy any coherence of activity, he needs to 
follow a mle whose virtue is not that it is “just” but that it is “settled”.171 In this respect, 
what categorically distinguishes sceptical politics from the other extreme in the early 
modem period is a sense of morality, where “the earth [was] recognised not as a world 
to be exploited but as a ‘player’s stage’.”172
An additional resource for the emergence of the politics of scepticism, Oakeshott 
continues, came from the historic character of the English Parliament. In the early 
centuries of the modem period the Parliament was still perceived as a “court of law” 
which provided judicial provisions of remedies for wrongs and meted out justice to all 
according to their desires. As a result, the office of government was recognised as the 
“maintenance of rights” and the “redress of wrongs”, not as the pursuit of a 
comprehensive setting of activity upon all the subjects of the realm. In this manner the 
Parliament was “an inheritance that spoke directly in habit and institution and needed no 
elaborate interpretation in order to divulge an understanding of government in [the 
sceptical] style.”173 Furthermore, a wider tradition of sceptical politics, in Oakeshott’s 
view, may include thinkers such as Bayle, Fontenelle, Schaftesbury, Hume, Burke, 
Hegel, Coleridge, Calhoun and Macaulay and so on. Irrespective of how they diverge 
from one another, they have in common a rejection of the politics of faith, that is, they 
object to the understanding of politics as an unlimited and overwhelming activity.
170 PFPS: 70-5.
171 PFPS: 76.
172 PFPS: 76.
173 PFPS: 77.
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On these views, Oakeshott states that the Constitution of United States of 
America and some aspects of Locke’s, Bentham’s and Paine’s thoughts contain the 
elements of sceptical politics. But this gives insufficient reason to interpret Oakeshott as 
a defender of liberalism. For Oakeshott contends that the politics of the modem world 
are the concordia discors of the two styles of government, and consequently it is 
possible that some writers do not support the one to the complete exclusion of the 
other.174 One of the main failures of modem scepticism in terms of a liberal outlook, 
Oakeshott soon points out, was its alliance with the politics of natural rights as in 
Locke’s writings.175 He writes that:
It was, perhaps, unavoidable that a style of governing in which the office of government 
is understood as the maintenance of appropriate order, the preservation of rights and 
duties and the redress of wrongs should be ambitious to establish itself on a firm 
foundation. The impulse to assure ourselves that our arrangements and authorised 
manners of behaviour represent not merely fact and habit, but ‘justice’ and ‘truth’, and 
that they have a ‘certainty’ which is out of reach of the vicissitudes of time and place, has 
always been strong. But it is an impulse which belongs properly to faith. Historically, so 
far as scepticism is concerned, it must be regarded as an infection caught from faith, a 
temporary desertion of its own character induced by the plausible triumphs of faith. And 
that such a foundation should be sought in the notion that the rights and duties to be 
protected are ‘natural’ and to be defended on account of their naturalness was an 
enterprise given in the climate of seventeenth-century opinion. The writer who led Europe 
in this respect was John Locke, the most ambiguous of all political writers of modem 
times; a politica l sceptic who inadvertently im posed the idiom o f  fa ith  upon the 
sceptical understanding o f  government [emphasis mine]. But how out of character this 
enterprise soon became apparent. To turn ‘right’ and ‘duties’ which were known as 
historic achievements, elicited by patient and judicial inquest from the manner in which 
men were accustomed to behave, into ‘natural’ rights and duties was to deny them just 
that contingency of character which was the heart of the sceptical interpretation, and was 
to attribute to them an absoluteness and a performance which in the sceptical
176understanding of them they could not possess.
I cite this important passage at length, because it repeatedly unveils Oakeshott’s 
rejection of the intellectual foundations of liberalism in relation to the assumptions of 
formalism in ethics: the impulse to establish the arrangements of politics on a firm 
foundation, in terms of a certain radical individualist theory such as that of natural rights, 
in order to arrive at a moral and political certainty indifferent to the vicissitudes of time
174 PFPS: 80.
175 Another example Oakeshott gives us is the alliance of sceptical politics with the politics of 
republicanism. See PFPS: 83-4.
176 PFPS: 82-3.
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and place. And here, what Oakeshott says about Locke, of course, applies to Kant and 
utilitarianism as well.
Moreover, it may help to clarify that, so far as the office of government is 
concerned, the root of liberalism or liberal democracy, claiming the value of the 
individual more than anything else, is a reaction against the politics of common good. 
However, at this point liberal ethics is, in fact, theoretically self-defeated in the sense of 
“imposing the idiom of faith upon the sceptical understanding of government.” That is, 
the quality of individuality that the liberal intends to protect is so radically ahistorical 
that it fails in its original purpose of seeing politics as the maintenance of rights, which 
are actually historic achievements. With liberalism, as a result, the idea of perfection has 
penetrated into a form of moral individualism purporting to suggest that we “ought” not 
because we “must” but because we “can”. In short, Oakeshott observes that the serious 
fault with liberalism is not its initial meaning to maintain the importance of individuality, 
but what it comes to achieve, namely a formalist theory of morality and politics.
Through our examination of The Harvard Lectures and PFPS, it has become 
more than clear that the extremes recognised as the politics of individualism and the 
politics of collectivism cannot be identified with the politics of scepticism and the politics 
of faith without qualification, in that Oakeshott does not agree with the liberal 
understanding of individuality as presented in the works of Locke, Kant or utilitarianism. 
Furthermore, to protect the identification of modem European politics in terms of two 
historic poles, Oakeshott in PFPS actually takes the sceptical thoughts intimated in the 
writings of Montaigne and so forth, and in the historic implications of the English 
Parliament as those that are categorically opposed to the politics of faith; and it is of little 
wonder to remark that it is the fortunes of the politics of scepticism as such that matches 
with the essences of Oakeshott’s own traditionalist politics that we have discovered so 
far. Consequently, it is observable that in this philosophical-historic scheme, liberal 
individualism only stands obliquely in between the extremes of faithful politics and 
sceptical politics; it is identifiable within the polarised structure of modem European 
politics but it has never reached either of these two poles. And I do not think Oakeshott 
has changed his position on this matter in HC\ The contrast between societas and 
universitas is a reformulation of the contrast between the politics of scepticism and the
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politics of faith; and the theory of civil association is a restatement of non-liberal 
conservatism in politics.
Before moving on to HC, nevertheless, there is another aspect of PFPS worth 
mentioning. So far the impression gained may be that Oakeshott’s philosophical 
enterprise never lacks an historic concern. Yet in PFPS, the historic concern has led him 
to detect that circumstances have arisen to push our politics so decidedly and over such a 
long period of time in the direction of the extreme in the politics of faith that we forget 
that “in order to make the fire bum a little more briskly, we have pulled out all the 
dampers, and in our enjoyment of the warmth we fail to remark that the scuttle is empty 
and the chimney near to being on fire.”177 That is to say, reflecting upon the theme of RP, 
in PFPS Oakeshott also sees the predicament of our time as a situation in which 
Rationalism has been at work for so long that we have gradually lost the sense of politics 
as a way of living. As a result, he maintains, “what needs to be restored in contemporary 
politics is a balance of attention and a balance of power.”178
Here, it comes as no surprise that Oakeshott claims the balance in question is the 
“separation of powers” in its formal sense, where the rule of law should win approval. 
For government by rule of law, that is, by means of enforcement by prescribed methods 
of settled rules binding alike on governors and governed, is itself an emblem of that 
diffusion of power which it exists to promote; it is the method of government most 
economical in the use of power. Oakeshott writes that:
[The rule o f law] involves a partnership between past and present and between governors 
and governed which leaves no room for arbitrariness; it encourages a tradition o f  
moderation and o f  resistance to the growth o f  dangerous assembles o f  power which is far 
more effective than any promiscuous onslaught, however crushing; it controls effectively, 
but without breaking the grand affirmative flow o f activity; and it gives a practical 
definition o f the kind o f  limited but necessary service that may be expected from 
government, restraining us from vain and dangerous expectation, and it from 
overreaching ambition.179
This statement, indeed, at once carries us back to Oakeshott’s own sympathy for 
traditionalist politics.
177 PFPS: 11.
178 PFPS: 86.
179 PFPS: 88-9.
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For Oakeshott, then, theoretically the politics of scepticism is a more coherent 
way of understanding politics, and given the predicament of our time in terms of 
Rationalism, it is “perhaps more appropriate to our circumstance”180. This, however, 
does not mean that conservative politics should substitute for rationalist politics, for it is 
not the philosopher’s task to offer a direction for us to follow. But rather, it only 
indicates that Oakeshott’s inclination to traditionalism is the result of a philosophical 
scrutiny in which both the theoretical and the historic conditions are considered.
Thus, the philosophical-historic perspective at stake does not concede that a 
history of political thought should replace political philosophy. Before turning to discuss 
the relation of history to philosophy in the next chapter, it only need be remembered that 
in a quasi-philosophical past the philosopher is aware that the historic conditions of 
modem European moral and political activity are predicated on a “circumscribed range 
of movement”,181 but he does not take this for granted. Instead, he views it as an 
“invitation” that calls for further investigation,182 and the result is a philosophical 
synthesis of the two extremes in favour of scepticism. For the sake of structure, I shall 
not discuss this facet of PFPS until the very end of this chapter.
IV.5. On Human Conduct
Having examined Oakeshott’s earlier works, we are now in a better position to consider 
his final statement on politics,183 namely On Human Conduct (HC).
IV. 5.1. Understanding Human Conduct
noRP: 426.
181 PFPS: 116.
182 Cf. HC: 1-31.
183 It is true that HC provides “a clarifying summation of [Oakeshott’s] reflection on political activity.” 
(T. Fuller, 1976: 185.) In saying that it is Oakeshott’s final statement on politics, however, I do not 
subscribe to Barber’s claim that Oakeshott’s earlier works before HC lack a “unification of themes”. (B. 
Barber, 1976: 450.)
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Oakeshott begins HC with the essay “On the Understanding of Human Conduct”, which 
comprises three sections of analysis: first, a brief account of the general character of 
understanding, continuing to maintain a non-foundationalist conception of philosophy 
and the self-consistency of modes of understanding or platforms of theorising (as he now 
calls it);184 second, an ethical theorising of “human conduct”; and third, a theoretical 
attempt to understand a contingent human performance which may be recognised as 
historical.185 However, it is only the second topic that I propose to examine here.
The expression “human conduct” used here denotes an ideal character; that is, 
“conduct” itself cannot be performed but it only postulates the conditions of human 
actions and utterances in terms of which they may be understood.186 In other words, 
Oakeshott is never tired of clarifying the categorical distinction between theory and 
practice: to theorise human conduct is not to “diagnose a situation” but to think in 
different terms what one already understands, not to enhance the intelligence of what 
goes on but to understand it in terms of its postulates.187 The idea of “conduct inter 
homines (i.e. performances understood as transactions between agents) that concerns 
Oakeshott is then, “that of an agent disclosing and enacting himself in performances
184 Consider, for example, this paragraph taken from HC: “Of the path it [the continuous enterprise of 
theorising or thinking] may follow, some (we may suppose) will soon exhaust their promise. It is an 
engagement of arrivals and departures. Temporary platforms of conditional understanding are always 
being reached, and the theorist may turn aside to explore them. But each is an arrival, an enlightenment, 
and a point of departure. The notion of an unconditional or definitive understanding may hover in the 
background, but it has no part in the adventure.” (HC: 2-3.)
185 It says that there are two idioms of theoretical understanding which are particularly discussed in HC: 
an ethical study which explains the postulates of human conduct as a whole, and an historical enquiry 
which deals with a substantive human action in a contingent context. These two conditional platforms of 
understanding must be distinguished from one another, because the theorems that compose the identity 
“human conduct” in an ethical exploration cannot elucidate the intelligence of a substantive human 
utterance or performance in an historical understanding. As such the latter is merely an illustration not 
an example of the former. (HC: 92.) Some writers, however, fail to tell the difference that Oakeshott 
makes here. (See, for example, B. Barber, 1976: 452-3; D. Thomas, 1977: 453; D. R. Mapel, 1990: 394.)
The reason why Oakeshott discusses the characteristics of history and ethics in the first essay of 
HC, I believe, lies in the fact that they are the two “instruments of theoretical enquiry” that Oakeshott 
wishes to apply to his later examinations of civil association and of a modem European state in the 
second and third essays of HC respectively. However, I do not think that what Oakeshott actually gives 
us is an historical past; but rather it can only be a quasi-philosophical past.
186 HC: 31.
187 HC: 32-5. When a going-on is identified as a human action, Oakeshott believes, our identification of 
it can be seen as a “diagnosis”, i.e. an invitation to understand what is being understood in the 
performance or utterance of that action. Thus, the identity “Tom considers which of two shoes he shall 
buy” is a diagnosis of what is being understood to prescribe the utterance or performance that “Tom is 
asking the salesman about the prices of the two shoes”. By contrast, however, that which is really 
problematic for an ethical theorist, for example, is not to re-make a diagnosis of human actions in more
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whose imagined and wished-for outcomes are performances of other agents or other 
performances of himself: satisfactions, not only pursued in actions and purchased by 
actions, but wholly composed of actions.”188
This characterisation is, of course, liable to understand human conduct in terms 
of the postulates of a free agent who is willing to make a response to a contingent 
situation (deliberation), to diminish the hazards of his action (persuasion) and to make his 
action more intelligible (explanation).189 And so, it basically reflects the conditions of the 
world of practice that Oakeshott has disclosed in EM: practice is the alteration or 
maintenance of “what is” so as to agree with a “what ought to be”; the principle of the 
coherence of practical knowledge is the idea of freedom of choosing (see [III. 5.2.]).
Yet, it is time now to point out that Oakeshott’s treatment of the individual 
contains two related levels of discussion. On one level, it deals with the Hobbesian 
formal conditions o f a free will to act, and this is expressed in EM  and the passages of 
HC under consideration; on another, it also touches upon the Aristotelian tradition or 
practice o f human volition, and this is presented in RP and other places in HC. We shall 
later have a chance to return to this matter in association with the theory of civil 
association itself. In this place, we need only note that HC, being a synthesis of the 
philosopher’s thought, also accounts for the main theme disclosed in RP: Since conduct 
inter homines indicates that agents communicate with each other in terms of choices and 
so forth, this at the same time assumes “more durable relationships between agents” 
which can constitute the conditional contexts of all human transactions.190 This 
conditional context of actions, which Oakeshott in RP otherwise calls a “tradition”, is 
now re-named as a “practice”. A practice, it follows, consists in the encounters of 
reciprocity in which agents converse with one another, and the relationships of conduct 
that compose it are capable of being engaged in because they have been learned. If we 
recall what Oakeshott meant by “tradition”, we can recognise it in what he now says 
about “practice”:
systematic terms, but to interrogate the conditions of “human conduct” in terms of “deliberation” 
“choice” and so forth.
188 HC: 36.
189 See HC: 36-51.
190 HC: 54.
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A  practice may be identified as a set o f  considerations, manners, uses, observances, 
customs, standards, canon’s maxims, principles, rules, and offices specifying useful 
procedures or denoting obligations or duties which relate to human actions and 
utterances. It is a prudential or a moral adverbial qualification o f  choices and 
performances, more or less complicated, in which conduct is understood in terms o f  a 
procedure. Words such as punctually, considerately, civilly, scientifically, legally, 
candidly, judicially, poetically, morally, etc., do not specify performances; they postulate 
performances and specify procedural conditions to be taken into account when choosing 
and acting.191
In civilisation, then, there are practices which differ in their dimension, their 
complexity, and their density, each is a distinguishable more of utterance such as poet ice, 
geome trice, his tor ice, orator ice, or philosophice. Moreover, with respect to generality 
and persuasiveness, the two most important forms of practice in terms of which agents 
are durably related to one another in practical conduct are a “common tongue” and a 
“language of morality”. Here, Oakeshott takes the opportunity to re-organise the 
conditions of moral conduct only in terms of two aspects of the art of agency: self- 
disclosure and self-enactment.
A moral practice can be considered to be a procedure or language of self- 
disclosure; the conduct it relates to is the intercourse of agents, each concerned with 
procuring imagined and wished-for satisfactions. But, compared to his earlier works, 
Oakeshott in HC stresses more explicitly that the satisfaction of the morality of individual 
agents is so self-contained that it has nothing to do with a “prudential art” dealing with 
the success of the enterprise of agents; that is, a moral practice, no matter what it is, is 
definitely not an “instrument” to the satisfaction of any substantive want.192 This means 
that Oakeshott claims morality is concerned with good and bad conduct itself, not with 
performances in respect of their outcomes. Thus, when Oakeshott writes that “a moral 
language is a language of propriety, not of prudence”,193 this can be regarded, once 
again, as his commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, i.e. Aristotle’s discussion of moral habits.
Moreover, a moral practice in itself has nothing to do with human nature or a 
philosophical system of values either; but it is only a vernacular language of colloquial 
intercourse. That is to say, instead of being pre-determined by a fixed foundation, a 
moral practice is far more like the informative context by means of which the agents may
191 HC: 55-6.
192 See esp. HC: 60-1.
193 HC: 80.
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get to know the genuine implications of the so-called “moral values”. So every moral 
discourse is an historic achievement lasting from a continuously accumulating residue of 
conditional relationships learned in an experience of intercourse between agents; it 
emerges as a ritual of utterances and responses in which agents are colloquially related to 
one another in the idiom of a familiar moral language.
But, there is another side to moral practice that needs to be considered, namely 
the self-enactment of agents. The character of self-enactment can be appealed to in order 
to understand actions in terms of the “motives” for which they are performed, and by a 
motive Oakeshott means an agent’s “sentiment” in choosing and performing the actions 
he chooses and performs. Synthetically, it may then be said that moral conduct is not 
only the behaviour of agents engaging in transactions with one another in the recognition 
of the authority of considerations to be subscribed to in choosing satisfactions, it is also 
the behaviour of an agent enacting himself in terms of the motives in which he permits 
himself to act.194
All this, obviously, points to the theme of RP that a moral practice is a 
“tradition” of moral behaviour: moral life involves a manner of living, not a set of 
principles; general principles, of course, may be elicited from a moral tradition, “but (like 
other languages) it is not the creation of grammarians, it is made by speakers.”195 Again, 
the moral self “has a ‘history’, but no ‘nature’, he is what in conduct he becomes.”196 As 
such, moral discourse is akin to the Aristotelian phronesis,197 not to the Kantian 
categorical imperative.
IV  5.2. Leviathan and The Nature o f  Political Philosophy 
The second essay, “On the Civil Condition”, is where Oakeshott moves to link 
Aristotelian morality with Hobbesian civility. More precisely, it is my view that 
Oakeshott’s theory of civil association can be interpreted in respect of two main topics:
194 For Oakeshott’s discussion on how self-disclosure and self-enactment stand to one another in moral 
conduct, see HC: 71-8.
195 HC: 79.
196 HC: 41; see also, VL: 64.
197 HC: 89.
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the formal conditions and the practical procedure of civitas. Where Oakeshott somehow 
differs from Hobbes in pondering the practice of civitas under the condition of “politics”, 
he clearly moves from Nicomochean Ethics to Leviathan when establishing the formal 
conditions of civitas in terms of what one may call the Hobbesian legalistic character of 
civil authority198. Thus, the point is that the theory of civil association presented in HC is 
a more sophisticated form of conservatism in politics, in that Oakeshott turns to bring 
Hobbes’s notion of law-making authority, the legalistic structure of civitas, into 
consideration.
Oakeshott’s interests in Hobbes’s writings, of course, may be traced back to his 
famous “Introduction to Leviathan” (1946).199 And consequently, in expounding the 
degree to which Oakeshott’s theory of civil association is influenced by Hobbes, it may 
be well to do so with reference to his own understanding of Leviathan. In this matter, let 
us start with the issue of the nature of political philosophy:
Firstly, for Oakeshott, our reflection about political life may take place at a 
variety of levels; ascending from the levels of “reflection in the service of politics” and of 
“reflection in political doctrine”, philosophical political reflection is to establish the 
relations between politics and eternity.200 This notion of political philosophy that 
Oakeshott persistently holds in his writings is exactly that which he applies to 
characterise Leviathan,201 And if the history of political philosophy lies in this permeating 
sense of human life as a “predicament”, Oakeshott believes its variety can be found in 
three “great traditions”: Reason and Nature, Will and Artifice and Rational Will. Whilst 
Plato’s Republic and Hegel’s Philosophie des Rechts are the representatives of the first 
and third models respectively, the paradigm of Will and Artifice constitutes “the context 
of Leviathan”.202 Oakeshott considers his own political philosophy as an example of this 
Hobbesian tradition.
198 It is this Hobbes, as Oakeshott observes, who begins with law and obligation that can be understood 
as the “originator of a new tradition in political philosophy.” (RP: 277. Cf. L. Strauss, 1952: chap. viii.)
199 Oakeshott’s essays on Hobbes were collected under the title, Hobbes on Civil Association, and 
published in 1975. Three of them, including “the Introduction to Leviathan”, “The Moral Life in the 
Writings of Thomas Hobbes” and “Logos and Telos”, are now also available to part three “On Hobbes” 
in a new edition of RP, to which I am referring where needed in this study.
200 Cf. esp. RP: 146-52.
201 See e s p . 225, 291.
202 SeeRP: 225-8.
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Secondly, as far as the “manner and mind” of a philosopher is concerned, 
Oakeshott sets up four criteria for assessing Hobbes’s achievements in civil philosophy: 
extraordinary confidence, the energy of constantly freeing himself from the formalism of 
his system (i.e. the striking technicalities of a scepticism), an affection for originality and 
a self-conscious stylist in writing.203 If it is open to question whether Oakeshott has ever 
reached this level of philosophising, it cannot be doubted that he more or less attempts to 
follow these criteria in his own enterprise.
Lastly, and most importantly, Oakeshott’s remarkable interpretation of the 
relation of civil philosophy to a “system” of philosophy in Hobbes’s establishment is 
perfectly harmonious with his own position. In rejecting the conventional view in 
Hobbes’s studies that the project of civil philosophy is based on a natural philosophy, 
namely materialism, Oakeshott maintains that the coherent system of Hobbes’s 
philosophy “lies not in an architectonic structure, but in a single ‘passionate thought’ that 
pervades its parts.”204 In other words, Hobbes’s civil philosophy belongs to a 
philosophical system, not because it is materialistic, but because it is the application of a 
doctrine about the nature of philosophy to the understanding of the system and place of 
politics. In Oakeshott’s terms, this means that political philosophy or ethics is nothing, if 
it is not a form of philosophising.
Before unveiling the parallels between Oakeshott’s civil association and the 
argument of Leviathan, it ought to be noted that Oakeshott’s interpretation of Leviathan 
(as a past text) is philosophical rather than historical: It is Oakeshott’s own conception of 
political philosophy that penetrates into his understanding of Leviathan, which in turn re­
affirms (or re-adjusts) his understanding of what political philosophy should be. Hence, 
by a quasi-philosophical past, I mean a philosophical consideration about the historic 
conditions of human agency (as to be found in PFPS) or a conversation between a 
philosophy and its own past image (as to be found in “Introduction to Leviathan”).
IV, 5.3. Civil Association (I): The Formal Conditions
203
204
SeeRP: 228-35. 
RP: 236.
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As we now come closer to Oakeshott’s theory of civil association, it is observable that he 
basically uses the Hobbesian terminology of civitas for the ideal condition of civility, 
cives for the personae related in this manner, lex for the terms of their relationships, and 
respublica for the comprehensive conditions of association.205 Moreover, Oakeshott is 
also following Hobbes in understanding the civil condition as an “artifact”: civil 
association is an understood relationship of intelligent agents.206
But in each case, Oakeshott’s notion of philosophy demands that the task of a 
theorist is to understand the civil condition in terms of its postulates, not to engage in 
civil intercourse. And Oakeshott’s primary concern in HC is to clarify the categorical 
distinction between civil association (societas) and enterprise association (universitas) in 
order to revive a non-rationalist way of understanding politics.207 Oakeshott begins his 
“intellectual adventure” with enterprise association.
Human conduct, we have seen, is that of an agent disclosing and enacting himself 
in performances whose imagined and wished-for outcomes are performances of other 
agents or other performances of himself: satisfactions; and those satisfactions can be self- 
contained or prudential. What Oakeshott calls enterprise association is precisely the 
mode of relationship in which the participants are engaged in the pursuit of some 
common good to be prudentially satisfied. It is true that of all durable human 
relationships, enterprise association is the most familiar; it includes a productive 
understanding (a factory), an association of the same profession or trade, an army, a 
“village community”, a sect, a fellowship, a party, a fraternity, a solidarity, a collegium, 
or a guild.208 And in politics, to be sure, we are accustomed to understanding the activity 
of governing in terms of this mode of relationship. Since Oakeshott has already said 
enough about this matter, he believes his concern now is only to theorise civil association 
in terms of its postulates.
By contrast with enterprise association, civil association is to be identified in 
terms of moral considerations; civitas is a moral relationship. This is, indeed, a 
proposition that Hobbes maintained as well. More crucially, Oakeshott follows Hobbes’s 
footsteps to argue that civil association is composed entirely of rules: “the language of
205 HC: 108-9.
206 HC: 109-12.
207 See esp. HC: 118-9. Cf. P. Franco, 1990: 158; N. O’Sullivan, 1993: 103.
208 HC: 112-7.
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civil intercourse is a language of rules; civitas is a rule-articulated association”,209 and, by 
a rule Oakeshott means an “authoritative assertion”. Thus, Oakeshott believes in the 
Hobbesian recognition that what really counts in civil association is not the forms of 
constitution (or the kinds of commonwealth as Hobbes called it), but the fact that it is 
constituted by a system of authoritative rules.210 It implies again that unlike 
contemporary liberal thinkers, Oakeshott does not think that democracy must be a 
necessary condition of civil association.
Moreover, led by Hobbes, Oakeshott also articulates that a rule has a “self- 
determined jurisdiction” within which agents are equal in respect of the rule and each has 
an obligation to subscribe to it; it prescribes a “norm of conduct” proper to be subscribed 
to in choosing performances; and it subsists in being recognised or acknowledged by the 
agents concerned.211 That is, authoritative rules are so self-contained that they should be 
distinguished from optional persuasive utterances such as a piece of advice, a request, a
plea, or a warning, and from mere prohibitions such as an order, a command, a behest, or
• • • 212 an injunction.
It appears that in the civil condition, agents are related in terms of their common 
recognition of the rules which constitute civitas. Stemming from this consideration, 
Oakeshott thus claims that the formal conditions of civil association are: lex (legislation, 
adjudication, ruling), authority and obligation.
First of all, since the rules that constitute civil association are authoritative assertions, 
they are nothing but “civil laws” or lex; or conversely, the most systematic character of 
lex, Oakeshott repeats, is that it is a self-contained system of laws which is able to 
identify its own jurisdiction. But, lex must postulate the norms of conduct which exist 
continuously in civil association. Thus, like Hobbes, Oakeshott claims that in the civil 
condition, there are related conditions of legislation, adjudication and ruling coming from 
the cardinal postulate of lex.
209 HC: 124.
210 Hobbes, 1946: chap. xix. Cf. RP: 261.
211 HC: 125-7. It is thus confirmed what we have earlier said that Oakeshott does not reject “norms” in 
practice, he only thinks that their meaning belongs to practice itself. The task of the philosopher is to 
explain the matter as a civil condition, not to impose it on human conduct.
212 In this respect, Oakeshott’s observation is parallel to H. L. A. Hart in the sense of rejecting J. 
Austin’s command theory of law. (Cf. Hart: 1994, chap. 2, 3 &4.)
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Legislation, to start with, is the procedure in which new lex is enacted or current 
lex is amended or repealed. It is true that how much use may be made of legislation 
depends on the change of situation. But in any event, legislation is of importance in the 
civil condition, because lex is “the life of civil association”,213 and civitas understood in 
terms of a system of laws is an emblem of human responsibility which may be alterable; 
insofar as legislation is a procedure of legal innovation by means of which civil 
association can enjoy its durability.214
Additionally, adjudication is the procedure in which the meaning of lex can be 
deciphered significantly, justifiably and appropriately. Oakeshott agrees with Hobbes that 
in the civil condition the “faculty” of adjudication is exercised in the court of law;215 and 
consequently he writes on the Hobbesian observation that “in a court of law, the ‘judge’ 
is not an arbitrator in a conflict of interests, he is the custodian of the norms of lex.”216 In 
other words, for both Hobbes and Oakeshott, since in civil association no common good 
is pursued, the opinion of the “judge” is merely concerned with the maintenance of a 
system of moral considerations which are exclusively indifferent to any merits of interest 
in procuring substantive and fixed satisfactions.
Finally, the condition of ruling must appear in civil association, too. In a nutshell, 
to rule is to require an identified agent to make a specified choice in an assignable 
situation, that is, to administer the prescriptions of lex. And yet, because ruling is the 
exercise of authority deriving from lex which is not the rule-book of an enterprise, those 
administrating rules “are not managers, arbitrators between claims or merits of 
conflicting interests, largotors or patrons of preferred interests” but “office-holders with 
powers and obligations concerned with the observance of a procedure.”217
Put together, then, the notion of lex must postulate an “apparatus of rule” in civil 
association which Oakeshott has identified elsewhere as “rule of law”218, and for the 
convenience of having a name for this system of conditions, Oakeshott now calls it 
respublica which, indifferent to a common good, is “a manifold of rules and rule-like
213 RP: 277.
214 HC: 138-41.
215 RP: 263.
216 HC: 132-3.
217 HC: 144.
218 And Oakeshott later returns to round out this conception in “The Rule of Law”, which is collected in 
OH: 119-64.
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prescriptions to be subscribed to in all the enterprise and adventures in which the self­
chosen satisfactions of agents may be sought.”219 And it is largely from this Hobbesian 
legalism that the purposeless characteristic of Oakeshott’s civil association comes.
To put it more clearly, Hobbes, indeed, argues that the authority of civitas would 
take care of “all those things which concern the common peace and safety”; or 
alternatively, that the condition of peace and safety is the effect of “a covenant of every 
man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I  
authorise and give up my right o f governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of 
men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions 
in like manner.”220 But, as Oakeshott puts it, in Hobbes the covenant is “to ‘erect’ and 
maintain a ‘sovereign’ civil authority, not to unite covenanters in pursuit of a common 
substantive enterprise.”221 In other words, Hobbes’s civil association does not pursue a 
summum bonum such as peace and safety, the contract to establish a sovereign does that. 
Hence, in Leviathan there is a difference between the desire for peace and safety as the 
motivation to get out of the state of nature in which every man is against every other 
man,222 and the task of civil association, commonwealth or state itself, which, beneath 
the sovereign, thereafter aims to produce civilisation - culture, the arts, commerce etc. 
Oakeshott certainly proposes the same view as Hobbes regarding the non-instrumental 
characteristic of civitas.
The civil condition understood in terms of lex, however, is still incomplete, 
because it is obviously conditional upon the assumption that rules are recognised as 
authoritative. Here we are entering into the condition of authority and obligation 
postulated in civil association.
It has been implied in our previous examination that respublica has the property of self- 
authentication: Ruling, legislation and adjudication are all the exercises of authority, 
which comes from lex, which in turn constitutes the civil condition. In other words, 
respublica contains rules in terms of which the authority of other rules may be
219 HC: 148.
220 Hobbes, 1946: 131-2.
221 HC: 232-3.
222 For Oakeshott’s interpretation of the Hobbesian predicament of human nature, seeRP: 249-61, 278- 
80, 298-309.
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recognised, but there is none which is exclusively a rule for the recognition of the 
authority of other rules. What is called Grundnorm or “the hierarchy of laws” - a 
jurisprudence mainly provided by the neo-Kantian, H. Kelsen223 - is here under attack:
There is no place in civil association for any but a conditional distinction between so- 
called ‘private’ and ‘public’ law. Nor can there be a single ultimate rule o f  recognition, 
an unconditional and unquestionable norm from which all others derive their authority: a 
‘constitution’ not subject to interpretation and immune from inquiry.224
This means that the validity of lex should be considered only in terms of the 
resources for consideration which lex itself provides. To characterise further the self­
authentication of civil authority as such, Oakeshott draws our attention to what it 
categorically excludes in the first instance.
First, the authority of respublica, he maintains, cannot be the identification of it 
providing “shelter” for the uncertainties of a human life or its prescriptions being 
subscribed to on most occasions by most cives. For civil association can provide such 
benefit or efficacy only on the condition that civil authority is recognised. Here, the point 
that the authority of lex has to do with acknowledgement rather than with desirability or 
truth is reminiscent of Hobbes’s position.225
Secondly, the distinction between natural authority and civil authority that was 
famously made by Hobbes, in principle, applies to Oakeshott’s political philosophy as 
well. In Hobbes’s case, indeed, “civil” is distinguished from “natural” in the sense that it 
is an artifact; so civil association is not a mere natural gregariousness (such as the family) 
and civil authority is arising out of an agreement of wills, not from natural authority 
(such as that of the father in the family).226 By contrast, neither societas nor universitas 
implies a sense of “natural association”. But here, the point is that since civil authority 
must be self-authenticating, the social bonds such as the natural authority exerted
223 H, Kelsen, 1967, 1996.
224 HC: 151.
225 Cf. P. Franco, 1990: 188-9.
226 Hobbes, 1946: 130, 153. Cf RP: 247-8.
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through the family are insulated from the foundations of civil authority by Oakeshott’s 
Hobbesian legalism.227
And finally, respublica must not be alleged to have authority on account of being 
identified with fixed general principles of any sort:228 whether it is a Baconian “common 
good”, a Rousseauian “general will”, or an Austinian access to “scientific information” 
about the tendencies of human actions to promote the general happiness229. Nor is there 
any place in civil association for the Weberian charismatic authority of a leader230 or for a 
“higher law” than authority presumed in what Oakeshott calls the “neo-Platonic view of 
matter”231. If there exists a “higher law” upon which the authority of respublica is 
conditional, it must itself be approved to enjoy authority. However, Oakeshott argues, no 
genuine rationality or wisdom will do that.232
We may thus reach the point that for Oakeshott the authority of respublica 
cannot be identified with anything other than that which is inherent in the legal system of 
respublica, that is, “the jus of /ex”.233 As a result of this, the attribution of authority to 
respublica, Oakeshott writes, is nothing but:
the acknowledgement o f  respublica as a system o f  moral (not instrumental) rules, 
specifying its own jurisdiction, and recognised solely as rules; that is, as conditions to be 
subscribed to in conduct and binding to consideration independently o f  their origin or 
likely or actual outcome in use and o f  approval o f  what they prescribe. This authority 
cannot be acquired in a once-and-for-all endowment but only in the continuous
acknowledgement o f  cives [emphasis mine]  In short the only understanding o f
respublica capable o f  evoking the acceptance o f all cives without exception, and thus 
eligible to be recognised as the terms o f civil association, is respublica understood in 
respect o f its authority.234
It is undeniable that the counterpart of civil authority is civil obligation. As such 
to recognise the rules of respublica as authoritative is to recognise them as obligatory. 
For this reason, civil obligation is not civil obedience, because it is related to the
227 See C. Covell, 1986: 123.
228 For the following examples, see HC: 152-3.
229 J. Austin, 1954: Lecture III; quoted in HC: 153.
230 SeeM. Weber, 1973:102-21.
231 Cf. OH: 155-6, where Oakeshott deals with the same matter by picking up Samuel Rutherford, 
Montesquieu and the early exponents of the Rechtstaat as his targets.
232 HC: 153.
233 OH: 140; cf. 157-9.
234 HC: 153-4.
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authority of lex, not to its efficiency; it is thus no more than a mistake to identify civil 
obligation with “a habit of obedience”, as Austin called it.235 In a like manner, having an 
obligation cannot be confused with fearing a penalty, because civil obligation bears no 
relation to the power of the rulers.236 And finally, the so-called “grounds of political 
obligation”237 do not lie in the theory of the general will, of the common good, of justice, 
or of consent. Regarding the consent theory, Oakeshott argues thus:
In a transaction aimed at an imaged and wished-for satisfaction [a person] may make a 
promise and thus put himself within the jurisdiction and under the authority o f  the rule 
that promises should be honoured. But although he does this in a chosen transaction and 
as a chosen means for achieving a chosen purpose, and although he can fulfil his 
obligation only in a chosen action which subscribes to its conditions, he does not choose 
the terms o f  the obligation; he merely employs them as a device for achieving his
238purpose.
It is true that by claiming this what Oakeshott is ostensibly rejecting is more of 
Lockean contractarian theory (see [II.3.2.]) than a Hobbesian one. For, to settle the 
terms of obligation in law so that, once in the state, a citizen uses the rules to achieve his 
purpose is precisely what Hobbes insists the state is for. Again, although for Hobbes the 
authority of commonwealth first has to be established by contract, i.e. theoretically civil 
association has to begin somewhere with the initial construction through all men’s wills 
of sovereign authority, he also believed that there must be a continuous 
acknowledgement of authority -  it is not an once-and-for-all endowment. It follows that 
Oakeshott may diverge from Hobbes in respect of the emergence of civitas -  where 
Hobbes related the emergence of civil authority to human nature (the state of nature), 
Oakeshott takes its emergence to be an historic achievement in development, namely the 
rule of law, which is so self-contained that it needs no further theoretical reasons to 
establish itself - but in general, Oakeshott’s understanding of civil authority and 
obligation in HC is simply clarifying not rejecting the Hobbesian position.
235 See J. Austin, 1954: Lecture VI, 198-205.
236 This is a distinction that has been made by H. L. A. Hart. (See esp. 1994: 6, 20-5.)
237 See D. D. Raphael, 1990: chap. 7.
238 HC: 156.
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But still, there is another important aspect of Hobbes’s thought that has been critically 
reformulated in Oakeshott’s theory of civil association, namely the problem of 
individuality.
According to Oakeshott, Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy falls within the 
paradigm of the morality of individualism,239 but it has its roots in the work of the late 
medieval nominalists maintaining that the nature of a thing is its individuality and that 
will is precedent to reason, rather than in the Cartesian doctrine of the primacy of human 
cognition (cf. [H.2.2.] & [IV.2.2.]). The difference between these two views of 
personality is that whereas the former stresses a “substantial element” in individuality, i.e. 
a man’s willing to act; the latter emphasises a “rational element” in individuality, i.e. a 
man’s innate ability to arrive at self-consciousness.240 1 have mentioned that Oakeshott 
seems to have considered the issue of individuality from two related perspectives: its 
formal conditions and its practice within a tradition. Now, it has become evident that the 
formal postulates of an agent who has a free will to make a response to a contingent 
situation that we examined earlier are related to the Hobbesian rather than the Cartesian 
point of view.
But, Oakeshott probably would not reject the suggestion that both Hobbesian 
and Cartesian individualisms, in one way or another, have inspired the development of 
liberalism,241 and he surely appreciates Hobbes’s gift of considering the formal conditions 
of human agency in terms of volition. But, Oakeshott also complains of Hobbes’s lack of 
consideration of the actual practice of civil association. In other words, no matter what 
contribution Hobbes might have made to liberal individualism, Oakeshott believes that it 
is the Hobbesian voluntarism, rather than the Cartesian “self-made man”, which is 
amenable to the search for a genuine understanding of individuality. For the proposition 
that a man has a freedom to act does not necessarily conflict with the importance of a 
moral practice, a world of moral ideas, or a civil discourse in providing actual 
information for his actions, but it is an importance which is neglected not rejected by the 
system of Leviathan. To fill in this lacuna in Hobbes’s thought, Oakeshott therefore
239 RP: 280-3, 295-8.
240 Seeesp. RP: 280, n l l l .
241 Whilst, as we have seen, Oakeshott links the liberal’s notion of a perfect self with the Cartesian 
rational element in personality, one of his most famous comments on Leviathan is, of course, the view 
that “Hobbes, without being himself a liberal, had in him more of the philosophy of liberalism than most 
of his professed defenders.” (RP: 283.)
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leaves the legalistic structure of civitas for the problem of the political postulated in the 
civil condition, by returning to the Aristotelian traditionalist individualism that he has 
established in RP.
IV. 5.4, Civil Association (II): The Political
If authority and obligation are concerned with the law, the political, Oakeshott says, is 
concerned with the desirability of this law or that law.242 This re-affirms that in HC 
Oakeshott does distinguish two considerations regarding civil prescriptions: the formal 
determination of the authority of lex and the actual decision of their worth and 
desirability.243 Whilst the recognition of authority has to do with the appreciation of lex 
as a self-contained system of moral rules which leaves unasked the question of approval 
or disapproval, the political involves a procedure of criticising its specific rules. The 
latter engagement, Oakeshott believes, “will entail going over some of the ground 
already trodden, but from a different point of view.”244
However, it should be noticed here that although in the civil condition politics is 
to be understood in terms of desirability, it may not alter the moral outlook of civil 
association; on the contrary it gives us an opportunity to separate it from other moral 
relationships. It is a unique characteristic inherent in the practice of civil association that 
“there are known procedures in which [an approval of a rule] may be undertaken and in 
which its fruits may be harvested in authoritative declarations”; whereas “the recognition 
of a moral virtue is itself the approval of the conditions it specifies for conduct; these 
conditions may be forgotten or neglected, but to dislodge them is nothing other than a 
withdrawal or qualification of this approval.”245 Amongst human relationships, it is only 
in the civil condition that authority and approval are distinguished.246
242 Cf. HC: 173.
243 See esp. HC: 174, nl.
244 HC: 159.
245 HC: 160-2.
246 Cf. Oakeshott, “On Misunderstanding Human Conduct”, p. 366. where the philosopher writes that 
the moral character of civil association differs from other moral considerations “in being subject to 
enactment, repeal and alteration in an authorised procedure, in that the conditions they prescribe are 
narrower, less demanding, and more precisely formulated, in there being an authoritative procedure for 
determining whether or not an agent in acting has adequately subscribed to these rules, and in there 
being known penalties attached to inadequate subscription and an apparatus of power to enforce them.”
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Keeping this in mind, we may now return to examine Oakeshott’s understanding 
of politics. According to Oakeshott, the mode of politics that engages in civil association 
is “thinking and speaking in order to reach a conclusion which may then be transformed 
into a rule by an authoritative act.”247 This means that in civil association respublica is 
the formal condition that will restrict the political to civil desirability alone. And since the 
civil condition is not predicated on an attempt to promote any substantive wants, this 
political engagement is only a “circumstantial deliberation about respublica in terms of 
bonum civile”.2** In short, politics is concerned with the custody and maintenance of a 
system of moral rules where lies civil desirability.
This suggests that in considering the desirability of a civil rule - a rule which is 
always in use but whose substance changes over time - political deliberation concerned 
can never be a demonstrative or deductive one. On this, Oakeshott writes that:
A  civil prescription ... cannot be shown to be desirable in virtue o f  satisfying a want or 
promoting a sought-after substantive outcome. But neither can its desirability be 
established by purporting to connect it inherently with a superior norm o f  unquestionable 
or acknowledged desirability, a moral rule, a prescriptive Law o f  Reason or o f  Nature, a
249principle o f  utility, a categorical imperative, or the like.
The terms o f a practice o f civility, then, are not conclusions inferred from ... theorems 
about the so-called natural conditions o f human life, from theorems about the 
dispositions o f  human character, from theorems about contingent human wants, 
purposes, and imagined satisfactions; nor are they inferences from the norms o f  a current 
morality or o f a purported Rational, Natural, or so-called ‘critical morality’, or from 
those o f a pretended summum bonum civile or ‘ideal justice’. And their desirability or 
worth cannot be argued in terms o f  their having been correctly inferred from or modelled 
upon any o f  these considerations.250
For Oakeshott, the distinction under consideration is crucial, because “an absolute coincidence 
between conduct believed to be morally wrong and conduct which is prohibited by law is not to be
expected anywhere, ............. To have achieved a distinction between crime and sin is one of the
characteristics of modem European societies.” (MPME: 16-7) We must distinguish the moral and the 
civil, otherwise we cannot explain why mala prohibita should be an authoritative prescription. This 
point, in general, is also what the legal positivist takes to attack the theory of natural law, though 
Oakeshott certainly cannot be understood as an exponent of legal positivism. (Cf. for example, H. L. A. 
Hart, 1994: chap. 8 & 9.)
247 HC: 165.
248 HC: 173.
249 HC: 174.
250 HC: 176.
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These two quoted passages mean that: On the one hand, theory and practice are 
two different forms of reasoning, not because those theorems or principles are 
theoretically impossible, but because in actuality the inference of this kind is impossible: 
for instance, no civil rule can be deduced from the Kantian categorical imperative. On the 
other hand, Oakeshott’s philosophical scrutiny of the theorems such as the Law of 
Nature, the Kantian categorical imperative or a principle of utility shows them to be 
incomplete ways of understanding politics. For a respublica is a practice of civil 
intercourse in use; but, the abstract moral principles alone can never reach the point of 
“knowing how” to respond to contingent situations in favour of civil desirability. In 
political deliberation, Oakeshott concludes, “demonstrative conclusions are necessarily 
impossible; final solutions and alternative ideal systems of lex are persuasive subterfuges 
or corrupting delusions.”251
In other words, the circumstantial understanding and diagnosis of situations 
cannot be indifferent to a practice of civil intercourse; a self-made individuality is not 
only impossible but lunatic; as a result, political engagement in the conditions of conduct 
specified in a respublica is “both an appeal to current achievements in civility and an 
exploration of the intimation of these achievements, and there is no mistake-proof 
manner of doing this.”252 What is confirmed by this statement is therefore Oakeshott’s 
attempt to draw on what he takes to be an Aristotelian understanding of practical 
reasoning which relies on rhetorical persuasion in the making of prudential choices in 
contingent circumstances; that is, just as for Aristotle, one needs to have already 
acquired the consistent moral habits or virtues to establish character dispositions, and 
then phronesis (practical reasoning) in these situations now, enables you to make choices 
about means to an end. For Oakeshott, politics is the recognition of plausible statements 
about current circumstances in respect of civil laws through the pursuit of intimations of 
a tradition of civil language.
Thus, we may here reach the conclusion that Oakeshott’s civil association is a more 
systematic restatement of conservatism in politics that he has declared in RP and
251 HC: 178.
252 HC: 180.
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elsewhere - more “systematic” because it is supplemented by something of an 
Aristotelian reading of Leviathan.
Indeed, throughout Oakeshott’s works there are parallels with Aristotle’s 
understanding of moral virtue and habitual practices, and with the notion of rhetorical 
persuasion rather than demonstration in individual political decision-making, but it seems 
to me that Oakeshott does not accept Aristotle’s understanding of phronesis or prudence 
which, for Aristotle, is an intellectual not a moral virtue. And Aristotle does have a 
definition of man’s nature and therefore a serious notion of the common good or 
summum bonum which both Hobbes and Oakeshott reject.
According to Oakeshott, the distinction between societas and universitas is 
significantly meaningful in a philosophical political discourse, because it appears to the 
philosopher that enterprise association is a less complete way of understanding human 
relationships that needs to be transcended. First of all, to conceive of human relationships 
as an enterprise will increase the power of the government to a degree where politics 
turns out to be a problem of leadership rather than an art of ruling. Again, like the notion 
of the mass, that of public interest is a “fiction” in the sense that it is specified, not by the 
actual interests of different individual agents, but by an imaginary collective character 
resulting from a false confidence in Universal Rationality.253 As a result, it neglects the 
distinction between our substantive practical reasoning in terms of a tradition of 
behaviour and theoretical reasoning in terms of a system of theorems, and so it commits 
the error of ignoratio elenchi. In short, enterprise association is the strongest form of 
rationalism in politics that Oakeshott has been willing to attack since the appearance of 
RP.
In contrast to the usual comments on HC concerning the distinction between 
societas and universitas,254 I believe that theoretically the real probing challenge that 
might be raised against Oakeshott’s theory of civil association is that it somewhat 
presumes that there are never “categorically competing and incommensurable” traditions 
of civility in one historic culture. As a result, although Oakeshott has never denied that 
there is proper practical reasoning to tell good values apart from bad ones within a
253 Cf. RP: 378-80.
254 See, for example, D. D. Raphael, 1975: 450-4; H. Pitkin, 1976: 301-20; R. N. Berki, 1981: 570-85; J. 
Shklar, 1975: 1018.
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certain political tradition, and he has attempted to trace the historic fortunes of the 
character of a modem European state in terms of societas, the civil association theory 
presented in the above discussion still cannot explain, for example, how civil war and its 
very different discourse ever occurs. In other words, in developing Hobbesian legalism, 
Oakeshott is simply leaving aside the problem of the legitimacy of authority without 
providing any alternative resolutions for it. Hence, what Oakeshott’s political philosophy 
falls short on is an account of the problem of “the possible break in a civil discourse”.
IV. 5.5. The Trimmer: Keeping the Ship on an Even Keel 
The last essay of HC, “On the Character of a Modem European State”, considers what 
has been thought and said about the character of a modem European state and about the 
office of its government in the last five centuries. With reference to PFPS, Oakeshott 
maintains that modem European reflection on this matter can be understood in terms of 
two categorically distinctive ideas, namely societas and universitas?55 The idea of 
societas, as Oakeshott understands it, is an identifiable association in which the tie that 
joins the agents is the loyalty to one another, i.e. observing the customs of ‘legality’; a 
relationship understood in terms of societas is a formal moral relationship, and a state, a 
civitas 256 Whereas the idea of universitas is a corporation aggregate recognised as 
persons in respect of some identified common purpose or acknowledged public interest; 
a relationship understood in terms of universitas is a substantive prudential relationship, 
and the state which corresponds to this is an enterprise association.257
What is central to understanding the distinction is the “unresolved tension” 
between these two categorically opposite modes of human association, namely, “a 
societas cum universitate”,258 That is, as noted earlier, Oakeshott’s ultimate purpose in 
the third essay of HC is to provide some historic references on the modes of civil 
association and enterprise association, so as to reach the verdict that “the modem
255 HC\ 199.
256 SeetfC: 201-3,313-5.
257 Seei/C: 203-6,315-7.
258 HC: 200-1.
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European political consciousness is a polarised consciousness, that these are its poles and 
that all the other tensions (such as those indicated in the words ‘right’ or ‘left’ or in the 
alignments of political parties) are insignificant compared to this.”259 As a result, 
Oakeshott uses most of his space in the essay considering the historic fortunes of 
societas260 and universitas261, and he does this by beginning with an inquiry into their 
intimations in the late medieval period.262 It is well known that through this examination, 
in which almost every important modem political thinker is more or less discussed or 
criticised, Oakeshott made his notable contribution to the contemporary study of past 
political theory and thought. Here, however, I intend only to point out three crucial 
observations:
First of all, the intellectual origins of societas and universitas that Oakeshott traces in 
HC correspond to those of the politics of scepticism and the politics of faith that he has 
earlier established. Unlike in PFPS, however, Oakeshott here believes that he is writing a 
history about the matter concerned263.
It is not for me to judge whether Oakeshott’s analysis of the character of a 
modem European state is historical enough in the sense of having given us a unity of 
ideas as comprehensive and detailed as he expected from historiography. For one reason, 
nevertheless, I believe that what he has provided cannot be genuinely historical as a 
distinctive mode of understanding. That is, it still leaves us with the impression that this 
history is in the service of the theory of civil association. In other words, it seems to me 
that Oakeshott’s intention in writing a history of the character of a modem European 
state is to substantiate the ideal identities - civil association and enterprise association - in 
a way which meets his philosophical concern. As a result, what Oakeshott actually 
provides us with in the third essay of HC is still a quasi-philosophical past, in the sense 
that the communication between ethics and history function only in the mind of the 
philosopher.
259 HC: 320.
260 See HC: 231-63.
261 See HC: 263-313.
262 See HC: 206-31.
263 See esp. HC: 199, 323-6.
Secondly, what is the role of liberalism in this philosophical-historic approach to modem 
political thought? At first sight, it seems true that by enterprise association Oakeshott is 
referring to socialism (among other things) rather than to liberalism, and he is, of course, 
an advocate of the value of the individual. Yet, Oakeshott sees himself ultimately as a 
philosopher, a victim o f thought, who dislikes understanding politics in terms of any 
“isms”. This is, I believe, the main reason why in HC Oakeshott is intent to “dissolve” all 
important “isms” of political thought in order to make room for his own terminology. In 
the course of this dissolution, Oakeshott retains the features of conservatism in politics in 
his establishment of civil association, although without mentioning the term 
“conservatism”. In unveiling the historic fortunes of civil association he speaks of 
liberalism, saying:
Liberalism was concerned [with] the menace o f ‘sovereign’ authority and with 
constitutional devices to reduce it. If it had any theoretical understanding o f  a state it was 
that o f  an association in terms o f assured ‘natural rights’ recognised as civil conditions to 
be subscribed to in conduct, and the menace was identified as the propensity o f  rules to 
inhibit the enjoyments o f these rights by the exercise o f  lordship. But these ‘natural 
rights’ came to include the enjoyment o f certain substantive conditions o f  things capable 
o f being assured only in the exercise o f  lordship (e.g. employment, medical attention, 
education) and consequently what was menacing became, not a lordly managerial 
government, but a government which failed in its lordly office o f  assuring subjects the 
enjoyment o f these conditions or one which imposed other similar but depreciated 
conditions, like religious uniformity. Locke showed his imperfect grasp o f  civil 
association when he attributed to the Executive (and not to the Judicial authority), ‘the 
power which should see to the execution o f the laws.” (.Second Treatise, sec. 144.) 264
Consequently, it is re-affirmed that for Oakeshott liberalism stands obliquely in 
between the extremes of societas and universitas. Referring to PFPS, liberal ethics 
engages in an ambiguous task of “imposing the idiom of faith upon the sceptical 
understanding of government”. And since insofar as it is self-defeated, there is little it 
may contribute to the civil condition that is really of interest to Oakeshott.
To sum up this crucial interpretative issue running throughout this chapter, then, 
my conclusion is that: Oakeshott cannot be understood as a liberal because liberalism to 
him is more a form of rationalist politics than anything else, and because rationalist
264 HC: 245, n2.
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politics in terms of abstractness, perfection and universalism is the Enlightenment ethical 
position that Oakeshott tries hard to transcend.
Moreover, although Oakeshott’s conservatism in politics and his theory of civil 
association are inclined to the paradigm of Will and Artifice, I have shown that 
Oakeshott does not accept the assumptions of egalitarian individualism, moral 
individualism, or radical individualism that characterise liberalism as we usually know it. 
By contrast, that which underlies Oakeshott’s political philosophy is what I have chosen 
to call traditionalist individualism based on an Aristotelian refinement of Hobbesian 
voluntarism. In this matter, Oakeshott’s critique of the notion of “self-made man” is 
significantly reminiscent of MacIntyre’s “emotivist self’265 or Taylor’s “unencumbered 
self’ or the “disengaged self’266; and so he would never agree with Rawls’s original 
position.267 In short, the point here as elsewhere in Oakeshott’s thought is not whether 
he is “a lover of liberty”268, but whether his love of freedom has the same quality as the 
liberal’s.
But further, Oakeshott’s rejection of much of the essence of the term that 
“liberalism” generally connotes cannot be taken to infer P. Franco’s point that he finds 
“the word ‘liberalism’ loaded down with meanings that do not convey” so that he 
substitutes the term civil association or societas for it, and for this reason his political 
philosophy is “a restatement of the formulation of liberalism.” 269 For we have seen that 
civil association is a more sophisticated form of traditionalist politics, and that 
Oakeshott’s ultimate ambition in establishing the mode of traditionalist politics or civil 
association is not only to prove that politics can be understood in a more coherent way 
which is categorically different from rationalist politics, but to protect the identification 
of the modem European political character and consciousness in terms of these two 
exclusive forms of politics. Now that liberalism is understood as that which has never 
reached the poles of societas and universitas, to identify the theory of civil association as 
liberal would dismiss the “unresolved tension”, namely “a societas cum universitate” that 
Oakeshott has consistently maintained.
265 See A. MacIntyre, 1985.
266 See C. Taylor, 1989.
267 See J. Rawls, 1971. For Oakeshotfs brief comment on Rawlsian justice, see OH: 156, nl3; cf. HC: 
153, nl.
268 M. Cranston, 1967: 82. Cf. N. O’Sullivan, 1993: 101.
269 P. Franco, 1990: 159; cf. pp. 8-11. For other interpretations of Oakeshott as a liberal, see chap. 1. n3.
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Thirdly, although Oakeshott retains the observation in HC that the predicament of 
contemporary politics is that on “the path marked universitas: dominium has been, in 
recent times, the more crowded with travellers”,270 for whatever reasons, he does not 
here intend to reach a “working compromise”271 between the two opposed modes of 
human relationship in HC?12
Given that it is a quasi-philosophical past that actually underlies “On the 
Character of a Modem European State”, I think it may not be inappropriate to conclude 
this chapter by adding a few remarks about the philosophical integration of the two 
analogies - societas and universitas or scepticism and faith - that Oakeshott previously 
achieved in PFPS. In that work, philosophy had gone further than in HC to synthesise 
these extremes in order to arrive at a more complete diagnosis of the predicament of our 
time.
We have seen from PFPS (and HC) that in historic terms the politics of faith and 
the politics of scepticism, (or universitas and societas) can be understood as the 
conditions of our moral and political activity. In the conclusion of PFPS, nevertheless, 
Oakeshott goes on to say that, taking these into account, the politics of scepticism still 
appears to be a more coherent understanding of politics and appropriate to our own 
situation. This is because our moral and political activity, like any other human action, is 
such a complex affair that we cannot escape from it by imposing “simplicity” upon our 
politics. Hence, if we search for the concrete character of a complex manner of politics, 
the politics of faith cannot be considered as suitable because thinkers like Bacon and 
Marx have only offered to our political thinking a simple-minded project of politics. The 
politics of scepticism is, by contrast, far more complex.
According to Oakeshott, although the sceptical style of politics is itself an 
extreme, “its extremity is not to impose a single pattern of activity upon a community, 
and consequently it enjoys (as we have seen) a characteristic forbearance of its own 
which can be seen to intimate a wider doctrine of moderation.”273 Inspired by Halifax’s 
The Character o f a Trimmer, Oakeshott believes the principle of the mean in action is a
270 HC: 321.
271 B. Parekh, 1987: 360.
272 See HC: 320-6.
213 PFPS: 123.
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“trimmer” who “disposes his weight so as to keep the ship upon an even keel”.274 This is, 
indeed, a saying reminiscent of his famous metaphor of politics in “Political Education”. 
And consequently, in a time when the politics of faith is in the absolute ascendancy, 
Oakeshott concludes his exploration by imposing three tasks upon the trimmer:
It is, first, to restore the understanding of the complexity of modem politics. In the 
present circumstances this is, perhaps, his most difficult task: the ascendancy of faith has 
obscured, indeed almost obliterated, this understanding by imposing upon our politics a 
counterfeit simplicity. Secondly, his task is to renew the validity of political scepticism so 
that this pole of our politics can once more exert its pull. Thirdly, in his participation in 
politics, he must dispose his weight against the prevailing current - not in order to make it 
flow to the opposite extreme, but to recall our political activity to that middle region of 
movement in which it is sensitive to the pull of both its poles and immobilises itself at
275neither of its extremes.
If it is the case that “to begin to work out what [Oakeshott’s] political philosophy means 
for political life as we know it is the next step in understanding and (more importantly) 
amplifying Oakeshott’s thought”,276 this denotation of the trimmer may serve well as a 
starting-point.
274 PFPS: 123.
275 PFPS: 128.
276 P. Franco, 1990: 236.
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CHAPTER V  
AN IDEALISTIC DEFENCE OF HISTORY
V.l. Introduction: Beyond Positivism and Historicism
The main purpose of this chapter is to approach Oakeshott’s idealistic defence of 
history1 in terms of certain philosophical problems. First, I shall be concerned with the 
epistemological problem of historical knowledge by exploring Oakeshott’s resolution to 
the “temporal dilemma in history” and the “epistemic tension in history”. Secondly, I am 
looking to examine Oakeshott’s statements on the “autonomy of history” so as to reject 
the Enlightenment scientism in general and to preserve our ability to converse 
historically in particular. That is, in the course of this study I am adopting Oakeshott’s 
position in order to transcend the historiographical position of the Enlightenment by 
separating the historical from the naturalised conception of History on which the notion 
of scientific history is based.
Oakeshott, we may observe, has provided a trilogy on historiography, the 
components of which are his chapter on “Historical Experience” in Experience and Its 
Modes (1933; hereafter EM), “The Activity of Being an Historian” (1958) in 
Rationalism in Politics (1962; hereafter RP) and “Three Essays on History” in On 
History and Other Essays (1982; hereafter OH). In these texts, history is invariably 
taken to be “a form of experience,” “a manner of thinking,” “a universe of discourse,” or 
“a mode of understanding”: in historiography, Oakeshott claims one is always concerned 
“with history as an enquiry and with the character of an historical enquiry.”2 Hence, for 
Oakeshott, history is never simply the Past in itself. And for convenience, I am here 
following the structure of EM to proceed with this study.
That history plays a central role in Oakeshott’s political theory is granted by 
many interpreters;3 and Oakeshott’s historiography has indeed been highly appraised by
1 For the idealistic grounds of Oakeshott’s historiography, see esp. D. Boucher, 1984.
2 OH: 2.
3 See, for example, K. Minogue, 1975b: 77-83; J. L. Auspitz, 1976: 261-94; T. W. Smith, 1996: 591-614.
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writers like Collingwood4, W. H. Greenleaf6, W. Dray6, A. Sullivan,7 and J. L. Auspitz,8 
for instance. However, compared to his politics, Oakeshott’s philosophy of history 
cannot be said to have been much discussed, at least to the extent of that which matches 
his contribution to the field.9 My ambition in this chapter is thereby to fill up this lacuna 
in Oakeshott studies by placing his historical thought into the context of his own ideas as 
a whole, and into the context of contemporary historiographical debate. On this account, 
in addition to repudiating the positivistic historiography, part of my task in this chapter is 
also to show Oakeshott’s general reception of Bradleyian Idealism and his specific 
reservations regarding the later Collingwoodian historicism.
In what follows, led by Oakeshott’s viewpoint, I shall examine, first, history as a form of 
experience so as to resolve “the temporal dilemma in history” ([V.2.]), second, the logic 
of historical enquiry so as to untangle “the epistemic tension in history” ([V.3.]), and 
third, the relation of history to philosophy and to science and practice so as to declare 
“the autonomy of history”, and in the meanwhile to repudiate the Enlightenment project 
in greater detail and to show Oakeshott’s non-historicist position ([V.4.] & [V.5.]). 
These topics are obviously interrelated, so a certain amount of repetition seems 
inevitable; yet this return to his central theory from different angles is perhaps the best 
way to grasp Oakeshott’s insights into historiography as a coherent whole.
V.2. Mind, Time, and Historical Experience
We have seen that one of the most substantial aims of EM  is to consider the 
characteristics of each of the main modes of understanding. Our purpose was to
4 See Collingwood, 1946: 158-9.
5 See W. H. Greenleaf, 1966: 29.
6 See W. Dray, 1968: 19.
7 See A. Sullivan, The New Republic: 42; quoted by T. W. Smith, 1996: 598.
8 J. L. Auspitz, 1993: 22.
9 The three published books on Oakeshott’s thought so far all focus on his political philosophy, and although 
in these books a treatment of history is available, it is presented somewhat because history is one of the 
modes that is disclosed in EM: See W. H. Greenleaf, 1966: 24-9; P. Franco, 1990: 31-43, 49-56; R. Grant, 
1990: 99-105. In addition to these texts, the important essays entirely discussing Oakeshott’s historical
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determine whether each of these different modes of understanding constitutes experience 
itself in its concrete totality, or whether each is an arrest in experience from a limited 
standpoint. Before we can discover whether history is one of the modes of 
understanding, we have noted that Oakeshott is obliged to establish history within the 
realm of experience, to establish it as a “form of experience” in the first place.
V2.1. History as a Form o f  Experience 
If history is established as a form of experience, related to the character of experience in 
general, then, as we have seen previously, it must be shown to be a world, a world of 
ideas; and it must be shown to recognise coherence as the sole criterion of achievement. 
These are the three basi^ characteristics of history as a form of experience. But each of 
these experiential characteristics of history has been eclipsed by the Rankian 
“incantation” that there is no distinction between history and the Past - Wie es eigentlich 
gewesen. Hence Oakeshott first draws our attention to some possible interpretations of 
this saying.
First of all, on the view that history constitutes a world, we must address those 
who deny this point and argue instead that history is a series of successive events. For 
example, before Oakeshott, Bosanquet characterised history as “a tissue of mere 
conjunctions,” and, “the doubtful story of successive events”; Schopenhauer similarly 
believed that history could only give us “a sample co-ordination of the facts” without 
“subordination or system.”10 According to this belief, then, the historian, it is said, is
thought are: W. H. Walsh, 1968: 5-18; W. Dray, 1968: 19-42; P. King, 1983: 96-132; D. Boucher, 1984: 
194-214.
10 EM: 89; see also, Paul Franco, 1990: 33. It should be observed that Bosanquet is here referring to history 
as a human way of thinking (although for him it is doubtful) not to the Past itself and he is distinguishing 
history as the narrative of successive events from those events themselves; again, Schopenhauer's emphasis 
is on history as co-ordination, not of facts themselves. And, being idealists, they would deny that the Past 
World existed of itself there and then. Nevertheless, the reason for Oakeshott taking them as examples might 
be that they seemed to believe that the nature of historical narrative cannot free itself from the time series of 
succession; it must be arranged in a temporal succession; and this is the reason why our historical thinking 
must be doubtful and not possible. Both Bosanquet and Schopenhaur are pessimists concerning men's 
historical thinking. By contrast, what Oakeshott intends to prove in history is precisely the idea that our 
historical thinking is able to free itself from the time series of succession; it is always a world of co-existent 
ideas. And, I think to do this Oakeshott has to establish a theory of history, in that our “historical time” can 
be distinguished from the “time series” given in Nature.
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concerned “not with what is ‘co-existent’ with what belongs to a world, but with what is 
‘successive’, with what belongs to a series.”11
This contrasting view of history has taken a dominant form, and is still widely 
held to be a science of history, as is claimed by positivism. The positivists, as we have 
seen, regard our physical world as a mind-independent world, where our present 
knowing makes no difference to what was known in the Past. For them, Oakeshott 
points out that history is therefore deemed to be “an ‘objective’ world, a world of past 
events to be discovered, unearthed, recaptured; it consists of what actually happened, 
and that (at least) is independent of what we think; it is a world, not of ideas, but of 
events.” And consequently, they believe that the business of the historian “is to recall, 
not to think; he is a receptive, not a constructive agent; he is a memory, not a mind.”12
Finally, there is a naive empiricist theory of history in association with this belief 
which suggests that in the course of writing history the historian “begins with the 
collection of data,” with the accumulation of “isolated facts,” after which comes “the 
search for causes.” This theory holds that “the data in history are fixed; they are given to 
be incorporated, not to be transformed.”13 In other words, the process in historical 
understanding, it is said, is to take a cluster of fixed facts in its successive sequence as 
what has really happened, not to fashion a coherent world of co-existent ideas.
For Oakeshott, these simplistic approaches to history cannot bear serious 
philosophical scrutiny; for it is evident that history as enquiry is not the same thing as 
History as the Past.14 History is by no means a mere time series, the course of events, the 
world of “what really happened” independent of us. Hence there are at least two points 
that can be made here.
In the first place, as far as the “boundary” is concerned, it should be observed 
that “history is concerned only with that which appears in or is constructed from a 
record of some kind.”15 This implies that our historical world - historical ideas or
11 EM: 90.
12 EM: 92.
13 EM: 96.
14 Among interpreters of Oakeshott’s historiography, P. King has especially tried to pose an objection to 
Oakeshott’s distinction between history and the Past (1983: 109-115), which, however, seems to me a 
misconception. In the course of the relevant examination below, I shall try to prove how important this 
distinction is, not only in Oakeshott’s establishment of the differentia of history but also in his transcending 
the “temporal dilemma in history”.
15 EM: 90.
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historical evidence - must be less than the Past as a whole. A simple illustration to 
demonstrate this point: Although millions of women really lived in the Past World, few 
of them now appear in our histories. Women, on the whole, have been “hidden from 
history,”16 yet existed and were participants in the Past World. This suggests that our 
historical world merely pertains to a world of recorded evidence that has survived and is 
attainable now: the Past as a whole is infinite and endless in the sense that it cannot be 
exhaustively incorporated into historical evidence. The whole Human Past, to use 
Rickert’s term, is unubersehbar (without limit) in the sense that it is impossible even for 
past agents to observe it in toto caelo}1 “ ‘Events’ may have happened (if we choose 
this way of speaking) of which all record or suggestion has been lost, and these are 
certainly no part of the so-called ‘historical series’.”18
In the second place, more critically, it must be noted that in essence history does 
not consist in a bare, uncritical account of whatever has survived and been recorded. 
“The facts of history,” says E. H. Carr, “cannot be purely objective, since they become 
facts of history only in virtue of the significance attached to them by the historian.”19 In 
other words, as G. R. Elton writes, it is plain that in history every piece of evidence 
needs to be criticised for the sake of “establishing its genuineness, and assessing its 
proper significance.”20Along the same lines, L. B. Namier depicts the function of the 
historian as being “akin to that of the painter and not of the photographic camera” as his 
task is to “discover and set forth, to single out and stress that which is of the nature of 
the thing, not to reproduce indiscriminately all that meets the eye.”21
Likewise, for Oakeshott, although an event is recorded it does not mean that it is 
historical, because “the so-called ‘authority’, better called ‘sources’, of history are 
frequently not themselves the product of historical thought and require to be translated 
into the category of history before they are used.”22 That is, Oakeshott objects to the 
view that the “original authorities are the touch-stone of historical truth,” a view which 
is so often associated with the notion of scientific history. The so-called authorities of a 
tradition, of a report, of a document can never speak for themselves; even those
16 Cf. K. Jenkins, 1991: 7.
17 G. Oakes, 1986: xvii.
18 EM: 90.
19 E. H. Carr, 1961: 120.
20 G. R. Elton, 1969: 97.
21 L. B. Namier, 1952: 8.
22 EM: 90.
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accounts of an eye-witness or of an expert make no direct sense to history if they are not 
first interpreted by him. And, if the task of the historian is merely to combine the 
testimonies of different authorities, the history he develops will be nothing more than 
what Collingwood once referred to as “scissors-and-paste history.”23
It follows that the historian is necessarily critical with regard to his “authorities”; 
he is obliged to think, to judge, to analyse the world with which he is faced. “The 
historian,” says Oakeshott, “is one who understands the events of the world before him 
as evidence for events that have already taken place.”24 Because criticism and 
understanding must involve the historian’s own contributions, the historical world must 
consist of the historian’s own judgement, not of the so-called “isolated facts” 
independent of him. Oakeshott remarks that:
It is impossible to exclude criticism from history, and where there is criticism there is 
judgement. Before a “recorded” event becomes an “historical” event, a judgement must
25have been interposed. But judgement involves more than a series, it involves a world.
Oakeshott thus goes on to articulate that “there are no historical facts about which 
mistake is impossible: where error is impossible, truth is inconceivable.”26 By contrast, 
the so-called isolated facts, if they existed, would never be wrong in the sense that they 
are taken by the positivists to constitute “what really happened” in the Past.
In addition, as we shall see later, Oakeshott argues that there are several forms of 
the past according to the several forms of experience in the conversation of humankind. 
Without being thought by the historian, then, a simple event that has taken place can 
possibly be read as a scientific past idea or a practical past idea. Whatever those other 
forms of past might be for now, clearly there is nothing that the historian has to do with 
them. An historical fact is always what the historian understands it to be in terms of the 
category of history.
The empiricist, however, has assumed much more about the course of historical 
writing. The so-called data or facts, he says, are not merely fixed and isolated but are to 
be explained causally. It is assumed that the task of an historian is to discover the course 
of objective facts as what really happened, not to transform them into the historical
23 See R. G. Collingwood, 1946: part v, sec. iv.
24 RP: 168.
25 EM: 91.
26 EM: 111-2.
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world of ideas; the historian is supposed to incorporate the successive facts or data, not 
form a consistent historical world.
The relations of historical facts to one another is a specific issue that has to be 
discussed in more detail later. Instead of considering this here, we need only remember 
that for Oakeshott no knowledge begins with “mere unrelated particles of data, isolated 
facts.” Because, as we have seen, this is one of his main idealistic beliefs: that the mind 
can entertain only that which has a meaning, that which belongs to a world of ideas, and 
the same requirement must hold for the data of the historian as well.27
Moreover, because an idea must be understood in terms of a world of ideas as a 
whole, any change that occurred in this world must involve the transformation of an 
entire world of ideas at the same time; in all human understanding, Oakeshott maintains, 
“each advance affects retrospectively the entire whole, and is the creation of a new 
world.”28 Within the realm of experience, the process of our historical understanding 
comes about not by adding newly discovered facts to those that have already been 
discovered, but by transforming the old ideas in terms of the new in order to make the 
whole world more coherent. Every new discovery in history is “not the discovery of a 
fresh detail, but of a new world”29 : it is judged by its place in the world of ideas as a 
_> whole. Hence Oakeshott tells his readej  ^that “the process in historical thinking is never a 
process of incorporation; it is always a process by which a given world of ideas is 
transformed into a world that is more of a world.”30 In short, what in the first place 
makes the data or facts historically significant is always “a homogeneous system of ideas 
or postulates, in terms of which (the historian) is conscious of whatever comes before 
him.”31
Accordingly, we may now reach a brief conclusion that Oakeshott claims history as 
enquiry and History as the Past are in different categories, and that there is no certain 
starting point in history, for it always begins with a homogeneous world of co-existent 
ideas and ends with more coherent conceptualisation of that world. Yet, I have indicated 
that the reason why the empiricist-positivistic theory of history tends to assume the
27
28
29
30 EM: 99.
31 EM: 97.
EM: 96-97. 
EM: 41. 
EM: 99.
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correspondence between history and the Past has to do with a naturalised conception of 
History embodied in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition of philosophy: the notion of 
Absolute Time, the existence of History as the object of historical enquiry and so forth. 
To elaborate on the distinction between the world of historical ideas and History in itself 
and thus to remove the philosophical grounding of positivistic historiography, I shall 
now reflect upon the notion of “time,” using it as my point of departure.
V.2.2. Absolute Time and Transcendental Time 
It seems to be the positivists’ common belief that we can only have one dimension of 
“time,” i.e. the Time given in Nature, Natural Time or Absolute Time. According to their 
view, both history and the Past must share a “temporal rhythm given in nature.”32 As a 
result, it is affirmed that history as an enquiry and History as the Human Past are the 
same thing, that is, the time series of successiveness, the course of events.
By way of contrast, if my understanding of Oakeshott's general theory of 
experience is accurate, he seems to believe that “time” is a thing of our own creation, 
and that even Natural Time cannot be perceived without our transforming it. And with 
transformation, we are entering into another dimension of “time,” which I shall call 
artificial time or transcendental time, in that we are always in the continuous present 
when we evoke the “past” and “change.” There are in fact several ways of speaking of 
“past” and “change,” which conform to the several modes of experience, and may be 
evoked in our reading of present. For example, the “time” understood in history, i.e. 
historical time, is “an historical awareness” of “time,” of “past,” and “change,” in its own 
terms and for its own sake.33 This historical time is not only different from that Time 
given in Nature, if there is any such Time, but also distinguishes itself from those pasts 
and changes understood in the modes of science, practice, and aesthetics. Let me make 
an effort to prove this point in a more complete sense:
Is Time necessarily successive? As a matter of fact, from a natural scientist’s 
point of view, succession is no longer the only one “authentic” conception about Time 
that we have formed from Nature. For instance, in his A Brief History o f Time, S. W.
32 R. Koselleck, 1985: 95.
33 OH: 7.
- 2 1 8 -
Hawking has called this traditional paradigm of Natural Time “Absolute Time” which in 
physics has now been revised by Einstein’s paradigm of “Relative Time.”34
Nevertheless, Oakeshott would probably not deny that we do have a great 
interest in the scientific measure of Time. For it should be remembered that he posits that 
science is “the pursuit of a homogeneous world of quantitative experience.”35 Thus, 
fixation on time’s quantity, clearly, must reflect our propensity for measurement: “The 
eye of the scientific observer is a measure; scientific perception is itself measurement.”36 
Oakeshott, however, would argue that even in the case of natural science we are always 
working in an abstract world; Nature can never exist of itself and independent of us. 
“Nature,” Oakeshott claims, “is a timeless world; it neither changes nor evolves; it is 
static and self-contained and the conception of past and future are inapplicable to it.”37 
In other words, it is the proposition of Oakeshottian idealistic philosophy that the world 
men inhabit is a thing of their own creation, that nothing is understandable merely 
because it is given.
This means that even though succession might be what we grasp about the 
changing world from the mode of science, this conception itself must enter into a world 
of ideas, represented by a system of postulates, before we are able to comprehend it. In 
the case of science, this comprehension must be in terms of the condition of quantity. 
But science is only one of the possible ways in which we are able to speak about pasts 
and changes.
According to Oakeshott, our conceptions of the past and change always come 
into our minds “through” a certain system of postulates (of history, science, practice, 
aesthetics) and, therefore, they will have more than one manifestation. It should be 
realised that for Oakeshott any system of postulates is always in our mind in the present: 
experience is always present, “that world upon which I open my eyes is unmistakably 
present,”38 and we are always in a present world when we understand things. This 
implies that a world of ideas is not merely a present world of ideas but a present world 
of past or future ideas as well, in terms of certain modified conditions. Accordingly, as 
far as the relation among past, present, future is concerned, Oakeshott in OH says:
34 S. W. Hawking, 1988: chap. 2.
35 EM: 244.
36 EM: 186.
37 EM: 200.
38 OH: 7.
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Future, then, is an understanding o f present in terms o f  a change it may be perceived to 
intimate.
Past, then, is an understanding o f  present in terms o f a change it may be perceived to 
record or to conserve.
Both future and past, then, emerge only in reading o f  present; and a particular future or 
past is one eligible to be evoked from a particular present and is contingently related to 
the particular present from which it may be evoked.
The relationship between present and past is a necessary relationship: present and past
39are here logical counterparts.
It follows that, although we are always in a present world, understanding past 
and change in relation to it, whenever we are evoking a past or a future in the reading of 
it, the present will be transcended; it will be transformed into past, into future.40 A 
“now,” in this sense, is therefore merely our mental capacity to make time stand still for 
the moment so that we are capable of speaking about changes. In so far as our ideas of 
past, present, future are exclusively associated with the temporal axis of intention our 
conceptions of time are related to our practical concerns, aesthetic imagination, memory 
and, indeed, to historical thinking. Time can therefore no longer be referred to as “the 
temporal axis of succession,” “temporal sequence,” or “the course of Time.” 
Accordingly, there are some general characteristics of this “transcendental time,” by 
contrast with so-called Natural Time, that should be pointed out:
Co-existence. By means of our awareness of past and future, a “now” is, in fact, 
transcended; the temporal relations between a past and a present or between a future and 
a present are co-existent in our minds, rather than successive. Furthermore, in the 
process of human understanding, a “now” can never be a suspended now; rather, it is a 
flowing state; we are always in the flow of the present when we understand the world in 
which we live. With respect to the process of the historian's reading of evidence, this 
notion of a stream of present experience supports the theory that ideas of the past will be 
transformed into and comprehended as a homogenous world of co-existent ideas.
Repeatability. Let me here cite a simple example to show this difference between 
transcendental time and Natural Time: We have known that John Locke was bom
39 OH: 8-9.
40 Cf. A. Heller, 1982: 37.
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“sometime” in 1632; however, it may be contested that there are at least two sorts of 
meaning of “sometime” in this statement. On the one hand, as the calendar shows, it may 
be taken to mean that there was such a natural phenomenon as “sometime” in 1632, in 
that Time the fact that “Locke was bom on earth” occurred and he existed on the earth 
objectively, and for a distinct period. On the other hand, it also may be taken to mean 
that there is such an artificial notion as “sometime”; and, with this notion of “sometime,” 
the fact that “Locke was bom on earth” will re-exist subjectively in our minds, once we 
know about and whenever we repeat this statement. Now, the Natural Time for me to 
read the statement that Locke “was” bom “sometime” in 1632, for instance, “is” 
“sometime” in 1998. In short, Natural Time, as it is used, is passing by us once only and 
it is unrepeatable; on the other hand, the artificial time is always repeatable but only if 
there are minds to conjure it.
Contingency. Oakeshott claims that in history human actions are to be 
understood “in terms of contingent relations.”41 Here, in our temporal awareness, it is 
inferred that a particular future or past is one eligible to be evoked from a particular 
present and is contingently related to the particular present from which it may be 
evoked.
In summing up, history and the Past can never share temporal rhythm, for while 
the notion of succession which positivism has applied to history is the temporal character 
attributable to Natural Time, to the Past World, to “what really happened,” in history, if 
we follow Oakeshott, all we can know is our pastness, that is, a past evoked in the 
reading of present in the historian's mind: history is always a present world of coexisting 
ideas. That is to say, history can never be independent of the historian; what is 
independent of him, if anything, is the Past World, the Flux of Time, which is 
unattainable in itself.
V.2.3. The Death of the Past and the Survival of Pasts
Getting clear in our minds the two-dimensional nature of “time,” artificial and natural, 
we may now go on to think about the real existence of the Past in itself. I have said in 
other places that “time” is in itself nothing, as we can only speak of “time” related to
41 Cf. HC: 105.
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things in it (see [II.4.3.]). The Past in the sense of being “Time itself’ is certainly 
nothing. Nevertheless, the Past, as it is commonly referred to, is actually taken to mean 
“what really happened in it.” To ask about the real existence of it is therefore to ask: Is 
there such a world as “what really happened in the Past” which is independent of us and 
exists of itself as the authentic object of our current historical understanding?
According to the epistemology on which positivism is founded, i.e. a form of 
empiricism in historiography, it is presumed that there are two worlds of “history,” as 
the unreflective usage of the word “history” suggests. One of these is the subjective 
world of the historian's interpretation, and the other is the objective world of “what 
really happened.” The process of historical understanding is the process in which these 
two worlds come to match each other. Such a distinction, for Oakeshott, however, just 
like the distinction between subject and object, between the knowable and what is 
known, is unreal, arbitrary and absurd. Oakeshott contends that:
An event independent of experience, “objective” in the sense of being untouched by 
thought or judgement, would be an unknowable; it would be neither fact nor true nor 
false, but a nonentity . . . The distinction between history as it happened (the course of 
events) and history as it is thought, the distinction between history itself and merely 
experienced history, must go; it is not merely false, it is meaningless. The historian's 
business is not to discover, to recapture, or even to interpret; it is to create and to 
construct.42
This, of course, does not mean that history and the Past are the same thing. But 
this does mean that in historical understanding we do not have two worlds, one being 
history, another being the Past; we only have one world, the world of co-existent ideas 
in our minds. History as enquiry is different from the Past in itself not only because its 
character can never mirror that of the Past, but because the Past in itself is nothing, in 
that we can know nothing of it at all. The Past-history distinction that we have drawn 
above, though, is not useless, since it enables us step by step to reflect on the character 
of history:
The enterprise in reflection may be likened to ascending a tower liberally supplied with 
windows at every level. The world seen from the ground floor is the world with which all 
reflection begins. But as we climb, the scene changes: the ascent brings into view what
42 EM: 93.
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was before invisible, and at each new level a new world appears . . . the philosophers 
being prepared to go on where the others are content to stop.43
Historians are usually content to present the Past wie es eigentlich gewesen, but 
that is where we should begin to reflect on the nature of history from the outside, i.e. 
from a philosophical point of view. (I shall return to this crucial point shortly.) Now, at 
the top of the tower, the Past being “a fixed and finished past, a past independent of 
present experience,” for Oakeshott, “is a past divorced from evidence [for evidence is 
always in the present] and is consequently nothing and unknowable.”44 Oakeshott’s idea 
is that:
What is known in history is not “what was,” “what really happened,” o f  that we can 
know nothing; it is only and solely with “what the evidence obliges us to believe.”
“What really happened” (a fixed and finished course o f events, immune from change) as 
the end in history must, i f  history is to be rescued from nonentity, be replaced by “what 
the evidence obliges us to believe.”45
It follows that the “object” of historical study, if we choose this way of speaking, 
is not the unknowable Past as the course of events, but “a recorded past composed of 
res gestae recognised as survivals.”46 And those survivals from the Past as evidence 
which obliges us in the present to believe need not be particulars (e.g. buildings 
remaining as relics) but contemporary accounts of those particulars. For Oakeshott’s 
idealism would lead him to accept that what really counts in history, (as in other ways of 
reading something past), is not a representation of events which really happened there 
and then, but a specific way o f understanding what past agents who expressed their 
thoughts in the past time took events to mean. In short, for Oakeshott history is only 
concerned with records of res gestae, namely “texts” (in its hermeneutic usage) which 
bear human thoughts rather than pure happenings in the Past; for this reason, as we shall 
see, it comes as no surprise that Oakeshott believes historical method involves a form of 
“narrative” rather than “causal explanation”.
Also, it may be observed that the nothingness of the Past is a necessary 
conclusion that can be drawn from Oakeshott’s idealistic views. Unlike the empiricist-
43 RPML: 146-7.
44 EM: 107.
45 EM: 107.
46 OH: 30.
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positivistic dogma that there is a physical world independent of us, Oakeshott like many 
idealists, argues that any claims made to maintain the existence of an independent and 
unconditioned world outside of our thinking are meaningless. A subject and an object, it 
must be remembered, always “correspond to and define one another.”47 They are, it is 
suggested, both integral elements in experience. In history, as a result, the claim that the 
real existence of the Past as the authentic object of historical enquiry is not only a 
metaphysical contradiction in the sense that the Past can never exist at present without 
transformation, but it is also a philosophical absurdity in the sense that there is nothing 
independent of experience; we can know nothing of the Past as “what really happened” 
as long as history stays within the realm of experience. As Heidegger puts it:
The past takes everything with it into nothing.
The Past -- experienced as authentic historicity — is anything but what is past [what 
really happened]. It is something to which I can return again and again [in the flowing 
present].48
In short, so far as the existence of History being the only legitimate object of 
historical enquiry is concerned, positivism is destined to break down. For, experience is 
always present, whereas “History” by definition, is “what really happened” which is, as 
we have seen, unknowable in the present.
From the death of the Past, however, does not follow the death of our pastness. 
For it has been shown that there are several forms of past or ways of comprehending res 
gestae corresponding to the several modes of experience that can be evoked in the 
reading of the present; the historical past belongs to one of these possibilities (although, 
as we shall see later, for Oakeshott, the historian may not be critically aware of the 
presentness of the dead past he evokes). Oakeshott remarks:
The past, then, is a certain way of reading the present. But in addition to its being a 
reading of the world in which present events are understood as evidence for events that 
have already taken place, it is a reading which may denote a variety of attitudes towards 
these past events . . .  die three most important attitudes available to us may be called the
47 OH: 27.
48 M. Heidegger, 1992: 12E, 19E.
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practical, the scientific and the contemplative. And, there is a manner o f  speaking about 
past events which is appropriate to each o f  these attitudes.49
(T)he past in history is not only the only past, and a clear view o f  the character o f  the 
past in history involves the distinction o f  this past from that in other forms o f  
experience.50
No matter what each of these forms of past is for now, it must be observed that 
none of these is entitled to claim itself as “the only genuine past.” For the “real” Past has 
already died; and if we can only have “a past” (for Oakeshott, many people often believe 
that the practical past is the only one genuine past), then to look for another and 
different so-called historical past would be “a lost endeavour.”51
Let me now try to sum up the position as it stands at the present stage of the argument. 
For Oakeshott, the historian never simply sets out to “build up in the present a world of 
ideas to correspond with a past and buried course of events”52; the correspondence 
theory of history, positivistic historiography, must be put aside if history is to be a 
legitimate form of experience. There does not exist such an objective world independent 
of the world of historical ideas, for the present world and a past course of events are 
self-contradicted, and the identification of history with “what really happened in the 
Past” and the positivist’s own dictum that “the real is observable” in the present is 
untenable. The “temporal dilemma in history” that has for a long time bothered the 
philosophers can be solved only if history is seen not as a representation of the Past but 
as a reading of the present in terms of the characteristics identified to be historical. And, 
history so understood would therefore make itself a self-systematic world of ideas which 
is safe from being “sundered from present experience,”53 to use Oakeshott’s own 
expression.
At this point, one may say that Oakeshott has shown his affinity with his 
idealistic forerunners, especially Bradley and Collingwood. For it is true that they too 
reject the criterion of history as consisting in “what really happened” in the Past. A
49 RR: 161-2.
50 EM: 102.
51 OH: 10.
52 EM: 94-5.
53 Cf. EM: 107.
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detailed comparison between the three thinkers on historiography, however, is a topic 
that I shall return to in [V.5.]. For now, I only intend to remark that Oakeshott does not 
think that the historian, in order to be legitimate, has to abide by the epistemological 
conditions disclosed by the philosopher. To see the ways in which Oakeshott keeps the 
logic of writing a history separate from his own philosophising, (and thus to start to 
embark on his non-foundationalist defence of the autonomy of history) we must now 
look into those identifying marks with which history “has come to establish itself.”54 It is 
at this stage that Oakeshott’s solution to “the epistemic tension in history” will be under 
consideration.
V.3. The Logic of History
In this section I intend to observe the conditions or characteristics that describe the 
mode of history. As indicated, being a modality of experience means that history is 
categorically different from philosophy as self-critical thought, i.e. thinking without 
modifications. That said, for Oakeshott, to think truly about the nature of history is one 
thing, but to write a history itself is quite another. The task of a philosophy of history is 
to reflect upon the logic of history from the outside rather than from the inside, i.e. from 
the philosopher’s view rather than from the historian’s view.55 Here, as elsewhere in this 
study, it is in the interest of constructing such a philosophy that we are invited by 
Oakeshott to theorise the problem of “What is history?” in terms of the following three 
topics: the postulate of the past in history, the notions of historical fact, truth and change 
and the problem of historical explanation.
V.3.1. The Historical Past
S4RP: 153.
55 EM\ 86-8. Thus, I do not think that Oakeshott’s philosophy of history contains the foundationalist 
implication of “providing us, in a highly disguised fashion, with an historical methodology for the 
humanities and social sciences.” (P. King, 1983:119; cf. 122.) An obvious point of view capable of rejecting 
King’s comment is that Oakeshott clearly treats ethics, history and poetry as three distinctive modes of 
understanding.
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According to Oakeshott, history must be concerned with the past: “the notion of the past 
[in history] cannot be dismissed without dismissing history itself’;56 the historian’s 
“sustained and exclusive interest” lies in the past.57 That is, to think of things in the form 
of past is “the most general of modal conditions of the present in historical 
understanding, and it is absolute.”58 Consequently, it is the past in history, i.e. the 
historical past, that we now have to consider in the first instance. Nonetheless, because 
the past in history is not the only past that may result from one’s reading of the present 
in terms of change, in order to grasp its distinctiveness Oakeshott first draws some 
categorical distinctions between this past and the other forms of past. Oakeshott’s three 
typical examples of such non-historical pasts are: the practical past, the scientific past 
and the aesthetic or contemplative past.
Among those non-historical pasts it is the practical past from which Oakeshott 
has tried most strenuously to distinguish the historical past.59 For Oakeshott, since every 
form of past is to be distinguished in terms of the modal conditions of the present to 
which it is related, the practical past, in favour of the world of practice itself, thus 
consists in an attempt to evoke the past “in relation to ourselves and our own current 
activities.”60 That is to say, just as the world of our ordinary life is “a present of common 
discourse” in which we come to inhabit ourselves by learning how to recognise the 
quality of its contents to satisfy our purposes and wants, the practical past is modified by 
such a present as can be found, in general, to serve politics, morality, and religion. The 
practical past occurs, Oakeshott argues, whenever one employs the past to explain and 
justify one’s present situation: a politician, for example, uses the past to support his 
political programme; a moralist imposes upon the past a moral structure, distinguishing 
virtue and vice, right and wrong in human behaviour and a priest applies the past - say, 
the story of the Gospels - to convince someone of his religious beliefs.61
56 EM: 146.
57 RP: 170.
58 OH: 27.
59 A similar discussion on the unhistorical “practical past” can be found in H. Butterfield, The Whig 
Interpretation o f History (1965), where he says that “the study of the past with one eye, so to speak, upon the 
present is the source of all sins and sophistries in history.” (Ibid.: p. 31) Also quoted in T. W. Smith, 1996: 
604.
60 RP: 162; see also, OH: 14ff.
61 The attempt to identify the historical past with the practical past, for example, has been formulated in 
Croce’s well-known statement - “all history is contemporary history” - which is meant to maintain that 
“[h]istories stimulated and guided by no practical problems would be at best virtuosities or fairy-tales, not 
serious history.” (See D. Boucher, 1984: 206.)
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As already noted, Oakeshott believes that our commonest attitude towards the 
world is in the idiom of practice, such that, while considering pastness as an issue, the 
practical past must be the most frequent one evoked in the present. But, this view is far 
different from the contention that the practical present is unconditional, emancipated 
from modality, and thus that the practical past is the only possible form of past in which 
an independent historical past is not possible. Oakeshott’s idea of modality in EM  or his 
notion of traditions of activity in RP or his theorisation of human conduct in HC that we 
have previously disclosed, indeed, all have made this point, restated in OH, that “no 
object is unconditionally recognisable.”62 And thus, for him, the attempt to name the 
practical past (or any other past) as the only genuine past must be both fruitless and 
absurd.
We shall take the opportunity later to liken Oakeshott’s notion of pasts to the 
Collingwoodian idea of the “living past” as an unconditional past. Instead of making this 
comparison now, however, we only need to note that, by contrast with the practical past, 
Oakeshott observes that the historical past, as it has emerged gradually, has recently 
begun to acquire a specific character in the work of those whom we are accustomed to 
recognise as historians,63 and is taken by them as a past evoked “for its own sake”; for 
them it is a past that is totally indifferent to present concerns. That is to say, by 
separating the historical past from the practical past, Oakeshott is willing to single out 
that in practice historians have perceptibly learned how to “let their thinking be guided 
not by personal considerations, but by the needs of their subject-matter” having an 
autonomous character of its own.64 And, according to Oakeshott, the characteristics of 
the historian’s independent attitude towards the historical past, entirely different to the 
practical man’s, are:
First, practical understanding may or may not be concerned with the past, while 
“whatever else historical understanding may be, it is certainly and exclusively concerned 
with past.”65 Second, in practical understanding, indicators are used to forecast the 
future, whose temporal pattern is “present-future”; whereas in history the present, as 
already indicated, is always seen as “a recorded past composed of res gestae recognised
62 OH: 9.
63 RP: 165-8.
64 W. H. Walsh, 1968: 6-7.
65 OH: 27.
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as survivals” that are to be understood historically, and thus its temporal pattern is 
“present-past.”
For these reasons, Oakeshott believes, history, if it is to be self-satisfactory, 
cannot construct idioms simply by means of using practical language or statements such 
as: “You are looking very well: where did you go for your holiday”? “King John was a 
bad king”; “The Factory Acts of the early nineteenth century culminated in the Welfare 
State of the twentieth century” and the like66. For this is to commit the error of 
ignoratio elenchi. On the contrary, as long as there is a distinctive voice as history in our 
conversation, there occurs an historically understood past “to be found nowhere but in a 
history book.”67 All this, of course, does not mean that the practical past is illegitimate; 
far from this, the practical past can never be considered as the enemy of mankind, it is 
merely the enemy of historians.68
I shall return to expand on Oakeshott’s separation of the historical past from the 
practical past in connection with some criticisms later on. For the moment, the pursuit of 
the past for its own sake, one might argue, could possibly be found originally in the 
scientific past as well, if there is any such past. For the scientist’s concern with the 
world, it will be remembered, appears not exactly in “himself and his current activity” 
but rather in the notion of “cause and effect.” At first glance, it does seem a trustworthy 
statement that “the scientific attitude towards the world and the historical attitude 
towards the past, have emerged together, and with some interdependence, in modem 
Europe”; that “the specification of the activity of being a ‘scientist’ and the specification 
of the activity of being an ‘historian’ were both achieved in a progress of emancipation 
from the primordial and once almost exclusive practical attitude of mankind.”69
However, Oakeshott rejects that there should be any categorical connection 
between science and history in terms of the concept of past. This is because Oakeshott 
argues, the scientist may be interested in the past but the historian, as said, is solely 
concerned with the past. Moreover, even if it is the case that the past is sought by the 
scientist, his categorical concern with “necessary and sufficient conditions” must lead
66 RP: 163.
67 OH: 33.
68 It appears to me a terrible misconception when P. King argues that Oakeshott’s case against practical or 
scientific past “is less an argument than a simple statement of distinctions (within the ‘past’) which, in a 
merely definitional manner, is intended to ‘persuade’ us of the sole legitimacy of the historical past.” (1983: 
123.)
69 RP: 171.
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him to take the past events to exemplify general laws 70 Oakeshott realises that there is a 
strong tendency encouraged by positivism to promote the view that the historian should 
emulate the scientist in his research; his rejection of scientific history in terms of general 
laws, however, is a wider question that I shall come to terms with where appropriate. 
For now, it is only sufficient to remind the reader once more that for Oakeshott, since 
history has already achieved a specific non-scientific character in interpreting the 
historical past for the interest of being an historian, it is thus folly to re-assimilate history 
into science, to return to philosophisme.
In other words, with regard to the practice of the historian for the last two 
centuries, now that the emergence of the historical past has been a de facto 
phenomenon, Oakeshott sees no point in re-dissolving this historical interest into the 
scientific one. Furthermore, so far as the notion of the past is concerned, “if we speak 
more strictly, there can in fact be no ‘scientific’ attitude towards the past, for the world 
as it appears in scientific theory is a timeless world, a world, not of actual events, but of 
hypothetical situations.”71
The historical past also has nothing to do with the contemplative past, as 
represented in the work of the artist and the poet. The world of aesthetics, according to 
Oakeshott, is a world “composed, not of events recognised as signs or portents, but of 
causeless ‘images’ of delight which provoke neither approval nor disapproval, and to 
which the categories ‘real’ and ‘fictitious’ are alike inapplicable.” For this very reason, 
the past evoked in such a world is nothing but “a storehouse of mere images.”72 The 
contemplative past, for example, occurs most often in so-called “historical novels.” But, 
it is obvious that to write a history in terms of a world of historical ideas for its own sake 
is logically different from creating a novel in terms of a world of mere images, in which 
pastness is often ignored. Thus, in a strict sense, as Oakeshott later argues, “aesthetic 
understanding is never concerned with past.”73
70 Here is an example that Oakeshott cites from Valery: “all the revolutions of the nineteenth century had as 
their necessary and sufficient conditions the centralized constitutions of power, thanks to which ... a 
minimum strength and duration of effort can deliver an entire nation at a single stroke to whoever 
undertakes the adventure.” (See RP: 163-4.)
71 RP: 164.
72 RP: 158; 164.
73 OH: 27.
- 2 3 0 -
So far we have considered the historical past by showing what is not the case about it. 
To grasp the positive character of the past in history, however, we must now turn to the 
past fo r  history, i.e. the past as the historian is accustomed to conceive it. According to 
Oakeshott, as already shown, the historian in writing a history has developed a specific 
interest in reading the present in terms of change for the sake of change itself, evoking 
the past for the sake of the past per se. “What the historian is interested in,” Oakeshott 
says, “is a dead past; a past unlike the present”; the differentia of the historical past 
precisely consists in “its very disparity from what is contemporary.”74 In RP, Oakeshott 
writes:
The “historian” adores the past; but the world today has perhaps less place for those who 
love the past than ever before . . . For it wishes only to learn from the past and it 
constructs a ‘living past’ which repeats with spurious authority the utterances put into its 
mouth. But to the ‘historian’ this is a piece o f obscene necromancy: the past he adores is 
dead. The world has neither love nor respect for what is dead, wishing only to recall it 
for life again. It deals with the past as with a man, expecting it to talk sense and have 
something to say apposite to its plebeian ‘causes’ and engagements. But for the 
‘historian,’ for whom the past is dead and irreproachable, the past is feminine. He loves
75it as a mistress o f whom he never tires and whom he never expects to talk sense.
Here the Oakeshottian bid to segregate the historical past from the practical past 
has been re-affirmed. But, from a philosophical point of view, the historical past as the 
past pursued for its own sake must be an “illusion,” because the past fo r  history as a 
dead past is nothing but “what really happened” in the Past. However, it has already 
been shown that we can only at every “now” evoke either pasts or futures; “what really 
happened” in the Past is a nonentity, unknowable to us. The result of the historian’s 
specific concern with the dissimilarity between the present and the past, as a result, is a 
self-contradiction and thus the view of the historical past cannot be maintained 
unmodified.
This is to say that in Oakeshott’s observation the modality of the historical past 
that the historian has learned to present must contradict the character of history as a 
form of experience (cf. [V.2.]). That is, the historical past being a fixed and dead past for 
its own sake must contradict the experiential character of history being present; “what 
was” must be paradoxical to “what is”; “what really happened” must be at odds with
74 EM: 106.
75RP: 166; also quoted by K. Minogue, 1993: 48-9; T. W. Smith, 1996: 607.
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“what the evidence obliges us to believe.” In sum, “the pastness of the world of 
historical experience involves a modification of its presentness, involves a modification 
of its character as experience.”76 This, I believe, is one of the most difficult parts of 
Oakeshott’s historiography to be understood and as such it is deemed unacceptable by 
many scholars.77 Here, in support of Oakeshott, I have to return to Oakeshott’s theory 
of modality that we have reviewed especially in [III.2.4.] and [III.3.1.] in order to make 
the point.
In my previous examination of Oakeshott’s idea of philosophy in EM, I have 
argued that for Oakeshott the business of philosophy is to transcend the abstractness of 
the modes of experience by disclosing the “self-contradiction” inherent in each of them, 
that is, to show how a mode of experience, on the one hand, by virtue of its character as 
a world of ideas, can be seen by philosophy as a self-consistent world of ideas while on 
the other hand, by virtue of its modality, it falls short of philosophy itself. On this view, 
then, by disclosing the abstractness of history in terms of the historical past, Oakeshott’s 
real purpose is to place history and philosophy into two different categories: history, 
since it cannot be claimed to be unmodified, cannot be taken as the criterion of 
experience, i.e. philosophy; philosophy, since it is self-critical thought, must attempt to 
transcend the modality of history.
Although philosophical thinking starts where the other modes of thoughts find 
themselves a platform to dwell on, or, to use a Platonic metaphor, a cave to dwell in, 
unlike Plato, for Oakeshott, the cave-dwellers, living happily as they are, do not require 
a philosophy to put them right.78 On the contrary, because “nothing can be dismissed as 
mere error,” and because it is both “the half-true in the error and the half-error in the 
truth” that constitute the logic of a mode of understanding, the self-contradiction of 
history should not be discarded as long as it remains self-consistent:
History, since it is experience, implies an attempt to organise, to make and to maintain 
coherent the whole world o f experience. But the differentia o f history is that in it an 
attempt is made to organise the whole world o f experience in the form o f the past and o f 
the past for its own sake. The historical past does not stand over against the present 
world o f experience, as a separate tract o f experience; on the contrary, it is a special
76 EM: 110-1.
77 See, for example, R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 155-8; G. C. Field, 1938: 15-6; W. H. Walsh, 1967: 88-9; P. 
King, 1983: 124-5; and G. Himmelfarb, 1984: 494-505.
78 See HC\ 27-31.
- 2 3 2 -
organisation o f that world, it is the organisation o f the totality o f experience sub specie 
praeteritorum. The historical past is always present; and yet historical experience is 
always in the form o f the past. And this contradiction must remain unresolved so long as
79we remain m the world o f historical ideas.
If this is what Oakeshott really wants to maintain by modifying history, that 
history is a self-determined mode of experience distinctive from philosophy (and the 
other modes), to this end he has hitherto had little to do with historicism, claiming that 
all knowledge is historical. I shall return to these qualifications on Oakeshott’s thought 
shortly.
Besides, it is equally important to note once again that the condition of the 
historical past as such would not require us to accept the correspondence theory of 
history. For, in contrast to Oakeshott’s theory, positivistic historiography neglects the 
truth-part in history (the experiential character of history as present experience) and 
accepts the wrong-part in philosophy (the belief that the Past exists in itself), and it is 
thus an “incorrect philosophy of inadequate history” that should be transcended by a 
more coherent philosophical scheme. By neglecting the fact that history is a form of 
experience, that the historian’s task is re-construction, what positivistic historiography 
offers us is pseudo-historical which is impossible to maintain without dissolving the logic 
of history at the same time. And furthermore, by accepting that the Past exists in itself, 
what it often persuades the historian to believe in, as it were, is not necessarily a dead 
past but a possibility of reproducing “a ‘living past’ which repeats with spurious 
authority the utterances put into its mouth.” As we shall see, what Popper says about the 
practical past in terms of the notion of “selection” in history, it seems to me, is standard 
for many neo-positivists.
V.3.2. Fact, Truth and Change in History
For Oakeshott, as we have seen, history is an attempt to organise an entire world of co­
existent ideas in the form of past, sub specie praeteritorum. History always exists as a 
single and coherent world of ideas resulting from the modality of historical past. To 
examine further the logic of history and thus to reject positivist historiography more
79EM: 111.
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completely, however, we must now consider how this absolute postulate of the past 
works in the other structural concepts that mark the process of historical understanding.
The two key issues here are historical change and historical explanation. In EM, 
before getting to these issues, however, Oakeshott dwells for a while on the relative 
problems of historical fact and historical truth which have already been largely answered 
by his establishing history as a form of experience. Following Oakeshott’s argument 
structure, I shall address these problems by reference to the condition of the past from 
which they derive. Therefore, we may move on toward the issues of historical change 
and historical explanation.
It is observable that all we have said about the character of history being a form 
of experience, in fact, conforms perfectly to the general character of experience that we 
have examined in [III.3.]. This is because, for Oakeshott, remember, a mode of 
understanding is not a part of experience but an arrest in experience as a whole, insofar 
as it can never abandon its essence of being experience. And consequently, in addition to 
fact (a world of ideas), truth and reality are the three concepts that Oakeshott employs 
to look into the general character of experience; it is now historical fact, historical truth 
and historical reality that he takes as necessary conditions to categorise historical 
experience.
In experience, fact, as indicated, is never isolated, atomic, fixed, finished and 
simply given; on the contrary, the meaning of a fact is always its place in the single world 
of ideas as a whole. Thus, historical fact, to put it another way, must be a conclusion, an 
inference and a judgement which belongs to and gains its meaning from the historical 
world of ideas, that is, numerous pieces of evidence bearing upon a past agent’s 
intelligence that have so far been reconstructed in the historian’s mind. Historical fact, as 
Oakeshott concludes, is nothing less than the world of historical ideas taken as a whole 
and seen to be coherent.
In like manner, Oakeshott continues, historical truth is also in harmony with the 
general feature of truth, i.e. the criterion of coherence within experience itself. The 
consequences of this are three: First, historical truth is a present truth as a past truth is a 
contradiction; second, it is never a matter of the correspondence of a present idea to a 
past event for there is no “external criterion” in experience, but it is only a matter of the 
coherence that a present idea enjoys being a member of the world of historical ideas; and 
third, it is impossible to establish this truth “piecemeal” (as Popper might have argued)
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as the task of the historian is to transform a given world of ideas into a more coherent 
world of ideas.80 Historical truth, Oakeshott argues, does not he in the question, “Does 
this set of past events hang together when taken in this way?” but rather in the question, 
“Does my whole world of experience gain or lose in coherence when I take these facts in 
this way?”81 On this account, then, “an anachronism is not a contradiction in a world of 
past events, it is a contradiction in a world of present world: it is something which comes 
to us as a fact, but which fails to establish its factual character on account of the 
incoherence it introduces into our world of present [historical] experience.”82
However, historical fact and historical truth must suffer the limitation of the 
historical past all the time. That is, they are necessarily present and they are 
simultaneously conceived of in the form of the past. Historical truth is not present truth 
about what happened in the past; but it is the entire world of experience seen as a single 
world of ideas sub specie praeteritorum. And thus, “it is the business of the historian to 
introduce into the world of experience whatever coherence this category of the past is 
capable of introducing.”83
Having explored the idea of historical fact and the truth in the form of the past, we may 
now address the topic of the logic of history, namely the notion of reality in history and 
the relative concept of historical change. It goes without saying that the criterion of 
reality (of self-completeness or individuality), as in the general character of experience, 
must be applied likewise to the world of history. Historical reality, Oakeshott thus 
argues, is composed of self-complete individuals which for the sake of convenience can 
be divided into events (the fall of the Bastille and the Reformation), things or institutions 
(the Roman Empire and Christianity) and persons. And, because history is a world of 
ideas, not the course of past events, the individual in history can only be “designed and 
not defined”; “history itself,” says Oakeshott, “does not and cannot provide us with the 
historical individual, for wherever history exists it has been constructed upon a 
postulated conception of individuality.”84
80 EM 113.
81 EM 114.
82 EM 114.
83 EM 118.
84 EM 120.
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But, the question is: How then can we identify an event, an institution or a 
person in history? To answer this, Oakeshott first offers us his “principle of continuity 
and discontinuity” to replace “Time and Place.” That is, an historical individual is not 
defined by the Time and Place that it occupied “there and then,” but is instead 
characterised by its relative continuity and discontinuity, judged by the historian in a 
world of historical ideas. In the case of an institution like the Roman Empire, for 
example, it stands out from what is taken to be its environment because:
it can show no change at all, no variation in shape, size or content, nor because the 
historian has chosen the line o f last resistance and has restricted the name either to the 
thing as it first appeared before change had made its individuality ambiguous or to some 
core which he supposes to have remained untouched by outward circum stances, but 
because its beginning is marked by an apparent break in the continuity o f what went 
before, and because, having been established, it could maintain a continuous existence. 
Into this individuality, place enters very little; Rome itself is scarcely significant at all, 
now W est, now East preserves the continuity. W hat establishes it for history is the fact 
that there appears some discontinuity at its beginning, and subsequently no absolute 
break in the Empire’s existence, various as were the circumstances o f its life. And when
85such a break is seen to occur, then and not till then, is the individuality shattered.
Likewise, the principle of break-discontinuity-continuity-break applies to an 
historical event or an historical person, too. An historical event is not like what 
positivists believe it to be, a “mere point-instant”; but rather, it is something with 
meaning in change, whose ability to establish its individual significance consists in its 
discontinuity and whose ability to maintain itself consists in its continuity. Historical 
events (or facts) are never fixed and finished in character; their meanings are arbitrarily 
joined and separated from one another in different historical works - works in which 
their individuality is distinguished and judged by historians.
It follows that, since discontinuity and continuity both centre on the concept of 
change, every historical individual must be a “changing identity.” In identifying an 
historical individual we are in actuality recognising its character of change in terms of 
what Oakeshott calls the principle of the “Identification of Indiscemibles.” To quote 
Bradley:
what seems the same is so fa r  the same, and cannot be made different by any diversity, 
and that so long as an ideal content is identical no change o f content can destroy its 
unity.
85 EM: 121.
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It implies that the sameness can exist together with difference, or that what is the same is
86still the same, however much in other ways it differs.
For Oakeshott, however, the task of an historian is not to examine this principle 
itself, but just to take it as an unchallenged presupposition about history. History, then, 
unlike philosophy, is a limited mode of human understanding. The world of history is the 
world of historical individuals governed by the ideas of change, of continuity and 
discontinuity and is pursued under the category of the past: Reality is present, and yet in 
history it must be past; the historical past is not a part of the real world but the whole of 
reality subsumed under the category of the past. And thus, to write a history is precisely 
to give a coherent account of the designed individuals in terms of change. Keeping this 
meaning of history in mind, we now enter into Oakeshott’s idea of historical explanation.
V.3.3. H istorical Explanation 
In the preceding discussions, we have been ceaselessly met with the problem of historical 
explanation. For, if experience is always a world of meanings, we then cannot disclose its 
character without using the notion of “explanation” as a means of understanding it. This 
implies that, besides being undertaken under the category of past, historical explanation 
also adheres to the general theory of understanding that Oakeshott has so far persistently 
maintained: in understanding, there is only one world, one reality, that is, a single unity 
of ideas as a whole; understanding starts with a unity of ideas and ends up with a more 
coherent unity of ideas; the given in understanding is a unity of individuals to be made 
more coherent.
Now that we have defined history in this way, as a world of historical individuals 
in terms of change, I would now like to define the Oakeshottian notion of historical 
explanation as a “complete narrative of the unity of historical individuals in terms of 
change”.
According to this view which Oakeshott himself calls “a complete account of 
change” or the “unity of history,” the historian in explaining change in history “is like the 
novelist whose characters (for example) are presented in such detail and with such
86 Bradley, Logic: 288, Appearance and Reality: 347; quoted in EM: 124.
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coherence that additional explanation of their actions is superfluous.”87 This analogy, of 
course, is not meant to equate histories with novels, since we have already distinguished 
the historical past from the contemplative past; rather, I think Oakeshott’s point is that in 
history “scientific method” should be allotted no status. For this very reason, Oakeshott 
thus criticises “causal explanation” as incapable of giving us a coherent understanding of 
historical change.
In EM , the pro-scientific targets tackled by Oakeshott are the methods of general 
causes, economic determinism, great events, and Bury’s conception of “contingency”;88 
In RP, Oakeshott argues that historical narrative, as in the work of de Tocqueville and 
Maitland, for example, has already been shown “not as the necessary and inevitable 
consequence of preceding events (as in scientific explanation), but as an intelligible 
convergence of human choices and actions”;89 whilst in OH it is the Popperian- 
Hempelian covering law model that lies behind his reflections. For my purpose, I shall 
only develop Oakeshott’s idea of the “unity of history” by focusing on the target of the 
covering law model alone. And, the issues I have to raise here are: first, the Popperian 
notion of selection in history; and second, the Oakeshottian historical particularity versus 
the Popperian-Hempelian scientific generalisation.
So far we have seen that history must be less than the Past as a whole, and that the 
historian has to criticise historical facts with regard to his authorities. In this respect, it 
does seem that in writing history “the historian is necessarily selective.”90 To say so, 
however, the implications of the notion “selection” need to be clarified.
In the first place, as already indicated, the concept in question has been used in 
the context of neo-positivism. Karl Popper, for example, argues that “the realm of facts 
is infinitely rich, ... [so] there must be selection;” “the facts at our disposal are often 
severely limited and cannot be repeated or implemented at our will” without choosing.91 
Again, it seems that the so-called bias of the historian in writing history is inescapable, if 
we pause to consider how many things, such as classes, ethnic groups, gender, and so
87 EM: 141.
88 See EM: 125-41.
89 RP: 111.
90 E. H. Carr, 1961: 12.
91 Karl Popper, 1962: 270, 265.
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on, have been omitted in our traditional texts.92 Popper could be at this point insisting 
further that in writing history there should be “a preconceived selective point of view 
into one’s history; that is, to write that history which interests us.” “The historian,” he 
continues, “need not worry about all those facts and aspects which have no bearing upon 
our point of view and which therefore do not interest us,” but instead “all available 
evidence which has a bearing on our point of view should be considered carefully and 
objectively.”93
Being a positivist, nevertheless, Popper’s conceding the importance of selection 
in history is only in order to maintain that the subjectivity of the historian (and the 
particularity of historical events) will not affect the fact that the structure of historical 
study is in accordance with that of scientific explanation. On this view, Popper, of 
course, has no intention to agree with the idealist’s view that selection must at the same 
time imply the function of transforming res gestae into historical ideas in the historian’s 
mind. Instead, for Popper as for other pro-positivists, historical evidence consists in 
positivist facts, and so in historical writing all the historian has to do is make a selection 
of facts or data and then explain them causally in terms of a certain standpoint (i.e. an 
empirically testable proposition or generalisation) being chosen.
Here, it is significant to note that what Popper means by “a preconceived 
selective point of view” is, in fact, an act of backward-looking at past things; it is a 
practical attitude which looks at past ideas with the purpose of justifying present beliefs, 
to see what has affected the present conditions of things, to learn lessons of political 
wisdom, and so on. Popper himself in his Preface to The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
explicitly wrote that: “even where it looks back into the past, its problems are problems 
of our own time; and I have tried hard to state them as simply as I could, in the hope of 
clarifying matters which concern us all.”94 Such a practical past, as we have seen, is 
indeed a necessary platform for mankind to dwell on, yet it is the foe of the historian. In 
Oakeshott’s view, then, the Popperian notion of selection is certainly not a genuine 
historical attitude; history is always an attitude towards past ideas for its own sake.
Indeed, Oakeshott would not disagree that in writing history the historian has to 
select a subject, a theme and a period of time etc.; he, however, strongly rejects the
92 Indeed, a similar bias may also exist at the level of historiography itself. R. Young, for example, reminds 
us of the problem of Eurocentrism embodied in the history of Western historiography. (See Young, 1990.)
93 K. Popper, 1957: 150.
94 K. Popper, 1962: vol. 1. vii.
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positivist notion of data-collection in history. For, as we have seen, even
is less than the entire Past, the surviving evidence that obliges the historian to believe is
always a world of historical ideas as a whole. That is to say, according to Oakeshott's 
general theory of knowledge, an idea is always to be conceived in respect of a world of
thinking is never a process of incorporation; it is always a process by which a given 
world of ideas is transformed into a world that is more of a world.” Thus, it is 
Oakeshott’s view that everything in the world of historical ideas bears on every other 
thing - nothing in history can be irrelevant to understanding. To explain the notion of 
“unity of history” as such, Oakeshott has made two important statements in EM  which I 
now quote at length:
[N]othing in the world of history is negative or non-contributory. All relationship 
between historical events is positive . . . The belief that the Donation of Constantine 
recorded a genuine ‘donation’ was erroneous; the document was a forgery. But, for the 
historian, the belief is a positive fact, an event which makes a positive contribution to our 
knowledge of the Middle Ages, and not a mere mistake. A forgery is not, of course, the 
same thing to the historian as a genuine world, but it is no less and no more important. 
History is never a balance of debit and credit; it is a positive unity. In short, the unity of 
history implies a world of positive events in which such negative concepts as ‘evil,’ 
‘immoral,’ ‘unsuccessful,’ ‘illogical,’ etc., have, as such, no place at all. Historical 
explanation, consequently, involves neither condemnation nor excuse.
Secondly, it is implied in this principle that in the course of events for history ‘everything 
goes by degree and nothing by leaps” . . .  It is a presupposition of history that every 
event is related and that every change is but a moment in a world which contains no 
absolute hiatus. And the only explanation of change relevant or possible in history is 
simply a complete account of change. History accounts for change by means of a full 
account of change. The relation between events is always other events, and it is 
established in history by a full relation of the events. The conception of cause is thus 
replaced by the exhibition of a world of events intrinsically related to one another in 
which no lacuna is tolerated. To see all the degrees of change is to be in position of a 
world of facts which calls for no further explanation. History, then, neither leaves change 
unexplained, nor attempts to explain it by an appeal to some external reason or universal 
cause [or general laws]: it is the narration [emphasis mine] of a course of events which, 
in so far as it is without serious interruption, explains itself. In history, “pour savoir les 
choses, il faut savoir le detail”. And the method of the historian is never to explain by 
means of generalisation but always by means of greater and more complete detail.95
ideas; the particular is always quarantined by the whole; and “the process in historical
95 EM: 142-3.
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To this view, a view with which Collingwood seems to have agreed, in general, 
by saying that “no fact is turned away from the historian’s door,”96 W. H. Greenleaf 
contributes the following:
This means that, in the history o f political ideas, for instance, it is inappropriate to start 
out with modem criteria o f relevance and significance in mind and to  turn away from  
consideration books and conceptions that seem to us unimportant or erroneous. There is 
“no place for mere error or mistake,” for the use o f such categories assumes an extra- 
historical criterion in terms o f which things could have been otherwise than they were. In 
history we have to attribute rationality to what now seems absurd, false or illogical; in 
the appropriate context we have to accept it as historically positive fact that the basis or
97appeal o f which has to be understood on its own terms.
In other words, for Oakeshott, “it is impossible to ‘fix’ a text before we begin to 
interpret it. To ‘fix’ a text involves an interpretation; the text is the interpretation and the 
interpretation is the text.”98 This, together with the point that every new discovery in 
history is “not the discovery of a fresh detail but of a new world,” indicates that 
Oakeshott’s conception is not strange to contemporary Hermeneutics. T. Kuhn, in his 
The Essential Tension, for example, has made a similar remark:
When reading the works o f an important thinker, look first for the apparent absurdities 
in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person could have written them. W hen you 
find an answer . . .  when these passages make sense, then you may find that more central 
passages, ones you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning.99
As a result, it may be confirmed here that Oakeshott’s conception of historical 
explanation is certainly much closer to a theory of “historical narrative” than to a theory 
of “causal explanation”.
To sum up, for Oakeshott, the general character of historical explanation is in 
accordance with that of understanding that we have unveiled so far; the criterion of 
historical truth, as of other modes of experience, is coherence rather than 
correspondence. That which categorically distinguishes the logic of history only lies in 
the fact that there is “a structural presupposition (assumed and left uncriticised in 
history, [namely the historical past]) which enables the historian to build a specific and
96 Quoted by W. H. Greenleaf, 1966: 28.
97 Ibid.: 27.
98 EM: 113.
99 T. S. Kuhn, 1977: xii.
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homogeneous world of ideas. In history there is the attempt to explain the historical past 
by means of the historical past and for the sake of the historical past.”100 Thus, like fact, 
truth and change in history, historical explanation must be arrested at the standpoint of 
the past as well, together they turn aside from the main current of experience in order to 
construct and explore a restricted world of ideas called history. And consequently, it 
may be inferred that Oakeshott does share certain affinities with post-modern views of 
“conventional history”: both are anti-Whiggish, anti-historical-objectivism, and based on 
a continental hermeneutic rather than a quest for positivist facts in their theory of 
historical understanding.101
Having introduced the Oakeshottian “unity of history”, let us now turn to consider how 
this view is different from the Popper-Hempelian covering law model in dealing with the 
“epistemic tension in history”.
According to Oakeshott, history is not only concerned with a comprehensive 
unity of ideas, but it is also concerned with the unique, particular and contingent 
relationship of those ideas,102 which is to say that the historical past is composed of 
“circumstantially and significantly related historical events”,103 and so it “has no place for 
extrinsic general terms of relationship - the glue of normality or the cement of general 
causes.”104 At this point, without doubt, Oakeshott is reminiscent of a number of non­
positivist thinkers. Collingwood, for example, argues that in history “nothing of value 
[is] left for generalisation”;105 and Elton declares that history deals with events “from the 
point of view of happening, change, and the particular”; it is “idiographic” rather than 
“nomothetic”.106
In the so-called idiographic-nomothetic debate in historiography lasting over a 
century in the Western intellectual environment, however, Popper and Hempel have 
powerfully argued that historical particularity and scientific generalisation are not necessarily 
in conflict, because whilst historians are dealing with the particular, in their study “laws may
100 EM: 144-5.
101 T. W. Smith, 1996: 601.
102 Although I disagree with almost every main argument that P. King makes about Oakeshott’s historical 
thought in “Michael Oakeshott and Historical Particularism”, I think he is right in characterising it in terms 
of the name: historical particularism.
103 OH: 62.
104 OH: 94.
105 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 222.
106 G. R. Elton, 1969: 24, 41. The terms “idiographic” and “nomothetic” were first coined by Windelband.
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be so trivial, so much part of [their] common knowledge, that [historians] need not mention 
them and rarely notice them”,107 that is, laws are often “tacitly taken for granted.”108 In the 
case of Hempel, for instance, the explanatory law which applies to both scientific and 
historical explanation is formulated as follows: Suppose that a set of events Cl, C2, ... Cn 
have occurred within which the situation E  is to be explained, the explanation of the 
occurrence of E  must consist of:
(1) a set o f statements asserting the occurrence o f certain events C l, C2, ... Cn at certain 
times and places, [i.e. the “determining conditions” for the event to be explained]
(2) a set o f universal hypotheses, such that
(a) the statements o f both groups are reasonably w ell confirmed by empirical 
evidence,
(b) from the two groups o f statements the sentence asserting the occurrence o f  
event E can be logically deduced.109
And since, insofar as the structure of historical explanation conforms to that of scientific 
explanation, history is a genuine form of scientific knowledge.110
To argue against Oakeshott’s historical particularism in favour of the Popper- 
Hempelian model, P. King writes that “it is of no use whatever to seek to characterise 
historical events as unique”, for although “we do not perceive history to be governed by 
universal laws, it does not follow that we can demonstrate that there are no such 
laws.”111 In defence of Oakeshott, however, I think writers like King fail to realise that 
the Popper-Hempelian model is actually based on a form of realism in history purporting 
to maintain that there exists such a thing as the Past which is independent of the 
historian, and therefore the task of the historian is merely to represent past events as 
what they really were. In other words, as already mentioned, that the historian always 
takes general laws for granted can be true only if the temporal structure that underlies 
his “causal explanation” has been identified as “successive” (Cl, C2, ... Cn) in terms of 
natural time, namely, history is treated as a series of events, the course of “what really 
happened”; such that the causality of historical events may be pre-determined as an 
existing fact (in the Past) without recognition by the historian. However, Oakeshott has 
made every effort to prove that history and the Past are not identical; the temporal
107 K. Popper, 1957: 145.
108 C. Hempel, 1965: 236.
109 Ibid.: 232.
110 For the supportive arguments for Hempel’s model, see esp. E. Nagel, 1959; M. White, 1959.
111 P. King, 1983: 129.
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rhythm in history is not given but artificial. And he actually takes it to be co-existence 
which allows the historian to understand historical events in his mind in terms of 
“contingent relationship”, that is, a kind of relationship “which, when in an enquiry it is 
found to subsist between antecedent events and a subsequent event, composes an 
identity which may be described, alternatively, as an event properly understood as an 
outcome of antecedent events, or as an assemblage of events related in such a manner as 
itself to constitute an historically understood event.”112
This means that in Oakeshott’s theory of past and time historical events are not 
necessarily themselves causally or successively (or even contingently)113; it is human 
agents who conceive them to be so. And just because insofar as the dominating words 
“cause” and “successiveness” in historical discourse belong to “the rhetoric of 
persuasion rather than the logic of historical enquiry”,114 the existence of general laws in 
the historical world is not absolute but optional. That is, as long as the distinction 
between history and the Past, between historical time and natural time is made, the neo­
positivist’s attempt to reconcile the “epistemic tension in history” by claiming a given 
common logical structure of the historical world is doomed to be in vain. As a result of 
this, the questions regarding the covering law model would turn out to be thus: first, in 
history, is it plausible to read the relationship of historical events in terms of 
generalisation? and second, is it desirable to do so?
Of the first of these questions, Hempel has clearly suggested, and Popper would 
not disagree, that since (no matter whether the historian recognises them or not) general 
laws exist universally and offer an “indispensable instrument” for historical study, it is no 
shame of the historian to largely apply general laws (or theories) to his study.115 And it is 
without question, as Oakeshott argues, that here by the notion “law” both Popper and 
Hempel do not mean “a law of historical change”, but the conclusion of a psychological, 
an economic or a sociological enquiry which is not concerned to explain occurrences but 
to formulate regularities, or a generalisation about human nature or a testable 
proposition about human behaviour.
However, Oakeshott claims that this scientific account of historical explanation is 
“muddled and untenable”, as it denies the essential conditions of an historical enquiry as
112 OH: 93-4.
113 Cf. OH: 94.
114 OH: 85; cf. 83-96.
115 C. Hempel, 1965: 231, 243.
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an endeavour to answer an historical question by gathering a passage of the past 
consisting of related events which have not survived inferred from a past of artefacts and 
utterances which have survived.116 That is to say, with the covering law model the 
historian is only attempting to deduce the occurrence of a survived event E  by relating it 
to the occurrence of other survived events (Cl, C2, ... Cn) in terms of universal laws 
which disclose this relationship to be causal, but “this is not a possible procedure for an 
inquiry concerned to understand a not yet understood past which has not survived, and 
its conclusion is not of a kind that any historical enquiry, or any alleged historical 
enquiry, has ever sought.”117 To this, Oakeshott has three relevant points to make. 
Together they may help us clarify further the main concern of an historical enquiry as 
categorically distinguishable from that of science.
First, let me take this opportunity to resume Oakeshott’s distinguishing the 
historical past from the practical past. It is true that a number of Oakeshott’s critics have 
questioned the possibility of Oakeshott’s insistence on history being the past for its own 
sake indifferent to the present concern, namely what may be called anti-presentism 
embodied in Oakeshott’s historical thought.118 P. King, for instance, quotes E. H. Carr 
to argue that “the function of the historian is ... to master [the past] as the key to the 
understanding of the present.”119 A. H. Birch writes that in history “interpretation means 
not only an assessment of the meaning of events in their own time but also, as H. P. 
Rickman has put it in his essay on Dilthey, “an assessment of these events in the light of 
the historian’s own age, that is, in terms of their consequences in time and the ways in 
which they ultimately affected the historian and his age’.”120 And more recently, T. W. 
Smith relies with his similar criticism on the authority of H. Trevor-Roper who claims 
that “history is not merely what happened, it is what happened in the context of what 
might have happened”; and on the authority of H. White who maintains that “the 
contemporary history has to establish the value of the study of the past, not as an end in
116 OH: 79.
117 OH: 80.
118 Here, allow me to remind the reader that the problem of presentism, (namely the practical past), is 
different from “the temporal dilemma in history” which is concerned with the presentness or pastness of the 
historian’s reading of an historical event.
119 See P. King, 1983:122.
120 See A, H. Birch, 1969: 225.
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itself, but as a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the 
solution of problems peculiar to our own time.”121
With his main objection to the covering law model as mentioned above, it seems 
that for Oakeshott an exclusive concern with past is possible in historical writing because 
res gestae which survive in the present, “when authenticated, are to be used as 
circumstantial evidence for constructing a past which has not [now] survived.”122 This 
means that in response to his critics Oakeshott does not change his mind about anti- 
presentism in the historical past, instead he only comes to restrict the major interest of 
the historian to be the reconstruction of a past which is not known to the historian in the 
present. Practically, this interest of an historical enquiry is posed so strictly that 
Oakeshott himself cannot write a history as such; and yet theoretically, that strictness 
surely enables him to treat the covering law model as “the secondary engagement of 
explaining” in history in the sense of affecting “to perform the impossible feat of leaping 
directly into a past which has not survived by beginning in a present of alleged 
informative statements reporting and asserting the occurrence of certain kinds of 
happening, for example, the defeat of Napoleonic armies at Waterloo and its attendant 
circumstances (‘initial conditions’).”123 As a result, with the covering law model, res 
gestae are only interpreted in terms of a given generalisation which is now available to 
the historian; it thus often involves practical concerns as we have seen in Popper’s case.
Additionally, we have seen that although a past event E  and other events (Cl, 
C 2,... Cn) which accompany it are recorded it does not mean that they are historical; but 
rather this only means that they are the characters of bygone situations which have not 
survived awaiting transformation into historical events. That is to say, discovery without 
judgement is impossible, and judgement concerning something past is not necessarily 
historical - there are a number ways of reading past corresponding to the different modes 
of experience. Thus, given the distinctiveness of an historical consciousness, “the 
moment historical facts are regarded as instances of general laws, history is dismissed”, 
for it is at once to be replaced by science. For this reason, Oakeshott argues, to relate 
historical events in terms of general causes “is not bad history; it is not history at all.”124
121 See T. W. Smith, 1996: 608.
122 OH: 80.
123 OH: 80.
124 EM: 128.
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Last, but not least, history is a unity of ideas concerned with the complexity, 
concreteness and intelligence of historical events.125 But the attribution of general laws 
to historical explanation will persuade the historian to pay attention to the abstract 
logical structure of past events alone. For “a cause may be attributed only to an 
abstraction: only ‘an event of the kind E  may be said to be regularly accompanied by 
‘events of the kinds Cl, C2 etc.’ which, by invoking a general law, may be recognised as 
its causal conditions.”126 And consequently, from the problem of abstraction it follows 
our next step is to consider the desirability of the covering law model in respect of the 
Enlightenment project.
It has been said that the philosophical commitment of pro-positivist historical 
thought is predicated on the Enlightenment historiographical position, namely, an 
identification of history with a naturalised conception of History. And, the assumptions 
of (1) the existence of the Past, (2) the representation of “what really happened” and (3) 
the application of general laws to history that mark the project of scientific history, are 
supported by foundationalism in philosophy - scientific certainty, a foundationalist 
analysis of all knowledge-claims and universality - which neo-positivism shares. That is, 
it will be remembered, for the neo-positivist, philosophy is so foundationalist that it is 
expected to disclose the structure of the entire world as the logical relationship of 
scientific statements having the character of universality. On this meaning, to be sure, the 
covering law mode is the representative of “rationalism in historiography”.
Throughout this thesis, nonetheless, we should have already become familiar 
with Oakeshott’s attack on Rationalism that certainty is not a complete criterion of 
genuine knowledge, and generalisation and abstraction are the twin pillars of the 
Enlightenment project. Thus, it is not difficult for us to reach the point that the covering 
law model is undesirable because the philosophes as such hear only one authentic voice 
in our conversation, and therefore they dissolve the self-consistent character of history in 
the same way as they have vacuumed the sources of our moral and political life. In this 
respect, the appearance of the covering law model precisely exemplifies the self-defeated 
character of the Enlightenment project: whilst the resolution of its crisis lies in an 
attempt to substantiate the abstract conception of rationality it wears by means of 
recovering some more concrete historical (and traditional) knowledge, the
125 Cf. W. Dray, 1957: 44-50, 79-86.
126 OH: 81-2.
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historiography in compliance with it requires the historian to give up the complexity of 
human intelligence for the simplicity of logical structure.
In summing up, the “epistemic tension in history” is an intellectual trap of the 
Enlightenment’s device; it merely bothers the philosophaster who intends to claim a 
single scientific criterion of knowledge for all human voices. However, once 
foundationalism in philosophy is discarded, we see no reason why the structure of 
historical explanation must conform to that of scientific explanation in order to be a 
genuine form of knowledge. Instead, according to Oakeshott, the eminence of the voice 
of history in the conversation of mankind precisely consists in its distinguishable 
concerns with a dead past, with particularity and contingency. In line with the view I 
have been taking, I now turn to consider the role of the historian in the face of the 
Enlightenment project.
V.4. The Autonomy of History
The purpose of this section is to emphasise the significance of the autonomy of history in 
Oakeshott’s thought. Yet, since in Oakeshott’s theory, not only should history be 
independent of other modes of understanding and philosophy, it also has no supreme 
power over any others. In what follows, we simultaneously set out Oakeshott’s non- 
historicist position.
V.4.1. History and Other Modes of Understanding
So far we have seen that for Oakeshott history understood in terms of its own logic of 
study is categorically distinctive from other modes of understanding such as science and 
practice: (1) history is distinctive from science because the historian is interested in 
particularity, whereas the scientist is absorbed in generalisation; (2) history is distinctive 
from practice because history is an exclusive concern with past for its own sake, whereas 
practice is a significant concern with future in terms of self-disclosure and self­
enactment. On the other hand, however, it is equally important to note that although
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Oakeshott may not deny that human conduct is historically conditioned, he does not 
think that only through historical study can the nature of things be better understood. My 
general arguments leading to Oakeshott’s non-historicist position are as follows:
Firstly, it is true that for Oakeshott as for the historicist the term “historically” 
used in the last-mentioned statement actually means that we must live in a tradition of 
behaviour, and with regard to a general idealistic connection by this they mean that the 
habit o f human mind has a tradition or a history, rather than an unchangeable nature. 
That is, they do agree in common that a tradition of behaviour is not the Human Past in 
itself but a self-understanding procedure of human mind. However, what distinguishes 
Oakeshott from the historicist in principle is that he thinks that history as an enquiry is 
only a specific way of understanding what past agents have said and thought about in 
reference to human intelligence, and thus historical knowledge and traditional knowledge 
are not identical. This is to say that historicism, Oakeshott would argue, somewhat rests 
on a confusion with our historical consciousness or historicity with history as a mode of 
understanding. As a result, the historicist claims that all knowledge proper is historical, 
because human understanding must be of historicity}21
By way of contrast, in Oakeshott’s system of thought, as we have seen (cf. esp. 
[IV.4.4.]), each mode of understanding has its own reason to converse with a tradition 
of behaviour concerned. And it may now be added that “conversation” understood as a 
method of understanding the multiplicity of meanings that compose a tradition of 
activity, namely “how to go about things”, must contain an element of historicity, but it 
is not exactly like an historical study. For example, as already indicated, in the world of 
practice, our practical reasoning is understood by Oakeshott, not merely as the exercise 
of an historicity, but as a form of rhetoric dealing with plausible statements in given 
circumstances, supported by “a pursuit of intimations” of a political tradition; this
127 As I shall return to expand on this doctrinal meaning of historicism in terms of the example of 
Collingwood below (see esp. [V.5.3.]), its further supportive argument, in fact, lies in the Diltheyian 
dichotomy that science explains nature, history understands man. Therefore, a more sophisticated 
formulation of historicism is that: because “history” is both the history of human thoughts as a whole and the 
only legitimate method of understanding those human thoughts in progress, i.e. because man’s self- 
understanding must be acquired within the history of human thoughts which requires historicity, and to 
understand the history of human thoughts must involve historical recognition, thus all human knowledge 
properly gained is historical (whereas all natural knowledge properly acquired is scientific.) Thus, here I 
also must remind the reader that in the context of historicism there is another implication of the term 
“history” being commonly used; that is, besides being the Human Past as a whole or an enquiry, it may also 
be taken to mean both the historicity of human mind or the aggregate of human thoughts (which is not the
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Aristotelian practical reasoning is so self-determined that it clearly does not apply to the 
world of history. Moreover, whilst past is considered as an issue, each non-historical 
mode likewise has its own way of reading res gestae, so that not everything concerning 
past is historical. Thus, in Oakeshott’s classification, neither the scientific past nor the 
practical past, for instance, can be identified with the historical past.
Secondly, although historical knowledge and traditional knowledge are 
distinguishable, it cannot be denied that history categorised as a narrative about the 
comprehensiveness and complexity of past performances and utterances, under certain 
circumstances, should be able to play a central role in constructing information about 
concrete traditional knowledge for other modes of experience. For example, Oakeshott 
would not dispute that a history of the manner of political activity or a history of the 
scientist at work is of importance to balance against the abstractness of rationalist 
politics or naive scientism. On this issue, Oakeshott, like the historicist, also seems apt to 
trace the crisis of the Enlightenment project to the trans-traditional or ahistorical 
foundation of modem natural philosophy which lacks historical consciousness.
However, it must be evident by now that Oakeshott’s diagnosis of the 
“ahistoricaF crisis of the modem world is philosophical rather than historical. That is, 
because traditional knowledge is a wider (philosophical) concept than historical 
knowledge, and because Oakeshott believes that a non-foundationalist conception of 
philosophy is possible and significant in human discourse, it is in philosophy not in 
history that the historical consciousness of human mind is disclosed, namely human 
conduct always involves a tradition of ideas. And so, it is possible for Oakeshott to 
circumscribe the necessity of an historical enquiry in unveiling the condition of 
historicity of human activity, namely the appeal to an historicised theory of knowledge, 
without adopting foundationalism.
Thirdly, this thus brings our attention back to the main theme of Oakeshott’s 
philosophy in association with the theory of modality in EM, meaning that the modes of 
understanding are exclusively discrete, each is an independent, self-consistent world of 
discourse, i.e. an invention of human intelligence. Adhering to this view, Oakeshott 
certainly would not accept that history is the master over the other modes of 
understanding. On the contrary, even though the historical study concerned may be
Past in itself) and the only legitimate method of man’s self-understanding (which is not a specific mode of 
human understanding but more like what Dilthey calls Geisteswissenschaften.)
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capable of balancing against rationalist politics or naive scientism, the point is that an 
historical idea must be transformed, taken out of the historical world to which it 
belongs, before it can establish itself in another world.128 And yet, by transformation, we 
are no longer staying in the historical world, but altering our concerns from the historical 
to the practical or the scientific. At this point, it is therefore re-affirmed that historical 
knowledge is not just the same as traditional knowledge being pursued in other non- 
historical modes of understanding, although it may offer some more informative 
messages for their practice.
By no means, then, does Oakeshott believe that, since the human mind is 
historically conditioned, all knowledge proper is historical. This, however, is not meant 
to diminish the importance of history in the confrontation of the crisis of the 
Enlightenment project, but rather it is only meant to avoid all human voices being united 
in that of history. Based on this general explanation, we may now come closer to look at 
the relation of history to science and practice respectively.
It must be remembered that the purpose of this thesis is to interpret the works of 
Oakeshott as a substantive critic of Enlightenment positions. And consequently, it 
appears to me, the most significant purpose of Oakeshott’s rejection of the assimilation 
of history (and poetry) to science is “to rescue the conversation from the bog into which 
it has fallen and to restore to it some of its lost freedom of movement.”129 That is, 
Oakeshott’s claim for the autonomy of history can be regarded as an extended critique of 
his life-long target, namely, Rationalism backed up by the incomplete understanding of 
scientific reason. For Oakeshott, “the conjunction of science and history can produce 
nothing but a monster”, 130 they can be joined only at the cost of an ignoratio elenchi 
and at the cost of making our conversation boring. Conversely, our potential to 
transcend the crisis of the Enlightenment project is our ability to speak differently.
Moreover, regarding the principle for distinguishing history from science 
Oakeshott’s theory of modality has little to do with the neo-Kantian movement. For, in 
EM  both history and science are seen as modes of experience which arrest the whole 
reality at certain standpoints, not as kinds of experience which refer to parts of reality.
128 Cf. EM: 265.
129 VP: 15.
130 EM: 168.
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That is, for Oakeshott reality is One which allows no pre-determined distinction such as 
History and Nature. And so, Oakeshott does not accept Dilthey’s dictum that “[science] 
explains nature but [history] understands man”;131 that is, he rejects the neo-Kantian way 
of treating the subject-matter as a criterion for separating history from science.132 And 
consequently, we may here expand on this system of EM  from two perspectives: the 
possibility of a science of man and the possibility of a history of nature.
In the first place, because in EM  science stands for the world as a whole seen 
under the category of quantity, unlike the new-Kantian approach, to study man 
scientifically is therefore permitted. For example, economics, if claimed to be scientific, 
must be “a science of measurements” in terms of quantitative conceptions and 
relations.133 Likewise, political science “must not be afraid of being abstract, and must 
free itself from all pretension of founding a science of history or of predicting historical 
events”;134 that is, it must be quantitative.
All this, however, is not inclined to the positivist proposal that the mode of 
science should be applied universally. In one sense, Oakeshott has reminded us that 
political science, for instance, tells us nothing about the individual meanings of human 
actions; and with its purpose of scientific generalisation, political science may do no 
good to our current moral and political situation. But this does not affect the fact that it 
is possible and legitimate; the point is that we must not understand political activity in 
terms of quantity and nothing more. In another sense, it is therefore important to protect 
the autonomy of history from being determined by science, for it would certainly bring 
us closer to a more coherent understanding about the manner of governing.
In contrast to political science, the notion of scientific history is to commit the 
error of ignoratio elenchi, because what it proposes is not to study, say, “the activity of 
the historian” in terms of quantity, but to mix two different worlds o f ideas. Here as 
elsewhere, it may be noticed, by ignoratio elenchi Oakeshott’s point is not that two 
modes of understanding can never communicate with one another under certain 
circumstances, but that no cardinal condition postulates two different worlds of ideas, 
and thus no argument can be meaningfully passed from one world of ideas to another
131 Quoted by A. H. Birch, 1969: 225.
132 Cf. P. Franco, 1990: 50-1,115.
133 EM: 230; for the general character of economics discussed in EM, see also 223-30.
134 Oakeshott, “Review of Catlin’s The Principles of Politics” (1929-30): 400; quoted by P. Franco, 1990: 
243, n l l l .
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without transformation. In other words, political science, for instance, is categorically 
absurd only if it combines generalisation with historical narrative; whereas it creates a 
different problem when the practical man makes use of political science to formulate a 
policy, i.e. to increase the ascendancy of rationalist politics. By the same token, the 
categorical mistake of a history of political thought does not happen because of it 
dealing with the political; it happens only when the historian interprets a political text in 
terms of universal generalisation.
But what about the possibility of a history of nature? At first sight, although it is 
possible to study human actions scientifically, it does seem impossible to study natural 
things historically: The goings-on recognised as a thunderstorm, a butterfly on the wing, 
melting ice, etc. only have a nature, a casual relationship, but there are no human 
thoughts in them to be “re-enacted” in the historian’s mind, to use Collingwood’s 
phrase. However, this gives us insufficient reason to maintain that historical study is 
distinguishable from scientific research because they are dealing with different subject- 
matters. For the world as a whole present to the historian is always a world of res gestae 
consisting of both written texts and impersonal relics such as buildings, tables, chairs, 
etc. waiting to be understood. Even though a table itself cannot be understood 
historically, man’s ways of using it, for instance, can be so understood. Thus, an ancient 
“table” may be seen under the category of science in terms of a physical structure or a 
process of chemical change, it may be seen under the category of history as a piece of 
evidence for studying the cultural life of the eighteenth-century Englishmen, it also may 
be approached under the category of practice with the phrase such as “this antique is 
priceless”, and so forth. So, Oakeshott finds nothing in the human to distinguish it 
absolutely from the non-human past. Reality is not divided as Nature and History in the 
first place, and then perceived by the historian or the scientist respectively; but rather, 
reality is a concrete whole (the same “table”) modified under different categories of 
thought.
With the categorical distinction between history and science, it does not follow 
that there is no communication between them under certain circumstances. On one level, 
indeed, just as scientific history is an ignoratio elenchi, the same categorical confusion 
occurs when the scientist applies historical methods to his study; thus Oakeshott has 
claimed that the biologist’s observation of the development of a tree, for example, is not 
a historical past in terms of contingency, but a scientific past in terms of causality. On
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another level, however, it is possible for the historian to write a history of the scientist at 
work, (or for the social scientist to pursue the “sociology of history”).
We have seen that science, for Oakeshott as for Kuhn, is a tradition of activity or 
a paradigm of research; and that what Oakeshott and Kuhn attack under the rubric of 
scientism is not science per se but a certain way of attributing a “pure reason” to the 
working basis of scientific research. Given this view, as might be expected, both thinkers 
would not deny that a history of science is of significance to balance against the abstract 
scientific reason held by pro-positivism. But, I do not think that Oakeshott would agree 
with Kuhn’s further historicist proposition, as MacIntyre puts in his interpretation of 
Kuhn’s The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (1970), that “the achievements of the 
natural sciences are in the end to be judged in terms of achievements of the history of 
those sciences.”135 For this contention would suggest that the authority of science is 
eventually conditional upon the works of historians of science. As a result, the self- 
consistent character of science is equally dismissed.
Oakeshott’s perspective is different from such an alternative historicist position. 
His arguments on this specific issue emphasise that all we need in the confrontation of a 
positivist perspective on science is, in the first place, a request for a philosophy of 
science which rejects foundationalism and scientism in order to return our scientific 
reason to the concrete tradition to which it belongs, rather than a history of science 
which intends to identify itself with that tradition. Although this is not to deny that a 
history of science should be capable of providing the scientist with some more concrete 
and detailed information about traditional knowledge in use (or what Kuhn calls “shared 
examples”) to substantiate the abstract scientific reason that he has been persuaded to 
believe in; yet because no ideas can simultaneously occupy two different worlds, an 
historical idea about the scientist at work can be a scientific judgement only if it is to be 
taken out of the historical world and transformed into the scientific world by the 
scientist. That is, a piece of historical knowledge about the exemplification of the 
scientist at work is not the same thing as the scientist’s getting to know how to go about 
his research by contact with that exemplification. Thus, neither philosophy nor a history 
of science can judge the achievement of a science; the scientist is the authority over his 
own territory.
135 A. MacIntyre, 1984: 47; see also 40-7.
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Besides, as for the relationship of history to practice, Oakeshott’s claim for an 
historical past for its own sake, viz. anti-presentism, is, of course, related to his objection 
to pragmatism in general. However, that the historical past is categorically distinctive 
from the practical past does not mean that there is no communication between the modes 
of practice and history. On the contrary, it is implied in previous discussions that the 
Oakeshottian practical past has two relative levels of implication. In one sense, it is the 
enemy of the historian, it hinders a possible human voice of speaking past and change; to 
write a history for the sake of the future is not bad history, but it is a part of practice. In 
another, however, it is also the friend of the practitioner, it indicates our common 
interest in reading past things and thoughts; even an historical idea may be transformed 
by the practical man to be useful, but in this transformation it must meanwhile cease to 
be historical.136
When one considers Oakeshott’s political thought, it is the practical past used in 
the second level that is worth noticing. For it implies that it is legitimate for the practical 
man to make use of a history which narrates the complexity of our political manners by a 
certain transformation, such that the crisis of rationalist politics in terms of abstractness, 
perfectionism and universalism can be reconciled. That is to say, a history as such may 
likewise provide concrete information substantiating a political tradition for the practical 
man’s “pursuit of intimations”. But the significance of this history is not likely to be 
historicist in the sense of making all practical knowledge historical. Because it has been 
shown that our practical reasoning recognised as rhetoric in relation to phronesis, i.e. 
traditional knowledge, is not identical with historical knowledge.
V.4.2. History and Philosophy 
To ponder more completely the meaning of the autonomy of history in Oakeshott’s 
thought, also, we must pay attention to the relation of history to philosophy in terms of 
two topics: first, the relationship between a philosophy of history and history in respect
136 On this account, it seems implausible to me when K. Minogue says that the work such as The History o f  
the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) may be useful for political practitioners but it cannot 
fit into the category of history. (1993a: 48) For whether or not a work is historical, according to Oakeshott’s 
own terms, depends not on the subject of study (which may be highly practical as the work in question 
suggests) but on the attitude of study. That is, as long as the interpreter is to reconstruct the survival for the 
sake of being interested in the historical past the historical approach is being taken. Whilst it is a different
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of Oakeshott’s non-foundationalism; and second, the relationship between philosophy 
and a history of philosophy in respect of Oakeshott’s non-historicism. Since from 
Chapter III up to the present stage we have already regarded the non-foundationalist 
character of Oakeshott’s philosophy (of history) in greater detail, (i.e. the view that a 
philosophy of history cannot replace the autonomous nature of historical knowledge), I 
now only want to sum up Oakeshott’s arguments against historicism in philosophy.
Roughly speaking, philosophical historicism has been taken in two forms, both of 
which are set forth with an awareness of the debacle of modem foundationalism as an 
ahistorical understanding of the nature of philosophy. First of all, it can be related to 
Rorty’s new-pragmatism which radically claims the end to philosophy. Since I have 
already discussed the difference between Oakeshott and Rorty in [III.4.4], here I only 
propose to gloss over this argument in repeating that because Oakeshott’s philosophical 
reflection in the pursuit of genuine meanings of truth, reality, the mind and so forth is 
exempt from engaging in foundationalist analysis of knowledge, there is no necessity for 
him to terminate philosophy itself as the only response to the crisis of the Enlightenment.
Secondly, there is also a tendency to hold the view that an historical perspective 
is the best way of approaching the nature of philosophy (and other forms of human 
knowledge), i.e. the attempt to base the authority of philosophy on a history of 
philosophy. C. Taylor, for example, argues that “it is essential to an adequate 
understanding of certain problems, questions, issues, that one understands them 
genetically”, that insofar as “philosophy ... is inherently historical”;137 and A. MacIntyre, 
following his study of Kuhn’s history of science as we have mentioned, articulates that 
“the achievements of philosophy are [likewise] in the end to be judged in terms of the 
achievements of the history of philosophy.”138
According to Oakeshott, however, even though it may be true that the substance 
of philosophical thinking is also historically conditioned, that is, philosophising is itself a 
way of human thinking that has to be learned from a tradition of philosophy, yet it is the 
philosopher in practice not the historian of a history of philosophy in practice that 
constitutes that tradition concerned. We have already become familiar with Oakeshott’s 
reference to tradition and history as two different categories of thing. So, Oakeshott
thing if  the practical man reads a historical text in favour of being useful. Otherwise, if  we follow Minogue’s 
criterion seriously, there would be no such a thing as genuine “political history” at all.
137 C. Taylor, 1984: 17.
138 A. MacIntyre, 1984: 47.
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would argue that “philosophy is inherently historical” is true, only if we take the 
adjective “historical to mean “contextual” or “traditional”; and yet, because a tradition 
of philosophy has its own idiom of language and has its own way of reading past, we do 
not need a history of philosophy to justify the activity of philosophising. Consequently, 
once again, the point regarding the relation of philosophy to a history of philosophy is 
that: a history of philosophy, indeed, may help to unveil the patterns and 
exemplifications of philosophical thinking for the philosopher, but they are not 
themselves philosophical judgements unless the philosopher takes them into 
consideration.
Moreover, to claim the historical or traditional property for the habit of human 
mind, namely the philosophical statement that human activity always involves a tradition 
of behaviour, in morality and politics Oakeshott’s philosophy also goes further to 
describe the tradition of modem Western political character itself. However, since 
philosophy takes nothing for granted, in so doing it must be eager to transcend any 
historic conditions that confront it. Thus, as we have seen in PFPS, for example, 
Oakeshott’s philosophising never stops at the realisation of the historic conditions of 
modem European politics in terms of the politics of faith and the politics of scepticism. 
Instead, it goes further to transcend the complexity of the Western political tradition so 
as to reach a more coherent understanding of the nature of politics: “What politics really 
is?”. It is at this point that I believe that the quasi-philosophical past should be allotted 
an important place in Oakeshott’s philosophical and historical thoughts, if only to try to 
assess his contribution to them from a more profitable point of view. For it allows the 
philosopher to pay careful attention to the historic implications of the object upon which 
he is reflecting with no reference to historicism. And further, unlike the commonly called 
“philosophical approach” in the study of the history of (political) philosophy, it contains 
no practical concern.139
Consequently, it implies that the level of political reflection that Oakeshott takes 
is always that of philosophy which, following Hegel, is understood as “a tireless 
exploration of the conditions of conditions”;140 as a result, political philosophy to him is 
so transcending that he sometimes only names Plato’s Republic, Hobbes’s Leviathan,
139 See, for example, L. Strauss, 1959.
140 HC: 257.
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Spinoza’s Ethics and Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophic des Rechts as examples.141 
Thus, if it is reasonable to suppose that Oakeshott himself has the ambition of writing a 
political philosophy (especially in respect of his theory of “civil association”),142 he will 
never allow the authority of a history of political thought to step in to replace that of 
political philosophy. And the same goes for the relation of a history of philosophy to 
philosophy itself.
Finally, according to Oakeshott, the attempt to relate the logic of a history of 
philosophy to that of philosophy is likely to commit an ignoratio elenchi. For, many of 
these writers would like to claim themselves as the “philosopher-slash-historian” and 
thus agree in principle that “both historical specificity and philosophical delicacy are 
more likely to be attained if they are pursued together [emphasis mine]”143 in an ideal 
historical study of philosophy. Oakeshott, of course, would not deny that a man can get 
to learn how to speak the languages of philosophy and history in his life, but he intensely 
doubts that “historical specificity” and “philosophical delicacy”, which are categorically 
distinctive, can be put together so as to establish a “multi-purpose enquiry”.144 Thus, 
even in HCy Oakeshott is liable to take a philosophical theory of civil association and a 
“historical” examination of the character of a modem European state as two different 
types of understanding politics, which can be communicated but can never be united. 
And here as elsewhere, if one wonders why it is so important for the philosopher to 
avoid the error of ignoratio elenchi, Oakeshott’s reply would be that: the more voices to 
be heard in the conversation the more well-established a civilisation may appear to be, 
and it is exactly the task of a philosopher to consider the distinctiveness of human voices 
and their relationships with one another.
Thus far, then, we have returned to reinforce Oakeshott’s objection to foundationalism 
and scientism in respect of the autonomy of history, and at the same time we have 
reached the point that Oakeshott is a non-historicist philosopher o f history. Nevertheless, 
in view of the fact that in the above discussions I treated historicism only as a doctrine
u l RPML: 150 \MPME: 14.
142 One of Oakeshott’s students, T. Fuller recalls that: “Oakeshott was ambitious to write essays of lasting 
import in political philosophy, and he thought he had. In his portrait in  Gonville and Caius College, 
Cambridge, he sits at a table on which On Human Conduct is prominently and centrally displayed.” (1996: 
x.)
143 J. Dunn, 1980: 14.
144 Cf. HC: 20.
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without giving it some detailed substance, and because the contemporary inclination to 
historicism has not infrequently been connected with the thought of Collingwood, I now 
propose to make a further comparison between Oakeshott’s and Collingwood’s 
philosophies of history. In the course of this examination, I think it may be well to bring 
Bradley’s historical thought into consideration where appropriate, such that we may 
clarify the background of Oakeshott’s historical thinking in a fuller sense.
V.5. Non-Historicist Idealism
The autonomy of history is a topic that likewise concerned Bradley and Collingwood, 
among other idealists. In The Idea o f History Collingwood celebrated Bradley’s The 
Presuppositions o f Critical History as “the Copemican revolution in the theory of 
historical knowledge”145 for its attempt to establish history as autonomous; meanwhile 
he praised Oakeshott’s EM  as presenting “the high-water mark of English thought upon 
history” for allowing the historian to play his game according to his own rules.146 
Nonetheless, since I think it would be oversimplified to identify idealism with 
historicism,147 here the contrast among the three British idealists on historiography 
should be further clarified so that we may continue to consider Oakeshott’s 
historiographical position from the standpoint of the general influence on him of 
Bradleyian idealism, and especially from the standpoint of his strict reservations on the 
later Collingwoodian historicism.
V.5.1. Collingwood (I): An Overall Review 
On one level, there is little doubt that Collingwood should be considered the most 
influential British thinker in the field of historiography; compared to Oakeshott, 
Collingwoodian scholarship has been very well established.148 On another level, 
nonetheless, many people would not deny that Collingwood is perhaps one of the most
145 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 240.
146 Ibid.: 159.
147 See, for example, W. H. Walsh, 1967: 14-5, 43.
148 For example, “The R. G. Collingwood Society” was established in 1994 whose official publication
Collingwood Studies.
difficult British thinkers in this century to be dealt with: not only is Collingwoodian 
terminology so flexible that its meanings depend largely on its contexts, and sometimes 
contradictions are apparent within the same work;149 but also, his major work of history, 
The Idea o f History, is a posthumous book edited from lectures and papers written from 
1936-39, a fact which leaves the reader questioning the book’s value and relevance in 
relation to his other published writings.150
Related to all this, a more comprehensive difficulty in interpreting Collingwood 
involves the lack of consistency in the development of his thought. In his An 
Autobiography, Collingwood did say that “[m]y life’s work hitherto, as seen from my 
fiftieth year, has been in the main an attempt to bring about a rapprochement between 
philosophy and history.”151 However, whether or not Collingwood stayed the course on 
this problem is debatable and what he meant by “rapprochement” has consequently been 
interpreted differently by different critics.
T. M. Knox, for example, has classified Collingwood’s work into three groups: 
the first basically includes Speculum Mentis (1924), Outlines o f A Philosophy o f Art 
(1925); the second An Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) and The Idea o f History,; 
and the third Autobiography (1939), The Essay on Metaphysics (1940), and The New 
Leviathan (1942). To “bring about a rapprochement between philosophy and history,” it 
seems to Knox, means that Collingwood has tried to set up the logical differentia 
between philosophy, history and science and to reflect philosophically upon the 
epistemological problems to which history gives rise. This aim, Knox argues, is 
successfully achieved “at the zenith of his powers,” i.e. in the second group of his 
philosophical writings. Be that as it may, Collingwood’s “enthusiasm for history,” Knox 
continues, has finally made his later work as shown in the third group, “turn traitor to his 
philosophical vocation.”152
On the same account, A. Donagan offers a further examination of this shifting 
calling it “Collingwood’s conversion to historicism”;153 and W. H. Walsh comparably 
remarks that with An Autobiography and An Essay on Metaphysics “Collingwood took
149 W. H. Dray: 1995:27-31.
150 Cf. L. O. Mink, 1972: 155 ff.
151 R. G. Collingwood, 1939: 77.
152 T. M. Knox, 1946: vii-xx.
153 A. Donagan, 1962: chap. 1, sec. 2.
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a step which marked a decisive break with his earlier thought.”154 That the later 
Collingwood came to dissolve philosophy into history, it seems to me, has now become 
a widespread conviction.155
However, D. Boucher precisely takes “a rapprochement between philosophy and 
history” to mean that for Collingwood “philosophy and history have the same order of 
enquiry: They are identified, if not identical.”156 The phrase so understood, Boucher 
argues, matches “the grandiose conception that Collingwood had of his mission in life,” 
even though in his early work philosophy and history were treated as two different forms 
of experience.157 In other words, it is Boucher’s view that Collingwood’s whole thought 
is interrelated, that he undertakes an enduring bid to carry out a rapprochement between 
philosophy and history. That in philosophy Collingwood has tried to establish a system 
of ideas in development also has been held by some other interpreters.158
The dispute around the development of Collingwood’s thought is, in fact, more 
about whether it should be read as a series of systems or as a single system of ideas than 
about whether or not the later Collingwood is a historicist. And thus, some concessions 
are made on both sides of this debate: for example, Knox does not deny that “the leit­
motiv” of Collingwood’s work is history and Boucher concedes that “Collingwood was 
not one of those philosophers who was a slave to the principle of consistency.”159 Here I 
cannot but grant the benefit of Knox’s division of Collingwood’s work, and yet, 
meanwhile I believe Boucher’s interpretation is worth noting because it reminds us that 
Collingwood’s conversion to historicism was not a radical break with his early work. 
The best explanation of this change, I contend, lies in the various contents of The Idea o f 
History itself.
That is, as far as I can see, there remains a grey area in Knox’s classification of 
Collingwood’s thought, and this has to do with the two problems in interpreting 
Collingwood that I mentioned earlier. Put all together, it is my contention that The Idea 
o f History should be regarded as an “in-between” work of the later Collingwood and 
that this work is, in fact, composed of two adverse components. On the one hand, it
154 W. H. Walsh, 1972: 100.
155 For other examples, see W. Dray, 1995: 2.
156 D. Boucher, 1989: 38.
157 Ibid.: 40-6.
158 For other earlier examples, see L. Rubinofif, 1970: 3-34; L. O. Mink, 1969:1-7.
159 D. Boucher, 1989: 39, 38.
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seems inclined to the view of Philosophical Method that philosophy should be 
distinguished from history; on the other hand, it also contains the historicist seeds later 
planted in An Autobiography that the genuine meaning of philosophy consists in a 
history of philosophy.
In my opinion, this is exactly because Collingwood has used the term “history” in 
two different senses for each case: history as a discipline and history as a habit of human 
mind, i.e. “history as a specific human past” and “history as a study of whatever is 
past.”160 Although Collingwood’s apparent aim in The Idea o f History, as we know, is to 
consider the nature of history as a discipline,161 a wider question has been raised as to 
whether the book is beyond the question “What is history?” and is rather concerned to 
advance the view that since the human mind is historically conditioned, all knowledge of 
it must be historical. And thus, when Collingwood says repeatedly in The Idea o f History 
that history is the only true knowledge of the human mind, this cannot be taken to mean 
that only the academic historian is able to reach such a truth, but rather that every 
individual, provided they are using an analogous historical method, is capable of 
reaching this truth as well.
Consequently, I rather think that the Collingwoodian notions of “historical 
imagination” and “historical re-enactment” constitute not merely a theory of historical 
understanding (as in writing a history per se) but rather a common historicised theory of 
human understanding. And for the purpose of this study, it is this Collingwood as an 
historicist that should be further discussed. But before going any further, I intend to take 
Bradley’s historical thought into consideration.
V5.2. Bradley (II): The Presuppositions of Critical History 
The main feature of historical thought that Bradley, Collingwood, and Oakeshott share 
is, certainly, their aversion to realism and thus to the empiricist-positivistic theory of 
history. To re-state: in contrast to the positivist view that historical truth lies in the 
statements made by the authorities on and witnesses of History, Bradley, Collingwood, 
and Oakeshott surely believe that history is the outcome of a judgement, i.e. a critique of 
authorities and witnesses which is made by the historian himself. That is, for these three
160 Cf. W. Dray, 1995: 20-1.
161 See esp. R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 9-10.
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British idealists, to use D. Boucher’s phrase, history is surely “the creation of the 
past”,162 which means that history is always the historian’s own experience; history must 
be critical and the criterion of criticism is the historian. In his Preface to Critical 
History, Bradley says that:
There is no history which in some respect is not more or less critical. No one in the world
thinks or could think of inserting into a history of the world all the events which have
been handed down, precisely as they have been handed down.
The historian as he is the real criterion; the ideal criterion . . .  is the historian as he ought
1 o
to be. And the historian who is true to the present is the historian as he ought to be.
In a certain sense, then, both Collingwood’s ideas of “historical re-enactment” 
and “historical imagination” and Oakeshott’s notion of “history as the transformation of 
what really happened in the Past” all demonstrate affinities with Bradley’s remarks. 
However, it cannot be denied that, compared to Collingwood, Oakeshott has made 
much more direct contact with Bradley in both the fields of philosophy and 
historiography.
As I have indicated in [III.2.2.] in his philosophy there are three major ideas that 
Oakeshott adopts (with revisions) from Bradley’s Appearance and Reality (1893): 
reality is a matter of degree, a coherence theory of truth, and the notion of concrete 
whole. That which lies behind Oakeshott’s argument against the view that history and 
History are united, it appears to me, resembles the very notions of truth and fact upon 
which Bradley himself based the autonomy of history.
Oakeshott accepts, with Bradley, that the world is what we understand it to be, 
and every such understanding must involve both subject and object. Bradley is aware 
that the word “history” has often had a double-meaning as both “Was geschieht”, i.e. 
“what really happened”, and “historical enquiry.” But, neither the representationalism in 
historiography nor the “reproductive” theory of history can be soundly maintained, 
because both tend to divorce subject from object and thus deny the “exercise of 
criticism” in the historian’s mind. “The historian,” he argues, “is not and cannot be 
merely receptive, or barely reproductive.”164
162 D. Boucher, 1984.
163 Bradley, 1993: i& ii.
164 Ibid.: 5.
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In history, Bradley believes, and as Oakeshott has equally argued, historical fact 
is always a judgement, “a conclusion; and a conclusion, however much it may appear so, 
is never the fiction of a random invention.”165 And, since the coherence theory of truth, 
as we have reviewed previously, demands no basic judgements beyond the condition of 
coherence - that every single unit of our thought must continually face experience as a 
whole - historical fact, being thought, needs to be “qualified by the premises of our 
knowledge, by our previous experiences.”166 For this reason, both Bradley and 
Oakeshott reach the same conclusion that “there are no facts as to which mistake is 
impossible”;167 that what really counts in history is consistency rather than 
correspondence. This implies at the same time that historical fact is in reality a theory, an 
inference, i.e. a world of ideas as Oakeshott likes to put it. Bradley articulates that:
The history then . . . which is for us, is a matter of inference, and in the last resort has
existence, as history, as a record of events, by means of an inference of our own. And
this inference furthermore can never start from a background of nothing; it is never a
fragmentary isolated act of our mind, but is essentially connected with, and in entire
dependence on the character of our general consciousness. And so the past varies with
the present, and can never do otherwise, since it is always the present upon which it
168rests. The present is presupposed by it, and is its necessary preconception.
Once again, here Oakeshott’s solution of the “temporal dilemma in history” may be seen 
as having been inspired by Bradley.
We might infer, then, that for Bradley, (as for Oakeshott but with a somehow 
different effect), critical history, because it is a matter of inference, must need a criterion 
against which it may be compared: “History must ever be founded on a presupposition,” 
“[tjhere is no such a thing as history without a prejudication;”169 and as such it is the task 
of philosophy “to know what criticism [in history] means.”170 However, the very 
criterion that Bradley applies to history has been bitterly condemned by Collingwood.
V.5.3. Collingwood (II): Historicism
165 Ibid.: 10.
166 Ibid.: 10.
167 Ibid.: 11.
168 Ibid.: 15.
169 Ibid.: 15.
170 Ibid.: ii.
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Collingwood thinks that Bradley is absolutely right in holding that historical knowledge 
is not a passive acceptance of testimony, but a critical interpretation of it according to a 
criterion which the historian brings with himself to the work of interpretation. Yet, 
where Bradley goes astray is:
in his conception of the relation between the historian’s criterion and that to which he 
applies it. His view is that the historian brings to his work a ready-made body of 
experience by which he judges the statements contained in his authorities. Because this 
body of experience is convinced as ready-made, it cannot be modified by the historian’s 
own work as an historian: it has to be there, complete, before he begins his historical 
work. Consequently this experience is regarded not as consisting of historical knowledge 
but as knowledge of some other kind, and Bradley in fact conceives it as scientific 
knowledge, knowledge of the laws of nature. This is where the positivism of his age
171begins to infect his thought.
Thus, in Collingwood’s eyes the inconsistency of Bradley’s historiography is this: 
that he sets out to prove the distinction between history and science, but in his view the 
criterion for the historian to criticise historical materials is an unchangeable identification 
of a body of experience, an inference in the world of to-day which is, in fact, supported 
by the world of science.172 And thus, history, at best, is a world of probability, since we 
can never be certain about what the past agents really thought. In short, Bradley’s 
historical thought is criticised by Collingwood for purportedly containing a latent 
positivism and a consequent scepticism.
For Collingwood, Bradley’s positivistic influence can be re-formulated in this 
way, that is, the criterion of the historian is constructed by a universal character of 
human understanding which like the laws in science does not itself change. According to 
Collingwood, nevertheless, this view fails to reflect the historicity of the substance of 
historical thinking itself.173 That is to say, the criterion of the historian’s understanding is 
an alterable process in which he “creates for himself this or that kind of human nature by 
re-creating in his own thought the past to which he is heir.”174 For example, the history 
of political philosophy “is not the history of different answers given to one and the same 
question, but the history of a problem more or less constantly changing, whose solution
171 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 139-40.
172 Cf. L. Rubinoff, 1996: 138; 144!
173 See esp. R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 239. Cf. L. Rubinoff, 1996:136-42.
174 Ibid.: 226, see also 85, 135.
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was changing with it.”175 Plato’s Republic is an understanding not of the unchanging 
character of political life, but of Greek politics as Plato perceived them and re­
interpreted them; Aristotle’s Ethics is a description about the morality of Greek 
gentlemen; Hobbes’s Leviathan expounds the political ideas of absolutism in seventeenth 
century England and so forth. But the quality of those works is superior because “in 
those works the authors are doing best the only thing that can be done when an attempt 
is made to construct a science of the human mind. They are expounding the position 
reached by the human mind in its historical development down to their own time.”176
For this reason, Collingwood argues, every generation has to rewrite its own 
history. Not only because every generation has its specific historical consciousness, 
interests and methods,177 but also because this rewriting is what shapes the self- 
identification of the generation concerned. Collingwood says that:
in history . . .  no achievement is final . . . This is not an argument for historical 
scepticism. It is only the discovery of a second dimension of historical thought, the 
history of history: the discovery that the historian himself, together with the here-and- 
now which forms the total body of evidence available to him, is a part of the process he
178is studying, has its own place in that process,...
However, in The Idea o f History Collingwood is not merely concerned with the 
historicity of history, but also, more generally, with the historicity of human 
understanding as a whole. And he somewhat treats history and man’s self-understanding 
as the same thing, because he seems to see history both as the aggregate of human 
thoughts and the only legitimate way of understanding human thoughts in progress:
“Man,” says Collingwood, “who desires to know every thing, desires to know 
himself.”179 This view is not new. And yet, the proposal for a “science of human nature” 
or “a science of man” cultivated by Locke, Hume, Kant, pro-positivism and so forth was 
fated to fail, because its method was not historical, but distorted by the application of the 
natural sciences.180 The distinction between history and science, to Collingwood, lies in
175 R. G. Collingwood, 1939: 62.
176 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 229.
177 Cf. A. Heller, 1982: chap, 1.
178 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 248.
179 Ibid.: 205.
180Ibid.: 206-9.
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the fact that the “historical process” is a process of human thoughts whereas the “natural 
process” is a process of natural events. That is, unlike science, all history properly so 
called is the history of human affairs, since man is the only animal that thinks and 
expresses what he thinks: “all history is the history of thought.”181 This implies that 
Collingwood accepts the Diltheyian dichotomy of the world and the two divisions of 
human knowledge related to each of them, namely science which deals with the world of 
nature and history which deals with the world of man; and so he identifies the mode of 
history not as a specific way of human understanding (different from, say, practice), but 
as a necessary method of it.
But, what exactly is the character of this general historical method? As we well 
know, Collingwood believes that it must be the “re-enactment” of past thought in one’s 
own mind. And with this, we are returning to the second target that makes up 
Collingwood’s critique of Bradley, namely, historical scepticism.
In Collingwood’s understanding, because Bradley holds that the past can be 
known only in terms of an inference, we can never be certain about our historical 
judgement, i.e. we can never know the past in a way that is identical to what past agents 
really thought about their actions. In other words, as Collingwood puts it, Bradley’s 
criterion of critical history “is a criterion not of what did happen but of what could 
happen.”182 With Bradley, he continues, all we have is no more than a probable world 
whose plausibility is determined by the world of science.183 Due to this sceptical 
propensity, Collingwood complains, Bradley stops short of realising that “the historian 
re-enacts in his own mind not only the thought of witnesses but the thought of the agent 
whose action the witness reports.”184
Put another way, although both Collingwood and Bradley grant in principle that 
as the past is never a given fact which one can apprehend by perception and observation, 
the correspondence theory of history held by empiricist-positivism must make history 
impossible;185 instead, history for them (as for Oakeshott) only exists in the historian’s 
mind. However, in addition to his neglecting the historicity of human understanding, 
Collingwood argues, Bradley’s answer to the possibility of historical knowledge, i.e. the
181 Ibid.: 210-17.
182 Ibid.: 239.
183 Ibid.: 239.
184 Ibid.: 138.
185 Ibid.: 282; 233; cf. 1939: 44-53.
-  267  -
problem, “Can the historian know the past ‘as what it was’ in his mind?” is too negative. 
For, Bradley’s identifying the criterion of history with the world of to-day must at the 
same time result in (positivistic-like) sceptical implications, i.e. an affection for the 
tradition of Hume, which concedes that history is at best probable.186
To escape from the muddle of scepticism, Collingwood himself thus claims that 
“to know someone else’s activity of thinking is possible only on the assumption that this 
same activity [which happened in the past] can be re-enacted in one’s own mind [in the 
present].”187 This implies that the notion which always accompanies historical re­
enactment in Collingwood’s conception of history is historical imagination: D. S. Taylor 
has thus connected them in explaining Collingwood’s historical thought as an 
“imaginative re-enactment of past thought.”188 Here, the term “imagination” is defined 
by Collingwood as a “blind but indispensable faculty” without which we could never 
perceive the world around us. In history, Collingwood maintains, it is this faculty 
“which, operating not capriciously as fancy but in its a priori form, does the entire of 
historical construction.”189 Historical imagination so defined is therefore the product of 
the historian’s own reasoning; it provides him with the justification for the historical 
materials he is using and the principles for selecting, for his use, actual evidence from 
potential evidence in the world. Historical imagination, then, is the historian’s “picture of 
the past,” whereas historical re-enactment is the very activity of rethinking the contents 
of the picture concerned, and these two elements are inseparable in every historical 
writing.
In short, for Collingwood, even though the object of history does not exist in the 
present, yet the possibility of historical understanding consists in our historical 
imagination by means of which the object may become a re-enactable thought. But, 
based on the view that history is both the history of human thought and the only 
legitimate method of man’s self-understanding, it comes as no surprise that what 
Collingwood really achieves by the proposal for an “imaginative re-enactment of past 
thought” is not simply a theory of history, but rather, a historicised theory of human 
understanding in general.
186 L. Rubinoff, 1996: 137.
187 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 288; see also part v, sec. 4.
188 Quoted by W. Dray, 1995: 191.
189 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 241.
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V.5.4. The Living Past vs. The Dead Past 
Where or not Collingwood has been fair in criticising Bradley’s attempt to base the 
criterion of history on science is disputable.190 However, the details of this interpretative 
debate, interesting as they are, are largely beyond my concern here. Instead, based on the 
above examination of Collingwood’s historicised theory of knowledge, I now only 
intend to demonstrate the differences between Oakeshott’s and Collingwood’s theories 
of history.
First of all, it is observable that the way in which Collingwood comes to 
distinguish history from science is reminiscent of Dilthey and the neo-Kantians. That is, 
Collingwood accepts the view that there is “a clear-cut distinction between human 
nature and nature proper, or, between human conduct, the subject-matter of history, and 
natural process, the subject-matter of the natural sciences”.191 Also, he maintains that 
unlike the abstract explanatory character of science, “the concrete universal is the daily 
bread of every historian, and the logic of history is the logic of the concrete universal.”192 
Nevertheless, although Oakeshott likewise considers the differentia between history and 
science in terms of the characteristics of their methods, as we have seen, Oakeshott’s 
theory of modification is at odds with the History-Nature division.193 As a result, 
Oakeshott objects to the Collingwoodian limitation of history’s subject-matter to the 
world of Man,194 and he clearly thinks that a scientific study of human activity in terms 
of quantity is possible and legitimate.195
Moreover, regardless of the fact that in The Idea o f History Collingwood regards 
highly the view of history in EM, it is worth noticing that he poses three main questions
190 See L. Rubinoff, 1996; G. Stock, 1993.
191 L. Rubinoff, 1996: 134.
192 R. G. Collingwood, 1924: 221; see also, 1946: 234.
193 Oakeshott’s theory of modality, as already mentioned, is inspired by Bradley’s Appearance and Reality, 
where reality is claimed as One, not many, inasmuch as there can be no ontological distinction between 
Nature and History. So, I doubt that it is plausible for Collingwood to attack Bradley’s positivistic and 
sceptical implications on the premise that Bradley’s has an intention to draw the distinction between history 
and science in terms of their subject-matter. This Collingwoodian premise on understanding Bradley’s 
historical thought is expanded by L. Rubinoff. (1996: 129-33.)
194 W. Dray, 1968: 19.
195 For a profound comparison between Collingwood’s and Oakeshott’s views on the relation of history to 
social science, see D. Boucher, 1993.
- 2 6 9 -
about this view: First, he argues that Oakeshott leaves unexplained why there is such a 
thing as history in the stream of experience as a whole; second, he criticises Oakeshott’s 
insistence on considering the logic of history from a purely philosophical point of view,
i.e. from the outside; and finally, he rejects Oakeshott’s notion of the historical past as a 
dead past.196 These comments of EM  made by Collingwood thus provide us with a 
further basis for comparing the two thinkers’ historical thoughts, that is, the 
Collingwoodian historical past as a “living past” considered from the “inside” versus the 
Oakeshottian historical past as a “dead past” considered from the “outside.”197
To begin with, Collingwood’s first question has already been thoroughly 
answered in “The Activity of Being an Historian” in which Oakeshott has shown how 
with its own practice history has come to establish itself as a self-satisfactory mode of 
activity. And this supplementary explanation in RP and the works that follow it thus 
gives Oakeshott a more plausible standpoint from which to argue for the historian’s 
practice as his object of observation, i.e. for consideration from the outside.
By way of contrast, however, it is Collingwood’s view that since it is too 
difficult, if not impossible, to analyse the logic of history merely from the outside, and 
since it is more desirable if a philosophy of history is pursued by persons who are 
historians and philosophers at the same time, “history is not [as Oakeshott claims] based 
on a philosophical error”, i.e. an arrest in experience, but “an integral part of experience 
itself.”198
Nevertheless, I think it is a misunderstanding when Collingwood argues that in 
Oakeshott’s system it is a philosophical error that makes history possible: “The historian 
is a philosopher who has turned aside from the path of philosophical thought to play a 
game which is none the less arbitrary for being only one of a potentiality infinite number 
of such games, others being those of science and the practical life.”199 For Oakeshott 
firmly believes that the historian does not engage in the philosophy of his subject matter; 
his mode of experience in constructing a coherent world of ideas is not thought by him 
to be “experience itself’ (i.e. philosophy) but a “mode”. Likewise a philosophy of history
196 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 158; for CoUingwood’s interpretation of EM  in that work, see, esp. 151-9.
197 Croce in his Theory and History o f Historiography has contrasted history proper with chronicle by 
describing the first as the living past of human thought, whilst the second is simply regarded a dead and 
unintelligible past. But the Collingwoodian-Oakeshottian debate in question is, indeed, quite a different 
case.
198 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 158.
199 Ibid.: 155,156.
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is not history or the mode of experience of the historian; that “historical experience must 
be present” is nothing but a philosophical statement. This, of course, does not mean that 
philosophy is superior to history, but rather, compared to Collingwood’s view on “a 
rapprochement between philosophy and history” in the historicist sense that “philosophy 
and history have the same order of enquiry”, it only says that Oakeshott claims the 
philosopher and the historian are trained to think differently.
Collingwood’s understanding of Oakeshott’s historical past as a dead past is 
inadequate, too. According to what we have seen, Oakeshott’s historical past is a dead 
past not because res gestae do not exist in the present - on the contrary, history is what 
the evidence obliges the historian to believe - but because there has appeared a specific 
historical interest in reading past for the sake of past and indifferent to the present’s 
concerns. Thus, the real difference between the Oakeshottian dead past and the 
Collingwoodian living past does not lie in the temporal problem (as Collingwood saw it), 
but in the historical scepticism that Collingwood attributed to Bradley. That is to say, 
Oakeshott agrees with Collingwood that epistemologically history is “a transformation in 
the present, and in that transformation known as past.”200 But the point is that this 
pastness being known and transformed by the historian is “a novelty, not a re-enactment 
or re-creation of anything, and [thus] the unearthing of the past that Collingwood urges 
is, Oakeshott declares, a non-historical exhumation, ‘a piece of obscene 
necromancy’.”201 This means that whilst Collingwood believes that it is possible for the 
historian to understand what the past agents really thought, Oakeshott thinks that this 
possibility is beyond the concern of history, as the historian must understand “men and 
events more profoundly than when they were understood when they lived and 
happened.”202 As a result, Oakeshott rejects the need to discover the “mens authoritf' as 
the criterion of understanding a genuine historical work; and so in the so-called “mens 
authoris” debate in the history of ideas,203 Oakeshott’s position is closer to Gadamer’s204
200 Ibid.: 158.
201 T. W. Smith, 1996: 600; see also W. Dray, 1968: 19.
202 Oakeshott, “Mr. Carr’s First Volume”, The Cambridge Review 4 (1950-1): 350.
203 For this comparison, cf. D. Boucher, 1984: 205-6.
204 Gadamer, 1975.
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than to Collingwood’s “re-enactment”, E. D. Hirsch’s “re-knowing”205, or Q. Skinner’s 
“intention”206.
Moreover, for Oakeshott the historical past as a dead past means that it is not an 
unmodified past, and it must be anti-presentist. Conversely, with reference to 
Collingwood’s widest definition of history, by a living past what he refers to is whatever 
is re-enactable in our mind, i.e. for him, the living past is the only possible form of past 
that we can evoke in the present; it is not only the source of historical study but it is also 
the source of our self-understanding in general.207 The Collingwoodian living past is, 
thus, the entire “human past” not as what really happened in the course of events, but as 
a condition of self-understanding by means of which we are able to touch others’ minds 
with our own.
Accordingly, this Collingwoodian definition of the living past implies that it is an 
integral world of life in which no further modifications are necessary; it takes all the 
historical past, the practical past, and the poetic past etc. into one mode of mind. For this 
reason, in The Idea o f History and An Autobiography Collingwood sometimes regards 
history simply as “a school of wisdom” which brings to our political and moral life a 
“trained eye for the situation in which one has to act”;208 he also says that “the analogy 
between legal methods and historical methods is of some value for the understanding of 
history.”209 That is, where Collingwood represents historical knowledge as producing 
more or less a kind of practical wisdom, Oakeshott insists that history should be totally 
indifferent to practical life.210 And, Collingwood’s notion of historical “imagination,” I 
would rather think, has first taken from and then replaced itself with what Oakeshott 
would simply refer to as the “contemplative past.”
Finally, and most importantly, my ultimate purpose here, it will be remembered, 
is to draw a paradigmatic picture of historicism in terms of Collingwood’s enterprise. 
After all this examination of Collingwood’s thought, I think, we should have arrived at a 
clearer understanding of the essence of historicism: it considers the human mind to be
205 E. Hirsch, 1967.
206 Q. Skinner, 1988: 29-67.
207 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 205-9; see also L. O. Mink, 1972: 157. It can be noticed that Collingwood 
believes that the notion of pastness has nothing to do with the natural sciences at all: within a natural 
process, he believes, “the past dies in being replaced by the present”, whereas within the historical process 
“the past, so far as it is historically known, survives in the present.” (1946: 225.)
208 R. G. Collingwood, 1939: 96, 100.
209 R. G. Collingwood, 1946: 268.
210 Cf. W. Dray, 1968:19; D. Boucher, 1984: 213; 1993: 697, 703.
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always historically conditioned (in a living past), and only by means of an historical 
approach can the nature of things be well comprehended. Since we have dealt with the 
matter of Oakeshott’s non-historicist view in some detail, I now only intend to re­
establish that for Oakeshott history as a way of thinking must be distinguished from 
other modes of experience and philosophy; “distinguished” not only in the sense that 
historical thinking is autonomous, but also in the sense that it is only one possible voice 
among many others to be heard in the conversation of mankind. Thus, it can be said that 
the differentia of the historical past as a dead past is a necessary consequence of 
Oakeshott’s theory of modality.
CONCLUSION
At the very beginning of this thesis I imposed upon myself the task to elucidate Oakeshott’s 
thought as a substantial critic of the Enlightenment project by concentrating on his 
philosophy of politics and history. Now, after the intellectual journey led by Oakeshott, I 
hope I have gone some way to fulfilling this goal. Since I have summed up my main 
arguments leading to Oakeshott’s criticisms of philosophical modernity, liberal ethics and 
positivist historiography and the uniqueness of these criticisms compared to the themes of 
post-modernism, reactionary traditionalism and historicism in the previous discussions where 
appropriate, I now only intend to re-consider two “hidden thoughts” or “guiding clues” that 
underpin the philosopher’s enterprise. These two threads are interesting to note here, 
especially considering my own position, because they are related to Confucius’s Analects, 
whose place in the history of Eastern political philosophy, to be sure, is on a par with 
something like Aristotle’s Ethics in the history of Western political philosophy.
The first of these hidden thoughts is the notion of uthe one thing that permeates 
e v e r y th in g In understanding the system of Hobbes’s philosophy by virtue of this 
perspective, Oakeshott writes that the coherence of Hobbes’s thought lies not in an 
architectonic structure, but in a single “passionate thought” that pervades its parts. If this is 
also the style of thinking that Oakeshott adopts himself, his “passionate thought” would be 
an attempt to “disenchant” Universal Rationality2 in order to return us to the Aristotelian- 
Montaignean point that there are reasons appropriate to different modes of acting and 
thinking. Oakeshott’s philosophy of politics and history (and of education and aesthetics 
etc.) is nothing but the application of this doctrine about philosophy to the investigation into 
the nature of political and historical activity. In this regard, it seems to me, the most
1 Confucius, 1979: book xv. Cf. RP: 236, n8.
2 This is a phrase indicating the paradox of “reason” in modernity that I borrow from P. R. Harrison, 1994.
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significant achievement of Oakeshott’s writings is to break the hold of the Enlightenment 
ethical and historiographical positions in his own way, where the Kantian trans-traditional 
ground of morality and politics is rejected so as to make room for a self-contained practical 
reasoning indifferent to philosophising itself; and the pro-positivist’s identification of history 
with a naturalised conception of History is disengaged so as to make room for a self- 
consistent historical reasoning indifferent to scientific rationality.
The second hidden thought under consideration is “the doctrine o f mean”1, which, 
used in Oakeshott’s quotation from Analects - “moderation lies in deficiency rather than in 
excess”4 - means the sceptical habit of being exact, and never extravagant.5 In politics, as we 
have seen from The Politics o f Faith and the Politics o f Scepticism, although the 
recognition of modem political character can be limited by two extremes, “the mean in 
action” is the appropriateness which can be learned not from rationalism in politics, but from 
scepticism in politics, i.e. the trimmer “who disposes his weight so as to keep the ship upon 
an even keel.”6 In a similar but not identical manner, the doctrine of mean also plays a 
certain part in Oakeshott’s finding the “middle course” between Cartesian-Kantian 
foundationalism and Rortyian “total scepticism”; between absolute positivism and relative 
historicism. Indeed, Oakeshott is a unique critic of the Enlightenment project who does not 
adopt either post-modernism or historicism. The heritage of Oakeshott’s thought, I agree 
with R. Price, is one of the “master spirits of this age”7, an age which has been confronted 
with the crisis of the Enlightenment project.
3 The doctrine of mean is so central to Confucianism that, instead of precisely indicating where it is coming 
from, I shall here only mark out that it is also the name given to one of the “great four books” (i.e. Analects, 
Mencius, The Great Learning and The Doctrine o f Mean) and characterises ancient Chinese ethics. For 
Oakeshott’s reference to Confucius regarding this matter, see esp. PFPS: chap. 6.
4 Confucius, 1979: bookiv. PFPS: 115,121.
5 See esp. PFPS: 106.
6 PFPS: 123.
7 R. Price, 1993: 42.
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